1 Reserved on : 11.03.2026 Pronounced on : 04.06.2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 04TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No. 11796 OF 2023 BETWEEN: MANIKIRAN.G.C, S/O G.C. HANUMANTHA RAO, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, R/AT NO. 6-2-637, LAXMI NIVAS, OPPOSITE TVS SHOWROOM, CHINTHAL BASTHI, KAIRATHABAD, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA STATE - 500 004. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANIKIRAN G.C, PARTY-IN-PERSON) AND: 1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA, BY KADUGONDANAHALLI POLICE, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU – 560 001. Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka 2 2 . DR. DIVYA YUVARAJ, W/O MANIKIRAN, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, R/AT NO.104, 3RD CROSS, PILLANNA GARDEN, 3RD STAGE, BANGALORE 560 045. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R-1; SMT. UDITA RAMESH, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET FILED BY THE KADUGONDANAHALLI POLICE IN SPL.C.NO.655/2023 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 498-A, 504, 34 OF IPC, 1860 AND U/SEC.3 AND 4 OF D.P ACT, 1961 AND SEC.3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) SC AND THE ST (POA) ACT, 1989 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF LXX ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSION SPL. JUDGE, BENGALURU(CCH-71). THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 11.03.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CAV ORDER The petitioner is before this Court calling in question proceedings in Special Case No.655 of 2023 registered for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 504 r/w 34 of the IPC CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA 3 and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“Act” for short). 2. Facts adumbrated are as follows: The petitioner who appears in person is the accused; the 2nd respondent, the complainant, his wife. The two get married on 11-10-2017 at Hyderabad. The relationship between the two appears to have floundered and on floundering of the relationship or lurking squabble between the two, leads the petitioner initially to register a complaint before the jurisdictional police at Hyderabad, which becomes a crime in Crime No.246 of 2022 for offences punishable under Sections 420, 324, 307, 506 r/w 34 of the IPC. After registration of the complaint or contemporaneously, the complainant also institutes the proceedings seeking annulment of marriage with the petitioner before the Family Court in M.C.No.86 of 2023. The aforesaid two proceedings are pending before the concerned Courts. On 25-11-2022 comes the impugned complaint before the jurisdictional police at Bangalore, alleging harassment on demand of dowry and hurling of abuses, which was allegedly for the 4 aforesaid offences. This becomes a crime in Crime No.382 of 2022. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The concerned Court then registers Special Case No.655 of 2023 for the aforementioned offences. It is the filing of the charge sheet that drives the husband- petitioner in person before this Court in the subject petition. 3. Heard Sri Manikiran G.C., petitioner appearing in person, Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Smt Udita Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 4. The petitioner, appearing in person, would vehemently contend that the averments of the complaint do not make out any of the ingredients that are necessary to drive home the offences so alleged. It is his submission that the complainant never showed any interest in marriage and was in the habit of running away. He had to himself register a crime on the alleged act of the complainant trying to stab the husband, the petitioner. He would further contend that there is unexplained delay in filing of the 5 complaint and the allegations are vague and are not specific and would seek to place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ACHIN GUPTA v. STATE OF HARYANA reported in (2025) 3 SCC 756 to buttress his submission that the husband is drawn into the web of proceeding on frivolous allegations. He would submit that his case is pari materia to what the Apex Court has considered in ACHIN GUPTA. 5. Contrariwise, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/complainant would vehemently refute the submissions of the petitioner in person contending that the averments made in the complaint by the complainant requires evidence in the least. Mere statements of the husband that there is no demand of dowry cannot be assessed in a proceeding under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Prima facie, the complaint discloses material or specific overt acts against the petitioner. The crime registered by the petitioner against the complainant is also pending consideration at the hands of the jurisdictional police. After the said crime was registered, the complainant was brought back to Bangalore by the police, unable to bear the harassment of the husband. The demand 6 of dowry is corroborated by payment trail. She would seek dismissal of the petition. 6. The petitioner in person would join issue to contend that the amount that is transferred is by the petitioner in favour of the complainant and not the other way round or at best what is allegedly given as dowry is only a laptop or a bike which also is beyond pale of any evidence or material documents. Therefore, the petitioner would submit that it is a fit case to quash the proceedings against the husband/petitioner. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the petitioner-in-person and the respective learned counsel and have perused the material available on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record and would not require any reiteration. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent/ complainant get married on 11-10-2017. Allegations galore between the two. The petitioner registers a complaint initially before the jurisdictional police at Hyderabad, which becomes a 7 crime in Crime No.246 of 2022, wherein an allegation of the wife attempting to stab the husband is alleged . The said FIR is said to be pending investigation before the concerned Court. The complainant then registers a case before the Family Court in M.C. No. 86 of 2023 seeking annulment of marriage, which is also pending consideration. On 25-11-2022 springs the impugned complaint against the petitioner. Since the entire issue has now triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. 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Nೋ? Nೋ? Nೋ? ೈಕನುA ೈಕನುA ೈಕನುA ೈಕನುA @ಾತ0 @ಾತ0 @ಾತ0 @ಾತ0 ೊP?#Fೕ ೊP?#Fೕ ೊP?#Fೕ ೊP?#Fೕ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ೈದು ೈದು ೈದು ೈದು ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ hೊರಟು hೊರಟು hೊರಟು hೊರಟು hೊ hೊ hೊ hೊÃದರು ದರು ದರು ದರು. ಅನಂತರದM ಅನಂತರದM ಅನಂತರದM ಅನಂತರದM ನನA ನನA ನನA ನನA ಗಂಡನು ಗಂಡನು ಗಂಡನು ಗಂಡನು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ ಾಲ ಾಲ ಾಲ ಾಲ ನ/ೊAಡ/ೆ ನ/ೊAಡ/ೆ ನ/ೊAಡ/ೆ ನ/ೊAಡ/ೆ @ಾತ/ಾಡ<ೆ @ಾತ/ಾಡ<ೆ @ಾತ/ಾಡ<ೆ @ಾತ/ಾಡ<ೆ Vಮa Vಮa Vಮa Vಮa ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ NಾO NಾO NಾO NಾO ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB Vೕನು Vೕನು Vೕನು Vೕನು ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa ಕುಟುಂಬದವೆ ಕುಟುಂಬದವೆ ಕುಟುಂಬದವೆ ಕುಟುಂಬದವೆ /ೆಮa#ಯನುA /ೆಮa#ಯನುA /ೆಮa#ಯನುA /ೆಮa#ಯನುA hಾಳT hಾಳT hಾಳT hಾಳT @ಾP#Fೕ&ಾ @ಾP#Fೕ&ಾ @ಾP#Fೕ&ಾ @ಾP#Fೕ&ಾ ನನೆ ನನೆ ನನೆ ನನೆ 5 ಲm ಲm ಲm ಲm ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA e?/ೆ e?/ೆ e?/ೆ e?/ೆ @ಾಡಲು @ಾಡಲು @ಾಡಲು @ಾಡಲು ತುNಾ,Q ತುNಾ,Q ತುNಾ,Q ತುNಾ,Q Vೕಡ#ದFM Vೕಡ#ದFM Vೕಡ#ದFM Vೕಡ#ದFM VನAನುA VನAನುA VನAನುA VನAನುA eಡುವ eಡುವ eಡುವ eಡುವ V•ಾ,ರ V•ಾ,ರ V•ಾ,ರ V•ಾ,ರ NೆೆದುೊಳTNೆBೕ/ೆ NೆೆದುೊಳTNೆBೕ/ೆ NೆೆದುೊಳTNೆBೕ/ೆ NೆೆದುೊಳTNೆBೕ/ೆ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು hೆದ?ದFನು hೆದ?ದFನು hೆದ?ದFನು hೆದ?ದFನು. ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ /ಾನು /ಾನು /ಾನು /ಾನು ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa ಕು ಕು ಕು ಕುಟುಂಬದ ಟುಂಬದ ಟುಂಬದ ಟುಂಬದ ಪ?‚:ಯನುA ಪ?‚:ಯನುA ಪ?‚:ಯನುA ಪ?‚:ಯನುA ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ :? :? :? :? #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ: 24.11.2021ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ: 27.03.2022ರರರರ ನಡು-ೆ ನಡು-ೆ ನಡು-ೆ ನಡು-ೆ ==ಧ ==ಧ ==ಧ ==ಧ #/ಾಂಕಗಳಂದು #/ಾಂಕಗಳಂದು #/ಾಂಕಗಳಂದು #/ಾಂಕಗಳಂದು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು 1 ಲm ಲm ಲm ಲm 25 Rಾ=ರ Rಾ=ರ Rಾ=ರ Rಾ=ರ ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ೊಗ7 ೊಗ7 ೊಗ7 ೊಗ7 ೇ ೇ ೇ ೇ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ೆೆೆೆ ೊU<ೆFೕನು ೊU<ೆFೕನು ೊU<ೆFೕನು ೊU<ೆFೕನು. ಇzಾದರೂ ಇzಾದರೂ ಇzಾದರೂ ಇzಾದರೂ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಏ107 ಏ107 ಏ107 ಏ107- 2022 :ಂಗಳM :ಂಗಳM :ಂಗಳM :ಂಗಳM ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ಮ)Xರ* ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ಇನುA ಇನುA ಇನುA ಇನುA hೆugನ hೆugನ hೆugನ hೆugನ ಹಣ ಹಣ ಹಣ ಹಣ ೇೆಂದು ೇೆಂದು ೇೆಂದು ೇೆಂದು ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa ನಮa Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ ಗwಾjೆ ಗwಾjೆ ಗwಾjೆ ಗwಾjೆ @ಾP<ಾಗ @ಾP<ಾಗ @ಾP<ಾಗ @ಾP<ಾಗ ನನA ನನA ನನA ನನA ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ NಾO NಾO NಾO NಾO ಸƒಲ\ ಸƒಲ\ ಸƒಲ\ ಸƒಲ\ ಸಮಯ ಸಮಯ ಸಮಯ ಸಮಯ ೊP ೊP ೊP ೊP ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ೋ<ಾಗ ೋ<ಾಗ ೋ<ಾಗ ೋ<ಾಗ ಅವನು ಅವನು ಅವನು ಅವನು ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಕೂಾPೊಂಡು ಕೂಾPೊಂಡು ಕೂಾPೊಂಡು ಕೂಾPೊಂಡು hೊರೆ hೊರೆ hೊರೆ hೊರೆ ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ೇಳTವ ೇಳTವ ೇಳTವ ೇಳTವ hಾೇ hಾೇ hಾೇ hಾೇ Nೆಲಗು Nೆಲಗು Nೆಲಗು Nೆಲಗು „ಾzೆಯM „ಾzೆಯM „ಾzೆಯM „ಾzೆಯM Nen Madigaru, Chappal Kultesevalu, Sambandamu, appako. Kodadunti, cheskakudu, du, takva jyatolu, takva buddival lu, nuvu ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಲMಗೂ ಎಲMಗೂ ಎಲMಗೂ ಎಲMಗೂ ೇಳTವಂNೆ ೇಳTವಂNೆ ೇಳTವಂNೆ ೇಳTವಂNೆ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ Vಂ#?ದನು Vಂ#?ದನು Vಂ#?ದನು Vಂ#?ದನು. ಆಗ ಆಗ ಆಗ ಆಗ ಅಕKಪಕKದವರು ಅಕKಪಕKದವರು ಅಕKಪಕKದವರು ಅಕKಪಕKದವರು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಏನು ಏನು ಏನು ಏನು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ೇ<ಾಗ ೇ<ಾಗ ೇ<ಾಗ ೇ<ಾಗ /ಾವb /ಾವb /ಾವb /ಾವb @ಾನ @ಾನ @ಾನ @ಾನ @ಾ_ಾ,<ೆೆ @ಾ_ಾ,<ೆೆ @ಾ_ಾ,<ೆೆ @ಾ_ಾ,<ೆೆ ಅಂ… ಅಂ… ಅಂ… ಅಂ… ಏನನುA ಏನನುA ಏನನುA ಏನನುA :ಸಲM :ಸಲM :ಸಲM :ಸಲM. ಆದ&ೇ ಆದ&ೇ ಆದ&ೇ ಆದ&ೇ ಆತ/ೇ ಆತ/ೇ ಆತ/ೇ ಆತ/ೇ These people a from Madiga Caste and they are showing their 10 status as per their caste with me ಎಂ#ದುF ಎಂ#ದುF ಎಂ#ದುF ಎಂ#ದುF,,,, ಆಗ ಆಗ ಆಗ ಆಗ ನನA ನನA ನನA ನನA ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ಇ<ೆwಾM ಇ<ೆwಾM ಇ<ೆwಾM ಇ<ೆwಾM ಒಳೆ ಒಳೆ ಒಳೆ ಒಳೆ ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು @ಾತ/ಾP @ಾತ/ಾP @ಾತ/ಾP @ಾತ/ಾP ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ೇ<ಾಗ ೇ<ಾಗ ೇ<ಾಗ ೇ<ಾಗ ಆತನು ಆತನು ಆತನು ಆತನು ಕೂಡwೇ ಕೂಡwೇ ಕೂಡwೇ ಕೂಡwೇ ಮ/ೆಯ ಮ/ೆಯ ಮ/ೆಯ ಮ/ೆಯ ಒಳೆ ಒಳೆ ಒಳೆ ಒಳೆ hೋQ hೋQ hೋQ hೋQ ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ೇಾದ ೇಾದ ೇಾದ ೇಾದ ಎwಾM ಎwಾM ಎwಾM ಎwಾM ವಸುBಗಳನುA ವಸುBಗಳನುA ವಸುBಗಳನುA ವಸುBಗಳನುA ಾ$• ಾ$• ಾ$• ಾ$• @ಾPೊಂಡು @ಾPೊಂಡು @ಾPೊಂಡು @ಾPೊಂಡು (ಬjೆ ಬjೆ ಬjೆ ಬjೆ ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB wಾ$p wಾ$p wಾ$p wಾ$p jಾ$p jಾ$p jಾ$p jಾ$p) /ಾ-ೇ /ಾ-ೇ /ಾ-ೇ /ಾ-ೇ VೕPದF VೕPದF VೕPದF VೕPದF ಟೂ ಟೂ ಟೂ ಟೂ =ಲ =ಲ =ಲ =ಲನM ನM ನM ನM hೊರಟನು hೊರಟನು hೊರಟನು hೊರಟನು. ನನA ನನA ನನA ನನA ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ ತಂ<ೆ NಾO NಾO NಾO NಾO ಆತಂಕದM ಆತಂಕದM ಆತಂಕದM ಆತಂಕದM ತ"ೆಯಲು ತ"ೆಯಲು ತ"ೆಯಲು ತ"ೆಯಲು ಪ0ಯ:A?<ಾಗ ಪ0ಯ:A?<ಾಗ ಪ0ಯ:A?<ಾಗ ಪ0ಯ:A?<ಾಗ Nಾನು Nಾನು Nಾನು Nಾನು XೕಳT XೕಳT XೕಳT XೕಳT 9ಾ 9ಾ 9ಾ 9ಾ:ಯವರ :ಯವರ :ಯವರ :ಯವರ ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಇರುವb#ಲM ಇರುವb#ಲM ಇರುವb#ಲM ಇರುವb#ಲM ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಕೂಾP ಕೂಾP ಕೂಾP ಕೂಾP Nಾನು Nಾನು Nಾನು Nಾನು ತನA ತನA ತನA ತನA ಊೆ ಊೆ ಊೆ ಊೆ hೋದುವb hೋದುವb hೋದುವb hೋದುವb<ಾQ <ಾQ <ಾQ <ಾQ. ನಂತರ ಆ ಕೂಡwೇ ಮ)Xರ* ರವರು ನಮa ಮ/ೆಯನುA eಟು ಅವರ ಊೆ hೈ<ಾ0ಾiೆ hೊರಟು hೋದನು. ಇzಾದರೂ ಸಹ /ಾನು ಮ)Xರ* ಸ hೋQ -ಾ ಾಸು ಬರುNಾB/ೆಂದು :ದುೊಂಡು ಸುಮaV<ೆFೕವb. ಅನಂತರ /ಾನು ಹಲ-ಾರು ಾ ಮ)Xರ* ರವೆ ಕ&ೆ @ಾPದರು. ಸಹ ಅವರು ನನA ಕ&ೆಯನುA ?ƒೕಕಸು:BರಲM ಇದನುA ಕಂಡು ಸು@ಾರು #ನಗಳ ಾಲ ಮ)Xರ* -ಾ ಾಸು ಾರ<ೆ ನಮa ಕ&ೆಗೂ ಸ\ಂ#ಸ<ೇ ಇದುFದನುA ಕಂಡು ನನA ತಂ<ೆ NಾOಗಳT hೇಾದರೂ @ಾP ಸƒಲ\ ಹಣ hೊಂ#?ೊ"ೊಣ /ಾ-ೇ hೋQ ಸ@ಾ•ಾನ @ಾP ಕ&ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬ&ೋಣ ಎಂದು :ೕ@ಾ,V?, hೈ<ಾ0ಾiನMರುವ ಮ)Xರ* ರವರ ಮ/ೆೆ ನನA ತಂ<ೆ ಮತುB ಅವರ RೆAೕkತ&ಾದ Rೆಲ\&ಾ' ಮತುB hೈ<ಾ0ಾiನM -ಾಸ=ರುವ &ಾ} ಾಬು ರವರುಗಳT hೋQದುF ಆ #ನ @ಾತುಕNೆೆ ಬಂದ ನನA ತಂ<ೆ ಮತುB ಅವರ RೆAೕkತರ @ಾ:ೆ X=ೊಡ<ೇ ಮ)Xರ* ಮತುB ಆತನ ತಂ<ೆ NಾO ಮತುB ಅಣ3ಂ#ರು ಏಾಏXೕ ಮ/ೆೆ ಬಂದ ಕುNಾQ Vಂ#? XೕಳT 9ಾ:ಯವರು ನಮa ಮ/ೆೆ ಾಲು ಇಡೇP ಎಂ<ೆwಾM ಅವ@ಾನ @ಾP Vಂ#? ಕಳTk?ರುNಾB&ೆ. ಅನಂತರ ನನA ತಂ<ೆಯವರು ಈ =tಾರವನುA /ೊಂದುೊಳTNೆBೕ/ೆಂದು ನನA ಬ :?ರಲM ಬದwಾQ hೈ<ಾ0ಾi ನ RೆAೕkತನ ಮೂಲಕ @ಾತುಕNೆ @ಾP? ಸಂRಾರ ಸ @ಾಡುNೆBೕ/ೆ ಾದು /ೋ"ೋಣ ಎಂದzೆ hೇದFರು. /ಾನು ಸಹ ನನA ಗಂಡನು ತನA ತಪ\ನುA ಅತುೊಂಡು -ಾ ಾಸು ಬರುNಾB/ೆಂದು ಆˆಾ„ಾವ/ೆ hೊಂ#<ೆFೕನು. ಆದ&ೆ ಇಷು :ಂಗLಾದರೂ _ಾವb<ೇ V•ಾ,ರ-ಾಗದ ಾರಣ /ಾನು ನನA ತಂ<ೆಯ RೆAೕkತ&ಾದ &ಾ}ಾಬು ರವರನುA ಸಂಪX,?<ಾಗ ಅವರು ನನA ತಂ<ೆ‰ಡ/ೆ ಈ kಂ<ೆ ನನA ಗಂಡನ ಮ/ೆೆ hೋQ<ಾFಗ ನ"ೆದ ಸಂಗ:ಯನುA :? ನನA ತಂ<ೆ`ೕ /ಾನು ೇಸರ @ಾPೊಳTNೆBೕ/ೆ ಎಂದು ಮತುB hೇಾದರೂ @ಾP ಸಂRಾರ ಸ @ಾ"ೋಣ ಎಂದು hೇಳದಂNೆ :?<ಾFQ :?ದFರು. kೕೆ ನನೆ ಮತುB ನನA ತಂ<ೆ NಾOೆ ವರದsೆ =tಾರ-ಾQ <ೈkಕ-ಾQ ಮತುB @ಾನ?ಕ-ಾQ kಂRೆ @ಾP ನಮa 9ಾ:ಯ ಬೆx ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ XೕLಾQ /ೋP ಅವhೇಳನ @ಾPದ ಮ)Xರ* ಮತುB ಅವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದವರ =ರುದŠ ಸೂಕB ಾನೂನು ೕNಾ$ ಕ0ಮ ಜರುQಸಲು ಈ #ನ ಾೆೆ ತಡ-ಾQ ಬಂದು ದೂರು VೕPರುNೆBೕ/ೆ. ವಂದ/ೆಗLೆ ಂ#ೆ” (Emphasis added) 11 The complaint was registered against the petitioner and other family members. The police after investigation drop the family members from the array of accused and retain the petitioner as sole accused in the case at hand. The charge sheet so filed against the petitioner post investigation reads as follows: “17.ೇ?ನ ಸಂsಪB Rಾ&ಾಂಶ Rಾ-1 ರವರು ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರದ ೆ.….ಹ ೕ ಾೆ ಸರಹ#Fನ 1ಳಣ3 ಾಡ, 3/ೇ ಹಂತ ಮ/ೆ ನಂ 104, ರM ತನA ತಂ<ೆ NಾOಯವ&ಾದ Rಾs-6 ಮತುB Rಾ-7 ರವ&ೊಂ#ೆ -ಾಸ@ಾPೊಂPದುF, "ೆಂಟ7 "ಾಕ ಆQ ೆಲಸ @ಾPೊಂPರುNಾB&ೆ. Rಾ-1 ರವರು ಆ# <ಾ0=ಡ (ಎ .?) 9ಾ:ೆ RೇದವLಾQರುNಾB&ೆ. Rಾ-1 ರವೆ 2017 /ೇ ಇಸ=ಯM @ಾ$U05ೕVಯ7 ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಆ&ೋ1 ಮ)Xರ* ಪಚಯ-ಾQದುF, ಆ&ೋ1 ಮ)Xರ* BCD (Arekatika-2) 9ಾ:ೆ Rೇದವ/ಾQರುNಾB/ೆ. Rಾ-1 ಮತುB ಆ&ೋ1ಯ =-ಾಹ Vಶgಯದ ಮುನA Rಾ-1 ಮತುB ಅವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದವರು ಆ&ೋ1 ಮತುB ಅವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದವರM ತಮa 9ಾ:ಯ ಬೆx :?ದುF, ಇದೆK ಆ&ೋ1 ಮತುB ಅವನ ಕುಟುಂಬದವರು ಒ1\ೊಂPದFಂದ =-ಾಹ Vಶgಯ-ಾQ #/ಾಂಕ: 11-10-2017 ರಂದು hೈ<ಾ0ಾi ನ ೆದFಮa jೆಂಪ7 ನM kಂದೂ ಸಂಪ0<ಾಯದಂNೆ kಯರ ಸಮುaಖದM ಆ&ೋ1‰ಂ#ೆ Rಾ-1 ರವರ =-ಾಹ-ಾQರುತB<ೆ. hಾಗೂ ೆ0ೕಜ jೌ ನMರುವ ‰ೕ ಾ0ಂo ನM ಷಪ\ ಸಹ @ಾPರುNಾB&ೆ. Rಾ-1 ರವರ =-ಾಹ ಸಮಯದM ಮ)Xರ* ರವೆ uನAದ ವಡ-ೆಗಳನುA ಮತುB =-ಾಹದ ಖu,ೆ ನಗದು ಹಣವನುA ೊUರುNಾB&ೆ. =-ಾಹದ ನಂತರ ಆ&ೋ1ಯು Rಾ-1, Rಾ-6 ಮತುB Rಾ-7 ರವರ ಮ/ೆಯM ಉದುೊಂPರುNಾB/ೆ. ಆ&ೋ1ಯು Rಾ-1 ರವರ ಮ/ೆಯM ಉದುೊಂPದF ಸಮಯದM _ಾವb<ೇ ೆಲಸವನುA @ಾಡ<ೇ ಆ&ೋ1ಯ ಖಚು,--ೆಚgಗಳನುA Rಾ-1 ಮತುB ಅವರ ತಂ<ೆNಾOಗ¼É /ೋPೊಂPರುNಾB&ೆ. ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು =-ಾಹ-ಾದ =-ಾಹ-ಾದ =-ಾಹ-ಾದ =-ಾಹ-ಾದ ೆಲವb ೆಲವb ೆಲವb ೆಲವb #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-6 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ =-ಾಹ =-ಾಹ =-ಾಹ =-ಾಹ ಸಮಯದM ಸಮಯದM ಸಮಯದM ಸಮಯದM ಸ_ಾQ ಸ_ಾQ ಸ_ಾQ ಸ_ಾQ ವರದsೆ ವರದsೆ ವರದsೆ ವರದsೆ ೊUಲM ೊUಲM ೊUಲM ೊUಲM ತಕƒ ತಕƒ ತಕƒ ತಕƒ 9ಾ: 9ಾ: 9ಾ: 9ಾ: ಎಂ<ೆಲM ಎಂ<ೆಲM ಎಂ<ೆಲM ಎಂ<ೆಲM ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ೈಯು:BದFನು ೈಯು:BದFನು ೈಯು:BದFನು ೈಯು:BದFನು, ಆದರೂ ಆದರೂ ಆದರೂ ಆದರೂ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಕುಟಂಬದವರು ಕುಟಂಬದವರು ಕುಟಂಬದವರು ಕುಟಂಬದವರು ಸk?ೊಂಡು ಸk?ೊಂಡು ಸk?ೊಂಡು ಸk?ೊಂಡು hೋಗು:BದFರು hೋಗು:BದFರು hೋಗು:BದFರು hೋಗು:BದFರು, ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ಓ"ಾಡಲು ಓ"ಾಡಲು ಓ"ಾಡಲು ಓ"ಾಡಲು -ಾಹನವ/ಾAದರೂ -ಾಹನವ/ಾAದರೂ -ಾಹನವ/ಾAದರೂ -ಾಹನವ/ಾAದರೂ ೊPಸುವಂNೆ ೊPಸುವಂNೆ ೊPಸುವಂNೆ ೊPಸುವಂNೆ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1, Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-6 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ತನA ತನA ತನA ತನA hೆಸನM hೆಸನM hೆಸನM hೆಸನM ೆನ ೆನ ೆನ ೆನ&ಾ &ಾ &ಾ &ಾ ಾ$ಂ• ಾ$ಂ• ಾ$ಂ• ಾ$ಂ• ನM ನM ನM ನM Rಾಲ Rಾಲ Rಾಲ Rಾಲ @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP ಾಾ ಾಾ ಾಾ ಾಾ @ಾಲುಪU @ಾಲುಪU @ಾಲುಪU @ಾಲುಪU ಸಂ8ೆ$ ಸಂ8ೆ$ ಸಂ8ೆ$ ಸಂ8ೆ$. 202/2022 ರM ರM ರM ರM 12 ನಮೂದು ನಮೂದು ನಮೂದು ನಮೂದು @ಾPರುವ @ಾPರುವ @ಾPರುವ @ಾPರುವ ೈ• ೈ• ೈ• ೈ• ಅನುA ಅನುA ಅನುA ಅನುA ೊP?ರುNಾB&ೆ ೊP?ರುNಾB&ೆ ೊP?ರುNಾB&ೆ ೊP?ರುNಾB&ೆ. ಇ<ಾದ ಇ<ಾದ ಇ<ಾದ ಇ<ಾದ ೆಲವb ೆಲವb ೆಲವb ೆಲವb #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ #ನಗಳ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ ತನೆ e?/ೆ e?/ೆ e?/ೆ e?/ೆ @ಾಡಲು @ಾಡಲು @ಾಡಲು @ಾಡಲು 5 ಲm ಲm ಲm ಲm ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ೊಡುವಂNೆ ೊಡುವಂNೆ ೊಡುವಂNೆ ೊಡುವಂNೆ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-6 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ ಪ<ೇ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ @ಾಡು:BದFಂದ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ:24-11-2021 ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ ####/ಾಂಕ /ಾಂಕ /ಾಂಕ /ಾಂಕ:27-03-2022 ರರರರ ನಡು-ೆ ನಡು-ೆ ನಡು-ೆ ನಡು-ೆ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ಆ&ೋ1ೆ ಆ&ೋ1ೆ ಆ&ೋ1ೆ ಆ&ೋ1ೆ ಗೂಗ7 ಗೂಗ7 ಗೂಗ7 ಗೂಗ7 ೇ ೇ ೇ ೇ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಮು8ಾಂತರ ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು ಸು@ಾರು 1 ಲm ಲm ಲm ಲm 25 Rಾ=ರ Rಾ=ರ Rಾ=ರ Rಾ=ರ ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಹಣವನುA ಆ&ೋ1ೆ ಆ&ೋ1ೆ ಆ&ೋ1ೆ ಆ&ೋ1ೆ VೕPರುNಾB&ೆ VೕPರುNಾB&ೆ VೕPರುNಾB&ೆ VೕPರುNಾB&ೆ. ಇzೇಲM ಇzೇಲM ಇzೇಲM ಇzೇಲM ೊಟರು ೊಟರು ೊಟರು ೊಟರು ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಆ&ೋ1 ಆ&ೋ1 ಆ&ೋ1 ಆ&ೋ1 ಮNೆB ಮNೆB ಮNೆB ಮNೆB hೆugನ hೆugನ hೆugನ hೆugನ ವರದsೆಾQ ವರದsೆಾQ ವರದsೆಾQ ವರದsೆಾQ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-6 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಬ ೇPೆ ೇPೆ ೇPೆ ೇPೆ ಇಟು ಇಟು ಇಟು ಇಟು #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ #/ಾಂಕ:08-04-2022 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-6 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ Iೕwೆ ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಮ/ೆಯM ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ ಮ/ೆOಂದ hೊರೆ hೊರೆ hೊರೆ hೊರೆ ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ಅಕKಪಕKದವೆ ೇಳTವ ೇಳTವ ೇಳTವ ೇಳTವ hಾೆ hಾೆ hಾೆ hಾೆ Nೆಲುಗು Nೆಲುಗು Nೆಲುಗು Nೆಲುಗು „ಾzೆಯM „ಾzೆಯM „ಾzೆಯM „ಾzೆಯM Nenu madigaru, Chappal kutteseval sambandamu oppakko kodaduntin, cheskakudu du, takva jyatolu, takva buddival lu nuvu ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು Vಂ#? Vಂ#? Vಂ#? Vಂ#? ಮNೆB ಮNೆB ಮNೆB ಮNೆB These people are from madiga caste & they are showing their status as per their caste with me ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-6 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ ಅವhೇಳನಾ_ಾQ ೈ#ರುNಾB/ೆ ೈ#ರುNಾB/ೆ ೈ#ರುNಾB/ೆ ೈ#ರುNಾB/ೆ. ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ಆ&ೋ1ಯು ವರದsೆ ವರದsೆ ವರದsೆ ವರದsೆ =tಾರ-ಾQ =tಾರ-ಾQ =tಾರ-ಾQ =tಾರ-ಾQ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-6 Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-7 ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ ರವೆ <ೈkಕ-ಾQ <ೈkಕ-ಾQ <ೈkಕ-ಾQ <ೈkಕ-ಾQ ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB @ಾನ?ಕ-ಾQ @ಾನ?ಕ-ಾQ @ಾನ?ಕ-ಾQ @ಾನ?