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2026 DAILYLAW 18699 (HP)

SUBHASH CHAND v. MAHANT RAM

RSA/527/2014 · 2026-08-18

Virender Singh

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Judgment text

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1 2026:HHC:34793 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA RSA Nos. :  527 of 2014 & 664 of 2015 Reserved on          :       28th July, 2026 Decided on            :   18th August, 2026 Uploaded on          :   18th August, 2026 1. RSA No.527 of 2014 Subhash Chand & Others …Appellants Versus Mahant Ram and Others …..Respondents 2. RSA No. 664 of 2015 Subhash Chand & Others …Appellants Versus Bohra and Others …..Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes _______________________________________________________________ 1. RSA No.527 of 2014 For the Appellant : Mr. Adarsh K. Vashista, Advocate. For the Respondents      : Mr. Prittam   Singh   Chandel, Advocate, for respondents No.1, 2, and 4. Mr. Bhupender   Gupta,   Senior Advocate with Mr. Ajeet Pal Singh Jaswal,   Advocate   for   respondent No.5. None   for   respondents   No.3(a)   to 3(e). 1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:34793 2. RSA No. 664 of 2015 For the Appellants : Mr. Adarsh K. Vashista, Advocate. For the Respondents      : Mr. Bhupender   Gupta,   Senior Advocate with Mr. Ajeet Pal Singh Jaswal,   Advocate,   for   respondent No.1. Mr. Prittam   Singh   Chandel, Advocate,   for   respondents   No.2,   3 and 4(a) to 4(d). Name of respondent No.5 is ordered to   be   deleted   vide   order   dated 16.12.2025. None for respondents No.6 and 7. __________________________________________________________ Virender Singh, Judge The above titled appeals are being disposed of by a common order, as, both the appeals have arisen out of the judgments   and   decrees   dated   10.06.2014   and   07.07.2014, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned First Appellate Court’). 2. RSA   No.527   of   2014,   has   been   filed   by   the appellants, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), against the judgment and decree dated 10.06.2014, passed by the learned First Appellate Court, in Civil Appeal No.63/13 of 2013, titled as Mahant Ram & Others versus Subhash Chand & Others. 3 2026:HHC:34793 3. By   virtue   of   judgment   and   decree   dated 10.06.2014, the learned First Appellate Court has allowed the appeal, preferred by the respondents and set aside the judgment and decree dated 01.11.2013, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior   Division),   Court   No.3,   Ghumarwin,   District   Bilaspur (hereinafter referred to as the learned trial Court’), in RBT Suit RBT No.403/1 of 2011/08, titled as Subhash Chand & Others versus Mahant Ram & Others. 4. By   way   of   judgment   and   decree   dated 01.11.2013, the learned trial Court has decreed the above suit, by granting the following relief:­ “27. In   view   of   the   findings   on   the   above issues the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed as they are owners in possession of the suit land by   way   of   adverse   possession   and   revenue entries in favour of the defendants are not valid and liable to be changed as per possession of the   plaintiffs   and   further   defendants   are restrained   from   interfering   over   the   suit   land measuring 2.7 bighas comprised in khasra No.6 and   100   kitta­2   khata   khatoni   No.20/37 situated   in   village   Ghumarwin,   Pargna   Tiun, Tehsil   Ghumarwin,   District   Bilaspur,   H.P.,   in any manner whatsoever. In the particular facts and circumstances of case, the parties are left to   bear   their   own   costs. A   decree   sheet   be drawn   accordingly. The   file   after   due completion be consigned to record.” 5. RSA No. 664 of 2015, has been filed by the appellants, under Section 100 of the CPC, against the judgment 4 2026:HHC:34793 and   decree   dated   07.07.2014,   passed   by   the   learned   First Appellate   Court,  in   Civil   Appeal   No.65/13   of   2013,  titled   as Bohra versus Subhash Chand & Others. 6. By   way   of   judgment   and   decree   dated 07.07.2014, the learned First Appellate Court has allowed the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 Bohra and set aside the judgment and decree dated 01.11.2013, passed by the learned trial Court, in RBT Suit RBT No.403/1 of 2011/08, titled as Subhash Chand & Others versus Mahant Ram & Others. 7. For   the   sake   of   convenience,   parties   to   the present appeal, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court. 8. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present appeal, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under:­ 8.1. Plaintiffs Subhash Chand and others, have filed a suit, under Sections 34, 35, 36, 37 of the Specific Relief Act, for declaration and Permanent Injunction, to the effect that the plaintiffs   are   owners­in­possession   of   land   measuring   2­7 bighas,   comprised   in   khasra   Nos.6   and   100,   kitta­2 khata/khatoni No.20/37 situated in village Ghumarwin, Pargna Tiun,   Tehsil   Ghumarwin,   District   Bilaspur,   H.P.   (hereinafter 5 2026:HHC:34793 referred to as ‘the suit land’), by way of adverse possession and the entries recorded in the revenue record, in the names of defendants are wrong, illegal, null and void, having no effect on the rights, title and interest of the plaintiffs. In addition to this, relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner, whatsoever, by way of changing the nature   of   land,   or   not   to   alienate   the   suit   land,   and dispossessing the plaintiffs, in any manner, from the suit land, has also been sought. 8.2. According to the plaintiffs, they are owners­in­ possession, of the suit land and the revenue entries in the name of defendants are wrong, illegal, null and void and not binding upon the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs. 8.3. According to the plaintiffs, earlier the suit land was owned and possessed by late Smt Gurdei and Sartaja, and Gurdei executed a Will in favour of late Shri Anant Ram son of Ram Dyal, father of plaintiffs No.1 to 3 and husband of plaintiff No.4,and defendants No.1 to 4. 8.4. As   per   the   plaintiffs,   Smt.   Sartaju,   also executed a Will in favour of defendant No.5. Said Gurdei and Sartaju   expired   about   48   years   ago   and   Shri   Anant   Ram, predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs took the possession of 6 2026:HHC:34793 the suit land on 13.1.1960, by forcibly ousting the defendants from the suit land. Since, the said date, the defendants were never allowed to enter in the suit land and they continued to reside at village Badsai, Chunjwani, in Pargna Ajmerpur, Tehsil Ghumarwin,   District   Bilaspur,   which   is   situated   about   25 kilometers from village Ghumarwin. 8.5. According to the plaintiffs, the possession of Shri Anant Ram, predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiff was open, peaceful, hostile uninterrupted and adverse possession during his life time. He expired on 03.03.2005, and thereafter, the plaintiffs   are   in   peaceful,   open,   hostile,   uninterrupted   and adverse possession over the suit land. 8.6. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that the predecessor­in­interest of Anant Ram, perfected his title over the suit land on 13.01.1972. The plaintiffs, after the death of Anant Ram,   stepped   into   his   shoes   and   now,   they   are   claiming themselves to be owners­in­possession over the suit land, by way of adverse possession. 8.7. According to the plaintiffs, their cow shed is there, over the suit land and they have spent a huge amount to develop the suit land for the last 48 years. Not only this, they have also planted fruit bearing trees over the suit land. 7 2026:HHC:34793 8.8. The cause of action is stated to have arisen to the plaintiffs on 27.03.2008, when, the defendants entered into the   suit   land   and   threatened   that   they   will   dispossess   the plaintiffs and also alienate the suit land and will also get the land partitioned, on the basis of wrong illegal entries. 9. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to decree the suit, as prayed for. 10. When   put   to   notice,   the   defendants   have contested the suit, by filing the written statement, taking the preliminary   objections;   that   the   suit   of   the   plaintiffs   is   not maintainable; the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present   suit;   the   plaintiffs   have   no   locus   standi   to   file   the present suit; the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present suit by their own acts, conducts, omissions and commissions; the suit is bad for non­joinder and mis­joinder of necessary parties; the   suit   is   barred   by   limitation;   and   the   suit   has   not   been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction. 10.1. On merits, the suit has been contested, on the ground,   that   the   revenue   entries   in   the   revenue   record   are correct and valid. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs and defendants are joint owners­in­possession of the suit land. 8 2026:HHC:34793 10.2. According to the defendants, no Will has been executed by late Smt. Sartaju, as alleged and if the plaintiffs produced   any   will,   then   the   same   is   result   of   fraud   and misrepresentation. They have also denied that late Anant Ram, has   taken   possession   on   13.01.1960   and   has   ousted   the defendants, as alleged. 10.3. According to the defendants, they are residents of village Ghhunjwani and Ghumarwin also. They have also disputed the fact that the possession of Anant Ram over the suit land   was   hostile,   open,   peaceful,   uninterrupted   and   adverse possession and has allegedly matured into adverse possession on 13.01.1972. Rest of the contents have been denied. 11. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the suit. 12. Plaintiffs   have   filed   replication,   denying   the preliminary submissions, as well as, the contents of the written statement, by virtue of which, the suit has been contested, by reasserting that of the plaint. 13. From   the   pleadings   of   the   parties,   following issues were framed, by the learned trial Court, vide order dated 03.03.2011: 1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for decree of declaration to the effect that they are owner in 9 2026:HHC:34793 possession   over   the   suit   land   by   virtue   of adverse possession, as alleged? OPP 2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of declaration that the revenue entries recorded in the name of defendants are wrong null and void, as alleged? OPP 3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, as alleged? OPP 4) Whether   the   suit   of   the   plaintiffs   is   not maintainable in the present form, as alleged? OPD 5) Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD 6) Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 7) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present suit by his acts, conduct and deeds, as alleged? OPD 8) Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is bad for want of   mis­joinder   and   non­joinder   of   necessary parties, as alleged? OPD 9) Whether   the   suit   of   plaintiffs   is   barred   by limitation, as alleged? OPD 10) Whether   the   suit   of   plaintiffs   is   not   properly valued   for   the   purpose   of   Court   fee   and jurisdiction, as alleged? OPD 11) Relief. 14. Thereafter,   parties   to   the   lis   were   directed   to adduce evidence. 10 2026:HHC:34793 15. After closure of the evidence, the learned trial Court, upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, has decreed the   suit   of   the   plaintiffs,   vide   judgment   and   decree   dated 01.11.2013, as referred to above. 16. Feeling aggrieved from the said judgment and decree,   defendants   No.1   to   4   had   preferred   the   Civil   Appeal No.63/13   of   2013,   titled   as   Mahant   Ram   &   Others   versus Subhash Chand & Others, which was allowed by the learned First   Appellate   Court,   vide   judgment   and   decree   dated 10.06.2014   and   suit   of   the   plaintiffs   was   ordered   to   be dismissed. 17. Aggrieved from the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs have been preferred, RSA No. 527 of 2014. 18. The   judgment   and   decree   dated   10.06.2014, passed by the learned First Appellate Court has been assailed before this Court, on the ground that the judgment and decree passed by the learned First appellate Court is against the law and facts on the file, as the learned First Appellate Court has failed to appreciate that in the present case, the predecessor­in­ interest of the Appellants/Plaintiffs came to be in possession of the suit land on the strength of the Will executed in his favour 11 2026:HHC:34793 and thereafter, he had perfected his title, on the suit land, till his death, as his possession was peaceful, open and hostile. 17. The findings have further been assailed on the ground   that   the   learned   First   Appellate   Court   has   not appreciated the pleadings of the parties, in the right perspective. 18. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the appeal, by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 19. This appeal has been admitted on 06.12.2018, on the following substantial questions of law:­ “1. Whether  the  Ld. Lower  Appellate  Court  being last Court of facts is right in not considering the entire oral as well as documentary evidence in view of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court?” 20. Whereas,   defendant   No.5­Bohra   had   also preferred Civil Appeal No.65/13 of 2013, titled as Bohra versus Subhash Chand & Others, which was allowed by the learned First   Appellate   Court,   vide   judgment   and   decree   dated 07.07.2014   and   suit   of   the   plaintiffs   was   ordered   to   be dismissed. 20.1. Aggrieved from the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs have preferred, RSA No. 664 of 2015, on the same 12 2026:HHC:34793 grounds, upon which, RSA No.527 of 2014 was preferred and prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 21. This appeal has been admitted on 28.12.2015, on the following substantial questions of law:­ 1) Whether the findings returned by the trial Court can be unsettled by the First Appellate Court without taking into account the pleadings of the parties   and   entire   evidence   adduced   by   the parties? 2) Whether   the   title   of   the   Appellants/Plaintiffs derived  from  the  testamentary document  and thereafter   perfected   by   efflux   of   time   can   be said   to   naught   on   the   basis   of   mere   oral evidence?” 22. In order to decide the controversy, involved in the present appeals, it would be just and appropriate, for this Court, to discuss the oral, as well as, documentary evidence, adduced by the parties, before the learned trial Court. 