[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 1347/2019 In D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 2016/2018 In D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 663/2025 Nirmala Runthla W/o Late Shri G.R. Runthala, Aged About 59 Years, Resident Of Near Dalmiya School, Station Road, Chidawa, District Jhunjhunu (Raj) ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan Through Its Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur 2. 2/1. Shri Vaibhav Galriya, Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur. Dr. Arushi Ajey Malik, Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur. 3. Dr. Om Prakash Bairwa, Commissioner, College Education, Rajasthan, Srk Shiksha Sankul, Jln Marg, Jaipur. 4. Shri A.k. Mohanti, Secretary, Management Committee, Chirawa College, Chirawa, Distt. Jhunjhunu 5. Dr. Richa Kulshresth, Principal, Chirawa College, Chirawa, Distt. Jhunjhunu ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Tanveer Ahamad Mr. Iliyas Khan For Respondent(s) : Mr. G.S. Gill, AAG with Ms. Shikha Sharma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP TANEJA Order 29/01/2026 1. Petitioner’s husband-Late Shri G.R. Runthala was stated to be a Lecturer in private aided College viz. Chidawa College, District Jhunjhunu and after his death, petitioner preferred this contempt [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (2 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] petition alleging disobedience of the directions in rem issued in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 663/2015: State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. The Management Committee Sh. Bhagwan Das Todi College & two other connected appeals decided on 06.11.2015. 2. Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that no independent and separate appeal or petition, in respect of not granting benefits to deceased- Late Shri G.R. Runthala in terms of directions issued under Bhagwan Das Todi (supra), was ever instituted and the contempt petition has been filed directly, alleging disobedience of such directions qua Late Shri G.R. Runthala. 3. Having heard learned counsels for both the parties, both the counsels do not dispute that the identical issue, which has arisen in this contempt petition, has already been dealt with in detail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 1666/2018: Dr. Anil Kumar Mathur and ors. Vs. Mr. Ashutosh A.T. Pednekar and ors. and other connected matters, decided vide judgment dated 21.08.2025 and the present contempt petition may also be disposed of in terms of the judgment dated 21.08.2025. 4. For ready reference, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment dated 21.08.2025: “12. We are reminded of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and Others-(1996) 6 SCC 291, wherein three Judges bench of the Supreme Court has observed as under:- [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (3 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] “6. The question then is whether the Division Bench) was right in setting aside the direction issued by the learned single Judge to redraw the seniority list. It is contended by Mr. S.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that unless the learned Judge goes into the correctness of the decision taken by the Government in preparation of the seniority list in the light of the law laid down by three Benches, the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether or not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyed the orders of the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Therefore, the learned single Judge of the High Court necessarily has to go into the merits of that question. We do not find that the contention is well founded. It is seen that, admittedly, the respondents had prepared the seniority list on 2.7.1991 Subsequently promotions came to be made. The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceedings to find out, whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, afresh direction by the learned single Judge cannot be given to redraw [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (4 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the Division Bench has exercised the power under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a judgment or order of the single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the mistake committed by the learned single Judge. Therefore, it may not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in this Court against the judgment of the learned single Judge when the matter was already seized of the Division Bench. 7. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. It may be open to the aggrieved party to assail the correctness of the seniority list prepared by the State Government, if it is not in comformity with the directions issued by the High Court, if they so advised, in an appropriate forum. No costs.” 12.1.The view taken by the Supreme Court in J.S.Parihar (supra) has been reiterated in Snehasis Giri Vs. Subhasis Mitra-(2023) 18 SCC 529. In Snehasis Giri (supra), it was held that in contempt proceedings of almost like persons, interim orders were passed on the basis that benefits were not confined and relief not granted only to the parties to the litigation but that the directions had the effect of in rem adjudication. The Court, therefore, directed the respondent contemnors to verify from the record with respect to entitlement of all the contempt petitioners but urged that there are express directions of this Court to release salaries of the contempt petitioners without insisting on verifying genuineness of their claims. Considering all the aspects, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (5 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] “10. Furthermore, there is merit in the respon- dents’ submission that the court, in contempt proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examine matters which are not part of its remit, i.e. ex- tent of the direction or orders contained in the judgement of which contempt is being alleged. In fact, in the decision in Sudhir Vasudeva (supra), it was held as follows: “19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Consti- tution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in re- spect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or or- der or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues can- not be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (6 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] available to the Court in other corrective jurisdic- tions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Gan- guly[(2002) 5 SCC 352] , V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610], Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop. Soci- ety Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami [(2008) 5 SCC 339] and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV [(2006) 1 SCC 613].” 11. In the present case too, this court is of the opinion that the respondents’ stand that without verification of the petitioners' appointment and whether the procedures prescribed were duly fol- lowed in respect of matters such as fulfilling eligi- bility conditions (essential qualifications and rele- vant experience); availability of vacancy; staff pattern in respect of madrasas where recognition was granted and if so for what period; whether the institution was aided and recognized or not or recognized and non-aided, and if so for what du- ration; whether a duly empowered selection body or bodies considered the candidature of the claimant before he/she was appointed and whether the committee or body selecting the in- dividual/claimant was constituted in accordance with the rules or guidelines, etc is justified. In these circumstances, this court is of the opinion [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (7 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] that further proceedings cannot be continued as no determination can be made unless there is a due verification in regard to the employment of each of the petitioners. 12. Furthermore, this court, in lawful exercise of contempt jurisdiction, cannot examine the merits of a decision, whether the state or the madrasa’s stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to the benefits of being treated as an employee, having regard to the concerned rules and regulations. In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar this court ex- plained the limited scope of contempt proceed- ings, as follows, in the facts of the case: “6. The question then is whether the Division Bench was right in setting aside the direction is- sued by the learned Single Judge to redraw the seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K. Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that unless the learned Judge goes into the correct- ness of the decision taken by the Government in preparation of the seniority list in the light of the law laid down by three Benches, the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether or not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyed the orders of the Court as defined un- der Section 2(b) of the Act. Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court necessar- ily has to go into the merits of that question. We do not find that the contention is well founded. It is seen that, admittedly, the respondents had prepared the seniority list on 2-7-1991. Subse- quently promotions came to be made. The ques- tion is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (8 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an ap- propriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the ag- grieved party to avail of the opportunity of judi- cial review. But that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. After re- exercis- ing the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge can- not be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the ju- risdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissi- ble under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the Division Bench has exercised the power under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordi- nance being a judgment or order of the Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected the mistake committed by the learned Single Judge. There- fore, it may not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in this Court against the judgment of the learned Single Judge when the matter was al- ready seized of the Division Bench.” 12.2. The Supreme Court exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, thereafter constituted a Committee to examine the claims of the petitioners. 13. We noticed that in none of the orders passed by the Court, the question regarding maintainability of the contempt petition was examined. [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (9 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] 14. It would be apposite to notice the provisions of Section 2 (b) of Contempt of Court’s Act, 1971 (for short ‘ the Act of 1971’):- “2. Definitions……... (a)-------------- (b) "civil contempt" means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an un- dertaking given to a court;” 14.1. Section 12 of the Act of 1971 reads as under:- “12. Punishment for contempt of court.— (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. Explanation.—An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or condi- tional if the accused makes it bona fide. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that speci- fied in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (10 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such pe- riod not exceeding six months as it may think fit. (4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person: Provided that nothing contained in this sub- section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commis- sion. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (4), where the contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been commit- ted with the consent or connivance of, or is at- tributable to any neglect on the part of, any di- rector, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be en- forced, with the leave of the court, by the deten- tion in civil prison of such director, manager, sec- retary or other officer. [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (11 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-sections (4) and (5),_ (a) “company” means any body corporate and in- cludes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a part- ner in the firm.” 14.2. Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the law as laid down in J.S. Parihar (supra) and Snehasis Giris (supra). 15. The petitioners’ contention of the judgment in the case of Bhagwan Das Todi (supra) being in rem and, therefore, no separate petition/application would require to be filed is found to be misconceived. The claims of the contempt petitioners are based upon separate set of fact with regard to the period of engagement, the institutes are different, the question as to when the employee was posted on the aided post and what aid was being received against their posts are all facts for which, finding is required to be given in each individual case. Such findings cannot be given in contempt proceedings. No reply can be received on facts in contempt proceedings. The nature of their termination/retirement/disengagement from such institution would also be looked into. 16. A close reading of the concluding para of the judgment passed in Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra), clearly shows that the Hon’ble Division Bench has held that the said judgment is not confined to the employees therein but also applies to several other employees who have either filed the writ petition or raised objections before the learned Tribunal. In the said context the Hon’ble Division Bench has held that the principle laid down in the said case would also be applicable in case of other similarly situated persons. The ‘term similarly situated’ used in the said para cannot be read in isolation but the same is required to be read in the context, which clearly [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (12 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] shows that the intention of the Hon’ble Division Bench is to make the principle laid down in the said case applicable also with regard to the petitioners who have already raised their grievance and submitted their independent claims before this Hon’ble Court or before the learned Tribunal. The intention of the Hon’ble Division Bench emerging of the said judgment read in its entirety is very clear that although the individual employee was required to establish their entitlement with regard to the benefits arising from their services rendered in the aided institution, however the said entitlement was to be adjudicated in view of the principles laid down in the case of Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra). In our opinion the contempt petitioners have misconstrued the intention of the Hon’ble Division Bench and without first getting their entitlement / claim independently adjudicated before this Hon’ble Court or before the learned Tribunal have straightway proceeded to file the contempt petition before this Hon’ble Division Bench meaning thereby the contempt of Court is alleged without there being any adjudication of their independent entitlement, which is not permissible in the eye of law. 16.1. We have also noticed that in respect of most of the contempt petitioners, the compliance / compliance in part has already been made, however, looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the individual cases, some benefits have not been extended to some of the contempt petitioners; which in our view, this gives rise to a separate cause of action to the petitioners, however they have contended that the complete compliance of the judgment passed in the case of Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra) has not been made. 17. It is reiterated that the scope of interference by this Court in contempt proceedings are very limited and the fresh adjudication of the claims of the contempt petitioners with regard to the part of benefits not allowed [2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB] (13 of 13) [CCP-1347/2019] by the State Government / Educational Institution looking to their peculiar facts cannot be done in the contempt proceedings. Since the respondents herein have considered the claim of the contempt petitioners and have already passed respective orders in the individual cases. The grievance, if any, left can be adjudicated before the appropriate authority / Court / Tribunal, however the same would not amount to wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order passed by this Hon’ble Court and, therefore, also the present contempt proceedings are not maintainable. 18. We are also aware of the limited power of the Court while deciding the contempt proceedings and we refrain from enlarging the scope of contempt petition, especially when there is an availability of statutory forum of Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutional Tribunal (for short ‘ the Tribunal’), which is competent to examine the claim of the individuals and pass orders relying upon the orders passed in the case of Bhagwan Das Todi (supra). The directions issued by the Tribunal are akin to a decree passed by the civil Court and is executable in terms of Section 27 of the Rajasthan Non- Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989. 19. We, therefore, find that there is no deliberate or willful non-compliance of Court's order on behalf of the respondents. The contempt petitions are wholly misconceived and the same are accordingly, dismissed.” 5. Accordingly, the instant contempt petition does not survive further and the same is hereby dismissed, in terms of the judgment dated 21.08.2025 (supra). 6. Notice(s) of contempt, if any, also stands discharged. (SANDEEP TANEJA),J (SUDESH BANSAL),J pcg/20