2026:JHHC:19220-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (C) No. 2297 of 2025 M/s Aggar Security Services (I) Private Limited, Kankarbagh, District-Patna (Bihar), through it authorized signatory, Mr. Sunil Kumar ….. Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Secretary, Department of Higher and Technical Education, Ranchi 2. Director of Technical Education, Department of Higher and Technical Education, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi ….. Respondents ----- CORAM HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Petitioner: Mr. Parth Jalan, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I ----- 03/01.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Parth Jalan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned Sr. S.C.-I, for the respondents- State. 2. The Rule is made returnable immediately at the request of and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 3. I.A. No. 5795 of 2025 seeking leave to amend the corrigendum dated 23.04.2025 is allowed. Let the amendment be carried out forthwith. 4. The petitioner challenges the order dated 15.04.2025, read with the corrigendum dated 23.04.2025, to the extent it blacklists the petitioner for a period of five years, effective from 15.04.2025. 5. Mr Parth Jalan, learned counsel for the petitioner, clarifies that though the entire order dated 15.04.2025 read with the corrigendum dated 23.04.2025 is challenged in the present writ petition, on instructions, he now restricts the challenge only to the extent of blacklisting of the petitioner for a period of five years. 2026:JHHC:19220-DB 2 6. Mr. Parth Jalan submits that before blacklisting the petitioner, three notices were issued to it. However, all these notices alleged certain breaches of the terms of the contract. He submits that none of the notices even hinted at any proposed blacklisting of the petitioner. He submits that in the absence of the petitioner being informed of the consequences of any alleged breach of contract, including the particulars of the proposed action of blacklisting, the impugned blacklisting order should not have been passed. He submits that this is a case of gross breach of the principles of natural justice and fair play. 7. Mr. Parth Jalan relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 70; Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 229; Gorkha Security Services v. Government (NCT of Delhi) and Others, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105; UMC Technologies Private Limited v. Food Corporation of India and Another, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 551 and Ventindia Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in (2021) 1 SCC 804 to support his above referred contention. 8. Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned Sr. S.C.-I, submits that not less than three notices were issued to the petitioner and from the context, it was quite clear that the petitioner was to be blacklisted in the event of offering no valid explanation. Accordingly, he submits that this is not a case of any breach of the principles of natural justice and fair play. 2026:JHHC:19220-DB 3 9. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 10. In this case, the impugned order dated 15.04.2025, as it was originally issued, did not even specify the period for which the blacklisting was to remain effective. This means that the original order purported to blacklist the petitioner for an indefinite or indeterminate period. This was in gross breach of the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Others, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 731. 11. However, the respondents-State, realising its error, within hardly a week of the issuance of the order dated 15.04.2025, issued a corrigendum clarifying that the blacklisting would remain effective for a period of five years from 15.04.2025. Thus, the argument about the term of blacklisting being indefinite no longer survives. 12. Having regard to the drastic consequences of a blacklisting order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, time and again, has held that a show cause notice which precedes a blacklisting order, must specify that blacklisting was being contemplated against the noticee. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that, even if there is no specific reference to blacklisting, the attendant circumstances or the tenor of the show cause notice must make it discernible that blacklisting was in contemplation. 13. In the present case, the notices dated 06.12.2024, 14.12.2024 & 29.01.2025 were issued to the petitioner before the impugned blacklisting order was passed. None of these notices referred to 2026:JHHC:19220-DB 4 any consequence of blacklisting. Further, on perusal of these notices, it is apparent that the petitioner was only called upon to explain the alleged breaches. Therefore, even from the attendant circumstances or the tenor of the three notices, it could not be discerned that the respondents intended to blacklist the petitioner. 14. The notice dated 29.01.2025 merely stated that the agreement with the petitioner would be terminated for non-compliance with its terms if the petitioner failed to submit a satisfactory response. However, even this notice did not refer to the consequences of blacklisting the petitioner. 15. In the above circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above-referred decisions relied upon by Mr Parth Jalan, has held that the action of blacklisting would suffer from the failure of natural justice and fair play. In particular, we refer the observations made in Gorkha Security Services (supra) in which it has been held that a valid show cause notice in such matters must clearly indicate the precise action proposed, including blacklisting, either expressly or by necessary implication. Since blacklisting carries serious civil and commercial consequences, failure to specify in the notice, deprived the affected party of a meaningful opportunity to respond. 16. Since this is precisely the situation in the present matter, we have no hesitation in quashing and setting aside the impugned order insofar as it blacklists the petitioner for a term of five years. 2026:JHHC:19220-DB 5 17. Though we quash the blacklisting order for failure of natural justice, we clarify that this will not prevent the respondents from issuing a fresh notice regarding blacklisting and, upon considering the petitioner's response, taking further action in accordance with law and on its own merits. 18. The Rule is made absolute to the above extent. 19. The present writ petition is accordingly allowed to the above extent without any order for costs. 20. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of. (M. S. SONAK, C.J.) (RAJESH SHANKAR, J.) 01.07.2026 Satish/Vikas/