ಕ-ಾQ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ kಂRೆ @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP @ಾP Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ Rಾ-1 ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB ಮತುB ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಕಟುಂಬದವೆ ಕಟುಂಬದವೆ ಕಟುಂಬದವೆ ಕಟುಂಬದವೆ ಅ-ಾ$ಚ$ ಅ-ಾ$ಚ$ ಅ-ಾ$ಚ$ ಅ-ಾ$ಚ$ ಶಬFಗಂದ ಶಬFಗಂದ ಶಬFಗಂದ ಶಬFಗಂದ Vಂ#? Vಂ#? Vಂ#? Vಂ#?, 9ಾ: 9ಾ: 9ಾ: 9ಾ: Vಂ Vಂ Vಂ Vಂದ/ೆ ದ/ೆ ದ/ೆ ದ/ೆ @ಾPರುವbದು @ಾPರುವbದು @ಾPರುವbದು @ಾPರುವbದು ತV8ೆOಂದ ತV8ೆOಂದ ತV8ೆOಂದ ತV8ೆOಂದ ದೃಢಪUದುF ದೃಢಪUದುF ದೃಢಪUದುF ದೃಢಪUದುF, ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಆ&ೋ1ಯ ಆ&ೋ1ಯ ಆ&ೋ1ಯ ಆ&ೋ1ಯ =ರುದŠ =ರುದŠ =ರುದŠ =ರುದŠ IೕಲKಂಡ IೕಲKಂಡ IೕಲKಂಡ IೕಲKಂಡ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ೕNಾ$ ೕNಾ$ ೕNಾ$ ೕNಾ$ <ೋzಾ&ೋಪಾ <ೋzಾ&ೋಪಾ <ೋzಾ&ೋಪಾ <ೋzಾ&ೋಪಾ ಪU ಪU ಪU ಪU . V-ೇದ/ೆ: ಸದ ಪ0ಕರಣದM ಎ-2 ಹನುಮಂತ&ಾy ಎ-3 ಸುSNಾ0 ಾO ಎ-4 &ಾ' Xರ* ಎ-5 5 ಸಂNೋr Xರ* ಇವರುಗಳ =ರುದŠ ಆ&ೋಪ Rಾ•ೕNಾಗದ ಾರಣ ಸದ ರವರನುA <ೋzಾ&ೋಪಾ ಪUOಂದ ೈeUರುತB<ೆ.” (Emphasis added) The issue now would be, whether the charge sheet material prima facie meets the ingredients of the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 504 of the IPC or the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The complaint is in detail and instances of certain overt acts against the husband is alleged in the complaint. This Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC ordinarily would not conduct a mini trial as to whether there 13 was demand of dowry or otherwise. There may be scores and scores of cases where this Court has exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C and has obliterated the crime or the proceedings before the concerned Courts even against the husband, but those are on the facts obtaining in each of those cases. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MUSKAN v. ISHAAN KHAN (SATANIYA)1, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. C. ANALYSIS 17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 18. At the outset it will be appropriate to advert to the observations made by the High Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the impugned order: “9. It is undisputed that prior to filing FIR (Annexure P/5), a written complaint dated 22.01.2023 (Annexure P/3) was filed before Mahila Police Station, Ratlam, District Ratlam (MP) for the alleged harassment meted out to respondent No. 2 from her husband and in-laws (applicants before this Court). It is also not in 1 2025 SCC Online SC 2355 14 dispute that both the parties i.e. applicant No. 1 and respondent No. 2, on their counter allegations, were advised by Police Mahila Thana, Ratlam to take recourse of law, but no action was taken on the above 3 MCRC- 10695-2024 complaint by respondent No. 2. In such a situation, if respondent No. 2 was aggrieved of advice dated 23.01.2023 given by Mahila Police Station, Ratlam, she might have approached the Superintendent of Police for inaction on the part of the concerned Police Station on her complaint, but this has not been done. 10. It is also pertinent to note that in the (sic) above written complaint, there has not been a whisper of the events of harassment on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, as narrated in the FIR (Annexure P/5). It manifests that the alleged incidents of harassment meted out to the complainant allegedly took place on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 are afterthought. The contentions raised on behalf of the applicants that FIR (Annexure P/5) is a counterblast to notice (Annexure P/1) given by applicant No. 1 to respondent No. 2 also finds support from the above.” (emphasis supplied) 19. From a bare perusal of the above mentioned paragraphs it can be seen that one of the important factors that weighed in while allowing the quashing application of the private respondents was that in the earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no mention of the events of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR dated 28.01.2024. Hence, we extract the relevant portion of the complaints dated 22.01.2023 and 23.01.2023 which would clearly indicate prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry against the private respondents: “22.01.2023 …That immediately after the Nikah, the respondents namely Ishan, father-in-law Ishaq Khan, mother-in-law Irfana Bi, sister-in law (Nanad) Ayesha, Nandoi Shayid Khan, Jeth Hemuddin son of Akbar Khan resident of Ujjain started raising demand of dowry from me. They are constantly causing physical and mental 15 harassment for the last two years. A demand of dowry is being raised every day since the day of my marriage. My father gave a Pulsar Bike but I was asked to bring a car. On the occasion of my sister-in-law's wedding, they asked me to ask my father to give an A.C to their daughter Ayesha in the dowry. My mother-in-law did not allow my husband to come to the hospital at the time of my delivery. At the time of my ‘God-Bharai’, she demanded clothes and my mother-in-law puts restrictions on my eating food and having breakfast. She asks me to eat the same vegetable three times a day and asks me not to eat breakfast, she lets me drink tea once a day, she has installed cameras in my kitchen. My mother-in-law locks me in the house from outside. She does not allow me to talk to my husband. My husband would come to me at 11 o'clock in the night and would quarrel with me and assault me. My sister-in-law and brother-in-law would come to Ghosla almost every day and would scare me and threaten to kill me. They do not give me my mobile phone, they do not let my family members come to Ghosla and talk to me even on the phone. It is the daily routine of my father-in-law to hurl abuses morning and evening.” ***** 23.01.2023 …. Since after my marriage, I have been tortured and threatened. Ask your father to give a car and a demand was raised for an A.C. in my sister-in-law's marriage. When the demand could not be fulfilled by my father, I am being made to eat same vegetable for three days and they do not allow me to take my breakfast and I am given tea only once in a day. My mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law and father-in-law come together to my room and hurl abuses and threaten me. My father-in-law hurls abuses in obscene language and my mother-in-law makes me work the entire day and does not let me eat anything. My sister-in-law and brother-in-law everyday tell my mother-in-law to send him away over the phone. Many times they confine me in the room and lock the same from outside and I am not allowed to go out and I am not even allowed to open the window of the house. They 16 have confined me as hostage in the house for many days. They do not let me talk to my family on phone and do not even let my family members meet me. My husband is also involved in all this. He never gives me even 2 rupees for expenses. They do not even allow me to visit my relatives. As such, being troubled by all this, I came to my parents' house. ….” It is also apposite that we extract the relevant portions of the FIR so as