1 2026:CGHC:22047 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2792 of 2023 Nita Bai Daheray W/o Shri Narendra Kumar Daheray Aged About 37 Years Presently Posted As Rajgar Sahayak, At Gram Panchayat Jarondha, Janpad Panchayat Takhatpur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Upper Commissioner Bilaspur Division Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Collector Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Takhatpur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause title, as taken for CIS) For Petitioner : Mr. Shrikant Kaushik, Advocate. For Respondents No. 1 to 3 For Respondent No. 4 : : Ms. Vartika Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Advocate. (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 11/05/2026 1. Despite three opportunities granted to respondent No. 4, he did not file return, therefore, the request made by counsel for Respondent No. 4 for further time to file a reply is hereby rejected. 2. With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2 3. The petitioner has preferred instant writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India, challenging the order dated 16.09.2019 (Annexure P-3) passed by respondent No. 4 – Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Takhatpur, District Bilaspur, whereby the petitioner has been removed from the post of Gram Rojgar Sayayak (GRS). 4. Facts of the case, in brief, are that , the petitioner was appointed on the post of Gram Rajgar Sahayak on contractual basis under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA) in Gram Panchayat Jaroudha, Tahsil Takhatpur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) vide order dated 11.02.2014 (Annexure P-2). Thereafter, the petitioner worked till her removal, but on the allegation of preparing false and fabricated muster roll, negligent in discharging her duties and the wages were paid to the laborers by the petitioner's husband after deducting ₹50/-, she was removed from the said post vide impugned order dated 16.09.2018 (Annexure P-3), which is challenged in the instant petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner discharged her duties with utmost honesty and dedication, but on account of a false complaint lodged against her, she has been removed from her post vide impugned order dated 16.09.2018 (Annexure P-3), without providing an opportunity of being heard. He further submits the petitioner preferred revision petition against the order dated 16.09.2018 passed by respondent No. 4 herein, which was also dismissed by Upper Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur vide order dated 02.08.2022 (Annexure P-1). He further submits that prior to the removal of the petitioner from her post, neither any show cause notice was served to her nor opportunity of hearing was afforded to her, rather the show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner about three months after the date of her removal from the post i.e. on 19.12.2018 (Annexure P-4). Thus, the principle of natural justice has not been followed while passing the impugned order of removal by respondent No. 4, therefore, he prays that impugned order dated 16.09.2018 (Annexure P-3) passed by respondent No. 4 3 may be set aside / quashed and respondent No. 4 may be directed to reinstate the petitioner in her service. 6. The State has filed its reply. Learned counsel for the State while referring to its reply would submit that the petitioner was contractual employee. A complaint was received against her regarding various acts of misconduct and financial irregularities/embezzlement; consequently, an inquiry report was sought, which corroborated the aforementioned allegations leveled against her in the complaint. Subsequently, vide impugned order dated 16.09.2018 (Annexure P-3), her service was terminated on the ground of the alleged misconduct and embezzlement committed by her. The revision petition filed by the petitioner before the Additional Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur against the order dated 16.09.2018 passed by respondent No. 4 has also been dismissed vide order dated 02.08.2022 (Annexure P-1). She further argued that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of being heard following due process of law as per the prevailing rules i.e. Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Contract Appointment) Rules, 2012 (for short, "Rules, 2012"). While referring to Rule 11 of the Rules, 2012, she would submit that as per terms of contract appointment order of petitioner, contract appointment can be terminated, if the work of the employee is not satisfactory or if commits any irregularity while performing the duties under the MGNREGA Scheme. On anenquiry, the petitioner has been found guilty of misconduct as well as financial irregularities/embezzlement and hence his services have been terminated. As such, he prays that this petition be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4 has extended his support to the reply and contention putforth by learned counsel for the State. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 4 9. Undisputedly, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak on contractual basis under Rules, 2012 vider order dated 11.02.2014 vide Annexure P-2 and her service was terminated vide impugned order dated 16.09.2018 vide Annexure P-3 levelling allegations that she has prepared forged muster roll, negligent in discharging her duties and her husband withdrew the amount through ATM and paid the same to the labourers after deducting Rs. 50/- from their wages. Thus, allegations levelled against the petitioner is stigmatic and criminality also. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of UP and Ors. reported in (2000) 5 SCC 152, in para 12 has observed as under:- “12. Now, it is well settled that the temporary government servants or probationers are as much entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as the permanent employees despite the fact that temporary government servants have no right to hold the post and their services are liable to be terminated at any time by giving them a month's notice without assigning any reason either in terms of the contract of service or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of such service. The courts can, therefore, lift the veil of an innocuously-worded order to look at the real face of the order and to find out whether it is as innocent as worded. (See: Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 36) It is explained in this decision that inefficiency, negligence or misconduct may have been the factors for inducing the Government to terminate the services of a temporary employee under the terms of the contract or under the statutory Service Rules regulating the terms and conditions of service which, to put in differently, may have been the motive for terminating the services but the motive by itself does not make the order punitive unless the order was “founded” on those factors or other disqualifications.” 5 11. In the matter of Kaushal Chandrakar and Ors.Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online Chh2251, this Court in para-20 held as under:- “20.The Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Vijaykumaran (supra) has clearly held that material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer, but might be contained in any document referred to in the termination order. It was further held that such reference may inevitably affect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order must be construed as ex facie stigmatic order of termination....” 12. In the matter of Rahul Tripathi vs. R.G.S. Mission reported in 2001 SCC Online MP 54, it is held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that though the replies were not found satisfactory, but no inquiry was conducted and thereafter, issuance of order of termination attaches stigma though the contract period ended, consequently, order of termination was set-aside with all consequential benefits. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2139 decided on 22.8.2024 has held that even if for contractual appointment, if any stigmatic order is to be passed, it is to be passed after holding proper enquiry and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent/employee. In para 34 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has held as under:- “34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5: "28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a 6 dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572: (1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673: AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be 7 terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been 8 visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.” 14. Reverting to the facts of the instant case it light of the afore-cited judgments rendered by the Supreme Court, it appears that services of the petitioner was terminated vide order dated 16.09.2018 vide Annexure P-3 without serving her any show-cause notice and even without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The State in its reply has wrongly stated that the petitioner was given an opportunity of being heard before being removed from the said post, but neither such prior notice was issued to the petitioner nor any document has been filed by the State in this regard, rather such show-cause notice dated 19.12.2028 (Annexure P-4) has been issued to the petitioner after more than three months from the date of her removal from services i.e. on dated 19.12.2018 (Annexure P-4), which reveals abundantly that without following the ‘Principle of natural justice’, the petitioner has been removed from services. 15. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court in afore- cited cases and for the reasons that the petitioner has been removed from service without following the principle of natural justice, impugned order dated 16.09.2018 (Annexure P-3) deserves to be and is hereby quashed/set-aside. 9 16. As per Rule 11(5) of the Rules, 2012, either of both the parties may terminate the contact appointment during the period of contract appointment by giving one month’s notice in advance or paying one month’s salary in its place. Since prior to the removal of the petitioner from her post, no show- cause notice whatsoever was served to the petitioner, rather for the first time, such show-cause notice was served to her on 19.12.2018 (Annexure P-4), therefore, treating it to be notice given by respondent No. 4 under Rule 11(5) of the Rules, 2012, respondents are directed to pay monetary benefits to the petitioner till 18.01.2019 i.e. three months for termination period and one month for notice period, within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt/ submission of copy of this order. Since the petitioner's appointment was renewable for a period of only one year, Respondent No. 4 - the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Takhatpur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) is at liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law and to take a decision regarding the continuation of the petitioner's services. 17. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge amit AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2026.05.14 10:44:38 +0530