- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ WRIT PETITION NO. 55526 OF 2013 (GM-SLUM) BETWEEN NOLAMBA VEERSHAIVA SANGHA (R) BY ITS SECRETARY REPRESENTING MOORU KALASADA MUTT, 1-A CROSS, 3RD PHASE 4TH MAIN, BASAVESHWARA NAGAR BANGALORE-560079 ...PETITIONER (BY SRI. SHANKARLINGAPPA NAGARAJ., ADVOCATE) AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS SECRETARY HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT M S BUILDINGS BANGALORE-560001 2. KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD NO.55, ABHAY COMPLEX RISALDAR STREET SESHADRIPURAM BANGALORE-560020 REP BY ITS COMMISSIONER 3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HASSAN DISTRICT HASSAN-573201. …. RESPONDENTS ® Digitally signed by SHWETHA RAGHAVENDRA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 (BY SRI. MAHANTESH., AGA FOR R1 & R3; SRI. SURESH BABU B.N., ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT TO PAY INTEREST AT 5% ON RS.32,71,500 FROM 21.05.1992 TILL THE DATE OF PAYMENT TO THE PETITIONER AND ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 13.03.2026, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ CAV ORDER 1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of mandamus to the 3rd Respondent to pay interest at 5% on Rs.32,71,500/- from 21.05.1992 till the date of payment to the petitioner. b. Pass any other order as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case including an order as to costs in the interest of justice and equity. 2. The petitioner claims to be the owner of land bearing Katha No.70 and Assessment No.26, measuring 2600 sq. mtr., situated at Arasikere Town, forming part of Sy.Nos.272 and 273, located in the heart of Arasikere Town. 3. The State Government issued a notification dated 06/08.08.1979 under Section 3 of the Karnataka - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 (for short, ‘the KSA Act’), which came to be published in the Karnataka Gazette on 13.08.1979. 4. Thereafter, the Government issued a notification dated 29.05.1992 under Section 11 of the KSA Act declaring the subject land as acquired. Consequently, in terms of Section 17 of the KSA Act, the land vested with the State Government. 5. The petitioner contends that despite acquisition of the land, compensation was not paid. Several representations were submitted seeking payment of compensation. Subsequently, the matter was referred to the District Registrar of Stamps for determination of the market value of the property, who assessed the market value at Rs.46,31,588/-. However, notwithstanding such determination, compensation was not disbursed. 6. The petitioner thereafter issued a legal notice dated 24.01.2006, followed by further representations. Eventually, the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan, passed an award dated 14.01.2008 determining compensation by applying 300 times the assessment value in terms of Section 20(1) of the KSA Act. Even - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 thereafter, the awarded amount was not paid despite repeated requests and representations. 7. Ultimately, a sum of Rs.32,71,500/- came to be paid to the petitioner on 09.05.2012. The petitioner states that upon obtaining a certified copy of the award dated 14.01.2008, it was noticed that no interest at the rate of 5% per annum had been awarded, though the land had vested with the State Government on 21.05.1992. 8. The petitioner therefore issued another legal notice dated 30.04.2013 demanding payment of statutory interest. Despite acknowledgment of the said notice, no payment was made, compelling the petitioner to approach this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for. 9. Sri. Shankaralingappa, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that 9.1. The preliminary notification under Section 3 of the KSA Act was issued on 06/08.08.1979 and the final notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act came to be issued on 29.05.1992. Consequently, the land stood vested with the State Government with effect from 29.05.1992. It is further submitted that, in fact, possession - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 of the land had already been taken as early as in the year 1979, since a slum had already been formed on the subject property by that time. 9.2. It is his further submission that the very formation and existence of the slum over the subject land necessitated issuance of the notification under Section 3 of the KSA Act declaring the area as a slum area. Section 3 of the KSA Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “Section 3 - Declaration of slum areas: (1) Where the Government is satisfied that- (a) any area is or is likely to be a source of danger to health, safety or, convenience of the public of that area or of its neighborhood, by reason of the area being low-lying insanitary, squalid, overcrowded or otherwise; or (b) the buildings in any area, used or intended to be used for human habitation are.-- (i) in any respect, unfit for human habitation; or (ii) by reason by dilapidation, overcrowding faulty arrangement or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental to safety, health or morals, it may, by notification, declare such area to be a slum area. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 (2) In determining whether a building is unfit for human habitation, for the purposes of this Act regard shall be had to its condition in respect of the following matters that is to say.? (i) repair, (ii) stability, (iii) freedom from damp, (iv) natural light and air, (v) water-supply, (vi) drainage and sanitary conveniences, (vii) facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal of waste water, and the building shall be deemed to be unfit as aforesaid, if it is so defective in one or more of the said matters that it is not reasonably suitable for occupation.” 9.3. By relying on Section 3 of the KSA Act, he submits that the very issuance of a notification under the said provision is founded upon the existence of an already developed slum area occupied by persons residing in insanitary and overcrowded conditions. He submits that the statutory scheme under Section 3 does not contemplate a mere proposed or anticipated use of the land, but is intended to address an existing factual situation where the land has already come to be utilised for habitation in - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 conditions detrimental to public health, safety and convenience. 9.4. Elaborating the said contention, learned counsel submits that Section 3 empowers the Government to declare an area as a slum area only upon its satisfaction that the locality is low-lying, insanitary, overcrowded, squalid or otherwise hazardous to public health and safety, or where the buildings situated therein are unfit for human habitation owing to dilapidation, lack of ventilation, sanitation and other basic civic amenities. Thus, according to him, the exercise of power under Section 3 necessarily presupposes physical occupation of the land by hutments, dwellings or other human habitations existing on the property. 9.5. It is therefore contended that once the respondents themselves issued the notification under Section 3 in the year 1979, the same constitutes a clear acknowledgment by the State that the subject land was already being utilised as a slum area and was under occupation by slum dwellers. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 9.6. Learned counsel submits that the State cannot now contend that possession continued with the petitioner in the conventional sense thereafter, since the very character of the property stood altered by governmental intervention and statutory control under the KSA Act. 9.7. Learned counsel further submits that from the date of issuance of the notification under Section 3 of the KSA Act, the petitioner was effectively deprived of the beneficial enjoyment, use and control of the property. According to him, the petitioner could neither develop the land, alienate it freely, nor exercise ordinary incidents of ownership owing to the statutory restrictions imposed under the KSA Act and the existence of the notified slum. The practical and beneficial possession of the land, according to him, therefore stood substantially divested from the petitioner from the year 1979 itself. 9.8. It is his submission that the subsequent notification issued under Section 17 of the KSA Act on 29.05.1992 merely formalised the acquisition and statutory vesting of the land in - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 favour of the State Government. However, in substance, the State had already assumed dominion and control over the property much earlier by permitting and recognising the existence of the slum and by regulating the land under the provisions of the KSA Act. 9.9. Learned counsel therefore contends that the respondents, having deprived the petitioner of effective enjoyment and possession of the property for several decades, were under a corresponding statutory and constitutional obligation to ensure expeditious payment of compensation. The failure to pay compensation within a reasonable period, despite vesting of the property and continued utilisation thereof for public purposes, is contended to be arbitrary, unjust and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 9.10. It is further contended that once the land vested with the State Government under Section 17 of the KSA Act on 29.05.1992, the liability to pay compensation together with statutory interest arose immediately. Learned counsel submits that withholding payment for - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 nearly twenty years and ultimately disbursing compensation only on 09.05.2012, without payment of interest, amounts to unjust enrichment by the State at the expense of the petitioner. 9.11. Section 17 of the KSA Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “Section 17 - Power to acquire land Where the Government is satisfied that, for the purpose of executing any work of improvements relation to any slum area or any building in such area or for the purpose of re-developing any slum clearance area, or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land within, adjoining or surrounded, by any such area, it may acquire the land by publishing in the Official Gazette, a notice to the effect that it had been decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section: Provided that before publishing such notice, the Government shall call upon the owner or any other person who, in the opinion of the Government, may be interested in such land, to show cause why it should not be acquired; and after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or any other person interested in the land, the Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.” 9.12. Placing reliance on Sections 3 and 17 of the KSA Act, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that both provisions form part of an integrated statutory scheme dealing with - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 identification, regulation, improvement and eventual acquisition of slum areas for public purposes. 9.13. Elaborating the said submission, learned counsel contends that a declaration under Section 3 necessarily presupposes the existence of an already developed slum area characterised by insanitary, overcrowded and uninhabitable living conditions. Thus, once the notification under Section 3 came to be issued in the year 1979, the State itself acknowledged that the subject property had already come to be occupied and utilised as a slum area requiring governmental intervention and regulation. 