to better understand the allegations against the private respondents, particularly the two specific incidents that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022. The relevant extract reads thus: “…..I kept tolerating their taunts in order to save my marital life. But on 22.07.2021, my husband Ishan Khan, mother-in-law Irfana Bee, father-in-law Ishaq Khan, sister-in law Aaysha Bee and brother-in-law (Nandoi) Syed Khan hurled abuses to me. My brother- in-law (Nandoi) Syed Khan slapped me also and asked me to bring dowry from your father's house. Despite all this, I kept tolerating their torture. But on 27.11.2022, my husband Ishan Khan told me that I have passed the examination of M.B.B.S. and now I have to pursue M.C.I. Examination, as such, now if you will bring an amount of Rs. fifty lacs from your father, only then, I will keep you with me and say this, he ousted me and my son Iwaan Khan from the house while holding our hand. Thereafter, I came to my father Zahid Khan's house at Alot and narrated the entire incident to my father and mother Parveen Bee. Since then, I am residing at Alot alongwith my father. My father made several attempts to make my husband and in-laws understand but these people are adamant for their demand of dowry of a sum of Rs. fifty lacs that unless and until, they are given a dowry of Rs. fifty lacs, they will not take me with them. Today, I have come to make a report in the police station alongwith my father Zahid Khan. I lodge the report, action may be taken.” (emphasis supplied) 17 20. The classic exposition on law under Section 482 of the CrP.C is found in Bhajan Lal (supra) wherein this Court elaborated upon the scope of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. It was held thus: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 18 (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 21. In Daxaben v. State of Gujarat9, a two-Judge Bench held as follows: “26. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide, such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is not to be exercised for the asking. 27. In Monica Kumar v. State of U.P. [(2008) 8 SCC 781 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 649], this Court held that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. 28. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would only be justified when the complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142 : AIR 1990 SC 494]. 19 ***** 36. Offence under Section 306 IPC of abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course, the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is wide and can even be exercised to quash criminal proceedings relating to non- compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of court. Where the victim and offender have compromised disputes essentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court can exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be exercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.” 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. 23. This Court in the case of State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty10 held that: “8.2. It is trite that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in rare cases. As per the settled proposition of law while examining an FIR/complaint quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than any ordinary rule. Normally the criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC when after a thorough investigation the charge-sheet has been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application under Section 482 CrPC the courts are not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or evidence in detail as if 20 conducting the mini-trial. As held by this Court the powers under Section 482 CrPC are very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.” 24. Further in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh11, this Court held that at the stage of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the High Court is not required to conduct a mini trial. “6. From the impugned common judgment and order [Aryan Singh v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4158] passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned trial court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency.” (emphasis supplied) 25. This Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited (supra) gave following directions to the Courts exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.: “Conclusions 33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or 21 “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173 CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: 33.1 …. 33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences. 33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. 33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest of rare cases” (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). 33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. 33.6 …. 33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule. 33.8 to 33.11 …. 33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the 22 investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure. 33.13 and 33.14 ….. 33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.” (emphasis supplied) 26. Further, this Court in the case of State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani12 held that: “13. There can be no dispute over the proposition that inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and when and only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the provision itself. There is no denial of the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it needs no special emphasis to state that conferment of wide power requires the Court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 14. In this regard, it would be seemly to reproduce a passage from Kurukshetra University [Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 451 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 613] wherein Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship then was) opined thus : (SCC p. 451, para 2) 23 “2. It surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a first information report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the FIR. It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases.”” (emphasis supplied) 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prime facie case against the accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the appellant as she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini trial.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that the High Court could not have conducted a mini trial when there is prima facie evidence for demand of dowry and therefore upturns the order passed by the High Court and 24 permits continuance of trial against the husband. The observations of the Apex Court would become applicable to the case at hand on a cursory perusal at the averments in the complaint and the summary of the charge sheet as quoted hereinabove. Therefore, the petitioner will have to come out clean in a full blown trial, insofar as the offences under the IPC and under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 are concerned. 9. What remains is the offence under the Act. The offence alleged against the petitioner under the Act is that the petitioner has hurled abuses against the wife and the members of her family calling the name of the caste. The complaint is conspicuously absent as to whether that has been done in a public place or a place within public view. The abuses have allegedly been hurled between the husband and the wife within four walls of the house. The only averment is that the petitioner was so loud that the neighbours could hear hurling of the abuses. This, in the considered view of the Court, would not meet the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) or 3(1)(s) of the Act. The allegations are vague with no specific instances of hurling of abuses in a public 25 place or in a place within public view. The four walls of a house in which the husband and the wife in a quarrel allegedly hurl abuses taking the name of the caste would not mean that it would become an offence under the Act. The Apex Court in KARUPPUDAYAR v. STATE2 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 8. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be apposite to refer to the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, which read thus: “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.— (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (a) ……………………………………………… (b) ……………………………………………… xxx xxx xxx (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” 9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal that for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be established that the accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence 2 2025 SCC Online SC 215 26 under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the accused abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view. 10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel2. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand3 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as under: “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”]. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443- 44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn 27 outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original)” 11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.” (Emphasis supplied) The said judgment is followed by the Apex Court in the case of GUNJAN @ GIRIJA KUMARI v. STATE3 wherein the Apex Court puts its imprimatur to the judgment rendered by this Court in RITHESH PAIS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA4 wherein this Court had held that a basement of an apartment complex would not be a place of public view. The Apex Court has held as follows: 3 2026 SCC Online SC 834 4 2022 SCC Online Kar 1676 28 “…. …. …. 5.1 Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act read as under, “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— 3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (a) to (q) ……….. (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” 5.1.1 The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act can be said to have been committed when a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with an intent to humiliate a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is made out when any member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name in any place within public view. 5.2 The ingredients of the offences are that there has to be an intentional insult or intimidation which has to be with an intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that such member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name by a person who does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The common essential for constituting the offence under both the Sections is that the insult or intimidation under sub-clause (r) or hurling of abuses under sub-clause (s) have taken place “in any place within public view”. 5.3 All the appellants are framed for the offence under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC. Section 506, IPC is about 29 punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation whereas the offence of criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503, IPC. It says that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, and when the same is done with an intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. Section 34, IPC speaks about the acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. 5.4 Before examining the sustainability of the charge framed and the charge-sheet for its details and contents in respect of the aforesaid offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, it would be useful to survey few decisions of this Court which have explained the scope and purport of the phrase “in any place within public view” pinpointing that the said requirement is indispensable to be fulfilled in order that the offence under the SC/ST Act is constituted. 5.5 In Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel7, the place where the informant was insulted by the appellant by calling him ‘chamar’ was one where he had been standing near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises of his employer. This Court held that such place was “a place within public view”. The argument that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence did not come within the purview of the offence under the SC/ST Act was negatived by explaining a fine distinction between the expression ‘in any place within public view’ as used in the provision and the expression ‘public place’. 