[2025:RJ-JP:52010] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11468/2014 Shri Madan Lal, S/o Shri Mukataya, since deceased 1/1 Smt. Rameshwari Wife Of Late Shri Madan Lal, Aged About 53 Years. 1/2 Sanju Daughter Of Late Shri Madan Lal, Aged About 29 Years. 1/3 Anju Daughter Of Late Shri Madan Lal, Aged About 27 Years All R/o Behind Patni Bhawan, Madangunj, Kishangarh, District Ajmer. ----Petitioners Versus 1. 2. Municipal Corporation of Kishangarh, Ajmer through Commissioner. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Of Kishangarh, Ajmer. 2. Chief Health Inspector, Municipal Corporation Of Kishangarh, Ajmer. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Veyankatesh Garg with Mr. Pranjal & Ms. Disha Jain For Respondent(s) : Mr. B.K. Sharma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Order Arguments concluded on ::: November 19, 2025 Reserved on ::: November 19, 2025 Pronounced on ::: January 19, 2026 1. The petitioner- Shri Madan Lal by filing instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has made a challenge to the order dated 09.10.2013 (Annex.2) [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (2 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] issued under the signatures of the Commissioner, Nagar Parisad Kishangarh, by which the petitioner has been dismissed (removed) from service. 2. Since the original petitioner- Shri Madan Lal has passed away, the benefits accruing from this order, shall be payable to the legal heirs of the deceased petitioner. 3. The facts of the case in nutshell are that the petitioner- Shri Madan Lal was initially appointed as a Class IV in the respondent department on 07.12.1973. The petitioner was said to have witnessed a prolonged and bitter family dispute in his later part of entire life, which had completely shattered him emotionally and psychologically. The petitioner proceeded on an unsanctioned leave from 01.01.2011 to March 2011, which resulted into issuing a show-cause-notice dated 25.03.2011 to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted reply to the aforesaid show-cause-notice on 31.03.2011. The respondent department being dissatisfied with the reply to the show-cause-notice dated 31.03.2011, issued a notice dated 27.04.2011 under Rule 86(3) of the Rajasthan Service Rules. On 03.05.2004 the petitioner in response to the aforesaid notice submitted an application/ reply to the notice before the respondent authority with the request that he shall not commit such mistake in future. On 01.06.2011 the petitioner submitted an application before the respondent No. 2 by which he sought [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (3 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] voluntarily retirement w.e.f. 01.09.2011 mainly on the ground of prolonged ill-health and continuous family dispute. The service career of the petitioner for 29 years remained unblemished. The respondent-department dissatisfied with the reply to the notice dated 27.04.2011, issued a memorandum of charges along-with charge-sheet on 07.07.2011 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short 'Rule of 1958'). The application submitted by the petitioner on 01.06.2011 seeking voluntarily retirement was dismissed on the ground that the inquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 is under cotemplation. The petitioner on 17.08.2011 submitted reply to the charges levelled against him. On 30.04.2012 the Inquiry Committee submitted its report and found the charges proved against the petitioner. Vide order dated 09.10.2013 (Annexure-12), the respondent-Authority dismissed (removed) the petitioner from service. The petitioner aggrieved with the order of dismissal (removal) dated 09.10.2013 has preferred this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner abandoning to challenge the punishment order on its merit and has limited his challenge to the extent that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner i.e. removal from service for the [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (4 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] allegation of willful absence from the duty is disproportionate and is very harsh and to alter the same. Counsel also submitted that the petitioner in reply to the notice tendered an apology and sought permission to join. Further the application for voluntary retirement dated 01.06.2011 was turned down for reason of a pending departmental inquiry by letter dated 10.08.2011. It is evident that on the day when the petitioner applied for voluntary retirement, no inquiry was pending against him. Counsel submitted that the respondent rejected the application of the petitioner for voluntary retirement so that a departmental enquiry could be initiated to deprive him of his benefits. Counsel also submitted that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is arbitrary, grossly excessive and out of proportion warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. The order of the respondent was illegal and irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic and normal standards. The unsanctioned leave for which the petitioner was terminated was for a period of around four months, which would by no stretch of imagination attract a punishment for termination and forfeiture of past service. Counsel also submitted that the act of the respondents is illegal and will deprive the petitioner from his legal and fundamental rights. The respondents have given a harsh and unbalanced punishment by forfeiting the pension [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (5 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] and other retiral benefits of the petitioner on account of a conduct, which can be very well termed as minor fault. Counsel to support his submissions has placed reliance upon following judgments:- (i) Shashi Bala Meena V/s Punjab National Bank and Ors. reported in 2023 SCC Online Raj. 5311 delivered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court; (ii) Union of India and Anr. V/s R.K. Sharma reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 2010 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided on 30.06.2022; (iii) Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited & Anr. V/s Mukul Kumar Choudhuri & Ors. reported in (2009) 15 SCC 620 delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court; 5. Mr. B.K. Sharma counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the impugned order of punishment has been passed by the respondent-authority after taking into consideration the entire material made available to the Enquiry Committee. In the reply to the writ petition, counsel appearing for the respondent department has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable against the impugned order dated 09.10.2013 on the ground that the impugned order passed by the respondent-authority, is an appealable order, therefore, the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (6 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] 6. Considered the submissions advanced by both the counsels appearing for the respective parties and gone through the entire material made available to the Court including the judgments cited. 