9.14. It is his submission that Section 17 constitutes the next stage of the statutory process, whereby the State acquires lands situated within, adjoining or surrounding such notified slum areas for the purposes of improvement, redevelopment and rehabilitation of slum dwellers. According to him, the acquisition under Section 17 is therefore not an isolated exercise of eminent domain, but a statutory - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 continuation of the control and regulatory measures initiated under Section 3 of the KSA Act. 9.15. Learned counsel submits that in the present case, from the very date of issuance of the notification under Section 3 in the year 1979, the petitioner was substantially deprived of the beneficial enjoyment and effective control of the property. The existence of the notified slum and the statutory restrictions operating under the KSA Act rendered the petitioner incapable of freely using, developing or commercially exploiting the land in the ordinary manner available to a lawful owner. 9.16. It is further contended that the notification issued under Section 17 on 29.05.1992 merely formalised the statutory acquisition and vesting of the land in favour of the State Government. In substance, according to learned counsel, the State had already assumed regulatory dominion and control over the property from the year 1979 itself by recognising, regulating and continuing the slum occupation upon the land. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 9.17. Learned counsel therefore submits that the respondents cannot seek to enjoy the benefits arising from occupation and utilisation of the land for slum rehabilitation purposes while simultaneously postponing payment of compensation for decades together. Once the land vested in the State Government pursuant to the notification under Section 17, the obligation to pay compensation together with statutory interest arose immediately. 9.18. It is his submission that the delay in determination and disbursement of compensation till 09.05.2012, despite vesting having taken place on 29.05.1992 and the land having remained under statutory control even prior thereto, amounts to arbitrary deprivation of property contrary to Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 9.19. Learned counsel lastly contends that the failure of the Deputy Commissioner, while passing the award dated 14.01.2008, to award statutory interest from the date of vesting till the date of actual payment defeats both the object of the KSA Act and the constitutional requirement of - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 ensuring just, fair and reasonable compensation in cases of compulsory acquisition. 10. Per contra, Sri Suresh Babu B.N., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 – Karnataka Slum Development Board, while not disputing the issuance of notifications under Sections 3, 11 and 17 of the KSA Act, fairly admits that the petitioner is entitled to compensation in respect of the acquired land and that compensation has in fact been paid. 10.1. However, learned counsel would contend that the petitioner is not entitled to payment of interest on the compensation amount. Elaborating the said submission, he contends that notwithstanding issuance of the notifications under the KSA Act, physical possession of the land was never formally taken over from the petitioner at the relevant point of time. According to him, whenever steps were initiated pursuant to the notifications, the petitioner had objected to the taking over of possession and therefore the actual physical possession continued to remain with the petitioner. - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 10.2. Learned counsel submits that mere issuance of notifications under Sections 11 and 17 of the KSA Act would not automatically entitle the petitioner to claim interest unless it is demonstrated that actual possession had been taken over by the respondents. According to him, since the petitioner continued to remain in possession of the property, there was no deprivation warranting payment of interest over and above the compensation already awarded. 10.3. It is his submission that the payment of compensation itself sufficiently satisfies the statutory obligation cast upon the respondents under the KSA Act and that no additional financial liability by way of interest can be imposed in the absence of proof regarding the date of actual dispossession. 10.4. On a specific query being put to the learned counsel as to when possession of the land was in fact taken over, particularly when the existence of a slum on the property is not in dispute, learned counsel fairly submits that there is no material available on record - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 indicating the exact date on which physical possession was taken by the respondents. 10.5. Learned counsel nevertheless contends that in the absence of any mahazar, possession certificate or contemporaneous document evidencing formal delivery of possession to the State or the Slum Board, the petitioner cannot automatically claim entitlement to statutory interest solely on the basis of issuance of acquisition notifications under the KSA Act. 11. Learned Additional Government Advocate, reiterating the stand of the State, submits that 11.1. Notifications under Sections 3, 11 and 17 of the KSA Act had been validly issued and that the petitioner was fully aware of the acquisition proceedings from their inception. 11.2. Elaborating the said submission, learned AGA points out that the petitioner had earlier challenged the notification issued in the year 1979 by filing W.P.No.24109/1990 before this Court. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the notification dated 29.05.1992 - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 came to be issued under Section 17 of the KSA Act acquiring the subject land. 11.3. Learned AGA submits that the aforesaid writ petition ultimately came to be dismissed while reserving liberty to the petitioner to challenge the subsequent notification dated 29.05.1992. However, despite such liberty having been expressly reserved, the petitioner did not challenge the acquisition notification issued under Section 17 of the KSA Act and thereby allowed the acquisition proceedings to attain finality. 