5.5.1 It was stated that the expression ‘a place within public view’ could not be confused with the expression ‘public place’. It was highlighted that a place can be a private place yet can be within public view, “….It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the 30 boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view….” (Para 28) 5.6 Swaran Singh (supra) came to be relied on by this Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand8 in respect of the concept of ‘place within public view’ as an ingredient of the offence. The very observations in Swaran Singh (supra) were reiterated in paragraph 14 in Hitesh Verma (supra) when the Court noticed the allegations in the FIR about abusing the informant. It was stated in the FIR that the incident of abuse happened within the four walls of the building of the informant, and it was not the case of the informant that any member of the public was present at the time of the incident in the house. The Court, therefore, ruled that the basic requirement that the abusive words were uttered in ‘a place within public view’ was not made out. It was further noticed that witnesses whose names were appended to the chargesheet were not the persons present within the four walls of the building. 5.7 In a more recent decision in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy9, this Court considered its own decisions in Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Hitesh Verma (supra), and elucidated an ironed-out proposition of law as under, “It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.” (Para 11) 31 5.7.1 The Court observed that even by taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, what was alleged was that when the complainant was in the office, the accused came there, made inquiries from the complainant and upon not being satisfied, started abusing the complainant in the name of his caste and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came later to pacify the accused and took him away. The Court thus noticed that the incident had taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant, which was not “a place within public view”. 5.8 A decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sri Rithesh Pais v. State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S.10 may also be noticed to be relevant, in which the offence was held to be not made out as the chargesheet material showed that the hurling of the abuses had happened in the basement and within the walls of the basement, holding that the basement of the building was not “a place within public view”. 5.9 A conclusive statement of law that emanates from the ratio of the decisions of this Court discussed above is that in order to make out the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act and conduct of hurling of caste-based abuses must take place at “a place within public view”. It must be a place within the public gaze. Even happens to be a private place, then in such eventuality a public-eye must have an access to be able to notice what happens there or what is taking place that will only make the “place within public view”. 6. Having appreciated the aspect that the requirement that the occurrence of the incident of insult or abuse, towards the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has to be in “a place within public view”, making the same a necessary condition for constituting the offence under the SC/ST Act, the facts in the present case may be attentively noticed. 32 6.1 In the FIR, while referring to the incident of abuse, on 28.01.2021, the statements were made by respondent No. 2-complainant that the appellants were in the habit of harassing and hurling caste-based slurs at him for over a year and that they used to do it when some other persons or friends come to meet him, by using the abusive words from their balcony or at the ground floor of the house. 6.2 These allegations about the alleged continuous conduct did not speak of any specific instance or happening on a particular day and they are too irrelevant to contribute to make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. It was next stated that because of such behaviour of the appellants, respondent No. 1-complainant had to send his son in a separate house. Such general accusations lead nowhere when it comes to allegation about the commission of offence. 6.3 As per the averments in the FIR, on the relevant date that is on 28.01.2021, the altercation occurred at the time when the appellants were trying to break open the house of respondent No. 2-complainant. According to respondent No. 2-complainant, appellant No. 1 hurled casteist slur in an abusive way to insult him and his wife. All the appellants-accused, it was further alleged, intimidated respondent No. 2-complainant and also threatened to implicate him in molestation charge. 6.4 It was noticeable that in the complaint/FIR, nowhere it was stated that the said incident wherein appellant No. 1 and other appellants are stated to have abused and threatened respondent No. 1-complainant, took place where there was a public gaze. The necessary ingredient of occurrence of the incident “in a place within public view” was conspicuously absent. 6.5 Not only that it was not stated that it was “a place within public view” or that the outsiders or the members of the family were present at the time, the details mentioned in the FIR clearly indicated that the 33 place of occurrence of the incident was inside the residential house. Referring to the facts stated and the contents of FIR in this regard, firstly the FIR is silent about the place of occurrence of the alleged incident. Secondly, point No. 5(b) in the FIR mentioned the place of occurrence at the address stated as “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi”, which was admittedly a residential home. Similarly was recorded the address of respondent No. 2-complainant in point No. 6(e) in the FIR to reinforce that it was the place of residential house where the occurrence took place. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed before the court, the very residential address “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, Kirti Nagar, Delhi” was mentioned to suggest the place of occurrence. 