7. Counsel appearing for the respondents has raised an issue that since the order under challenge in the present writ petition is an appealable order, the present writ petition is not maintainable. 8. The impugned order imposing penalty of dismissal from service has been passed on 09.10.2013 and the charge- sheet is pending since 2011. 9. The petitioner has limited his challenge to the extent of proportionality of the punishment imposed and not on the merits of factual aspects. In view of the limited challenge i.e. proportionality of punishment for a charge of willful absence from the duty for a period of about three months only, the Court feels appropriate to exercise the writ jurisdiction in the present case in view of limited prayer. 10. The only charge against the petitioner is of willful absence from duty for a period of about three months. After holding the petitioner guilty for the misconduct of remaining willful absence from duty for a period of about three months, a penalty of removal from service has been imposed upon the petitioner. [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (7 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] 11. It is not disputed that the petitioner has already completed 29 years of service but the respondents have not brought on record anything adverse other than the present charge. 12. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case where the charge against the petitioner is of willful absence from duty for a period of about three months, the punishment/ penalty of removal from service is disproportionate? 13. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shashi Bala Meena (supra) has observed in paras 9.2, 9.3, 10, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8, 11 and 14 as under:- "9.2 Now the questions remain for adjudication of this court is that “Whether for absence of six months, the punishment of “compulsory retirement” is proper or disproportionate?”. 9.3 For adjudicating this fact, the whole service career of the petitioner is required to be seen. 10. This court is conscious enough about the scope of interference with the decision of Disciplinary' Authority. The scope of interference is very narrow and limited in such like matters, but the High Court has powers of moulding the relief in case where the punishment/penalty imposed shocks the judicial conscience. 10.5. The doctrine of proportionality is thus well recognised concept of judicial review and if it is found that the punishment is disproportionate, then it remains open for the court to interfere under its limited scope of judicial review. 10.6. The principles of proportionality of punishment vis-avis misconduct have been recognised by the Courts of various European countries as well as British Courts. It has time and [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (8 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] again been held that if the punishment imposed on an employee is out of proportion, the Court has power to interfere with the same. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services, [1984] 3 All ER 935, it has been held:"Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call illegality the second irrationality and the third procedural impropriety. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also recognised the theory of proportionality of punishment when they said that "an order imposing punishment, which is shockingly disproportionate or is highly excessive having regard to the gravity of misconduct, is liable to be declared as arbitrary and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." 10.8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman cum Managing Director, Coal India Limited v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620, has dealt with the doctrine of proportionality and the limited scope of High Court under judicial review in paras 19, 20, 21 and 22 as under:- 19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well- recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (9 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be. justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. 22. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration on the question of punishment but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this exercise may not be proper. In our view, the demand of justice would be met if the Respondent No. 1 is denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months." 11. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in case a quantum of penalty, there should be compelling and strong circumstances which must be recorded and such interference cannot be on the [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (10 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] basis of misplaced sympathy and generosity. Considering the said concept of rendering justice, this court has no hesitation to hold as far as the present case on hand is concerned, that interference is called for, which is not based on misplaced sympathy or generosity, but on the basis of rendering equitable justice which is a hallmark of judicial review by this court which is exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. Bearing in mind the celebrated doctrine of proportionality, the impugned order dated 15.01.2015 and the appellate order dated 12.03.2015 are quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration on the question of punishment and pass appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order." 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.K. Sharma (supra) has observed in paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 as under:- "8. The short question which falls for consideration is whether the punishment of dismissal from service on account of absence from duty for the period mentioned in Article 1 of the Charge-memo, is proportionate, reasonable and in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India? 9. Learned counsel for the appellants have rightly pointed out that besides the absence period, the respondent had on several occasions remained on Casual Leave/Earned Leave or other sanctioned leave also. It is pointed out that such leave was sanctioned by the officers who were not competent to do so. However, the appellants have not proved that the respondent was "willfully" absent from service during [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (11 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] those periods. It remains a possibility that respondent merely acted under the faith that the officer in question had the power to approve his requests for leave. It is also undeniable that no action was taken against the officers who purportedly granted leave to the respondent despite not being competent to sanction the same. 10. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that no misconduct can be attributed to the respondent for the periods he availed one or the other sanctioned leave. 11. As regards to the period for which the respondent was absent from duty, we are satisfied that the punishment of dismissal from service is too harsh, disproportionate and not commensurate with the nature of the charge proved against the respondent. We are, therefore, of the view that the ends of justice would have been adequately met by imposing some lesser but major penalty upon the respondent. 12. The misconduct attributed to the respondent is based on the charge-memo dated 04.12.1998 with respect to which he was dismissed from service in the year 2000. We, therefore, do not deem it necessary to remit the case to the disciplinary authority after such a long spell of 22 years. Instead, we are inclined to invoke our power under Article 142 of the Constitution, keeping in mind the doctrine of proportionality and with a view to do complete justice between the parties. This Court has utilized Article 142 on numerous occasions in the past, such as in Hind Construction & Engineering v. Their Workmen and Management of the Federation of Indian [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (12 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] Chambers of Commerce v. Their Workmen to ensure that the punishment meted out to a public sector employee for a violation of the applicable service laws/rules is not disproportionate to the infraction that he/she has committed. The doctrine of proportionality is employed to examine whether the penalty that is imposed upon is congruent with the charges brought against the delinquent employee. 13. We, thus, allow this appeal in part and dispose of the same in the following terms: (i) The order of the High Court dated 06.12.2012 to the extent of setting aside the dismissal dated 14.07.2000 is upheld. (ii) The respondent is ordered to be reinstated in service but he shall be deemed to have remained in service till he completed minimum "qualifying service" of 20 years to earn pension and other retiral benefits. (iii) The respondent shall be deemed to have been 'compulsorily retired from service', with entitlement to pension, gratuity and other retiral benefits on completion of minimum qualifying service. (iv) No arrears of pay shall be paid to the respondent from the date of dismissal from service i.e. 14.07.2000 till he is deemed to have completed the minimum "qualifying service". (v) The respondent, however, shall be entitled to arrears of pension and other retiral benefits, without any interest, provided that such arrears are paid within a period of four months from today. In the event of delay, the respondent shall [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (13 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum on delayed payment. (vi) It is made clear that the above stated order shall not constitute a precedent as the same has been passed by invoking power under Article 142 of the Constitution." 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mukul Kumar Choudhuri & Ors.(supra) in paras 15, 18, 19, 20 and 21 as observed as under:- 15. The question, however, remains: is the punishment of removal grossly disproportionate to the proved charge of unauthorized absence for more than six months? In order to answer the aforesaid question, it would be appropriate to refer to a few of decisions of this Court wherein doctrine of proportionality has been considered. 18. Again, in the case of Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Assn. and Another this court considered the doctrine of proportionality and it was held: “17. So far as the doctrine of proportionality is concerned, there is no gainsaying that the said doctrine has not only arrived in our legal system but has come to stay. With the rapid growth of administrative law and the need and necessity to control possible abuse of discretionary powers by various administrative authorities, certain principles have been evolved by courts. If an action taken by any authority is contrary to law, improper, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (14 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] court of law can interfere with such action by exercising power of judicial review. One of such modes of exercising power, known to law is the “doctrine of proportionality”. 18. “Proportionality” is a principle where the court is concerned with the process, method or manner in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at a decision. The very essence of decision-making consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors and considerations in the case. The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true nature of exercise—the elaboration of a rule of permissible priorities. 19. de Smith states that “proportionality” involves “balancing test” and “necessity test”. Whereas the former (balancing test) permits scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter (necessity test) requires infringement of human rights to the least restrictive alternative. [Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), pp. 601- 05, para 13.085; see also Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law (2005), p. 366.] 20. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.), Reissue, Vol. 1(1), pp. 144-45, para 78, it is stated: “The court will quash exercise of discretionary powers in which there is no reasonable relationship between the objective which is sought to be achieved and the means used to that end, or where [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (15 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] punishments imposed by administrative bodies or inferior courts are wholly out of proportion to the relevant misconduct. The principle of proportionality is well established in European law, and will be applied by English courts where European law is enforceable in the domestic courts. The principle of proportionality is still at a stage of development in English law; lack of proportionality is not usually treated as a separate ground for review in English law, but is regarded as one indication of manifest unreasonableness.” 21. The doctrine has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without abuse of discretion. There can be no “pick and choose”, selective applicability of the government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a “sledgehammer to crack a nut”. As has been said many a time; “where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded”. 22. In the celebrated decision of Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for Civil Service(1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL) Lord Diplock proclaimed: (All ER p. 950h-j) “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (16 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’….” (emphasis supplied) 23. CCSU has been reiterated by English courts in several subsequent cases. We do not think it necessary to refer to all those cases. 24. So far as our legal system is concerned, the doctrine is well settled. Even prior to CCSU, this Court has held that if punishment imposed on an employee by an employer is grossly excessive, disproportionately high or unduly harsh, it cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and it is always open to a court to interfere with such penalty in appropriate cases. 25. In Hind Construction & Engg. Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR 1965 SC 917), some workers remained absent from duty treating a particular day as holiday. They were dismissed from service. The Industrial Tribunal set aside the action. This Court held that the absence could have been treated as leave without pay. The workmen might have been warned and fined. (But) [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (17 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] “It is impossible to think that any other reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner.” (AIR p. 919, para 7) (emphasis supplied) The Court concluded that the punishment imposed on the workmen was “not only severe and out of proportion to the fault, but one which, in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed”. (AIR pp. 919-20, para 7) (emphasis supplied) 26. In Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry v. Workmen [(1972) 1 SCC 40], the allegation against the employee of the Federation was that he issued legal notices to the Federation and to the International Chamber of Commerce which brought discredit to the Federation—the employer. Domestic inquiry was held against the employee and his services were terminated. The punishment was held to be disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and established. This Court observed that: (SCC p. 62, para 34) “[T]he Federation had made a mountain out of a mole hill and made a trivial matter into one involving loss of its prestige and reputation.” 27. In Ranjit Thakur referred to earlier, an army officer did not obey the lawful command of his superior officer by not eating food offered to him. Court-martial proceedings were initiated and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year was imposed. He was also dismissed from [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (18 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] service, with added disqualification that he would be unfit for future employment. 28. Applying the doctrine of proportionality and following CCSU, Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed: (SCC p. 620, para 25) “The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” (emphasis supplied) 19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in access to the [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (19 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations." 16. The petitioner has served with the respondents for a long period of 29 years and nothing has been brought on record as regards any adversity during these 29 years against [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (20 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] him. The petitioner has been imposed with a penalty of dismissal from service on account of willful absence from duty for a period of about three months. It is also submitted by the counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner submitted an application for V.R.S. but the said application was turned down because of pendency of the inquiry. 17. Taking into consideration the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court and also Coordinate Bench of this Court, as stated above, as regards the proportionality of the punishment in the similar circumstances of misconduct of willful absence and the charge has been found to be proved against the present petitioner i.e. of willful absence from the duty for a period of about three months only, this Court can safely held that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner i.e. dismissal from service is too harsh and deserves to be interfered with. 18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of dismissal from service dated 09.10.2013 (Annex.2) is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for passing a fresh order as regards the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner other than the penalty of dismissal from service. 19. The respondents shall pass a fresh order within a period of one month from the date of receiving a copy of this order. [2025:RJ-JP:52010] (21 of 21) [CW-11468/2014] 20. Consequences to follow according to fresh order to be passed by the respondents, as directed above. 21. The fresh order passed by the Disciplinary Authority in compliance of this order shall be treated to be with effect from the date of the impugned order dated 09.10.2013. 22. In view of the order passed in the main petition, the pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J Sharma N.K./Dy. Registrar-368-S