Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2026:HHC:35086 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No. : 568 of 2025 Decided on : 18.08.2026 Joginder Singh
…Petitioner Versus Yashpal Thakur & Ors. …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner : Mr. Anuj Gupta, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Sidharth, Advocate, for
respondent No. 1. Mr. Parveen Chauhan,
Advocate, for respondents No. 2 and 3.
Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) PetitionerJoginder Singh, has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the judgment dated 12.08.2025, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first appellate Court’), in Civil Appeal No. 02 of 2025, titled as “Joginder Singh Vs Yashpal Thakur”. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. By way of the judgment dated 12.08.2025, the learned first appellate Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner, against the order dated 10.01.2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in CMA No. 255VI/2024, which has been filed in Civil Suit No. 254 of 2024, titled as “Yashpal Thakur Vs Naresh Kumar & Ors.”.
3. Vide order dated 10.01.2025, the learned trial Court has allowed the application filed by respondent Yashpal Thakur, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and
directed the parties to maintain status quo qua, possession and alienation over the suit land.
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis, are, hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court.
5.
Brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 5.1 Plaintiff Yashpal Thakur has filed a suit for possession by way of Specific Performance of the Contract, against the defendants, regarding the agreement to sell dated 02.05.2014, executed by Sh. Jiwa Nand, father of
3 2026:HHC:35086 defendant No.1, in favour of plaintiff, with respect of land bearing old Khata Khatouni No. 93/176, new 110/197, Khasra No. 3426/2289, measuring 10000 bigha, to the extent of ½ share i.e. 001000 bigha, situated at Phati Sosan Kothi Kanawar, Sub Tehsil Jari, District Kullu, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’). 5.2 The said suit has been filed, on the ground, that the predecessorininterest of defendant No. 1 was recorded owner in possession of the suit land and he had agreed to sell the suit land, vide agreement to sell, dated 02.05.2014, to the plaintiff and at the time of agreement to sell, plaintiff had made the full and final payment of sale
consideration of Rs. 10,00,000/ in favour of the father of defendant No. 1, which has duly been acknowledged by Jiwa Nand (father of defendant No. 1) and the possession of the suit land was also delivered to the plaintiff. 5.3 According to the plaintiff, at the time of execution of agreement to sell, in the revenue record, the suit land was in the ownership of Jiwa Nand and Chaman Lal, both sons of Sh. Beli Ram, but in the column of possession, entry of Forest Department was wrongly entered. Both Jiwa Nand and Chaman Lal had filed the
4 2026:HHC:35086 Civil Suit, qua correction of wrong revenue entries, which, at the relevant time, was pending in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge Lahaul and Spiti at Kullu. 5.4 It is the further case of the plaintiff that Jiwa Nand expired on 21.02.2023, and after his death, his estate was inherited by defendant No. 1. When, defendant No. 1 has refused to execute the sale deed, then, the present suit has been filed. 6. Along with the suit, application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, has been filed, with a prayer to restrain the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit land and also restraining them from alienating and mortgaging the suit land, by way of sale, gift, mortgage etc. 7. The suit, as well as, the said application has been contested by the defendants by filing the written statement. 7.1 Defendants No. 1 and 2 have filed the joint reply, in which, they have taken the preliminary objections that the suit is based upon wrong and vexatious facts; suit has not been properly constituted and instituted; suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties; plaintiff has no locusstandi to file the present suit; suit has been filed
5 2026:HHC:35086 with malafide intention; suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation; and plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit. 7.2 On merits, the suit has been contested, on the ground, that the father of defendant No. 1 never sold the suit land, vide agreement to sell dated 02.05.2014, in favour of the plaintiff. As such, according to defendants No. 1 and 2, making payment of sale consideration does not arise.
They have further submitted that no payment was acknowledged by Jiwa Nand, father of defendant No. 1, nor, he delivered the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. The agreement to sell is stated to be forged and fictitious document, which has been prepared to usurp the suit land. Other contents have been controverted. 7.3 Defendant No. 3 has filed the separate written statement, taking preliminary objections, that suit is barred by limitation; suit of the plaintiff is based upon wrong; concocted and vexatious facts; suit is not properly valued, constituted and instituted; plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit; and the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit. 6 2026:HHC:35086 7.4 On merits, the suit has been contested, on the ground, that father of defendant No. 1 had not sold the suit land vide agreement to sell dated 02.05.2014. According to him, Jiwa Nand (father of defendant No. 1) and Chaman Lal, were recorded as owners in possession of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni (old) No. 93/176 (new) 110/197 Khasra No. 3426/2289 measuring 10000 bigha situated at Phati Sosan Kothi Kanawar, Sub Tehsil Jari, District Kullu, H.P., to the extent of ½ share each. Father of defendant No. 1, Jiwa Nand, had expired on 21.02.2023, and after his death, his estate has been inherited by his son Naresh Kumar (defendant No. 1). Thereafter, defendant No. 1 had executed the sale deed qua the suit land in favour of defendant No. 3. As such, defendant No. 1 has appointed defendant No. 2 as his General Power of Attorney, on 05.08.2023, to act on his behalf, regarding the suit land, who executed and registered the sale deed of the suit land in favour of defendant No. 3, on 07.06.2024. 7.5 Thus, the defendants have prayed for dismissal of the suit. 8. Plaintiff has filed the replication to the written statements filed by the defendants, denying the
7 2026:HHC:35086 preliminary objections, as well as, the contents of the written statements, by virtue of which, the suit has been contested. 9.
On the similar lines, application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, has been contested. 10. The learned trial Court, after hearing the
learned counsel for the parties, has allowed the application, by directing the parties to maintain status quo qua possession and alienation over the suit land.
11. The said order has been assailed before the learned first appellate Court, by defendant No. 3 Joginder Singh, who as per the plaintiff, is subsequent purchaser. His appeal has also been dismissed by the learned first appellate Court, vide order dated 12.08.2025.
12. Said findings have been assailed before this Court.
13. The relief of injunction is a discretionary relief. The primary purpose to grant the relief of interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, is to maintain the subject matter of the lis, during the pendency of the suit, as, it exists, at the time of inception of the lis. It is a protective relief to maintain status quo, till the rights
8 2026:HHC:35086 of the parties are decided by the Court, after full fledged trial. In order to succeed in the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the applicant has to pass the triplicate test i.e. ‘prima facie case’, ‘balance of convenience’ and ‘irreparable loss and injury, which cannot be compensated in terms of money’.
14. In the present case, the learned trial Court has considered all these three ingredients and thereafter,
directed the parties to maintain status quo qua alienation and possession. That order has been upheld by the learned first appellate Court. 15. Defendant No. 3, the subsequent purchaser, is now before this Court, by way of the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in “K. Valarmathi & Ors. Versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606” has elaborately discussed the scope of interference, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Relevant para 9 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the
9 2026:HHC:35086 Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.”
17. In a recent decision in “Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Versus B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of interference has again been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.”
18.
Being guided by the above decisions, the order passed by the learned trial Court, to the considered opinion of this Court, does not fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’. 10 2026:HHC:35086
19. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases
206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:
“22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the
discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
11 2026:HHC:35086 evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3.
The New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus:
12 2026:HHC:35086
"8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under:
"9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse.
But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officercum Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in
13 2026:HHC:35086 constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the factfinding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness as distinguished from the legal permissibility of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court
Cases
206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said
judgment are reproduced, as under:
“22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse.
14 2026:HHC:35086
23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the
discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 15 2026:HHC:35086
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3.
The New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus:
"8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under:
"9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it
16 2026:HHC:35086 would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse.
But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officercum Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the factfinding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed.”
20. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court
17 2026:HHC:35086 Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:
“30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.
If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).”
21. Being guided by the above decisions, now this Court would proceed further to determine further that the findings of learned trial Court fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’, or the learned trial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, while allowing the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, by directing the parties to maintain status quo. 22. The plaintiff, in the present case, is able to make out a prima facie case in his favour, which cannot be thrown away at the threshold of the litigation, as the same also require mature consideration by the learned trial
18 2026:HHC:35086 Court. Once, this Court could not record the findings that the learned trial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the application, or the findings of the learned trial Court suffers from perversity, then, the scope of interference in the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is limited one. As such, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned trial Court, does not require any interference. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. 23. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations are confined, only to the disposal of the present petition. 24. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s)
disposed of.
25. Record be sent back.
(Virender Singh) 18th August, 2026
Judge (Pramod Kumar)