6.6 Respondent No. 2-complainant named two witnesses, one Love Manchanda and another named Chandra Prakash. Not only that both were the friends of respondent No. 2- complainant, from their statements, nothing could be elicited to show that they witnessed the incident. Love Manchanda stated that “on 28.12.2020, Bhim Sain (complainant) asked me to accompany him to his house where he wanted to take a picture of the locked lock of his house”. In his statement, Chandra Prakash stated that “he went to the house at Ramesh Nagar with the complainant Bhim Sain and when he wanted to open the lock of his house, the accused interjected”. 6.7 All material facts go to suggest that the alleged incident took place in a private place and within four walls of the house of respondent No. 2-complainant and the appellants, who all are family members. While the allegation in the FIR was, as stated, that respondent No. 2-complainant had been suffering similar kind of incidents since long and for last one year, it was not stated anything specific in respect of those earlier incidents with regard to the incident for which the complaint was filed, it was not indicated that any independent member of public was present to witness the occurrence. Once that is so, to suggest that the house place was not exposed to public eye or public gaze, a residential house in no way becomes “a place within public view”. 34 7. For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting point is filing of a complaint and registration of FIR. The complaint/FIR provides the first account of the happening of events and incidents alleged as commission of offence. A reaction and revelation at the first blush is always natural and therefore becomes creditworthy. The contents of the complaint giving the initial and primary description could be treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage, there would be a scope and room for improvisation. 8. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal11, this Court laid down the acid test that if the contents of the FIR, taken at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused, such an FIR registered with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed. In Hitesh Verma (supra), in addition to the ingredient of “a place within public view”, the details in the FIR or the charge-sheet failed to disclose the precise contents of abusive language employed by the applicant to attract the offence under the SC/ST Act. In other words, when the essentials to constitute the offence did not come out from and were not satisfied in the contents of the FIR, the offence was held to have not been made out, rendering the FIR liable to be quashed. 8.1 In Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh12, this Court noted that the defect in the FIR was in the nature of non- mentioning of the name of material witness PW-1 which was treated as a basic defect in the hypothesis portrayed by the prosecution. The Court, in that context, observed, “although we accept that the FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of the crime, but absence of certain essential facts which are conspicuously missing in the present FIR, point towards suspicion that the crime itself may have been staged”. 8.2 Also in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh13, this Court found absence of requisite ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act holding that the offence was not committed at “a place within public view”. It was observed that even though the appellant in that case might have abused the 35 complainant, but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in view of the clear absence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. 9. Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged therein. The basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR must stem and stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR. In order that the FIR alleging any action is sustainable in law to be a good and acceptable document to proceed criminally against any accused named therein or any person to be made accused on its basis, it must manifest and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s) alleged therein. For an offence to be made out under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant case, the requirement that the occurrence has to be “in a place within public view” is not satisfied, is missing and absent. 9.1 It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to become an offence under the SC/ST Act must have happened “in a place within public view”, is in a way, a principal requirement amongst the other ingredients. The other aspects namely “intentional insult or intimidation” and “an intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind of intensity when the insult, intimidation, humiliation or abusive utterances, as the case may be, takes place in “a place within public view”, in the presence of members of the public. The requirement that the place must be one “within public view” can be said to be substantiating the other elements of the offence under the SC/ST Act. It is therefore a sine qua non for making out the offence under the SC/ST Act.” (Emphasis supplied) If the ingredients of the complaint and the summary of the charge sheet are considered on the bedrock of the principles laid down by 36 the Apex Court, the unmistakable inference would be that the offences under the Act are loosely laid against the petitioner. Therefore, the offences under the Act, are on the face of it, unsustainable and permitting further trial against the petitioner for the offences under the Act, would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. Resultantly, the offences under the Act requires obliteration, while offences under the IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 are to be sustained and it is for the petitioner to come out clean in a full-blown trial. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal Petition is allowed in part. (ii) Impugned proceedings in Special Case No.655 of 2023 pending before the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Special Judge, Bengaluru insofar as the offences under the Act is concerned stand quashed. (iii) The offences under the IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act stand sustained. 37 (iv) The trial be conducted by the regular Court in the light of quashment of the proceedings under the Act. Consequently, pending applications if any, also stand disposed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:BR