APHC010123092026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3208] WEDNESDAY,THE ELEVENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D RAMESH WRIT PETITION NO: 6819/2026 Between: 1. CH SUBBA RAO, S/O KRUPALU, 54 YEARS, E.626087, DRIVER, R/O 157, MUPPAVARAM, J PANGALURU MANDAL, PRAKSAM DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH-523261. ...PETITIONER AND 1. THE STATE OF AP, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY(TRANSPORT), TRANSPORT, ROADS AND BUILDINGS, SECRETARIAT, VELGAPUDI, AMARAVATI. A.P - 522238. 2. THE COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT AND EX OFFICIO MANAGING DIRECTOR, ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, PANDIT NEHRU BUS STATION VIJAYAWADA-520013. 3. THE DISTRICT PUBLIC TRANSPORT OFFICER, REGIONAL MANAGER, APSRTC PRAKASAM REGION ONGOLE, PRAKASAM DISTRICT-523001. 4. THE DEPOT MANAGER APSRTC, ONGOLE DEPOT, PRAKASAM DISTRICT-523001. ...RESPONDENT(S): The Court made the following ORDER: 1. This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief: “to issue an appropriate Writ, or Order or Direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring that the action of the Respondents in not providing alternative employment to the petitioner including ail the reject proceedings, on the specious plea that color blindness is not a disability as per Section 2(i) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 by misconstruing the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 23.02.2017 in Civil Appeal No. 3529 of 2017 though clarified by the judgment dated 06.11.2017 in Writ Appeal No 1635/2017 of this Honble High Court which was upheld by the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 01.08.2025 in Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025 by ignoring the binding Settlement dated 17.12.1979, is arbitrary, unjust, contrary to the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, set aside the reject proceedings dated 04.03.2025 and consequently direct the Respondents to provide suitable alternative post of Shramik to the petitioner duly protecting the pay scale of the post of Driver with all consequential service benefits including payment of salary for the interregnum period, in the interest of justice and fair play and pass….” 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for the respondents. 3. The case of the petitioner is that the respondents have not provided alternative employment to the petitioner and have rejected his claim on the ground that colour blindness is not a disability under Section 2(i) of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ch. Joseph vs. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (arising out of SLP (C) No.36278 of 2017) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that herein as follows:- 36. In light of this evolving doctrine, the Court in Mohamed Ibrahim clarified that employees with conditions like colour blindness, although not falling within the defined categories of the statute, must still be accommodated wherever their functional capacity permits. To do otherwise would result in a regressive interpretation of the law, undermining the very foundation of equal opportunity in public employment. 37. Thus, even though in the present case the Appellant had an enforceable right under a statutory industrial settlement-placing his claim on firmer footing-we find it necessary to reaffirm that even in the absence of such contractual rights, employees who acquire disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity for reassignment. The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment. 38. This Court, therefore, affirms that beneficial and remedial legislation must not be diluted by narrow interpretation, and the protections offered therein must be extended purposively to protect the livelihood, dignity and service continuity of employees who acquire disabilities during employment. In doing so, we not only vindicate the Appellant's rights but also reaffirm our constitutional commitment to a just and humane employer- employee relationship CONCLUSION: 39. To conclude, the record before us makes it clear that the Appellant was prematurely retired from service on medical grounds without any meaningful effort by the Respondent- Corporation to explore his suitability for alternate employment. This action, taken in disregard of Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979 and without adherence to principles of fairness or accommodation, cannot be sustained in law. 40. The Corporation's omission to consider redeployment violates both statutory and constitutional obligations. Settled jurisprudence, including Kunal Singh (supra), which mandates that an employee who acquires a disability during service must be protected through reassignment where possible. The duty to reasonably accommodate such employees is now part of our constitutional fabric, rooted in Articles 14 and 21. 41. While judicial restraint guards against overreach, it must not become an excuse for disengagement from injustice When an employee is removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where viable alternatives are ignored, the Court is not crossing a line by intervening, it is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself. The employer's discretion ends where the employee's dignity begins. 42. In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the High Court in W.A. No. 1343 of 2017 is set aside. The Respondent- Corporation is directed to appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition, and on the same pay grade as he held on 06.01.2016, within eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The Appellant shall be entitled to 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits from the date of his termination to the date for alternate employment. This action, taken in disregard of Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979 and without adherence to principles of fairness or accommodation, cannot be sustained in law. 40. The Corporation's omission to consider redeployment violates both statutory and constitutional obligations. Settled jurisprudence, including Kunal Singh (supra), which mandates that an employee who acquires a disability during service must be protected through reassignment where possible. The duty to reasonably accommodate such employees is now part of our constitutional fabric, rooted in Articles 14 and 21. 41. While judicial restraint guards against overreach, it must not become an excuse for disengagement from injustice When an employee is removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where viable alternatives are ignored, the Court is not crossing a line by intervening, it is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself. The employer's discretion ends where the employee's dignity begins 42. In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the High Court in W.A. No. 1343 of 2017 is set aside. The Respondent-Corporation is directed to appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition, and on the same pay grade as he held on 06.01.2016, within eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The Appellant shall be entitled to 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement. The intervening period shall be reckoned as continuous service for all purposes. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that a similar issue was already considered by this Court in W.P.No.2937 of 2024 and batch, wherein this Court issued the following directions: (i) The petitioners shall exercise their option in terms of G.O.Ms.No.58, Transport, Roads and Buildings (PTD.1) Department within eight (08) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. (ii) On receipt of the same, the respondent-State shall process the claims for additional monetary compensation in lieu of alternative employment as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months thereafter. (iii) The individuals claiming alternative employment shall be considered within six months from the date of receipt of the order, subject to availability of vacancies. (iv) No costs. 6. Considering the same and in view of the observations made in the above-referred judgment, the writ petition is disposed of with similar directions. The petitioners shall exercise their option in terms of G.O.Ms.No.58, Transport, Roads and Buildings (PTD.1) Department within eight (08) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Upon receipt of the same, the respondent-State shall process the claims for additional monetary compensation in lieu of alternative employment as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months thereafter. The individuals claiming alternative employment shall be considered within six months from the date of receipt of this order, subject to availability of vacancies. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the writ petition shall stand closed. ___________________________ JUSTICE D RAMESH 11.03.2026 klk 52 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D RAMESH WRIT PETITION NO: 6819/2026 11.03.2026 klk