1 2026:CGHC:13921-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 247 of 2026 1 - Ramesh Kumar S/o Chandraman, Aged About 63 Years, R/o Village Jumarpara, Post Karanji, Police Station Vishrampur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - South Eastern Coal Fields Limited Through CMD (Chairman Cum Managing Director), South Eastern Coal Fields Limited, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 2 - Duty General Manager Office Sub-Area Manager, Kumda Sub-Area, Powa- Kumda, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh 3 - General Manager Office Sub-Area Manager, Kumda Sub-Area, Powa-Kumda, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 4 – CTI, Chairman South Eastern Coal Fields Limited, Kolkata (West Bengal) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Surya Kawalkar Dangi and Ms. Priyanka Bajpai, Advocates. For Respondents : Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 24-03-2026 1. The present writ appeal filed by the writ appellant who was the writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge, against the impugned order dated 16-10-2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.04.01 12:20:23 +0530 2 No.10078/2019 whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner has been dismissed as not pressed by the counsel and the review petition filed by the petitioner was also dismissed on 16-12-2025. 2. The present writ appeal is barred by 73 days and an application for condonation of delay in filing the writ appeal (I.A. No.01/2026) has also been filed in the writ appeal. 3. Heard on I.A. No.01/2026 which is an application for condonation of delay in filing the writ appeal. 4. The writ appellant explained reasons for delay that the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner was dismissed as not pressed vide order dated 16-10-2025 without granting liberty to the writ petitioner to pursue the statutory appeal. The issue of termination of services of the petitioner was involved in the writ petition. The petitioner filed review petition/application for review of the order dated 16-10-2025 to the extent of grant of liberty to avail the remedy of statutory appeal, but the review application of the petitioner has also been disposed of on 16-12-2025 in chamber. 5. It is also explained in the application that the petitioner was suffering from persistent illness with symptoms of typhoid and underwent prolonged medical treatment for more than a month and due to his weakness he was unable to move for filing of the present writ appeal. Further, the petitioner was unaware about the dismissal of the review application in chamber, subsequently he got information of its dismissal and applied for certified copy of the order passed on the 3 review application which has been supplied to him on 20-01-2026 and thereafter, he filed the instant writ appeal on 13-02-2026 which is delayed by 73 days. 6. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that the writ petition, WPS No.10078/2019 was argued by Mr. S.B. Pandey, Advocate who was representing the petitioner. On 16-10-2025 after primarily consideration on the facts of the case, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner not pressed the writ petition and on his submission the writ petition was dismissed as not pressed. Thereafter, Review Petition No.425/2025 was filed by the petitioner on 10-11-2025 by changing his previous counsel and assigning the present counsel, Ms. Surya Kawalkar Dangi and her associates. The said review petition was put up in the chamber as provided under Rule 90(2) of the High Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007 and the same was dismissed on 16-12-2025 holding that no case is made out for review of the order dated 16-10-2025. When the order was passed on 16-10-2025 in the writ petition, the counsel representing the petitioner was present and on his submission the writ petition was dismissed/disposed of as not pressed. It has not reflected that he prays for any liberty to avail statutory alternative remedy. Thereafter, the petitioner has changed his counsel and the review application has been filed by another counsel who was not present at the time when his writ petition was decided. Filing of the review petition changing their counsel by the petitioner who was not present at the time of hearing of writ petition is deprecated by the 4 Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court in the order dated 15-12-2025 passed in Review Petition No.422 of 2025 and thus, the explanation for delayed filing of the writ appeal appears to be untenable. In the Review Petition No.422 of 2025 in paragraph No.8 to 11 it has been observed that:- “8. In the matter of “Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v. N. Raju Reddiar and Another” 1997 (9) SCC 736, the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of filing review petition by engaging a different counsel. In para 1 of its judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “1. It is a sad spectacle that new practice unbecoming of worthy and conducive to the profession is cropping up. Mr. Mariaputham, Advocate-on-Record had filed vakalatnama for the petitioner-respondent when the special leave petition was filed. After the matter was disposed of, Mr. V. Balachandran, Advocate had filed a petition for review. That was also dismissed by this Court on April 24, 1996. Yet another advocate, Mr. S.U.K. Sagar, has now been engaged to file the present application styled as "application for clarification", on the specious plea that the order is not clear and unambiguous. When an appeal/special leave petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where error of law or fact is apparent on the record, no review can be filed; that too by the advocate on record who neither appeared nor was party in the main case. It is salutary to not that court spends valuable time in deciding a case. Review petition is not, and should not be, an attempt for hearing the 5 matter again on merits. Unfortunately, it has become, in recent time, a practice to file such review petitions as a routine; that too, with change of counsel, without obtaining consent of the advocate on record at earlier stage. This is not conducive to healthy practice of the Bar which has the responsibility to maintain the salutary practice of profession. In Review Petition No.2670/96 in CA No.1867/92, a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy,J., was a member, has held as under: "The record of the appeal indicates that Shri Sudarsh Menon was heard and decided on merits. The Review Petition has been filed by Shri Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. It is unknown on what basis he has written the grounds in the Review Petition as if it is a rehearing of an appeal against our order. He did not confine to the scope of review. It would be not in the interest of the profession to permit such practice. That part, he has not obtained " No Objection Certificate" from the Advocate-on Record in the appeal, in spite of the fact that Registry had informed him of the requirement for doing so. Filing of the "No Objection Certificate" would be the basis for him to come on record. Otherwise, the Advocate- on-Record is answerable to the Court. The failure to obtain the "No Objection Certificate" from the erstwhile counsel has disentitled him to file the Review Petition. Even otherwise, the Review Petition 6 has no merits, It is an attempt to reargue the matter on merits. On these grounds, we dismiss the Review Petition". 9. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the matter of ”Vinita Bhatnagar v. Union of India” 2018 SCC Online Allahabad 6411 followed the N. Raju Reddiar case (supra) and has held that:- “1. …….. It is well-settled that a review application ought not to have been filed by a Counsel who has not argued the matter but ought to have been filed by the same Counsel who has earlier argued the matter. In T.N. Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar the Apex Court has deprecated the practice of arguing the matter by one Counsel and review by another Counsel and has observed that the review application ought to have been filed by the, same Counsel who has argued the matter.” 10. In another matter of “Jai Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, through its Principal Secretary, Housing and Urban Planning and others” 2023 SCC Online Allahabad 4490, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in para 20 and 21 that:- “20. In Review Petition Defective No. 281 of 2008 titled U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. Anil Kumar Mishra decided on 30.03.2012, this Court dismissed a review petition filed by a subsequently engaged counsel. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below:— “Shri Umesh Chandra, learned senior Counsel has raised a preliminary objection that in view of law laid 7 down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar, (1997) 9 SCC 736, the review petition is not maintainable as Shri Manoj Singh, Advocate who has filed the review petition was neither appeared as a counsel on behalf of the review petitioner nor argued on their behalf in the writ petition. So, the review petition is not maintainable, liable to be dismissed on the said ground. * * * Applying the abovesaid settled proposition of law in the present case, I don't find any good ground and reason taken by review petitioner in the matter in question for review of judgment and order dated 3.12.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 1827 (SS) of 1997, and also in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar, (1997) 9 SCC 736, same is liable to be dismissed. 21. The aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Vinita Bhatnagar v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine All 6411, in which this Court held that:— “It is well-settled that a review application ought not to have been filed by a Counsel who has not argued the matter but ought to have been filed by the same Counsel who has earlier argued the matter. In T.N. Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar (1997) 9 SCC 736 the Apex Court has deprecated 8 the practice of arguing the matter by one Counsel and review by another Counsel and has observed that the review application ought to have been filed by the, same Counsel who has argued the matter.” 