1 2026:CGHC:23061-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 287 of 2024 1. Mohd. Izrail S/o Raza Khan Aged About 45 Years R/o Vinobha Nagar, Street No. 2, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1. Shri Amolak Singh Bhatiya S/o Late Harvansh Singh Bhatiya R/o Dayalband, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (CG) ... Respondent For Petitioner : Mr. J.K. Gupta, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Waquar Naiyer, Advocate DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu,J & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Singh Rajput, j Order on Board Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J 14.05.2026 1. Present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by petitioner, who is aggrieved by the order dated 20.02.2024, Annexure P-4, by which the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur (for short ‘the Tribunal’) has dismissed the application for condoning delay SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Digitally signed by SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI 2 in filing appeal against the order dated 28.7.2023 passed by the Rent Control Authority, Bilaspur in Case No.32/A-90 (7)/2022-23 and consequently dismissed appeal also. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that respondent filed an application under Section 12 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act 2011 (for short ‘the Act of 2011’) seeking eviction of petitioner herein from the premises in question and arrears of rent. Upon receipt of summons, petitioner appeared before the Rent Control Authority through his counsel and filed reply. Based on pleadings of the parties, issues were framed on 3.4.2023 and thereafter the case was fixed for recording of evidence of the parties. However, petitioner or counsel engaged by him stopped appearing thereafter and accordingly, an ex-parte order was passed against the petitioner on 28.7.2023. On 20.9.2023, petitioner filed an appeal under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 along with an application for condonation of delay on the ground that he came to know about eviction order only upon service of notice of execution proceeding. The Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay as also appeal on the ground that the same is barred by limitation recording that petitioner was aware of the proceeding since before, therefore, reason assigned for condoning the delay in filing 3 appeal that he came to know for the first time about the case on 14.09.2023, is not proper. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was not having knowledge of the impugned order dated 28.7.2023 passed ex-parte. Petitioner came to know about the eviction order for the first time when, notice of execution proceeding initiated by respondent was received by him. Just after knowledge of order of eviction, petitioner immediately filed the appeal as well as application for condoning delay. However, learned Tribunal disbelieved the reason assigned for condoning delay by adopting a very rigid approach and rejected application of petitioner seeking condonation of delay as also the appeal. He submits that present is not the case where petitioner avoided service of eviction proceeding or after service of notice has avoided the Court. Rather, after service of notice of eviction proceeding, petitioner caused his appearance, engaged a counsel and submitted reply also, which show petitioner’s intention to defend the case. Therefore, it cannot be said that delay occurred in filing appeal is deliberate or on account of negligence on the part of petitioner. He further submits that the pleadings in an application for condonation of delay are required to be interpreted liberally and in a justice- oriented manner, the Courts should examine the substance 4 and bona fides of the explanation offered for delay caused rather than adopt a pedantic or hyper-technical approach. In these circumstances, the Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay in preferring appeal, which is not inordinate. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent supports the impugned order and opposes submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner. He submits that the absence of the petitioner was willful in nature just to avoid passing of decree of eviction against him. Petitioner is duty bound to explain the delay of each and every day and from the contents of application for condonation of delay it is clear that petitioner did not properly explain the delay caused even after 14.09.2023. The Tribunal has assigned just and proper reason for rejecting the application for condonation of delay, which does not call for interference. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available in record of writ petition. 6. From perusal of record it is noticed that after service of notice of application for eviction, petitioner appeared before the Rent Control Authority, engaged the counsel namely Shri Raj Kamal Kaushik, Advocate who filed vakalatnama on behalf of petitioner-tenant on 8.12.2022 and thereafter reply on 28.2.2023. Petitioner-tenant was proceeded ex-parte on 5 12.7.2023 as on previous dates of hearing neither petitioner nor the counsel engaged by him appeared. Thereafter on 28.7.2023 ex-parte eviction order was passed against petitioner under Section 12 of the Act of 2011. Said order was appealable under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 and there was a limitation of 30 days in filing appeal as per Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Adaptation Rules, 2016. Petitioner filed appeal on 20.9.2023 i.e. after 21 days of the period of limitation, and reason assigned for condoning such delay is that petitioner was not aware about passing of the impugned order and came to know about the same only on 14.9.2023 when notice of eviction proceeding was received by him. The Tribunal vide order impugned rejected the application for condonation of delay and consequent thereto appeal being barred by time recording that petitioner though aware of the eviction proceeding but submitted false affidavit that he came to know about the case on 14.09.2023, therefore, the reason assigned for condoning the delay is not proper and as such, petitioner failed to offer sufficient reason. 