1 2026:CGHC:13683-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 758 of 2025 Laxman Devdas S/o Kushal Devdas Aged About 23 Years R/o Ward No. 9 Jogideepa Patewa, P.S. Patewa, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh. ... appellant (s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Gundardehi, District Balod Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For appellant (s) : Mr. Kamlesh Patel, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Soumya Rai, Panel Lawyer Division Bench: Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge 23.03.2026 1. Heard Kamlesh Patel, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer for the Respondent / State. 2. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 24.03.2025 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, FTSC, (POCSO), Balod, Dist- Balod, in Special Sessions Case (POCSO) No. 116/2021 hereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as below:- S.No. Conviction Sentences 1 U/s 363 of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs. 1000/- SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.04.01 10:57:31 +0530 2 in default of payment of fine RI for 01 year. 2 U/s 366 of IPC R.I. for 7 years and fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine RI for 01 year. 3 U/s 6 of POCSO Act R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine RI for 01 year. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 3. Brief facts of the case are that on 08.11.2021, the father of the victim (PW/5) has lodged a missing report to the Police Station Gundardehi that his minor daughter is missing since 06.11.2021 who had gone to enjoy Matar festival, but had not returned. Despite her search, her whereabouts could not be traced out. The FIR (Ex-P/14) was registered against the unknown persons for the offence under Section 363 of IPC. The another copy of FIR is (Ex-P/33). During the inquiry, the victim was recovered on 15.11.2021 at bus stand, Patewa and recovery panchanama (Ex-P/1) was prepared in presence of the witnesses. She was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital Balod, where (PW/3) Dr. M. Choubey medically examined her and gave her report (Ex-P/10). While medically examined the victim, the doctor has noticed that her hymen was torned, however, there was no external injuries found on her body and opined that no definite opinion can be given regarding sexual assault. Two slides of her vaginal swabs were prepared, sealed and handed over to the Police for FSL examination. The Spot map (Ex-P/15) was prepared by the Police and (Ex-P/16) was prepared by the Patwari. Underwear of the victim has been seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/4). One mobile phone has 3 also been seized from the victim vide seizure memo (Ex-P/5). With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, the school register has been seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/8) and according to the school register the date of birth of the victim is 25.09.2004. After retaining its attested true copy (Article-A(c)) the original register was returned back to the school. The high school certificate of the victim has also been seized by the Police vide seizure memo (Ex-P/18). The appellant was arrested on 18/11/2021 and he too was sent for his medical examination to District Hospital Balod where Dr. A.P. Chandrakar (PW/4) has examined him and he found that the appellant is capable to perform sexual intercourse and gave his report (Ex P/12). The underwear of the appellant has also been seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/20). The motor cycle has been seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/21). The motor cycle of the appellant has been seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/27) and his mobile phone has also been seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/28). The underwears of the victim as well as appellant and the vaginal slides of the victim was sent for its chemical examination to FSL, Raipur. The Statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. of the victim was also recorded. The statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. of the prosecution witnesses have also been recorded and after completion of the usual investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the three accused persons i.e. the appellant, Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran and Sonu Bariha before the learned trial Court for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n), 368 and 34 of IPC and Section 4, 5(l) and 6 of POCSO Act. 4. The learned Trial Court has framed charges against the appellant Laxman Devdas for the offfence under Section 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of 4 IPC and Section 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act and framed charge against the co-accused Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran for the offence under Section 368 of IPC and Section 11/12 of POCSO Act, whereas the charge against the co-accused Sonu Bariha has been framed for the offence under Section 363, 376/109 of IPC and Section 11/12 of POCSO Act. The accused persons have denied the charge levelled against them and claimed trial. 5. During the proceeding of trial, the accused Sonu Bariha @ Sonu Shikari absconded and permanent warrant of arrest has been issued against him vide order dated 13.12.2024 and the trial of the present appellant and co-accused Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran was separated and proceeded. 6. In support of their case, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. One court witness (CW/1) has also been examined before the learned trial Court. Statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. of the accused persons have also been recorded in which they denied the circumstances appears against them, pleaded innocence and submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. 7. After due appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the co- accused Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran from all the offence but has convicted the appellant Laxman Devdas and sentenced him as mentioned in Para 2 of this Judgment hence this appea. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omission and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. There is no legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth 5 and age of the victim that on the date of incident she was minor and below the 18 years of age. The author of the school admission and discharge register has not been examined to prove the same. In absence of any cogent evidence to prove the date of birth, it cannot be hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident. He would further submit that the victim herself eloped with the appellant as she was having an affair with him. The victim and the appellant together traveled and she has not made any complaint to any person who met them on the way while traveling. The appellant has not kidnapped her in any manner and has not kept her from her lawful guardianship as the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that she was minor at the time of incident. Therefore, no offences against the appellant as alleged are made out and he is entitled for acquittal. 9. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The minor omission and contradictions does not make the evidence of the victim doubtful. The school register as well as the high school certificate is an admissible piece of evidence to prove the age of the victim and as per the high school certificate, she was minor on the date of incident. She was being kidnapped by the appellant and has kept away from lawful guardianship of her parents. Even if she has not made hue and cry at the time of making physical relation with the appellant, the same cannot be termed as consensual physical relation, in view of the fact that on the date of incident she was minor. Therefore the impugned judgment of conviction of the appellant and sentence is justified and the same needs no interference. 6 10.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11.The first and foremost question arises in this appeal is that whether the victim was minor on the date of incident or not. 12.The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register (Article-A(c) and high school certificate (Article-B(c)). The school register is sought to be proved by (PW/2) who is the Assistant Teacher of the school and the high school certificate is sought to be proved by (PW/5), who is the father of the victim. The (PW/2), who is the assistant teacher, has stated in his evidence that the Police has seized the school register from the school vide seizure memo (Ex-P/8) and after retaining its attested true copy {Article-A(c)}, the original register was returned back to the school. As per the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 25.09.2004. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the entries made in the school register is not in his hand writing. He admitted that who has got admitted the victim in the school and on what basis, her date of birth is recorded in the school register are not mentioned in the same. He also admitted that there is no counter sign of the parents of the victim in the said school register. He also admitted that there is requirement of birth certificate of the child at the time of her admission in the school. From the evidence of this witness, it is quite vivid that he is not the author of the school register nor the prosecution could produce any material on the basis on which the date of birth of the victim is recorded in the school register. 13.In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2)SCC-385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence 7 under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. In paragraphs 40 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different 8 standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 14.In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the 9 concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view 10 regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 15.Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules 11 (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. The another evidence relied upon the prosecution is the high school certificate of the victim which is sought to be proved by PW/5 who is the father of the victim. He stated in his evidence that the date of birth of the victim is 25.09.2004. He has brought the original high school certificate of the victim with him and the copy of which is Article-B(c) In cross examination, he stated that he disclosed the date of birth of the victim at the time of recording of his Police statement and if her date of birth is not written in his Police statement (Ex-P/22), he could not tell the reason. He admitted that at the time of birth of the child, normally the villagers have got it registered with Kotwari register and he too have got registered the birth of the victim with the Kotwari register. He admitted that he has not produced the birth certificate of the victim before the Police but has given the copy of her mark-sheet. When the 12 school register has not been proved by the prosecution by its author and no material will produce with respect to the basis on which the date of birth has been recorded in the school register, mentioning the date of birth of the school in the high school certificate also insufficient to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident. Though, high school certificate is the statutory document admittedly under Section 35 of Evidence Act but in absence of sufficient prove of correctness of the date of birth of the victim, it cannot be said that the victim was minor on the date of incident for holding guilty of the appellant for the alleged offence. The high school certificate alone is not sufficient to determine the age of the victim, particularly, when the witnesses have admitted the existence of birth certificate but the same has not been produced by the prosecution. 17. (PW/1), the victim has stated that her date of birth is 25.05.2004, however, in cross-examination, she admitted that she had her birth certificate with her and her birth was also registered with the Kotwari register. She further admitted that she has not produced her birth certificate or Kotwari register before the Police. She disclosed her date of birth on the basis of school record. She did not know as to who has got recorded her date of birth in the school. She also did not know on what basis her date of birth was recorded in the school. 18.From perusal of the aforesaid evidence, it is sufficient to hold that the prosecution could not produce any cogent evidence to determine the age of the victim that she was minor on the date of incident and less than 18 years of age. She was at the verge of majority and in absence of any cogent evidence, the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt 13 that the victim attains her age of majority. Yet, the learned trial Court has held her minor. 19.So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, we again examined the evidence of the victim. 20.The victim (PW/1) has stated in her evidence that in the month of January, 2021, the appellant came to her village who was driver of JCB. They exchanged their mobile numbers and had a regular talk with each other. In the month of November, 2021, the appellant came to Gureda turning to take her with him and made a telephonic call to her. When she went to visit him at Gourela turning, the appellant and his friend Sonu Bariha came by there motorcycle and they took her to Raipur by their their motorcycle. At Raipur, the accused Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran also joined with them and subsequently she came to know that accused Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran is the wife of the appellant Laxman. She committed marpeet with her at Raipur and when she was informing her parents by mobile phone the accused Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran snatched her mobile phone and switched it off. They took her to village Patewa and asked her to stay there. When they were at Raipur, the appellant Laxman made physical relation with her by saying that he will marry with her. Since she was under assurance that he will marry with her, she has not raised any objection in making physical relation with him. When they reached at Patewa, the parents of the appellant came to know that she was being kidnapped by the appellant and then the brother of the appellant assaulted him and thrown him out from the house. Thereafter, they stayed at Patewa Jungle along with the accused persons. In the night they stayed in the house of the friend of the 14 appellant. On the next morning they proceeded towards Orissa and stayed for two days in the house of the sister of the appellant and came back to Patewa. They again stayed in waiting hall at Patewa and again went to Orissa by motorcycle. They stayed there further for 4 -5 days in a rented house where quarrel took place between her and accused persons and thereafter, they left her at village Patewa. At Patewa also the appellant Laxman made physical relation with her on the pretext of marriage. On being advised given by the persons, at village Patewa, she made the Police complaint. Thereafter, the Police called her parents and proceeding were stated. In cross-examination she admitted that she was well-acquainted with the appellant Laxman and they exchanged their mobile number and having long conversation of their love affair. She was in love affair with the appellant and wanted to marry with him. She herself wanted to marry with the appellant. On 12.02.2021, she had gone to enjoy mela at village Gureda and she called the appellant there through mobile phone. Their affair was also came to know by her parents and they tried to stop her affair. She visited various placec with the appellant when he took her with him. But she has not made any complaint and has not raised any alarm when she was traveling with the appellant. She further stated that the she disclosed in her police statement Ex.D/1 about commission of marpeet by the accused Smt. Maheshwari Devdas @ Kiran and snatching of her mobile phone and if it is not there, she could not tell the reason. She also disclosed about the instances of their staying at Patewa and Orissa, if it is not there she could not tell the reason. She exaggerated from her statement Ex.D/1 and in cross-examination she stated that she made statement to the Police and if the Police has not 15 written her statement, she could not tell the reason. She further admitted that when her parents came to police station, she asked her parents that she wanted to marry with the appellant. When she admitted that she was having love affair with the appellant she wanted to marry with him and she on her own will eloped with him and traveled upto Raipur and Orissa without raising any objection or making any complaint. It cannot be said that she was subjected to any forceful measure by the appellant for kidnapping her rather it transpires from her evidence that she was in love affair with the appellant, she wanted to marry with him, she herself called the appellant and eloped with him and engaged in making physical relation. Even at the time of making physical relation, she has not made any protest or objection. Her evidence is completely satisfies that she was the consenting party and eloping with the appellant on her own will. 21.In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person and has held in Para 9 and Para 10 of its judgment that:- “9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be 16 shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 22.PW-5, the father of the victim has stated in his evidence that when the victim could not be found in his house. He lodged missing report Ex.P/14. After 4-5 days the police informed him that the victim is found and is present in police station, he went there and then his daughter informed him about the incident. When this witness has been examined by the prosecution, he admitted that in his cross-examination that his daughter has informed him that the appellant proposed her for marriage and thereafter, made physical relation with her. In cross- examination he admitted that before the present incident, he lodged a report against the accused Virendra Kumar Sahu with respect to the outraging the modesty of the victim and he faced criminal trial. He admitted that adjoining to his house, there are other houses of other persons where they are residing. In front of his house there is a main 17 road where the persons are visiting regularly. He further admitted that he did not know as to whether his daughter is in love affair with the appellant or not. 23.Considering the evidence of her father, no offence is made out against the appellant as alleged by the prosecution. The victim herself is found to be consenting party and eloped with the appellant on her own will, the evidence of her father does not give any support to the prosecution’s case. 24.On being medically examined the victim by Dr. M. Choubey (PW-3), no any external injuries have been found on her body. The doctor opined that no definite opinion can be given regarding sexual assault. The vaginal slides were sent for its chemical examination, however, the prosecution has failed to produce FSL report to establish that in the vaginal slides of the victim semen and sperms were present. 25.Considering all the evidences produced by the prosecution there is lack of cogent and clinching evidence to prove the offence against the appellant and hold him guilty in the alleged offence. 26.The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused 18 cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 27.Accordingly, by giving benefit of doubt the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. The appellant Laxman Devdas is in jail since 18.11.2021. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 28.Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of B.N.S.S. 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond of sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one reliable surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 29.The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika