2026:HHC:34711 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 109 of 2014 Reserved on: 10.08.2026 Date of Decision: 18.08.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Parkash Chand ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr Rahul Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.07.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-I, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34711 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. It was asserted that Suresh Kumar (PW1) was coming to his home on 30.09.2010 at about 09.30 A.M. Prakash Chand met him on the way. Prakash Chand enquired from the informant as to why the informant had abused Prakash Chand. The informant replied that he had never abused Prakash Chand. Prakash Chand told the informant that this fact was disclosed by Shakuntala (the informant’s aunt). Prakash Chand beat the informant with a stick. The informant sustained injuries. Kamala Devi rescued the informant from the accused. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ex.PW6/A) was recorded in the Police Station. An application was filed for the medical examination of the informant. Dr Ramesh Dogra (PW2) examined the victim and found that he had sustained injuries. He advised an X-ray. Dr Kalpana Mahajan (PW4) went through the X-ray and found that there was a fracture of the proximal phalanx of the big toe of the left foot. Dr Ramesh issued the MLC (Ex.PW2/A). FIR (Ex.PW7/B) was registered at the Police Station. HC Pooja (PW7) investigated the 3 2026:HHC:34711 matter. She visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW7/C). The informant produced a stick (Ex. P1) which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). She recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. The informant Suresh Kumar (PW1) narrated the incident. Ramesh Dogra (PW2) examined the informant. Pawna Devi (PW3) is an eyewitness. Kalpana Mahajan (PW4) is the Radiologist who went through the X-ray and issued the report. Indira Devi (PW5) is the witness to recovery. ASI Amar Singh (PW6) signed the FIR. Pooja Sood (PW7) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, admitted that the informant was returning to his home 4 2026:HHC:34711 from the field. He denied the rest of the prosecution version. He stated that Suresh Kumar gave him beatings. He examined Preeti Kumari (DW1) in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the relationship between the parties was strained, and the prosecution case was required to be seen with due care and caution to rule out the possibility of false implication. The statement of Pawna Devi was not satisfactory, and her presence on the spot was not established. The Medical Officer admitted that the injury could be caused by means of a fall on a hard surface. The stick was recovered after 19 days of the incident. The accused had also reported the matter to the police, but no investigation was conducted to find out the truthfulness or otherwise of the complaint made by the accused. All these circumstances made the prosecution case highly suspect. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses 5 2026:HHC:34711 were discarded without any cogent reason. The informant’s statement was corroborated by the statement of Pawna Devi and the medical evidence, and the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the prosecution’s version. Enmity is a double-edged weapon, and it can furnish a motive for the commission of a crime. The recovery of the stick was also proved. The informant remained admitted to the Military Hospital, and he produced the stick after getting discharged. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/ State and Mr Rahul Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant’s statement was duly corroborated by the statement of Pawna Devi and the medical evidence. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that the testimony of Pawna Devi was not reliable because her name was not mentioned in the FIR. The informant made a 6 2026:HHC:34711 supplementary statement in which he had mentioned the name of Pawna Devi. An alternative hypothesis admitted by the Medical Officer in his cross-examination is not sufficient to discard the prosecution version. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Rahul Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the relationship between the parties was strained, and learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution version was required to be seen with due care and caution. The presence of Pawna Devi was not established on the spot. She was a chance witness and satisfactory evidence was required to be led to establish her presence. The medical evidence pointed towards the alternative hypothesis and the learned Trial Court was justified in accepting the alternative version. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7 2026:HHC:34711 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of 8 2026:HHC:34711 his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 9 2026:HHC:34711 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 10 2026:HHC:34711 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. ASI Amar Singh stated that the informant made a statement on 30.9.2010 at about 1.00 PM and the informant was sent to the Medical Officer for conducting his medical examination. The entry (Ex.PW6/A) was not recorded at 1.00 P.M., but it was recorded at 1 GMT, which is equivalent to 6.30 PM IST. 15. The application filed for the medical examination states that Suresh Chand had filed an application before the police mentioning that his uncle Nika Ram and his family members were forcibly cutting the grass and they tried to quarrel with the informant. Prakash Chand attacked the informant on 30.9.2010 at about 9.30 A.M. with a stick and inflicted injuries by means of the stick. He sustained multiple injuries. The written application filed by Prakash Chand was not brought on record. Rather, an entry (Ex.PW6/A) was brought on record. The entry 11 2026:HHC:34711 (Ex.PW6/A) does not mention any attempted quarrel on 29.09.2010. The complaint filed by the informant was the First Information Report given by him to the police. However, the police have withheld that written complaint, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution for withholding it. 16. The entry (Ex.PW6/A) or the application made to the Medical Officer does not mention the presence of Pawna Devi. Pawna Devi (PW3) admitted in her cross-examination that she is residing at a distance of 20-25 kilometres from the place of the incident. Therefore, she had no occasion to be present at the place of the incident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that a chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of the incident by chance and not by course. His testimony is to be seen with due care and caution. It was observed: Chance witness 29. A chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a 12 2026:HHC:34711 chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed, though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect that is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817]: (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13) “12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9, who are independent witnesses, by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence, and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same. 13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial, by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses”, it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If a murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a 13 2026:HHC:34711 country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate, in the matter of explaining their presence.” 30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23) “21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105], this Court, while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer- by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under: If the offence is committed in a street, only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there. The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country like India, where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate, in the matter of explaining their presence. 22. The evidence of a chance witness requires a very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain 14 2026:HHC:34711 Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ). 23. Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident, may also be taken into consideration, particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284]). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR, and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue, has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution's case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the acquittal of the said two co-accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 503: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1164 that the chance witnesses have a habit of appearing suddenly at the place of the incident and thereafter disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and caution. It was observed at page 427: 23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab, (1952) 15 2026:HHC:34711 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri LJ 1925. It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence. 24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 429, this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 and the absence of their names in the FIR have been very lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579 and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107 are authorities for the proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that the evidence of a chance witness requires a cautious and careful scrutiny. It was observed: “26. As regards the testimony of PW-5 (Mahender Khurana), he too is a chance witness. As to when the testimony of a chance witness could be relied upon, the law is settled, which is that the evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence. Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (See: Rajesh Yadav v. State of 16 2026:HHC:34711 Uttar Pradesh (2022) 12 SCC 200; and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 9 SCC 719. 19. The informant stated that Kamla Devi, wife of Prakash Chand, had rescued him from the accused. Pawna Devi specifically denied in her cross-examination that the wife of Prakash had rescued the informant from the accused. Therefore, the statements of these two witnesses regarding the person who had rescued the informant from the accused are contradicting each other. 20. Pawana Devi admitted in her cross-examination that she is related to the informant. Considering that her name was not mentioned in the daily diary, she has denied the presence of Kamla Devi, her relationship with the informant, and that she is residing at a distance of 20-25 kilometres from the place of incident and had no reason to be present on the spot; learned Trial Court had rightly discarded her testimony. 21. The informant Suresh Kumar (PW1) stated that the accused enquired from him as to why he had abused the accused. He denied, and the accused beat him with a stick. He sustained injuries on the left foot and knee. Kamala Devi rescued him from the accused. 17 2026:HHC:34711 22. Dr Ramesh Dogra (PW2) examined the informant and found contusion and abrasion on the left big toe. He did not find any other injury on the informant's person. The MLC issued by him does not show that any patterned wound which is likely to be caused by a stick was present on the body of the informant.2 Therefore, the medical evidence does not corroborate the informant's testimony. 23. No other witness has supported the prosecution case. 24. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken by the learned Trial Court, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 2 Modi A textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology 24th Edition 2012 at page 521 18 2026:HHC:34711 27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th August, 2026 (Chander)