NITIN THAKUR v. JOINT REGISTRAR (CREDIT) CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AND ORS
LPA/826/2025 · 2026-04-06
Bipin Chander Negi, Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 1850 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 1850 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 2026:HHC:10513 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA LPA No. 826 of 2025 Date of decision: 06.04.2026 ________________________________________________________ Nitin Thakur ...Appellant Versus Joint Registrar (Credit) Co-operative Societies & others
…Respondents ________________________________________________________
Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin C. Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 ________________________________________________________ For the Appellant: Mr. Ganesh Barowalia, Advocate. For the respondents: Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Deputy Advocate
General,
for respondents No. 1 & 2. G.S. Sandhawalia
, Chief Justice
(Oral)
The present Letters Patent Appeal is
directed against the order of the learned Single passed in CMPMO No. 384 of 2019, titled as Nitin Thakur Vs. Joint Registrar (Credit) Co-Operative Societies, Himachal Pradesh & others, dated 01.09.2025, whereby the learned Single Judge had declined to 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2 interfere in the order dated 12.06.2019, passed by the Joint Registrar (Credit) Co-operative Society H.P., whereby the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the Revision Petition under Section 94(2)(b) of the Himachal Pradesh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1968, was dismissed.
2. While dismissing the petition, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the appointment of the private respondents as Assistant Secretaries was not challenged within the period of limitation from the date of approval of appointment and was assailed after a period of more than five years. It was held that the writ petitioner had the knowledge of appointment since 2014 and merely because he had filed an application under the Right to Information Act before the competent Authority, would not make a sufficient ground to condone the delay in filing the Revision Petition. Further, the conduct of the present appellant was also noticed to the effect that no justification was given as the information under the
3 Right to Information Act was received in February, 2017 and as to why the revision was thereafter filed after a period of nine months.
3.
Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the information under the Right to Information Act was received only in the year 2017 and thereafter, the Revisional Authority had been approached. 4. We are of the considered opinion that the issue pertains to the promotion of the private respondents as Assistant Secretaries. 5. A perusal of the writ petition would go on to show that the dispute as such was that the post of the Secretary was to be filled up by way of promotion from amongst the Assistant Secretaries and respondents No. 4 & 5 were not eligible for promotion as such and the respondent-Society had violated the Rules as such, without following the proper procedure. 6. The appointment/promotion was thus subject matter of consideration of Resolution dated
4 31.03.2014 and Office Orders dated 09.04.2014 and
03.05.2014. 7. It is not disputed that the petitioner himself was a Salesman appointed in the year 2013 and the post of the Secretary fell vacant in the year 2014 which was to be filled up as per the Primary Agricultural Credit Co-Operative Societies Rules, and the writ petitioner being eligible and qualified, was entitled to be promoted as Secretary and Assistant Secretary. In such circumstances, it is apparent that there was a dispute of service litigation, which the appellant had failed to agitate at the earliest. 8. It is a settled principle that such orders have to be challenged within a period of six months from the date of the order. 9. Reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1975 (1) SCC 152, wherein it has been held that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at
5 least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. 10. Apparently, in the present case, the appellant was having knowledge about the appointment way back in 2014 and has been negligent in challenging the said order and waited for a period of about three years as such to get the information under the Right to Information Act. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was well justified in upholding the order of the Revisional Authority and dismissing the petition on the ground of limitation. 11.
It was also noticed that after getting the information under the Right to Information Act, there was again a delay of about nine months in filing the Revision Petition and the period of limitation is only 90 days. 12. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the fact that the matter pertains to the dispute regarding service matter, and objections as such were not submitted within the time having knowledge from the year 2014, which would be clear
6 from Annxure P-4, and merely applying for information or by filing representation, would not extend the period of limitation as such. 13. Resultantly, we are of the considered opinion that no case is made out to condone the delay in filing the revision or for challenging the order of the learned Single Judge by filing an petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. Further, the Letters Patent Appeal would also not lie against the order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the Letters Patent Appeal would lie only against the order passed in petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. We are of the considered opinion that in view of the settled principle of law, an intra-Court appeal against an order passed under Article 227 is not maintainable. 16. Reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji versus State of Gujarat and Others, (2015) 9 SCC 1, wherein the issue in question was whether an appeal
7 would be maintainable against an order passed by a Civil Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The Apex Court has held that it is the obligation of the Division Bench to discern and decide whether the order passed by the learned Single judge was in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution or both and resultantly, came to the conclusion that when exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has been done and in the light of pronouncement in Radhey Shyam versus Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423, by a three Judge Bench, a Letters Patent Appeal would not be maintainable, and the remedy would lie before the Apex Court. 17. A similar view was taken by the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Ram Kishan Fauji versus State of Haryana and others, (2017) 5 SCC 533, which would go on to show that against an order challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution, no intra-Court appeal would lie. 8
18. A similar view has also been taken by another three-Judge Bench of Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India versus Nandini J. Shah and Others, (2018) 15 SCC 356. It also held to the same effect while placing reliance upon the
judgment in Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji case (supra), that there is difference in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India and writ cannot be issued against an order passed by a Civil Court and, therefore, no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable, in such cases. The effect and nature of the impugned order are crucial in determining maintainability, and in that case as well, the Supreme Court held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable.
19. A similar observation was made by us in LPA No.122 of 2008, titled Mehar Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 24.03.2021, wherein the impugned orders had been challenged by invoking both Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It was held that power under
9 Article 227 is intended to be used for the purpose of keeping Subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors and no appeal would lie against the order of the learned Single Judge passed in supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution and if the judgment under appeal falls squarely within the four corners of Article 227, it goes without saying that intra-Court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable.
20. It is a matter of record itself that the petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the appellant having chosen to file such a petition now cannot pretend to wriggle out.
21. In such circumstances, we also do not find that present petition is maintainable. Resultantly, if the said exercise is permitted, it would amount to every
order being passed by the learned Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution or while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to be challenged by way of intra-Court Letters
10 Patent Appeal, which has been held to be not permissible.
22. Accordingly, the present Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.
23. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(G.S. Sandhawalia)
Chief Justice. April 06, 2026
(Bipin C. Negi) (hemlata)
Judge.