11. In the present case also, earlier the review petitioner had initially engaged Mr. Vineet Kumar Pandey to pursue his case before the learned Single Judge. In the writ appeal before this Court, he engaged another counsel Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. Sameer Oraon, Advocates and in the review petition, he engaged another counsel Mr. Rohitashva Singh, who filed the instant application seeking review of the order dated 18.03.2025. The writ appeal was pleaded and argued by the counsel, who was not there before the learned Single Judge and not here in the review petition. The counsel, who is arguing the present review petition has not raised any arguments in the writ appeal. The present counsel was not an arguing counsel, when the writ appeal was heard nor was present at the time of arguments. It would not be in the interest of the justice to permit such practice.” 7. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that filing of the review by changing the counsel would not be sufficient ground to condone the delay in filing the writ appeal, as such we are not inclined to condone the delay of 73 days in filing the writ appeal on this ground. The ailment of the petitioner from 07-11-2025 to 09-11-2025 is also untenable on the ground that in between that period the petitioner has filed his review application on 10-11-2025 supported by his affidavit dated 09-11-2025 sworn at Bilaspur and when he filed the review 9 application within time he would also have filed writ appeal within time and thus, the explanation offered by the writ appellant for condonation of delay is not sufficient and is not plausible. 8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary” 2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:- “5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide 10 on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause 11 prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for 12 instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned 13 order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/ appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous 14 delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But 15 that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).” 9. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial justice. 10. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of 73 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate. The explanation offered by the appellant, i.e. suffering from illness, lack of legal guidance, and ignorance of the remedy, though invoking sympathy, cannot be treated as “sufficient cause” in the eye of law. It is now well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law by themselves do not constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of limitation be lightly taken away. 11. The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks 16 to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances which prevented timely action. In the present case, the appellant has not been able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of limitation which disabled him from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the record reveals that he remained inactive for a long period and sought to revive his claim by filing the present appeal which has been filed with a delay of 73 days. Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is unexplained for a substantial period. 12. In the light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra) and considering the grounds raised in I.A. No. 01/2026, for condoning the delay of 73 days is not at all explained with cogent reason, hence we do not find any good ground to condone the delay of 73 days in preferring the writ appeal. 13. Even otherwise, from perusal of the facts of the case as has been mentioned in the impugned order dated 16-10-2025 and reflected from the pleadings of the writ petition, it transpires that the petitioner was terminated from service vide order dated 09-10-2019 and he claims reinstatement with all consequential benefits. Under Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy lies with Labour Court/Tribunal to decide the issue involved in the case and the appropriate Government is required to refer the matter to the authority concerned and despite alternative statutory remedy the petitioner had filed the writ petition 17 which was not maintainable. It is also fact of the case that allegation against the petitioner that he obtained appointment showing that he is the husband of the land oustee and when a complaint was made to the authorities, the departmental enquiry was initiated in which certain irregularities have been found. In the writ petition the claim of the petitioner that Sunanda and Balmoti are the same person, whereas, the Sarpanch of Village Jhomarpara issued a certificate that Sunanda Jaiswal is wife of the petitioner and her date of birth is 15-12-1976, from whom their son Ankit Jaiswal was born. Even if the mother’s name of Ankit Jaiswal is recorded as Balmoti in the school record, which would not make any difference as both are the names of the same person. 14. From perusal of the impugned order dated 16-10-2025 passed in Writ Petition (S) No.10078/2019 and order dated 16-12-2025 passed in Review Petition No.425/2025, this Court find that the writ petition of the petitioner has not been decided on merits, but has been dismissed as not pressed and since there is no adjudication of the writ petition on merits, we are not inclined to exercise writ appellate jurisdiction to examine merits of the case. 15. Accordingly, the application I.A. No. 01/2026 filed by the writ appellant for condonation of delay is rejected and as consequence thereto, the writ appeal is also dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil