2026:CGHC:7704 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 147 of 2025 1 - Kailash Chouhan S/o Late Shri Adalat Chouhan Aged About 51 Years Through- Power Of Attorney Holder Smt. Kedalti Chouhan, W/o Kailash Chouhan Aged About 49 Years, R/o Nehru Road, Near Adalt Saw Mill, Supela, Bhilai, Dist- Durg ( C.G. ). 2 - Sanjay Chouhan S/o Late Shri Adalat Chouhan Aged About 47 Years R/o Nehru Road, Near Adalt Saw Mill, Supela, Bhilai, Dist- Durg ( C.G. ). 3 - Naresh Chouhan S/o Late Shri Adalat Chouhan Aged About 61 Years R/o Nehru Road, Near Adalt Saw Mill, Supela, Bhilai, Dist- Durg ( C.G. ) ... Applicant(s) versus 1 - Ganesh Chouhan S/o Late Shri Adalat Chouhan Aged About 56 Years R/o Beisde Kamla Medical, Supela, P.S. Supela, Dist- Durg ( C.G. ). ... Respondent(s) RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT For Applicant(s) : Mr. Rakesh Kumar Manikpuri, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Praveen K. Dhurandhar, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 11/02/2026 1. By way of this revision, the applicant has prayed for following reliefs:- “It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to allow the Civil Revision Petition and set aside the order dated 22.04.2025 passed by learned Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 18-A/2021, in the interest of justice.” 2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the plaintiff–respondent has instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property situated at Supela, South Gangotri, D- Block, Tahsil and District Durg (C.G.), admeasuring 60 x 82 + 85/2 sq. ft., out of which he has constructed a shop measuring 12 x 15 sq. ft. (180 sq. ft.), the detailed description of which is mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint. It is pleaded that the property was earlier within the jurisdiction of the Special Area Development Authority (SADA) and is presently within the limits of the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai; that in the year 1986 SADA divided the area into four blocks, namely A, B, C and D, and allotted plots to various persons for business purposes, and the suit land was allotted to the plaintiff, with electricity connection issued in his name. It is further stated that vide Letter No. 908 dated 09.06.1992 SADA proposed issuance of patta in favour of possession holders, but as no decision was taken, the plaintiff filed WPC No. 1120/2018 seeking compliance of the earlier decision, which was disposed of on 04.05.2018; however, despite the said order, the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai failed to issue patta in his favour. The plaintiff contends that during survey proceedings his name was recorded as possession holder, though the defendants’ names were wrongly included in the survey list; demarcation also confirmed his possession, and the Corporation issued him an ID for payment of property tax. The plaintiff asserts that he has been in possession since 1992, is the sole possession holder, and had let out a portion of the property to Gauhar Ali in 2012 at a monthly rent of Rs. 3,500/-, but in 2020 the said tenant stopped paying rent and claimed possession, leading to a complaint. It is alleged that the defendants are unlawfully disputing his possession and attempting to mutate their names in municipal records without any legal right, compelling him to file the present suit for declaration of his status as sole possession holder and for permanent injunction restraining interference. Upon service of notice, the defendants appeared and filed a joint written statement denying the plaint averments, contending that their father, Adalat Chouhan, had been running business on the suit property since 1964; after establishment of SADA, the land was allotted to him based on his prior possession, and after his death the names of both plaintiff and defendants were jointly recorded in municipal and survey records; they further assert that the land was partitioned during the lifetime of Adalat Chouhan and the parties are in separate possession of their respective shares. The defendants also pleaded that the property belongs to the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai and the State Government has authority over allotment, and as the Corporation and State have not been impleaded, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and not maintainable. Issues were framed on 04.08.2022 and an additional issue on 03.02.2024. Defendant No. 3 thereafter filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the property belongs to the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, that the allotment application had been rejected by order dated 29.08.2024, and that in absence of impleadment of the Corporation the suit is barred by law. The plaintiff filed a reply stating that he has not sought declaration of title, that notices under Section 80 CPC and Section 401 of the Municipal Corporation Act were issued, that the defendants’ names were wrongly inserted in survey records, and that the suit is not barred by law. By impugned order dated 22.04.2025, the learned trial court rejected the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC holding that the suit does not appear to be barred by law and that jurisdiction is not ousted. It is contended that the said order is illegal and contrary to law as the trial court failed to consider that the property belongs to the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, that vide letter dated 29.08.2024 the plaintiff’s claim was rejected and his possession termed illegal, and that without impleading the Corporation the suit for declaration and permanent injunction is not maintainable; hence, the present Civil Revision has been filed challenging the order dated 22.04.2025. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned order dated 22.04.2025 passed by the learned 8th District Judge, Durg in Civil Suit No. 18-A/2021 is contrary to law as well as to the facts available on record. It is contended that although SADA had divided the concerned area into four blocks, namely A, B, C and D, in the year 1986 and had issued Letter No. 908 dated 09.06.1992 for grant of patta in favour of possession holders, the plaintiff has utterly failed to establish any lawful title over the suit property and has merely asserted possession, alleging that a portion thereof was let out to Gauhar Ali in the year 2020 at a monthly rent of Rs. 3,500/-. He further submits that the suit for declaration and permanent injunction was instituted on 28.06.2021, the respondents filed their written statement on 29.11.2021, and issues were framed on 04.08.2022, however, at the stage of final arguments on 03.02.2024, the learned Trial Court itself observed that an additional issue regarding maintainability of the suit in the absence of a necessary party was required to be framed and accordingly framed such issue. He further submits that despite this development, the plaintiff’s application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC seeking impleadment of Nagar Palika Nigam, Bhilai (C.G.) was rejected on 05.10.2024, which clearly demonstrates that the suit suffers from non-joinder of a necessary party. It is further submitted that the plaintiff attempted to rectify the defect by issuing notice under Section 401 of the Municipal Corporation Act and by filing an application, however, in the absence of the Municipal Corporation as a party to the proceedings, the suit remains barred by law. He further submits that the applicant, therefore, rightly preferred an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on 22.02.2025 seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground of non-maintainability, but the same has not been properly appreciated or considered by the learned Trial Court. It is argued that continuation of the suit proceedings, particularly in view of the interim order dated 06.01.2026 passed in W.P. (227) No. 206/2025, amounts to an abuse of the process of law. Learned counsel further submits that the Trial Court failed to consider that the plaintiff/respondent has instituted the suit in respect of property which admittedly belongs to the Municipal Corporation Bhilai and, in paragraphs 8(a) and 8(b) of the plaint, has categorically averred that no relief has been claimed against the State of Chhattisgarh or the Municipal Corporation Bhilai and that they are not necessary parties; despite such clear pleadings, the settled legal position that the true owner of the property is a necessary party and that mandatory notice under Section 401 of the Municipal Corporation Act must precede institution of the suit has been overlooked. It is contended that non-impleadment of the Municipal Corporation and the State constitutes a fundamental defect which cannot be cured at a belated stage and, in the absence of any relief sought against the true owner, the suit discloses no cause of action and is barred by law. Consequently, the learned Trial Court has committed a grave error in holding the suit to be maintainable and in rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Brajesh Kumar & Another vs. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur passed in SA No. 391/2004 on 26.4.2014. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the plaintiff had instituted the suit for declaration of his status as sole possession holder and for permanent injunction in respect of Schedule-A property, namely a plot admeasuring 5000 sq. ft. situated at Dakshin Gangotri, D-Block, Supela, Tahsil and District Durg (C.G.), which originally belonged to SADA and, after its abolition, came under the management of the Municipal Corporation Bhilai, Supela, District Durg (C.G.), and that possession of the said land had been granted to the plaintiff in the year 1992 under the policy of settlement of shopkeepers. The suit also pertains to Schedule-B property, i.e., the plaintiff’s house and shop, over which the defendants—who are his real brothers—are allegedly interfering. It is contended that the application filed by defendant No.3 under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, alleging that the plaintiff is an encroacher and that the suit is barred by law, did not disclose any specific statutory bar or jurisdictional prohibition, and therefore the learned trial court rightly rejected the same by order dated 22.04.2025, holding that the plaint does not ex facie disclose any legal bar. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff had moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to implead the Municipal Corporation Bhilai as a necessary party, which was rejected and is presently under challenge in a writ petition wherein interim orders have been passed; however, non-impleadment of a necessary party is a curable defect and, in view of Order I Rules 9 and 10 CPC, cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Lala Nahata v. Chandi Prasad Sikaria (2007) 2 SCC 551 and P. Suresh v. D. Kalavani and others, 2026 SCC Online SC 143, to contend that cause of action is a bundle of facts and that rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC has drastic consequences and must be strictly confined to the grounds pleaded in the application itself, thus, new pleas raised only during oral arguments, such as absence of notice to the Municipal Corporation, cannot be entertained. It is lastly submitted that the suit is at the stage of final arguments, additional issues including that of necessary party have already been framed, and therefore the impugned order rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is just, legal and calls for no interference in revision. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Upon a careful perusal of the plaint as well as the reliefs sought therein, it clearly emerges that the plaintiff has prayed for a declaration to the effect that he be declared the lawful possessor and bhoomiswami/holder of the properties described in Schedule- A, which, according to him, were taken over from the Special Area Development Authority (SADA) and the Nagar Palik Nigam, Bhilai, and that he has been in possession thereof since the year 1992. The plaintiff has further sought a declaration that he is legally entitled to receive rent from his tenant, Gauhar Ali, in respect of the said property, and has contended that the defendant has no right, power, or authority whatsoever to interfere with his lawful possession and enjoyment of the property or to create any obstruction or hindrance in the exercise of his rights. The aforesaid claims and assertions are evident from the averments made in the relevant paragraphs of the plaint. 7. A plain reading of the reliefs sought by the plaintiff further makes it abundantly clear that no specific or substantive relief has been claimed against the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai. The plaintiff has neither sought any declaration, injunction, nor any other consequential relief against the Municipal Corporation. Consequently, the plaintiff has not impleaded the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai as a party defendant in the present proceedings, as no cause of action or grievance has been articulated against it, and no relief has been claimed which would necessitate its presence as a party respondent in the suit. 8. The provision of Section 401 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 which reads as under:- “401. Notice, limitation and tender of amends in suit against Corporation, etc. (1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation, the 2[Mayor-in-council] or any Corporation officer or servant, or any person acting under the direction of the Corporation, the 2[Mayor-in-Council] or any municipal officer or servant, in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or any rule or byelaw made thereunder until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the Chief Corporation Office or at the residence of such officer, servant or person stating with adequate particulars - (a) the cause of action; (b) the name and residence of the intending plaintiff and of his advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of the suit; and (c) the relief which he claims. (2) Every such suit shall be commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action, and the plaint therein shall contain a statement that a notice has been delivered or left as required by sub-section (1). (3) If the Corporation or any person to whom any notice is given under sub-section (1) has tendered sufficient amends so the plaintiff before the suit is instituted, the suit shall be dismissed. (4) If the defendant in any such suit is the Commissioner or any other Corporation Officer or servant, payment of any sum or part thereof payable by him or in consequence of the suit may, with the sanction of the [Mayor-in-Council] be made from the Municipal Fund.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Prem Lala Nahata and another vs. Chandi Prasad Sikaria, (2007) 2 SCC 551, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “12. Thus, in a case where a plaint suffers from the defect of misjoinder of parties or misjoinder of causes of action either in terms of Order 1 Rule 1 and Order 1 Rule 3 on the one hand, or Order 2 Rule 3 on the other, the Code itself indicates that the perceived defect does not make the suit one barred by law or liable to rejection. This is clear from Rules 3-A, 4 and 5 of Order 1 of the Code, and this is emphasized by Rule 9 of Order 1 of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and the court may in either case deal with the matter in controversy so far as it regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. This is further emphasised by Rule 10 of Order 1 which enables the court in appropriate circumstances to substitute or add any person as a plaintiff in a suit. Order 2 deals with the framing of a suit and Rule 3 provides that save as d otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of actions against the same defendant and any plaintiffs having causes of actions in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant may unite such causes of action in the same suit. Rule 6 enables the court to order separate trials even in a case of misjoinder of causes of action in a plaint filed. 17. Thus, when one considers Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code with particular reference to clause (d), it is difficult to say that a suit which is bad for misjoinder of parties or misjoinder of causes of action, is a suit barred by any law. A procedural objection to the impleading of parties or to the joinder of causes of action or the frame of the suit, could be successfully urged only as a procedural objection which may enable the court either to permit the continuance of the suit as it is or to direct the plaintiff or plaintiffs to elect to proceed with a part of the suit or even to try the causes of action joined in the suit as separate suits.” 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P. Suresh vs. D. Kalaivani and others, 2026 SCC Online SC 143, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “6.2. Now, there is a specific provision under the CPC in the nature of Order VII Rule 11, which deals with the rejection of the plaint, which mentions specific grounds on which the court may reject the plaint. The said provision is reproduced herein, 11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) where It does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper Insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff falls to comply with the provisions of rule 9. 6.2.1. The provision says that the plaint shall be rejected in the following cases, firstly, if it does not disclose a cause of action. Now, the cause of action is a bundle of facts. Whether cause of action exists for the purpose of validly instituting the suit or not would necessarily require a factual inquiry. The second ground is that the relief claimed when undervalued and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation and pay the deficit court fee within the time which may be fixed by the Court, falls to do so. The third ground mentioned for rejection of the plaint is similar with regard to the plaint which is Insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff has failed to supply the requisite stamp paper within the time fixed by the court, 6.2.2. The fourth ground is about the suit appearing from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Though this may be a legal consideration, the attendant facts would become relevant and the Issue may not always be finally adjudged without application of facts. The fifth ground is that the plaint is not filed in duplicate. This is curable defect and a procedural aspect. The sixth ground is where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, which is also not to be immune from consideration of facts of the case. 6.2.3. As far as the ground of correction of valuation for supplying of the stamp paper is concerned, the proviso mentions that time may be extended by the Court, for the reasons to be recorded, if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of exceptional nature. There is no gainsaying that there will have to be factual inquiry In the process of determination for rejection of plaint and for the satisfaction to be arrived at by the Court with regard to the extension of time, which the court may grant. Therefore, it would be entirely proper to conclude that when the grounds for rejection of the plaint, provided In statutory provision, require the consideration of the facts of the case, such issue should not be gone Into by exercising supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, which even otherwise is supposed to be exercised by the Court sparingly and not just for the purpose of correcting purported errors. In any view, the overriding criteria in law is that the supervisory Jurisdiction cannot be applied to substitute the remedy available specifically in the CPC Itself.” 11. It is further pertinent to mention that the suit has already reached an advanced stage and pertains to a dispute between the brothers, wherein the matter is presently at the stage of final arguments. Notably, an additional issue with regard to the question of necessary parties was also framed by the learned Trial Court on 03.02.2024. In such circumstances, the Trial Court, after duly considering the entire factual and legal aspects of the matter, has rightly declined to interfere by invoking the provisions of Section 401 of the Act of 1956. The Court has correctly observed that the defence sought to be raised by the defendant cannot be taken into consideration at the stage of deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it is well settled that, for the purpose of adjudicating such an application, only the averments made in the plaint are to be examined. On a plain reading of the plaint, there is nothing on record to suggest that the suit is barred by any law. More precisely, the requirement of service of notice under Section 401(A) of the Act, as a condition precedent for institution of the suit, does not appear to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 12. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, passed in S.A. No. 391/2004, is clearly distinguishable on facts and circumstances and does not have direct applicability to the present case. The factual matrix, nature of reliefs sought, and the stage of proceedings in the said matter materially differ from those involved herein. In the present case, the suit has already reached the verge of completion, and the learned Trial Court has duly framed proper and comprehensive issues for adjudication of the disputes between the parties. Therefore, at such an advanced stage of the proceedings, when the matter is ripe for final consideration, reliance upon a judgment based on a different factual background is misplaced and does not warrant any interference. 13. Accordingly, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the material available on record, and the submissions advanced, this Court finds that the present revision petition is wholly devoid of merit and does not warrant any interference. No illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error has been demonstrated in the impugned order so as to justify the exercise of revisional powers. Hence, the revision petition, being unsustainable in law, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat