1 2026:CGHC:13864 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 729 of 2025 1 - Sunil Singh S/o Late R.P. Singh Aged About 55 Years Residing At Dindayal Upadhyay, Ward No. 7, Dipka, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Sadhram S/o Latel Aged About 64 Years Residing At Village- Mendra, Tehsil- Sakri, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Awadhram S/o Latel Aged About 63 Years Residing At Village- Mendra, Tehsil- Sakri, District- Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 3 - Anandram S/o Latel Aged About 55 Years Residing At Village- Mendra, Tehsil- Sakri, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Rahul Agrawal S/o Shri Shyamsundar Agrawal Aged About 39 Years Residing At Ward No.3, Nehru Nagar, Jabbal Gali, Mungeli Road, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 5 - State of Chhattisgarh Through District Collector, Bilaspur District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Shri Nikhil Kumar Singh, Advocate. For Respondents 1 to 4 : Shri Ravindra Sharma, Advocate. For State : Shri Vikhyat Arora, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board 23.03. 202 6 1. The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 25.04.2025 passed by 8th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Misc. Civil Appeal No.43 of 2023 whereby the Misc. Appeal filed by the petitioner have been dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the are that, the petitioner is the plaintiff before trial court who is prosecuting a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.04.06 14:56:02 +0530 2 injunction over the suit land Khasra Nos. 12/1, 13,14 and 15 total area 0.96 Acre situated at village Mendra. PH No.24, Tehsil Takhatpur, District Bilaspur. It is the pleading of the plaintiff in the civil suit that the suit land was purchased by his mother late Chutra Devi through registered sale deed dated 17.07.1989 from its owner Hori Lal and came into possession thereof as per the fourcorners mentioned in the sale deed. After death of his mother, he inherited the property and came into possession of the same which is detailed in Schedule-A annexed with the plaint. In the month of August, 2021 the plaintiff came to know that the land of the plaintiff is being encroached by unknown person by putting Murum over it and then he made an application before the Tehsildar Sakri on 01.09.2021, who, in turn, directed the concerned Halka Patwari Mendra to submit the report. The Patwari submitted his report on 28.11.2021 in which the plaintiff’s possession from 1989 have been mentioned. The other land of the plaintiff bearing Khasra No.629/1 and 630/1 is adjoining to its purchased land and for the said reason his mother purchased the land from Hori Lal. The defendant No.1 to 3 had purchased the land of Khasra No. 344,164/3 and 623, total Area 0.92 Acre from Hori Lal through registered sale deed dated 28.02.1992 and they are in possession over the land as per their fourcorners mentioned in the sale deed. On 12.04.2021 the defendants No.1 to 3 made an application before the Tehsildar Sakri for correction of records in which they mentioned that the land of Khasra number 344 was recorded in the name of Hori Lal and Khasra No.623 was recorded in the name of Chhedi Lal and thus before 12.04.2021 the defendants No.1to3 were not the recorded owner of said land of Khasra No.344 and 623. With the collusion of Revenue Authority, they 3 get an order in their faovur of correction of revenue records despite knowing that fourcorners of the land of Khasra No.623 is in possession of plaintiff since 1989. Immediately after correction of revenue records, the defendants No.1 to 3 sold the land of Khasra No.623 to defendant No.4 through registered sale deed dated 11.08.2021 showing the fourcorners of the land of the plaintiff which has been shown in their sale deed dated 17.07.1989. The fourcorners mentioned in the sale deed dated 28.02.1992 and sale deed dated 11.08.2021 with respect to Khasra No.623 are different and by suppressing the material facts the defendants No.1 to 3 have executed sale deed in favour of defendant No.4 by which the title of the plaintiff over his land is clouded and then he filed the civil suit. 3. In the civil suit the plaintiff has filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1&2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction against interference of the defendants over the suit land. The said application of the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial court vide its order dated 12.04.2022 holding that there are difference of fourcorners of the land of Khasra No.623 and Khasra Nos. 12/1,13,14 & 15 which has been shown in the respective sale deeds of the parties. Considering the threat of alienation of the suit land by the defendants No.1 to 3, the plaintiff again filed an application on 10.02.2023 under Order 39 Rule 1&2 read with Section 151 CPC for grant of temporary injunction against alienation of the suit land. The said application of plaintiff was again dismissed by the trial court by the trial court vide order dated 24.04.2023 holding that prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are not in favour of the plaintiff. The said order dated 24.04.2023 was challenged by the plaintiff by filing Misc. Appeal before the 8th Additional District 4 Judge, Bilaspur, which has also been dismissed vide order dated 25.04.2025. Hence the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the plaintiff is claiming his limited prayer in his application that during pendency of civil suit the defendants may be restrained from alienating the suit land as they are intending to execute the sale deed in prospective purchasers. If the defendants succeed in alienating the suit land, the purchasers would raise construction over the suit land and then the nature of suit property would be changed and recovery of possession from purchasers, if the plaintiff succeeds in suit, would be very difficult. Only to defeat the fruits of decree and rights of the plaintiff from the suit land the defendants are intending to alienate the suit land. There are sufficient material produced before the trial court which demonstrates prima facie case and irreparable loss in favour of plaintiff and the balance of convenience is also in his favour. He would further submit that to protect the interest of the plaintiff over the suit property and the party, the alienation of the suit land by the defendants may be restrained till the pendency of civil suit by setting aside the impugned orders passed by the trial court as well as appellate court. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the trial court as well as appellate court concurrently held that the plaintiff is not having any prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in his favour. Earlier also the application filed by the plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction has been rejected by the trial court vide order dated 12.04.2022 which has not been challenged in any higher forum and that attains its finality, 5 despite that the plaintiff again approached before the trial court by filing another application. In view of provisions of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short, The Act, 1882) any alienation made by the defendants is subject to final outcome of the civil suit and the defendants cannot be deprived by rightful enjoyment of their property particularly when the plaintiff’s plaint has been declined on the ground there is no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss to him. Mere pendency of civil suit does not entitle him to restrain the defendants from enjoyment of the right of their property. Under their rightful ownership, they are entitled to enjoy their property and to alienate the same as per their convenience and requirement. The writ petition does not have any merit and is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the writ petition. 7. From perusal of documents annexed with the writ petition it transpires that on 12.04.2022, the application filed by the plaintiff has been rejected by the trial court and declined to grant temporary injunction with respect to interference of the defendants from the possession of the plaintiff is declined. The plaintiff again moved his application for restraining the defendants from alienating the suit property as he apprehended that defendants may alienate the suit property which creates more complication in the suit and the plaintiff would be required to implead the proposed purchasers in civil suit and if it is not, then the ultimate decision would affect the rights of the plaintiff if he succeeds in suit. 6 8. The limited prayer made by the counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff that the defendants may be restrained to alienate the suit land till pendency of suit is appealing to this court in view of nature of dispute and under the pleadings of the parties. Though there is a provision of Section 52 of the Act, 1882 which provides doctrine of lis pendens and any alienation made during pendency of civil suit are subject to final outcome of the civil suit, yet to avoid any further complication and to secure ends of justice, the defendants may be restrained from alienating the suit property till pendency of suit. When the plaintiff have specifically pleaded in his plaint that the defendants have put the fourcornes of their land in the sale deed executed by them with respect to land of Khasra No.623 and put the same fourcorners in the sale deed by which the purchasers have claimed the possession over the land of the plaintiff. Further, in view of the pleadings with respect to lands of adjoining and the claim of possession of plaintiff through registered sale deed dated 17.07.1989 purchased by his mother, makes prima facie case and balance of convenience to grant interim relief in his favour. His apprehension of alienation of property by the defendants also found support that immediately after correction of revenue records the defendants No.1to3 alienated the suit land of Khasra No.623 to the defendant No.4 on 11.08.2021 and as per the application of the plaintiff filed under Order 39 Rule 1&2 read with Section 151 CPC, he apprehended alienation of suit property by defendants No.1 to 3, is found to be a bonafide apprehension under the facts and circumstances of the case and if any alienation would be made by the defendants No.1to3 that would certainly cause irreparable 7 loss to the plaintiff if he ultimately succeeds in suit and in that condition reversion of possession would be very difficult for him. 9. The Hon. Supreme Court in case Dalpat Kumar and Another Vs. Prahlad Singh and Others, 1992(1)SCC 719 in para 5 of its judgment has held as under: “5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 10. Further, in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi Vs. Harish Amblal Choksi & Others, 2024(11)SCC 351, it has been held in para 44 as under: “44. Quite often, in these types of litigations, it is sought to be argued that an injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the suit property was absolutely unnecessary as no post-suit transfer by the defendant can adversely affect the result of the suit because of the provisions of Section 52 of the T. P. Act whereunder all such transfers cannot but abide by the result of the suit. It is true that the doctrine of lis pendens as enunciated in Section 52 of the T. P. Act takes care of all pendente lite transfers; but it may not always be good enough to take fullest care of the plaintiffs interest vis-a-vis such a transfer. We may give one appropriate illustration of a suit for specific performance of contract based on an agreement of sale. In a suit wherein the plaintiff prays for specific performance and if the defendant is not 8 restrained from selling the property to a third party and accordingly a third party purchases the same bona fide for value without any notice of the pending litigation and spends a huge sum for the improvement thereof or for construction thereon, the equity in his favour may intervene to persuade the Court to decline, in the exercise of its discretion, the equitable relief of specific performance to the plaintiff at the trial and to award damages only in favour of the plaintiff. It must be noted that Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Code clearly provides for interim injunction restraining the alienation or sale of the suit property and if the doctrine of lis pendens as enacted in Section 52 of the T. P. Act was regarded to have provided all the panacea against pendente lite transfers, the Legislature would not have provided in Rule 1 for interim! injunction restraining the transfer of suit property. Rule 1 of Order 39, in our view, clearly demonstrates that, notwithstanding the Rule of lis pendens in Section 52 of the T. P. Act, there can be occasion for the grant of injunction restraining pendente lite transfers in a fit and proper case. (See: Sm. Muktakesi Dawn and Ors. v. Haripada Mazumdar and Anr. reported in AIR 1988 Cal 25)” 11. Applying the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court and under the facts and circumstances of the case and pleadings made by the respective parties, this court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has made out a case for interference in the present writ petition. 12. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and considering that the dispute between the parties primarily relates to the identification and boundary of the respective lands, it is directed that the defendants shall not alienate or create any third-party interest over land bearing Khasra No. 623 for a limited period, until proper demarcation of the suit land and adjoining lands of the parties is carried out. The parties are at liberty to file an appropriate application before the learned trial Court seeking demarcation. Upon such application being filed, the learned trial Court shall appoint a competent Commissioner for demarcation and obtain a report in accordance with the law. The aforesaid restraint shall remain operative only till submission of the demarcation report. Thereafter, the trial Court shall be at liberty to pass appropriate orders in accordance with the law. 9 13. It is made clear that this court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and the trial court shall decide the case strictly in accordance with law on its own merits. 14. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder