Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1
2026:CGHC:21879-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1679 of 2025 Smt. Rameshwari Rajput W/o Late Dhannu Lal Rajput, Aged About 59 Years R/o Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, District Mungeli (C.G.)
--- Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, District Mungeli (C.G.) 2 - Doman @ Lalla Rajput, S/o Bhagwanta Rajput, Aged About 20 Years R/o Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, District Mungeli (C.G.) 3 - Bhagwanta Rajput, S/o Kriparam, Aged About 53 Years R/o Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, District Mungeli (C.G.)
--- Respondent(s) CRA No. 2202 of 2025 Smt. Rameshwari Rajput W/o Late Dhannu Lal Rajput Aged About 59 Years R/o Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, Distt. Mungeli, Chhattisgarh.
---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Distt. Mungeli, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Xyz Nill
--- Respondent(s) MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.05.14 10:49:01 +0530
2 For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Add. A.G. Hon'ble Shri
Ramesh Sinha,
Chief Justice
Hon'ble
Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
, Judge
Judgment
on Board
Per
Ramesh Sinha
, Chief Justice
11.05.2026
1. Heard Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellants on I.A. No.01 of 2025 in CRA No. 1679/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 248 days and I.A. No.01 of 2025 in CRA No. 2202/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 325 days. Also heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
2. Today, the present appeals have been listed as fresh matters for
consideration of I.A. No. 01/2025 filed in each appeal seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeals, contending that the learned trial Court erred in convicting the accused persons for lesser ofence punishable under Section 304 Part-I read with Section 34 IPC and that they ought to have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The same were also listed along with connected Criminal Appeal Nos. 1906/2024 and 1931/2024 preferred by the convicted accused persons against the common judgment of conviction and order of sentence arising out of the very same Crime No. 220/2022 registered at Police Station- Pathariya. Since
3 all the appeals emanate from the same occurrence, common prosecution case and identical impugned judgment, they were placed together before this Court. After hearing and dismissing Criminal Appeal Nos. 1906/2024 and 1931/2024 on merits, this Court proceeded to consider the present appeals on the question of condonation of delay and, with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, heard the matters finally. 3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that complainant Mrs. Rameshwari Rajput lodged a merg intimation alleging that on 21.08.2022, in the morning hours, she along with her husband Dhannu Lal Rajput had gone to the agricultural field for weeding work. At about 08:30 A.M., on account of a dispute relating to putting grass on the embankment of the field, accused Bhagwanta, Doman and the juvenile accused, acting in furtherance of their common intention, assaulted deceased Dhannu Lal Rajput by means of deadly weapons including sickle, stick, axe and knife, thereby causing grievous injuries resulting in his death. On the basis of the said information, merg intimation Ex.P-01 was recorded and merg inquest proceedings Ex.P-02 were initiated. During investigation, the spot map Ex.P-03, spot panchnama Ex.P-04 and dead body panchnama Ex.P-11 were prepared. Thereafter, Police Station Patharia registered FIR bearing Crime No.220/2022 for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and took up the investigation. 4
4. During the course of investigation, the articles allegedly used in the commission of offence were seized in presence of witnesses, the accused persons were arrested and sent to judicial remand and, after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court. 5.
The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the same was committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mungeli to the Court of Sessions. After transfer of the matter by the learned Sessions Judge, Mungeli, charges under Sections 302/34 IPC were framed against the accused persons, which were read over and explained to them. The accused persons abjured guilt and claimed to be tried. Their statements were also recorded. 6. In relation to the same incident, the documents and evidence collected during investigation were also considered in Special Case (Juvenile Justice) No.01/2023 concerning the juvenile accused. After completion of prosecution evidence, statements of the accused persons under Section 313 CrPC were recorded, wherein they denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against them, pleaded innocence and contended that they had been falsely implicated in the case. No defence evidence was adduced on behalf of the accused persons. 7.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he has preferred the instant appeals against the findings and judgment of acquittal
5 dated 20.09.2024, passed in Sessions Trial No. 56/2022 and Special Case (Juvenile Court) No.1/2023, by the Court of learned First Additional Sessions Judge Mungeli, District- Mungeli (C.G.) whereby convicted the respondents for lessor offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I/34 of the IPC and convicted the for 10 year R.I. and fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 06 months.
8.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Trial Court as well as the learned Juvenile Court have committed grave error in law and on facts by convicting the respondents for the lesser offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code instead of convicting them for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC, despite overwhelming evidence available on record clearly establishing the intention and participation of the accused persons in committing the murder of deceased Dhannu Lal Rajput. It is contended that the appellant, being the undisputed eye-witness to the fateful incident, categorically deposed that respondent along with the juvenile accused brutally assaulted her husband with deadly weapons including stick, iron rod (Shabbal), Tangiya and knife, causing multiple injuries on the vital parts of his body, which ultimately resulted in his death. Learned counsel submits that the nature of weapons used, the manner of assault and the injuries inflicted unmistakably establish the common intention and murderous assault committed by the accused persons, which is
6 further corroborated by the testimony of the PW-1 in paragraphs 9, 10, 12 and 14 of her deposition. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below, particularly the conclusions contained in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the impugned judgments, are perverse, contrary to the evidence available on record and based upon erroneous appreciation of material evidence. According to learned counsel, the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate that the assault was intentional, premeditated and directed towards vital parts of the body with deadly weapons and, therefore, all ingredients constituting the offence under Section 302/34 IPC stood fully proved. It is thus submitted that the alteration of offence from Section 302/34 IPC to Section 304 Part-I/34 IPC and the imposition of lesser sentence upon the respondents are wholly unjustified, inadequate and unsustainable in the eyes of law and deserve to be set aside. 9. It has been contended by the appellant that so far as the delay in filing the present appeals is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is an illiterate village lady having no proper knowledge about the legal proceedings and was under the bona fide impression that the matter was being properly pursued by the prosecution before the competent Courts.
It is submitted that only in the month of September, 2025, when the appellant happened to see respondents in the market of Village- Gangdwari, she became suspicious regarding the status
7 of the criminal case and thereafter made enquiry through her counsel, upon which she came to know for the first time that respondent No. 2 had already been convicted by the learned Juvenile Court, Mungeli and that Criminal Appeal No. 1931/2024 had also been preferred before this Court. Immediately thereafter, the appellant took necessary legal steps for filing the present appeals. Thus, the delay occurred neither intentionally nor deliberately, but due to lack of knowledge and bona fide circumstances beyond the control of the appellant, and therefore the same deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. 10. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to appeals for enhancement of sentence. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.K. Ramachandran V. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556, has reaffirmed that courts cannot condone delays in filing appeals unless sufficient and bona fide reasons are shown, underscoring the principle that limitation periods must be strictly observed. 12. Further, Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (2010) 8 SCC 685 is a landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had dealt the interpretation of procedural delays and the principles of condonation of delay under the Limitation Act, 1963. Decided in
8 2010, the case clarified the extent of judicial discretion in accepting delayed appeals and applications. 13. Further, though Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to criminal appeals against acquittal/enhancement of sentence in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence (2024 INSC 125), nevertheless, the appellant is required to establish sufficient cause explaining the delay satisfactorily.
Mere plea of ignorance of proceedings or general assertions without due diligence cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of an inordinate delay of 248 days and 325 days respectively. 14. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to furnish any cogent, satisfactory and convincing explanation for condonation of the inordinate delays of 248 days and 325 days respectively in preferring the present appeals. The explanation offered by the appellant is founded primarily upon alleged lack of knowledge regarding the status of the criminal proceedings and the plea that she came to know about the
judgment only upon seeing the respondents in the market in September, 2025. However, except making bald and general assertions, no material has been placed on record to establish
9 that the appellant had acted with due diligence or had taken reasonable steps to ascertain the status of the proceedings within the prescribed period of limitation.
15. It is well settled that though the expression “sufficient cause” occurring under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to receive liberal construction in appropriate cases, nevertheless such liberal approach cannot be extended to condone negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of a litigant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran (Supra), has categorically held that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigor and courts cannot extend limitation on equitable grounds alone. Similarly, in Balwant Singh (supra), it has been held that a party seeking condonation of delay must establish bona fide reasons coupled with reasonable diligence and that casual or fanciful explanations cannot constitute sufficient cause.
16. In the present case, the explanation furnished by the appellant does not inspire confidence and fails to satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. The appellant has also failed to demonstrate any circumstance beyond her control which prevented her from approaching this Court within the prescribed limitation period. Mere ignorance of legal proceedings or lack of legal knowledge, in absence of due diligence, cannot by itself constitute sufficient cause for condonation of substantial delay.
10
17. Consequently, this Court is not inclined to condone the delays of 248 days and 325 days in filing the present appeals. Accordingly, I.A. No.01 of 2025 in CRA No.1679/2025 and I.A. No.01 of 2025 in CRA No.2202/2025 are hereby dismissed. As a consequence thereof, the appeals also stand dismissed as barred by limitation. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet