2026:HHC:33630 ______________ Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 836 of 2026 Reserved on: 04.08.2026 Date of Decision: 11.08.202 Amrit Lal ....Petitioner Versus Seema Mishra ....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the petitioner : Mr Vipul Malhotra, Advocate through VC and Mr Vedant Singh, Advocate. For respondent : Nemo Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the petition filed by the respondent claiming maintenance of ₹1,00,000/- per month from the petitioner. 2 2026:HHC:33630 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the respondent filed a petition before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Hamirpur, H.P. asserting that marriage between her and the petitioner was solemnised on 06.04.2022 at Jhaniari Devi Mata Temple . The parties started living together in village Panyala. The respondent is a divorcee and the petitioner is a widower. The petitioner had major children, who are married. The petitioner and his children harassed the respondent, and they turned her out of her matrimonial home. The respondent is unable to maintain herself, whereas the petitioner is running a business under the name and style of ‘Gautam Steel Sales ’ at Salouni, District Hamirpur, H.P. He is earning ₹7,00,000/- per month. Hence, a petition was filed seeking maintenance of ₹1,00,000/- per month. 3. Aggrieved by the filing of the petition by the respondent, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the petitioner had instituted a civil suit before the Court of the learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Hamirpur, H.P. seeking a declaration regarding the non- existence/invalidity of the marriage, which is pending 3 2026:HHC:33630 adjudication. The respondent does not fall within the definition of a wife because her marital status is under challenge. She had filed a petition under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. The statements made by the witnesses of the respondent are contradictory. As per the claim of the respondent, she had resided with the petitioner for approximately twelve days. She has not filed any proof of the marriage. The respondent possesses a postgraduate qualification. The petition filed by the respondent is an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned trial Court be set aside. 4. Mr Vipul Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the respondent has filed a false petition before the learned trial Court. She had filed an earlier petition under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. She has made contradictory pleas in the present petition. Her witnesses have also not supported her version in the previous petition. The petitioner has filed a petition seeking the invalidity of the marriage stated to have been solemnised between the parties. The respondent could not have filed the 4 2026:HHC:33630 petition seeking maintenance because her status is under challenge before the civil court. She had earlier filed a petition under the DV Act, and the present petition is not maintainable. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned trial Court be quashed. 5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to 5 2026:HHC:33630 prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6 2026:HHC:33630 (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause nos. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 7. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: 7 2026:HHC:33630 “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations: (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 8. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9. The present petition has been filed on the premise that the respondent had filed a petition under the DV Act and she cannot file a petition under Section 125 of the CrPC. This premise is fallacious. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 8 2026:HHC:33630 Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 903 that a wife can claim maintenance under different provisions, but the Court has to consider the maintenance awarded under one Act before awarding maintenance under a different Act. It was observed at page 366: “60. It is well settled that a wife can make a claim for maintenance under different statutes. For instance, there is no bar to seek maintenance both under the DV Act and Section 125 CrPC, or under HMA. It would, however, be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. If maintenance is awarded to the wife in a previously instituted proceeding, she is under a legal obligation to disclose the same in a subsequent proceeding for maintenance, which may be filed under another enactment. While deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the civil court/Family Court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. 61. To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, we direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding and the orders passed therein, so that the court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the court concerned in the previous proceeding.” 9 2026:HHC:33630 10. Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is no bar in claiming maintenance under the different Acts, and the respondent was within her right to claim maintenance from the respondent under Section 125 of CrPC. 11. It was submitted that the respondent possesses a postgraduate qualification and she is not entitled to any maintenance. The submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Lipi Mohapatra vs. Vinay Kumar 2018 (1) HLR 891 that maintenance cannot be denied to a wife on the ground that she is capable of earning. It was observed: “On asking of the court, it has been informed that the applicant is educated, having done Post Graduation in the subject of English. But the circumstances that she is capable of earning and is doing some constructive work for earning will not disentitle her for maintenance pendente lite as the said factor will not ipso facto disentitle her for the maintenance pendente lite as she has to be maintained commensurate with the status and earnings of the husband.” 12. Similarly, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manish Jain vs. Akanksha Jain 2017 (15) SCC 801 that it is no 10 2026:HHC:33630 answer to the claim of the wife that she is educated and capable of earning for herself. It was observed: 5. An order for maintenance pendente lite or for costs of the proceedings is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim for the same has no independent income sufficient for her or his support or to meet the necessary expenses of the proceeding. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. Likewise, the financial position of the wife's parents is also immaterial. The Court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay maintenance and whether the applicant has any independent income sufficient for her or his support. Maintenance is always dependent upon the factual situation; the Court should, therefore, mould the claim for maintenance, determining the quantum based on various factors brought before the Court. 13. It was held in Shailja vs. Khobanna AIR 2017 SC 1174 that there is a distinction between the actual earning and capable of earning. It was observed: 8. That apart, we find that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the appellant No.1 was capable of earning and that is one of the reasons for reducing the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court. Whether the appellant No.1 is capable of earning or whether she is actually earning are two different requirements. Merely because the appellant No.1 is capable of earning is not, in our opinion, sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324: (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 220: 2020 11 2026:HHC:33630 SCC OnLine SC 903, that the fact that the wife is earning cannot disentitle her from the maintenance. It was observed: 90. The courts have held that if the wife is earning, it cannot operate as a bar from being awarded maintenance by the husband. The courts have provided guidance on this issue in the following judgments: 90.1. In Shailja v. Khobbanna [Shailja v. Khobbanna, (2018) 12 SCC 199: (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 308; See also the decision of the Karnataka High Court in P. Suresh v. S. Deepa, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 8848: 2016 Cri LJ 4794 (Kar)], this Court held that merely because the wife is capable of earning, it would not be a sufficient ground to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court. The court has to determine whether the income of the wife is sufficient to enable her to maintain herself, in accordance with the lifestyle of her husband in the matrimonial home. [Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316: (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 547: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 356] Sustenance does not mean, and cannot be allowed to mean, mere survival. [Vipul Lakhanpal v. Pooja Sharma, 2015 SCC OnLine HP 1252: 2015 Cri LJ 3451] 90.2. In Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha [Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 753: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 589] the wife had a postgraduate degree and was employed as a teacher in Jabalpur. The husband raised a contention that since the wife had sufficient income, she would not require financial assistance from the husband. The Supreme Court repelled this contention and held that merely because the wife was earning some income, it could not be a ground to reject her claim for maintenance. 90.3. The Bombay High Court in Sanjay Damodar Kale v. Kalyani Sanjay Kale [Sanjay Damodar Kale v. 12 2026:HHC:33630 Kalyani Sanjay Kale, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 694] while relying upon the judgment in Sunita Kachwaha [Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 753: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 589], held that neither the mere potential to earn nor the actual earning of the wife, howsoever meagre, is sufficient to deny the claim of maintenance. 90.4. An able-bodied husband must be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money to maintain his wife and children, and cannot contend that he is not in a position to earn sufficiently to maintain his family, as held by the Delhi High Court in Chander Parkash v. Shila Rani [Chander Parkash v. Shila Rani, 1968 SCC OnLine Del 52: AIR 1968 Del 174]. The onus is on the husband to establish with the necessary material that there are sufficient grounds to show that he is unable to maintain the family and discharge his legal obligations for reasons beyond his control. If the husband does not disclose the exact amount of his income, an adverse inference may be drawn by the court. 90.5. This Court in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan [Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 274 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 785] cited the judgment in Chander Parkash [Chander Parkash v. Shila Rani, 1968 SCC OnLine Del 52: AIR 1968 Del 174] with approval, and held that the obligation of the husband to provide maintenance stands on a higher pedestal than the wife. 15. Therefore, the respondent is entitled to maintain the petition even if she is highly educated. 13 2026:HHC:33630 16. It was submitted that the respondent had filed a petition under the D.V. Act, in which she had claimed an interim maintenance of ₹30,000/-, whereas she has claimed a maintenance of ₹1,00,000/-. Her witnesses had made statements, which are contrary to the averments made in the present petition. These submissions will not result in the quashing of the petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, that the High Court cannot quash the F.I.R. based on the improvements made in the statements. It was observed: - “17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. xxxx 19. From a bare perusal of the above-mentioned paragraphs, it can be seen that one of the important factors that weighed in while allowing the quashing application of the private respondents was that in the earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no mention of the events of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later added in the FIR dated 28.01.2024. Xxxx 14 2026:HHC:33630 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the appellant, as she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini-trial. 17. It was submitted that the petitioner has filed a petition seeking the invalidity of the marriage between him and the respondent, and the respondent is not entitled to file a petition seeking maintenance. The submission is only stated to be rejected. Mere filing of the petition for invalidity does not bring an end to the relationship between the parties. Admittedly, no decree has been passed by any competent Court holding that the respondent is not a legally wedded wife of the petitioner. It is a matter of proof whether the relationship between the parties subsisted or not, and the petition cannot be quashed simply 15 2026:HHC:33630 because the husband has filed a petition seeking the invalidity of the marriage. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed with cost of ₹10,000/- as the present petition has been filed on frivolous grounds to waste precious time of the Court. The cost so imposed shall be deposited in the Chief Justice Disaster Relief Fund within a period of four weeks, failing which steps will be taken to recover it as per the law. ( Rakesh Kainthla ) Judge 11th August, 2026 (Ravinder)