2026:HHC:35438 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 60 of 2014 Reserved on: 14.8.2026 Date of Decision: 21.8.2026. Parveen Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr V.S. Rathour, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 21.02.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge- III, Kangra at Dharamshala, Camp at Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.10.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-I, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35438 to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 181 and 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Vijay Kumar (PW1), Rajinder Kumar, Roshan Lal, Chuni Lal (PW3), Ram Singh (PW7), and Manju Ram were travelling in a van bearing registration No. HP-39A-0245 on 13.12.2006. A Jeep bearing registration No. HP-68-0822 hit the van near Daar at high speed. Rajinder Kumar died in the accident. The driver fled from the spot. The injured were carried to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and an entry (Ex.PA) was recorded at the Police Station. HC Chaman Lal (PW4) went to the Hospital and recorded the informant’s statement (Ex.PW1/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/A) was registered. HC Praveen Katoch (PW5) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW5/A). He seized the vehicles vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). HC Rajinder Kumar 3 2026:HHC:35438 (PW2) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that there was no defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW2/B). The MLCs of Ram Singh (Ex.PH), Roshan Lal (Ex.PI), Manju Ram (Ex.PJ), Chuni Lal (Ex.PK), Vijay Kumar (Ex.PL), and X-ray Films (Ex.PC to Ex.PE) were obtained. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put on him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304A of IPC and Sections 181 and 187 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Informant Vijay Kumar (PW1) narrated the incident. H.C. Rajinder Kumar (PW2) mechanically examined the vehicle. Chuni Lal (PW3) and Ram Singh (PW7) were travelling in the van. HC Chaman Lal (PW4) recorded the informant's statement. HC Parveen Katoch (PW5) investigated the matter. Ashok Kumar 4 2026:HHC:35438 (PW6) signed the FIR. Sanjay Kumar (PW8) is the owner of the van. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He stated that Sanju and not he, was driving the Jeep on the date of the incident. The accused came to know of the accident on the next day of the incident. The witnesses deposed against him at the instance of Sanju. He was innocent and was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses proved that the Jeep had hit the van on the wrong side of the road, which showed the negligence of the driver of the Jeep. The accused was identified by Vijay Kumar (PW1). Sanjay Kumar (PW8) also stated that he had handed over the Jeep to the accused. Thus, the identity of the accused as the driver of the vehicle was established. The accused admitted the MLCs. Hence, it was duly proved that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle, which led to the death of Rajinder and injuries to Ram Singh, Roshan Lal, Manju Ram, 5 2026:HHC:35438 Chuni Lal and Vijay Kumar. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Sections Sentence Section 279 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹750/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days. Section 337 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for ten days. Section 338 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹750/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days. Section 304-A of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 181 of MV Act To pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. 6 2026:HHC:35438 Section 187 of MV Act To pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. All the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra, at Dharamshala, Camp at Palampur, District, Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The accident occurred on the right side of the road, which showed the negligence of the accused. Rajinder Kumar died in the accident. Ram Singh, Roshan Lal, Manju Ram, Chuni Lal and Vijay Kumar sustained injuries. The accused fled away from the spot and failed to carry the injured to the hospital. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:35438 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The prosecution had failed to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the plea taken by the accused. The statements of the witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, and their testimonies should not have been relied upon by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr V.S. Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr V.S. Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the identity of the accused was not satisfactorily proved. Vijay Kumar (PW1) stated that he had identified the accused on the spot, but it was dark, and it was not possible to identify the accused. No Test Identification Parade was conducted to determine the power of identification of the 8 2026:HHC:35438 witnesses. The owner of the Jeep made contradictory versions, and his testimony should not have been relied upon. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other on material particulars. The owner of the jeep categorically stated that he had handed over the keys of the jeep to the accused. Thus, the identity of the accused as the driver of the vehicle was duly established. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision petition. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: 9 2026:HHC:35438 “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” 10 2026:HHC:35438 Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate 11 2026:HHC:35438 Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: 12 2026:HHC:35438 i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. 13 2026:HHC:35438 Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The statement (Ex.PW1/A) mentions that the informant could identify the driver of the Jeep, but he did not know his name. Thus, the initial version does not mention the name of the driver of the Jeep. 16. Sanjay Kumar (PW8) stated that he had employed Parveen Kumar as the driver of the vehicle, who was his cousin. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not employed the accused as the driver of the vehicle. He was re-examined, and he stated in his examination-in-chief that his testimony that he had employed the accused as the driver was correct and the statement in the cross-examination that he had not employed the accused as the driver was incorrect. Therefore, it is apparent that this witness has made contradictory statements, and learned Courts below erred in relying upon his testimony. 14 2026:HHC:35438 17. Chuni Lal (PW3) stated that he did not know who was driving the vehicle because the driver had left the spot. He again clarified in his cross-examination that he was not aware who was driving the Jeep at the time of the accident. Thus, the testimony of this witness does not establish that the accused was driving the Jeep at the time of the accident. 18. Ram Singh (PW7) stated in his cross-examination that the driver of the Jeep had sped away from the spot and he could not identify the driver of the Jeep. Thus, his testimony also does not establish the prosecution version that the accused was driving the Jeep. 19. The informant Vijay Kumar (PW1) stated that the accused present in the Court was driving the Jeep at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that he could identify the accused, but he did not know his name. The incident had occurred during the night. The driver of the Jeep had sped away from the spot. The police had not carried out any Test Identification Parade. 20. He has not clarified as to how he could have identified the accused. He admitted that the police had not 15 2026:HHC:35438 conducted any Test Identification Parade. Thus, the prosecution is relying upon the identification of the accused in the dark. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed: "It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of an accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock is the one he saw coming out of a house at a particular time, or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is reduced by the reflection that there is any degree of resemblance between the man in the dock and the person previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to himself that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if he has already described the latter to them, with the result that he will be inclined to swear positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain. People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well known to them with sufficient frequency to make them question the propriety of convicting an accused person on nothing more than the visual identification of a single witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in poor light." 21. It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the first time in the Court is improper and the witness should be 16 2026:HHC:35438 asked to identify the accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in para 363: “A witness shouldn't be asked to identify the defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential witnesses may be asked to pick him up.” 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 791: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to the witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is not acceptable. It was observed on page 605: “17. The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”! xxx 21.It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock identification, that is, identification made by a witness in court during the trial. This identification has been made in court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismissed the identification made by PW 1 for the reason 17 2026:HHC:35438 that the appellant, i.e. Accused 2, was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP, to admit the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the court was not proper. xxxx 23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a witness, and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness (see: Kunjumon v. State of Kerala, (2012) 13 SCC 750: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406). xxx 27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis on TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown by this Court in the recent two cases of Jayanv. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402; (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404. 28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words: (Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, SCC p. 44, para 18) “18. It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI 18 2026:HHC:35438 parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy.” 23. Therefore, there is a force in the submission of learned counsel for the defence that the identity of the driver of the Jeep has not been established and learned Courts below erred in holding that the identity of the accused was proved. 24. Therefore, the judgments and orders passed by learned Courts below cannot be sustained. Hence, the present revision is allowed, and the accused is acquitted of the charged offences. The fine, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner/accused after the expiry of the period of limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 25. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation 19 2026:HHC:35438 that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 26. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st August, 2026 (Nikita)