2026:HHC:35189 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 130 of 2014 Reserved on: 13.08.2026 Date of Decision: 20.08.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Kamla Devi ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr Digvijay Singh, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.11.2013, passed by Learned Special Judge-II, Mandi H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35189 in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (2) of the PC Act. It was asserted that the accused was posted as Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Magar Padhu. Khem Singh (PW12) was Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. An amount of ₹1,40,000/- was sanctioned for the construction of the Gram Panchayat building. The first instalment of ₹50,000/- was deposited by the Block Development Officer in the account of the Gram Panchayat. Some construction material was purchased by the Gram Panchayat. The payment of the bills was to be made, and the accused was to issue a cheque of ₹50,000/-. However, she issued a cheque of ₹25,000/-, and told the informant, Khem Singh (PW12), that she would issue the cheque of the remaining amount of ₹25,000/- only upon payment of ₹3,500/- as a bribe. The informant was not willing to pay the bribe to the accused. Hence, he made a complaint to the police. The police registered the FIR (Ex.PW4/C). Inspector Shamsher Singh (PW15) investigated the matter. He 3 2026:HHC:35189 associated Khem Singh (PW12), Thakur Singh (PW14) and Constable Rajinder Singh (PW1). He took out two glasses, powder of sodium carbonate and phenolphthalein from his IO Kit. He poured the water into the glasses. He prepared the solution of sodium carbonate and water in one glass and the solution of phenolphthalein and water in another glass. The water remained colourless. When he mixed the two solutions, the water turned pink. Shamsher Singh explained to the witnesses that water changes colour when two solutions are mixed. He obtained the samples of sodium carbonate and phenolphthalein in two separate paper packets, which were put in two separate match boxes. Each match box was put in a cloth parcel, and each parcel was sealed with two impressions of seal ‘S’. Solution was preserved in a nip (Ex. P1), and the nip was sealed with seal ‘S’. Seal impression (Ex.PW1/A) was taken on separate pieces of cloth. Memo of demonstration (Ex.PW1/G) was prepared. Khem Singh produced 7 currency notes of ₹500/- each. These were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1A) and the serial numbers of the currency notes were noted in the memo. The currency notes were treated with phenolphthalein powder and were handed over to Khem Singh with a direction to deliver the money on demand by 4 2026:HHC:35189 the accused. Thakur Singh was joined as a shadow witness, and he was asked to watch the transaction between the accused and the informant and to signal the police party on delivery of money to the accused. Khem Singh and Thakur Singh went to the spot, and the police officials followed them. Khem Singh and Thakur Singh went to Panchayatghar Magarpadho. Khem Singh entered the Panchayatghar, whereas Thakur Singh watched the proceedings from the window of the Panchayatghar. The accused enquired from the informant whether he had received the payment, and he replied in the affirmative. The accused demanded her share of ₹3,500/-, and the informant handed over the currency notes worth ₹3,500/- to the accused. Thakur Singh signalled the police, and the police party and shadow witness entered inside the panchayatghar. LC Alka Devi caught the accused by both wrists. A jug of water was brought, and the hands of the accused were washed. The water remained colourless. When sodium carbonate powder was added by Shamsher Singh to the solution, the water changed its colour to light pink. Hand wash was preserved in a nip, and the nip was sealed with seal ‘S’. Memo (Ex.PW1/C) was prepared regarding the hand wash. LC Alka Devi searched the accused, and she found seven currency 5 2026:HHC:35189 notes worth ₹500/- each kept in the purse of the accused. Shamsher Singh checked the serial numbers and found them to be tallying with the serial numbers recorded in the memo. He sealed the currency notes in a cloth parcel with five impressions of seal ‘S’ and seized the parcel vide memo (Ex.PW1/D). The purse of the accused was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/F). Panchayat Proceeding Register (Ex.PW12/B) was seized vide memo (Ex.PW12/A). Seal impressions (Ex.PW1/E) were taken on a separate piece of cloth. Shamsher Singh investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW15/A). He seized the cheque (Ex.PW9/B) and resolution (Ex.PW9/A) vide memo (Ex. P9/C). He deposited the case property with M.H.C. Kuldeep Singh (PW4), who made an entry in the Malkhana Register at Serial No.48 (Ex.PW4/D) and deposited the case property in the Malkhana. M.H.C. Kuldeep Singh sent two sample parcels, one large parcel with sample seals (S), FIR, seizure memo and docket to FSL, Junga, through Constable Brijesh, vide RC No. 30/2009 (Ex.PW3/A). HC Brijesh deposited all the articles at FSL, Junga and handed over the receipt to MHC on return. The result of analysis (Ex.PW2/A) was issued, in which it was mentioned that traces of phenolphthalein and Sodium Carbonate were detected 6 2026:HHC:35189 in the nip. Traces of phenolphthalein powder were detected in the inner pocket of the lady’s purse. Inspector Mahinder Kumar (PW13) conducted the further investigation and seized the copy of the letters (Ex.PW7/A, Ex.PW13/A and Ex.PW13/B), order (Ex.PW7/D and statement of account Ex.PW11/B). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (2) read with Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its case. Constable Rajinder Singh (PW1) and Thakur Singh (PW14) were the members of the reading party. HC Rajesh Kumar (PW2) brought the case property and the result of analysis from FSL, Junga. Brajesh Kumar (PW3) carried the case property to FSL, Junga. ASI Kuldeep Singh (PW4) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. Harbans Lal (PW5) witnessed the recovery. Bhupinder Singh (PW6) prepared the 7 2026:HHC:35189 challan. Jai Chand (PW7) proved that the accused was posted as Secretary of Gram Panchayat Magarpadhu, and he produced the documents. Sunita (PW8) produced the posting and appointment order of the accused. Sunita (PW9) produced the copy of the resolution and the cheque. Lekh Raj (PW10) produced the copy of the resolution. Dharam Singh Thakur (PW11) handed over the account statement and other documents. Khem Singh (PW12) is the informant/Pradhan. Inspector Mahinder Kumar (PW13) and Shamsher Singh (PW15) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), admitted that she was posted as Panchayat Assistant in Gram Panchayat, Magarpadhu and that the informant was elected as Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. She also admitted that an amount of ₹1,40,000/- was sanctioned for the construction of the room in the Panchayat in the year 2008. She admitted that a cheque of ₹25,000/- was issued one day before the incident and ₹25,000/- remained payable. She denied the rest of the prosecution case. She claimed that she was not aware as to why the case was filed against her. She examined Bindra Devi (DW1), Vidya Sagar (DW2) and Gopal Das (DW3) in her defence. 8 2026:HHC:35189 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. Shadow witness did not support the prosecution version. The informant’s testimony should be corroborated in material particulars, and this corroboration was lacking in the present case. The informant was under liability to deposit ₹15,000/- with the Panchayat Secretary. He had deposited ₹12,000/- and had falsely implicated the accused. Mere recovery of the money was not sufficient to convict the accused in the absence of satisfactory evidence of the demand and acceptance. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. The informant’s statement was duly corroborated by the statements of the shadow witness and the members of the raiding party. The shadow witness had supported the informant's version regarding the demand of bribe money. However, this version was discarded by the learned Trial Court without any cogent reason. The defence taken by the 9 2026:HHC:35189 accused that the informant was liable to pay ₹15,000/-, out of which he had deposited ₹12,000/-, was not established. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Digvijay Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant's testimony was duly corroborated by the statements of the official witnesses. The shadow witness had corroborated the informant's testimony regarding the demand of the bribe by the accused, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding that there was no corroboration to the informant's testimony. The defence taken by the accused that the informant had deposited ₹3,000/- towards the remaining liability of ₹15,000/- was not established, and the learned Trial Court erred in accepting it. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10 2026:HHC:35189 10. Mr Digvijay Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the shadow witness had not supported the prosecution version regarding the demand and acceptance of the money. The accused had provided a satisfactory explanation regarding the recovery of ₹3,500/-. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that mere recovery of the money is not sufficient to convict the accused. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 11 2026:HHC:35189 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. 12 2026:HHC:35189 It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only 13 2026:HHC:35189 when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The police have presented the present challan for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The ingredients of Section 7 were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Devinder Kumar 14 2026:HHC:35189 Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 at page 498: 11. Thus, in an offence under Section 7 of the 1988 Act, the points requiring proof are: (i) that the accused at the time of the offence was, or expected to be, a public servant; (ii) that he accepted or retained or agreed to accept, or attempted to obtain from some person a gratification; (iii) that such gratification was not a legal remuneration due to him; (iv) that he accepted such gratification as a motive or reward, proof of which is essential for (a) doing or forbearing to do an official act, or (b) showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to someone in the exercise of his official functions, or (c) rendering or attempting to render any service, or disservice to someone, with the legislative or executive government, or with any public servant. 15. Thakur Singh (PW14) was joined as a shadow witness. He stated that the informant told him on 04.01.2009 that accused Kamla Devi had demanded ₹3,500/- as bribe from him. He accompanied the informant to the police station. Police put the money in a packet and told the informant to hand over the money to the accused on demand. The informant handed over the money to the accused in Gram Panchayat, Magarpadho. The lady 15 2026:HHC:35189 constable caught the hands of Kamla. The police asked the accused to show the purse, which was checked by the lady constable. The hands of the accused, Kamla, were washed with water in a bowl. Enquiry was made of Kamla about the origin of the money, and she stated that the money belonged to her. However, the serial numbers of the currency notes were found to be the same as were recorded in the memo. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted that the accused demanded money and the informant handed over money to the accused. He signalled the police. He admitted that the police came to the spot after his signal and a lady constable caught hold of the accused by the wrists. He stated in his cross-examination that there was a meeting of General House at Magarpadhu, which started at about 10.30 a.m. 25-30 people had gathered. 15-20 people arrived after his arrival. The accused was in the hall. He had not heard the accused and the informant talking to each other and had only seen Kamla counting the money. Money was kept in a paper bag in the Police Station. 16. The statement of this witness is highly contradictory. He had not stated anything about the demand for a bribe by the accused from the informant. He was permitted to be cross- 16 2026:HHC:35189 examined and stated that the accused had made the demand for a bribe and the informant paid the money to her. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not heard the accused and the informant talking to each other. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the testimony of this witness does not establish the demand and the acceptance. 17. The informant Khem Singh (PW12) admitted in his cross-examination that the Secretary has to make the payment in accordance with the resolution of the Gram Panchayat. He admitted that ₹25,000/- was paid to him as per the resolution of the Panchayat. The copy of the resolution (Ex.PW9/A) mentions that the Gram Panchayat had resolved for the withdrawal of ₹25,000/-, and Pradhan was authorised for the withdrawal. It is undisputed that the accused had released ₹25,000/- to the informant and only ₹25,000/- was payable, which could only have been withdrawn by a Panchayat resolution as per the informant’s admission. However, no Panchayat resolution regarding the withdrawal of ₹25,000/- was produced on record, and the whole of the prosecution version that the accused had demanded bribe for the release of ₹25,000/- is not supported by the material on record. The accused could not have released 17 2026:HHC:35189 ₹25,000/- without the resolution of the Panchayat, and the informant was aware of this fact. Therefore, the informant had no justification for paying the bribe of ₹3,500/- to the accused for the release of ₹25,000/- without the resolution of the Panchayat. 18. Bindra Devi (DW1) stated that she had attended the general house of Gram Panchayat on 04.01.2009. The informant came to the general house and gave ₹3,500/- to the accused by keeping it on her table and asked her to issue a receipt. ₹400 were for framing a photograph of Basant Singh, ₹3,000/- were arrears of the Panchayat and ₹100/- were demanded by the informant. The Secretary went towards her almirah to take the receipt book. Khem Singh went outside. 4-5 persons entered inside the room and disclosed that they belonged to the Vigilance Department. They seized the currency note and the purse and took the accused with them. 19. The statement of this witness shows that the payment of money by the informant to the accused was not disputed. The only question is whether the money was paid as a bribe or towards the dues. 18 2026:HHC:35189 20. Vidya Sagar (DW2) stated that as per the audit for the financial year 20.06.2007, there was a recovery of ₹15,000/- against Khem Singh Pradhan, Gram Panchayat. Khem Singh did not make the payment despite requests. He deposited ₹12,000/- with Secretary Kamla Devi, and the Pradhan promised to repay ₹3,000/-. 21. He is a Panchayat Secretary, and his testimony is duly corroborated by the cash book register (Ex.PW3/B), which mentions that the amount had been withheld by the Panchayat Pradhan and ₹15,000/- was to be deposited by the Pradhan. The cash book (Ex.PW3/A) shows that an amount of ₹15,000/- was due from Khem Singh, Pradhan, out of which he had deposited ₹12,000/- and ₹3,000/- remained payable. These documents corroborate the defence version that the informant was required to pay money to the Gram Panchayat. 22. The informant denied in his cross-examination that he did not remember that he had deposited ₹12,000/- and that ₹3,000/- was still payable. This is contrary to the record produced by the defence, which shows that there was an audit 19 2026:HHC:35189 objection requiring the accused informant to pay ₹15,000/-, out of which ₹12,000/- was paid and ₹3,000/- remained payable. 23. There is no other corroboration to the testimony of the informant, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence produced before the learned Trial Court, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this 20 2026:HHC:35189 judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th August, 2026 (Chander)