23. After   framing   the   issues,   plaintiffs   No.4 Kalashi Devi, appeared in the witness­box, as PW­1, and filed her affidavit Ex. PW­1/A, in which, she asserted that Plaintiffs   No.1   to   3   are   her   sons. They   are   owners­in­ 13 2026:HHC:34793 possession of the suit land. The revenue entries are wrong. Earlier,   the   suit   land   was   owned   by   Gurdei,   who   has executed a will in favour of her husband Anant Ram and defendants   No.1   to   4,   whereas,   share   of   Sartaju   was bequeathed to defendant No.5, Bohra. Gurdei and Sartaju expired about 50 years ago. Thereafter, defendants had attempted to obtain the possession of the suit land. On 13.01.1960, husband of this witness had ousted them from the suit land and till the day, when she has appeared in the witness­box, defendants are not in possession of the same. Defendants   are   resident   of   village   Barsai,   Funjvani, Pargana Ajmerpur, Tehsil Ghumarwin, which is about 25 kilometers away from Ghumarwin. The possession of her husband remain uninterrupted over the suit land during his lifetime. Her husband expired on 3.3.2005. Thereafter, the   plaintiffs   are   in   possession   of   the   suit   land. Her husband become owner of the suit land, during his life time on 13.01.1972. As such, she has stated that the revenue entries are wrong. They have constructed a cow shed over a portion of the suit land and also planted fruit bearing trees. On 27.03.2008, the defendants tried to oust them 14 2026:HHC:34793 forcibly from the suit land, for which, they have no right to do so. 23.1. In the cross­examination, this witness has admitted   that   the   dispute   regarding   the   suit   land   was decided by High Court. She has feigned ignorance about the   fact   that   defendants   No.1   to   4   are   brothers   of   her husband. She has also feigned ignorance about the name of her father­in­law. 24. PW­2 Rattan Lal also deposed about the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. In the cross­ examination, this witness has deposed that he does not know as to how many brothers and sisters, Anant Ram was having. 25. PW­3   Jagar   Nath   also   deposed   on   the similar lines, however, in the cross­examination, he has admitted that Anant Ram was father of plaintiffs. He has further admitted that the suit land was inherited by Anant Ram, Mahant Ram, Nand Lal, Nikka Ram and Jeet Ram, after the death of their father. He has also feigned his ignorance   about   the   fact   that   partition   suit   is   pending before the parties. 15 2026:HHC:34793 26. To   rebut   this   evidence,   defendant   No.1, Mahant Ram appeared, in the witness box as DW­1 and filed   his   affidavit   Ex.DW­1/A,   disclosing   therein   that plaintiffs No.1 to 3 are his nephews, whereas, plaintiff No.4, is his sister­in­law. Predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs was his real brother. He has asserted his possession over the   suit   land,   along   with   other   co­sharers. He   has admitted  that his  village   Barsali  is  about  25  kilometers away from Ghumarwin. He has admitted that suit land was owned by Gurdei. Voluntarily stated that Ram Dayal was also owner. He has denied that Gurdei had executed a Will in favour of defendant No.5. He has also admitted that some land was owned by Sartaju, but, feigned ignorance about the fact that she had executed a Will in favour of Bohra. He   has   denied   that   Anant   Ram   has   obtained possession   of   the   suit   land   on   13.01.1960. He   has admitted that Anant Ram was in possession of the land, without any interruption. He has admitted that the suit land   is   still   in   possession   of   his   legal   representatives. Firstly, he has admitted that efforts were made to obtain the possession forcibly on 27.03.2008, but, again stated that defendant No.5 had tried to obtain possession forcibly. 16 2026:HHC:34793 27. So   far   as   the   documentary   evidence   is concerned, Ex.P­1 is Jamabandi, for the year 2000­01, in which, the name of Anant Ram, Nikka Ram, Nikka, Nand Lal, Mahant Ram, Jeet Ram, sons of Ram Dayal and Bohra son of Arjan, are recorded as owners­in­possession of the suit land. This is the entire evidence. 28. The   learned   trial   Court   has   decreed   the suit by declaring the plaintiffs as owners­in­possession of the suit land, by way of adverse possession and also held that the revenue entries in favour of the defendants are not valid and liable to be changed as per possession of the plaintiffs. In addition to this, relief of injunction was also granted to the plaintiffs. 29. Now, this Court would proceed to find out, as to whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court,   have   rightly   been   reversed   by   the   learned   First Appellate Court or not. 30. The plaintiffs have filed the suit seeking declaration of their title on the basis of adverse possession, on the basis of revenue record, i.e., Jamabandi for the year 2001­02. As   per   the   said  document,   in  the   column   of possession, name of Anant Ram, predecessor­in­interest of 17 2026:HHC:34793 the plaintiffs and defendants No.1 to 4, has been recorded as owner­in­possession. 31. Except   this   document,   no   other documentary   proof   has   been   placed   on   record   by   the plaintiffs, to substantiate that their predecessor­in­interest, Anant Ram had obtained the possession of the suit land by forcibly ousting the defendants from the suit land from the date, i.e., 13.01.1960, till the filing of the suit, i.e., for the period of 48 years. They could not produce any document showing their possession in the revenue record. By way of the present suit, they have objected to the entries in the revenue record as ‘Kabza and Kashtkari Swanm’. 32. The bald stand taken by the plaintiffs, in the   pleadings,   that   too,   without   any   supporting documentary proof, the plea of adverse possession that too, based upon the alleged forcible ouster of the defendants is too short to be accepted as proof of adverse possession over the suit land. Merely, the defendants are not residing in the village, where the suit land is situated and residing about 25 kilometers away from the village, is not sufficient to prove ouster, resulting into the adverse possession. 18 2026:HHC:34793 33. Law   regarding   adverse   possession   has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karnataka Wakf Board versus Government of India &   Others,   (2004)   10   Supreme   Court   Cases,   779. Relevant paragraph 11 of the judgment is reproduced as under:­ “11. In   the   eye   of   the   law,   an   owner would be deemed to be in possession of a   property   so   long   as   there   is   no intrusion. Non­use of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse   possession   is   a   hostile possession   by   clearly   asserting   hostile title   in   denial   of   the   title   of   the   true owner. It is a well­settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is ‘nec vi, nec clam,   nec   precario’,   that   is,   peaceful, open   and   continuous. The   possession must   be   adequate   in   continuity,   in publicity, and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of   the   rightful   owner   and   be   actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over   the   statutory   period. (See  S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina,  Parsinni v. Sukhi and  D.N.   Venkatarayappa   v.   State   of Karnataka.)   Physical   fact   of   exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner   are   the   most   important   factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who 19 2026:HHC:34793 claims adverse possession should show: (a)   on   what   date   he   came   into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession   was   known   to   the   other party, (d) how long his possession has continued,   and   (e)   his   possession   was open   and   undisturbed. A   person pleading   adverse   possession   has   no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” (Self emphasis supplied) 34. The   plaintiffs,   in   the   present   case,   have pleaded that the suit land was earlier owned and possessed by Gurdei and Sartaju and said Gurdei and Sartaju have executed a Will in favour of Anant Ram, predecessor­in­ interest of the plaintiffs and defendants No.1 to 4, whereas, Sartaju has executed a Will in favour of defendant No.5. Both, Gurdei and Sartaju, died about 48 years back, from the   date   of   filing   of   the   suit   and   Shri   Anant   Ram, predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs took possession of the   suit   land   on   13.02.1960,   by   forcibly   ousting   the defendants from the suit land. 35. Meaning   thereby,   the   ouster   of   the defendants has been sought on the basis of the alleged Will executed by Gurdei in favour of plaintiffs and defendants 20 2026:HHC:34793 No.1 to 4 and by Sartaju, in favour of defendant No.5. This fact has specifically been denied by the defendants, in the written statement and they have also mentioned that if the plaintiffs produced any Will, the same is result of fraud and misrepresentation. The   inception   of   possession   is permissive in nature, on the basis of Will, which, as per the case set up by plaintiffs, was in favour of the parties to the lis. 36. The very execution of the Wills by Sartaju and   Gurdei   has   been   disputed   and   controverted   by   the defendants. As stated above, when a person has taken a plea   of   adverse   possession,   it   is   his   duty   to   plead   and establish all necessary facts, as he is asserting a hostile title against the true owners. 37. When, the very base of the suit is the two Wills, allegedly executed by Gurdei and Sartaju, then, it was   incumbent   upon   the   plaintiffs   to   assert   all   these material facts to demonstrate that the property was earlier owned and possessed by Gurdei and Sartaju and on the basis of the Wills, executed by said Gurdei and Sartaju, the same has been inherited by the parties to the lis. 21 2026:HHC:34793 38. Even, in the replication, nothing has been asserted about the Wills allegedly executed by Sartaju and Gurdei. The parties to the lis are not strangers, but, co­ sharers in the suit land. Possession of one co­sharer is possession of all the co­sharers. 39. When, there is no documentary proof, with regard to the fact that the suit land was earlier owned and possessed by Gurdei and Sartaju, then, the question of execution of Wills, in favour of the parties to the lis, does not arise. The pleadings are totally silent about the fact that   as   to   what   occasion   prompted   Anant   Ram, predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs, to forcibly oust the defendants from the suit land. 40. The admission of defendant No.1, qua the fact that the suit land was earlier owned and possessed by Gurdei and Sartaju, is too short to give an occasion to the plaintiffs or their predecessor­in­interest to set up a claim of   adverse   possession. Situation   would   have   been otherwise, had the the adverse possession been claimed by predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs, prior to the alleged execution of Wills, by Gurdei and Sartaju. 22 2026:HHC:34793 41. Here, the claim of the plaintiffs, qua the fact that their predecessor­in­interest has forcibly ousted the defendants from the suit land on 13.01.1960, is not liable to be accepted, as the suit is silent about the fact that prior to execution of Will, who were in possession and when   Gurdei   and   Sartaju   had   expired,   as,   Will   is   a document, which will come into operation, after the death of testator. 42. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that their predecessor­in­interest was not having any right title and interest   in   the   suit   property   and   he   has   ousted   the defendants from the same, whereas, according to the stand taken by the plaintiffs, on the basis of the alleged Wills, executed   in   favour   of   the   parties   to   the   lis,   their predecessor­in­interest had forcibly ousted the defendants from the suit land. 43. Even if it is assumed that the Wills were executed   in   favour   of   the   parties   to   the   lis,   then,   the plaintiffs would become co­owners and possession of one co­owner, is possession of all the co­owners. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that a specific portion of the land was bequeathed to the parties to the lis and that apart from 23 2026:HHC:34793 their   specific   share,   their   predecessor­in­interest   had entered into possession of the land, which was bequeathed, in favour of the parties to the lis, by Gurdei and Sartaju. 44. Another   fact,   which   has   allegedly   been highlighted by learned counsel for the defendants is that a cow shed of the plaintiffs exists over the suit land and they have   also   planted   fruit   bearing   trees   in   the   suit   land, whereas, the revenue record is totally silent about the said fact. In   the   revenue   record,   the   type   of   land   has   been mentioned as ‘Banjar Kadeem’, ‘Gair Mumkin Beed’ and ‘Kohali’. Parties to the lis are proved to be co­sharers and the property is not partitioned. 45. As per the revenue record, relied upon, the suit   land   has   been   recorded   in   joint   ownership   and possession of the parties to the lis and the plaintiffs have taken a contrary plea to the said revenue record that their predecessor­in­interest, Anant Ram, took the possession of the   suit   land   on   13.10.1960,   by   forcibly   ousting   the defendants from the suit land. As such, the very inception of the possession of the plaintiffs or their predecessor­in­ interest,   cannot   be   said   to   be   peaceful,   because,   term ‘forcible’ is converse to the term ‘peaceful’. 24 2026:HHC:34793 46. It is not in dispute that the parties to the lis  are co­owners. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a  Des Raj   &   Others   versus   Bhagat   Ram   (dead)   by   LRs   & Others,   (2007)   9   Supreme   Court   Cases   641,  has explained the ingredients for establishing the ouster of a co­sharer. Relevant paragraphs 20 to 22 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ 20. A plea of adverse possession or a plea of ouster would indisputably be governed by Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act. 21. In a case of this nature, where long and continuous possession of the plaintiff­ respondent   stands   admitted,   the   only question  which  arose   for  consideration  by the   courts   below   was   as   to   whether   the plaintiff   had   been   in   possession   of   the properties in hostile declaration of his title vis­`­vis   his   co­   owners  and   they  were  in know thereof. 22. Mere assertion of title by itself may not be sufficient unless the plaintiff proves animus possidendi. But the intention on the part of the plaintiff to possess the properties in suit exclusively and not for and on behalf of other co­owners also is evident from the fact   that   the   defendants appellants themselves had earlier filed two suits. Such suits were filed for partition. In those suits the   defendants appellants   claimed themselves to be co­owners of the plaintiff. A bare perusal of the judgments of the courts below clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff had   even   therein   asserted   hostile   title claiming ownership in himself. The claim of hostile title by the plaintiff over the suit land, therefore,   was,   thus,   known   to   the 25 2026:HHC:34793 appellants. They allowed the first suit to be dismissed   in   the   year   1977. Another   suit was filed in the year 1978 which again was dismissed in the year 1984. It may be true, as   has   been   contended   on   behalf   of   the appellants before the courts below, that a co­owner can bring about successive suits for partition as the cause of action therefor would be continuous one. But, it is equally well­settled that pendency of a suit does not stop running of 'limitation'. The very fact that the defendants despite the purported entry made   in   the   revenue   settlement   record   of rights in the year 1953 allowed the plaintiff to possess the same exclusively and had not succeeded in their attempt to possess the properties   in   Village   Samleu   and/or otherwise enjoy the usufruct thereof, clearly go to show that even prior to institution of the   said   suit   the   plaintiff­respondent   had been in hostile possession thereof. 47. If   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the present case, are seen in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  Des   Raj’s   case   supra,   the revenue entries are in the name of the parties to the lis, as co­sharers, as such, the alleged forcible ouster, which is also anti­thesis to the concept of adverse possession, is fatal to the case of the plaintiffs. 48. In Ravinder Kaur Grewal  versus Manjit Kaur,   AIR   2019   Supreme   Court   3827,  the   Hon’ble Supreme   Court   has   elaborately   discussed   the   principle 26 2026:HHC:34793 governing   the   plea   of   adverse   possession. Relevant paragraph 57 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ 57. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co­exist at the same time, namely, nec­vi i.e. adequate in continuity,   nec­clam   i.e.,   adequate   in publicity and nec­precario i.e. adverse to a competitor,   in   denial   of   title   and   his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know   notorious   facts,   knowledge   is attributed to him on the basis that but for due   diligence   he   would   have   known   it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a   title   which   is   not   pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser’s long possession is not   synonym   with   adverse   possession. Trespasser’s possession is construed to be on  behalf  of  the   owner,  the   casual  user does   not   constitute   adverse   possession. The   owner   can   take   possession   from   a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case  of  agricultural  property  by  and  the large   concept   is   that   actual   tiller   should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The   legislature   in   various   States   confers rights based on possession. 49. In the present case, the learned trial Court has   swayed   away   with   the   fact   that   the   plaintiffs   have pleaded the date, when their predecessor­in­interest had forcibly ousted the defendants, as 13.01.1960, which, even, has not been supported by any documentary proof, nor, in the revenue record, such fact of exclusive possession of 27 2026:HHC:34793 predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs has been recorded and thus, wrongly decreed the suit. 50. The findings of the learned trial Court fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’, as, the material fact has been ignored that the alleged Wills have not seen the light of the day, till date, and the bald plea of claiming ownership, on the basis of the Will, has been accepted, as gospel truth, as a plea of execution of the Wills, by Gurdei and Sartaju has specifically been denied by the defendants. 51. Except the pleadings, there is nothing on record   to   demonstrate   the   alleged   possession   of   the plaintiffs   upon   the   suit   property   from   13.01.1960. Moreover, the alleged act of the predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs to forcibly ousting the defendants, is fatal to the case of the plaintiffs. 52. The revenue record, as relied upon by the plaintiffs, contains entries in favour of the parties to the lis, as joint owners­in­possession, although, those entries are rebuttable   one. Presumption   has   been   attached   to   the revenue entries. The bald statement of PW­1 is too short to rebut the said presumption, as, the said witness has simply 28 2026:HHC:34793 stated that the plaintiffs are owners­in­possession of the suit land. 53. In the absence of any documentary proof, to support the bald assertion, the learned trial Court has fallen into error by decreeing the suit. Hence, this Court has no legal hesitation to hold that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court below, has rightly been reversed by the learned First Appellate Court. 54. In   view   of   the   discussion   made   above, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere in the well reasoned judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court. The   substantial   questions   of   law,   are   decided against the appellants. 55. Accordingly,   both   the   appeals   are dismissed   and   the   judgment   and   decree   passed   by   the learned First Appellate Court, is upheld. Consequently the suit of the plaintiffs is ordered to be dismissed. 56. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) Judge August 18, 2026 (ps)