2026:HHC:34238 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4260 of 2013 Reserved on: 11.08.2026 Date of Decision: 14.08.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Manjeet Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State: Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr B.S. Ahuja, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.05.2013 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahaul and Spiti at Kullu, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34238 referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Dharam Chand (PW1) was going to his home on 04.04.2009. He reached near Didri Nala at about 06.45 p.m., a white Qualis bearing registration No. PB-01-4803 came at a high speed from Kullu and hit Surat Ram, who fell and sustained injuries. One Sikh was driving the vehicle. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the Qualis. The injured person was taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW8/A) was recorded at the police station. ASI Gian Chand (PW9) was sent to the hospital for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW9/C) was registered. ASI Gian Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/A)/ He filed an application (PW9/B) for medical examination of the injured. Dr Shishu Pal 3 2026:HHC:34238 (PW7) examined Surat Ram and found that he had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW7/A). ASI Gian Chand (PW9) seized the vehicle along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). Surat Ram subsequently succumbed to his injuries. Report of postmortem examination (Ext.P1) was obtained, in which the cause of death was mentioned as shock and haemorrhage caused by antemortem injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Roshan Lal (PW3) mechanically examined the vehicle and found that it had no defect that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW3/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. Prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Dharam Chand (PW1) is the informant/eyewitness. Mukesh (PW2) 4 2026:HHC:34238 and Prem Chand (PW6) are eyewitnesses. Roshan Lal (PW3) mechanically examined the vehicle. HC Narpat Ram (PW4) witnessed the recovery. Karam Chand (PW5) is the son of the deceased, who had accompanied the deceased to the hospital. Dr Shishu Pal (PW7) medically examined Surat Ram. Constable Narender Kumar (PW8) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Gian Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the vehicle was seized along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). He denied the rest of the prosecution version. He claimed that a false case was made against him and the witnesses deposed falsely against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the Toyota Qualis came at a high speed and left the spot after the accident. Therefore, the witnesses had insufficient opportunity to see the driver. The Investigating Officer failed to carry out a Test Identification Parade to test the power of identification of the witnesses. The identification of the accused was not satisfactory. The prosecution 5 2026:HHC:34238 had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material placed before it. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any cogent reason. Dharam Chand, informant, specifically stated that the accident had occurred because of the rashness of the accused present in the Court. His testimony was supported by Mukesh (PW2), Karam Chand (PW5) and Prem Chand (PW6). The accused was properly identified by the witnesses in the learned Trial Court, and this identification was wrongly rejected by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Courts be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr B.S. Ahuja, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution witnesses had 6 2026:HHC:34238 categorically identified the accused present in the Court as the person who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the accused was not properly identified. The statements of prosecution witnesses proved that the accident had occurred because of the rashness of the driver of the Qualis. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr B.S. Ahuja, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution witnesses admitted in their cross-examination that all Sikh men looked alike. The Test Identification Parade was essential because the witnesses had a fleeting glance of the driver. The identification made by the witnesses for the first time in the Court without a previous Test Identification Parade was not reliable, and the learned Trial Court had rightly rejected such identification. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view of the matter, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:34238 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is 8 2026:HHC:34238 consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: 9 2026:HHC:34238 “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 10 2026:HHC:34238 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. It is an admitted version of the prosecution that Toyota Qualis came at a high speed from Kullu and left the spot after the accident. Dharam Chand (PW1), Mukesh (PW2) and Prem Chand (PW6) specifically stated this fact. Therefore, the identification of the accused was material in the present case. 15. ASI Gian Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. He stated that he had made enquiries from Punjab Transport Authority, Chandigarh regarding the ownership of the Qualis and found that Manjeet Singh was the owner of the vehicle. He arrested Manjeet Singh and released him on bail. He admitted in his cross- examination that he had not made any enquiry at any check post regarding the movement of the vehicle bearing registration No. PB-01-4803 in Himachal, even though entries of the vehicle entering Himachal are made at various check posts. He has not stated that any Test Identification Parade was conducted by him to test the power of identification of the witnesses. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that no test identification parade was conducted in the present case. 11 2026:HHC:34238 16. Dharam Chand (PW1) stated that the accident occurred because of the negligence and high speed of the accused, who was present in the Court. Mukesh (PW2) stated that the accident occurred because of the negligence and high speed of the accused. Prem Chand (PW6) stated that the accident occurred because of very high speed and negligence of the accused present in the Court. It was submitted that the identification made by the witnesses in the Court was sufficient to establish the identity of the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed: "It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of an accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock is the one he saw coming out of a house at a particular time, or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is reduced by the reflection that there is any degree of resemblance between the man in the dock and the person previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to himself that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if he has already described the latter to them, with the result that he will be inclined to swear positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain. People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well known to them with sufficient frequency to make them 12 2026:HHC:34238 question the propriety of convicting an accused person on nothing more than the visual identification of a single witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in poor light." 17. It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the first time in the Court is improper and the witness should be asked to identify the accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in para 363: “A witness shouldn't be asked to identify the defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential witnesses may be asked to pick him up.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 791: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to the witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is not acceptable. It was observed on page 605: “17. The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”! xxx 13 2026:HHC:34238 21.It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock identification, that is, identification made by a witness in court during the trial. This identification has been made in court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismissed the identification made by PW 1 for the reason that the appellant, i.e. Accused 2, was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP, to admit the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the court was not proper. xxxx 23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a witness, and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness (see: Kunjumon v. State of Kerala, (2012) 13 SCC 750: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406). xxx 27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis on TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown by this Court in the recent two cases of Jayanv. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402; (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404. 28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words: (Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, SCC p. 44, para 18) “18. It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by a 14 2026:HHC:34238 witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy.” 19. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the identification of the accused in the Court without any previous identification parade was valueless and no conviction could have been recorded based on it. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. 20. No other point was urged 21. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 22. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed 15 2026:HHC:34238 against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 23. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th August, 2026 (Nikita)