7. In view of above, the question that falls for consideration is whether learned Tribunal was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 8. In case of Vedabai alias Vaijyanatabai Baburao Patil vs Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, reported in (2001) 9 6 SCC 106 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that pragmatic attitude should be adopted by Courts and liberal approach is required while considering application for condonation of delay and distinction is made between cases in which delay is inordinate, thus giving rise to question of prejudice to the other side and the cases where delay is of a few days only. 9. In case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar Singh and others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 786, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that unless mala-fides are writ large on conduct of the party, as a normal rule delay should be condoned. It has further been held that attempt should always be made to allow the matter to be contested on merits rather than throw it out on technicalities and each case is to be weighed on its facts and circumstances. 10. In case of S. Ganeshraju (Dead) through L.Rs and another Vs. Narasamma (Dead) through L.Rs and others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 341, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “12.The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in
 Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to 7 contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. 13] The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 14] We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. In fact, it is always just, fair and appropriate that matters should be heard on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice at the threshold. Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and had not been negligent and callous in the prosecution of the matter…...” 11. In the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon’ble Supreme Court while summarizing the principles applicable while dealing with application for condonation of delay, has observed thus;:- "21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for 8 the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2 The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3 Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4 No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7 The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said 9 principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11 It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude." 12. On a conspectus reading of the above principles set out in above decisions, it is clear that a liberal approach should be extended while considering the application for condonation of delay as refusal to condone the delay may result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. However, while adopting liberal approach, Court cannot ignore the principle of law that law comes to rescue only diligent litigants. It is also clear to the effect that it is not the number of days of delays that matters, but the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the party which caused the delay. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 10 13. In case at hand, as noticed above, after service of notice of eviction proceeding, petitioner put in appearance, engaged a counsel to defend the proceeding of eviction filed against him and also filed reply to application for eviction, however, the petitioner was proceeded ex-parte and ex-parte order of eviction was passed against him. It is also evident from the order sheets of the Rent Control Authority that no notice was issued/sent to petitioner before passing ex-parte order. Petitioner getting knowledge of ex-parte order of eviction when notice of execution proceeding was served upon him, filed an appeal along with application for condonation of delay, within 06 days of knowledge, through another counsel. Thus, it can be safely inferred that the petitioner was not careless or negligent in prosecuting the eviction proceeding. 14. There is no quarrel on the point that the pleadings are hand- work of the lawyers and therefore, while interpreting pleadings, the real intention of the parties will have to be seen rather than adopting a hyper-technical approach based on drafting imperfections. In case at hand also, the application for condonation of delay might not be drafted eloquently or articulately, but the real intention of the petitioner to contest the case on merits can be gathered from steps taken by him while prosecuting eviction proceeding, as discussed above. 11 15. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal erred in mechanically dismissing the application for condonation of delay as also appeal on the ground that the same is barred by limitation. In the considered opinion of this Court, petitioner deserves opportunity to contest the case on merits. 16. Resultantly, present writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 20.02.2024 (Annexure P-4) passed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur is hereby set aside. Delay in filing appeal under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 before the Rent Control Tribunal is condoned and the appeal is restored. The Rent Control Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal on merits, as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law after providing opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 03.06.2026. 17. Record be sent back forthwith. Sd/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Judge roshan/-