11.4. It is therefore contended that the vesting of the land in favour of the State Government under Section 17 has become conclusive and binding upon the petitioner and the petitioner cannot now indirectly reopen issues concerning acquisition or possession while seeking interest on the compensation amount. 11.5. Learned AGA further submits that the petitioner had also submitted representations and objections before the Principal Secretary to Government, Housing Department, questioning the acquisition proceedings and seeking - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 redressal of grievances relating to the subject property. 11.6. The said representations and objections, according to learned AGA, came to be considered and rejected by order dated 04.09.2000. Under the said order, the Government directed the Karnataka Slum Development Board to explore acquisition of the subject land by mutual agreement in terms of Section 26A of the KSA Act. 11.7. Learned AGA therefore submits that the Government had, at all stages, acted bona fide and in accordance with the statutory scheme under the KSA Act. It is contended that the respondents have already paid compensation to the petitioner and no further liability survives insofar as the claim for interest is concerned. 11.8. He refers to Section 26A of the KSA Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “Section 26A - The Board to have power to acquire land by agreement (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 17 and 20, the Board may, with the previous approval of the Government, enter into an agreement with any person for the acquisition from him, by purchase, lease or exchange of any land within, adjoining or - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 surrounded by any slum area or slum clearance area, or any interest in such land which is needed for the purpose of executing any work of improvement in relation to any slum area or any building in such area or for the purpose of redeveloping any slum clearance area, or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers. (2) Where any land is acquired under sub- section (1), the Board may undertake the measures referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 27 in accordance with such plans as may be approved by the Government and subject to such directions as may from time to time, be given by the Government.” 11.9. Placing reliance on Section 26A of the KSA Act, learned AGA submits that the statutory scheme itself contemplates acquisition of lands either through compulsory acquisition under Section 17 or through consensual acquisition by agreement under Section 26A. According to him, the order dated 04.09.2000 passed by the Principal Secretary directing the Board to explore acquisition by agreement clearly demonstrates the bona fide intention of the Government to resolve the matter amicably and avoid further disputes. 11.10. Learned AGA contends that Section 26A begins with a non obstante clause overriding Sections 17 and 20 of the KSA Act and thereby provides an independent statutory mechanism enabling - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 the Board to acquire land through negotiation, purchase, lease or exchange with the consent of the land owner. It is therefore submitted that the Government was justified in directing the Board to initiate negotiations with the petitioner for the settlement of compensation by mutual agreement. 11.11. It is his submission that the respondents were continuously engaged in resolving the issue relating to compensation and there was no deliberate or intentional withholding of amounts payable to the petitioner. According to him, the delay, if any, occurred on account of the pendency of disputes and objections raised by the petitioner regarding acquisition and possession. 11.12. Learned AGA further submits that the petitioner, having participated in the proceedings and having accepted the compensation amount ultimately paid, cannot now seek to impose an additional liability upon the State by way of interest, particularly when the issue regarding possession itself remained disputed. - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 11.13. It is therefore contended that the provisions of Section 26A, read in conjunction with the earlier proceedings before the Government and this Court, would clearly indicate that the respondents had acted within the framework of the KSA Act and had made bona fide attempts to settle the matter. Hence, according to learned AGA, no case is made out for interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 11.14. His submission is that notwithstanding Section 17 and 20 of the KSA Act, an agreement could be arrived at. However, no agreement was arrived at. 11.15. He refers to Section 20 of the KSA Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference. “Section 20 - Amount payable (1) The amount payable in respect of any land acquired under this Act shall be [three hundred] times the property tax payable in respect of such land on the date of publication of the notice referred to in section 17, under the municipal law applicable to such area and where no such property tax is payable in respect of such land, the property tax payable in respect of similar land adjacent thereto. (2) The prescribed authority shall, after holding an enquiry in the prescribed manner, - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 determine by order the amount payable under sub-section (1) and publish the said order in the Official Gazette, A copy of the said order shall be communicated to the owner of the land and every person interested therein. (3) Where the owner of the land and the owner of the building on such land are different, the prescribed authority all apportion the amount between the owner of the land and the owner of the building (in the same proportion as the value of the land bears to the value of the building on the date of the acquisition).” 11.16. Placing reliance on Section 20 of the KSA Act, learned AGA submits that the statute itself specifically prescribes the manner in which compensation is to be determined in respect of lands acquired under the Act. According to him, the Legislature, in its wisdom, has consciously adopted a fixed statutory formula by providing that the amount payable shall be three hundred times the property tax payable in respect of the acquired land. 11.17. Learned AGA contends that once the statute expressly stipulates both the method of determination and the quantum payable, the entitlement of the land owner stands confined to the amount so determined under Section 20 of the KSA Act. It is therefore submitted that - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 no additional amount by way of market value, solatium or statutory interest can be claimed unless specifically provided for under the Act itself. 11.18. It is his submission that Section 20 constitutes a self-contained code governing compensation payable under acquisitions made pursuant to the KSA Act. Unlike acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the KSA Act does not contain any express provision mandating payment of interest for delayed disbursement of compensation. 11.19. Learned AGA therefore submits that this Court cannot import principles relating to interest, solatium or enhanced compensation from the Land Acquisition Act into proceedings governed exclusively by the KSA Act, particularly when the Legislature has intentionally framed a distinct mechanism for the determination of compensation under the special enactment. 11.20. It is further contended that the prescribed authority, namely the Deputy Commissioner, has already conducted the enquiry contemplated under Section 20(2) of the KSA - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 Act and passed the award dated 14.01.2008 determining the compensation payable to the petitioner strictly in accordance with the statutory formula prescribed under Section 20(1) of the KSA Act. 11.21. Learned AGA submits that the petitioner has accepted the compensation amount determined under the award and has not challenged either the methodology adopted for computation or the quantum of compensation awarded. In that background, according to him, the petitioner cannot maintain a separate claim solely seeking interest over and above the amount statutorily determined and paid under the KSA Act. 11.22. It is therefore contended that the claim made by the petitioner for payment of interest lacks the statutory foundation under the KSA Act and is liable to be rejected. 11.23. His submission is that since no agreement was arrived at in terms of Section 20 of the KSA Act, the compensation was calculated and award was passed on 14.01.2008 for a sum of Rs.32,71,500/- and the amount paid thereafter - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 on 09.05.2012. Therefore, he submits that no interest is required to be paid. 11.24. He, however, submits that though the petitioner was the owner of the land, it was occupied by a number of persons calling themselves slum dwellers, and the petitioner was not in possession of the subject land or even a portion thereof, the actual slum dwellers had sought rehabilitation in the same land. They could not be evicted, and as such, the land was acquired. 11.25. His further submission is that the compensation having been paid on 09.05.2012 and the Slum Clearance Board became the owner of the said land on that date. The question of payment of interest does not arise. 11.26. He relies on Section 24 of the KSA Act and submits that the interest would be liable to be paid if the compensation is not deposited on or before taking possession. 11.27. Section 24 of the KSA Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: “Section 24 - Payment of interest When the amount is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 prescribed authority shall pay the amount with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited and such interest shall be paid or deposited by the prescribed authority in the same manner as provided for the amount.” 11.28. Placing reliance on Section 24 of the KSA Act, learned AGA submits that the statute itself clearly specifies the circumstances under which interest becomes payable on the compensation amount. According to him, interest at the rate of 5% per annum would arise only when possession of the land has been taken prior to payment or deposit of the compensation amount. 11.29. Learned AGA contends that the liability to pay interest under Section 24 is therefore conditional and not automatic. The statutory trigger for payment of interest is the actual taking over of possession by the acquiring authority. In the absence of proof regarding the date of possession, no liability to pay interest can be fastened upon the respondents. 11.30. Elaborating the said submission, learned AGA argues that the expression “from the time of so - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 taking possession” occurring in Section 24 assumes significance and clearly indicates legislative intent that interest would commence only upon dispossession of the owner and assumption of possession by the State or the Board. 11.31. It is his submission that in the present case, there is no document evidencing the exact date on which possession was taken over by the respondents. According to him, no mahazar, possession certificate, panchanama or other contemporaneous record has been produced by the petitioner establishing formal delivery of possession to the State authorities. 11.32. Learned AGA further submits that the petitioner himself had objected to the acquisition proceedings and resisted dispossession at various stages. In that background, according to him, the petitioner cannot now seek to presume that possession stood automatically transferred merely upon issuance of notifications under Sections 11 and 17 of the KSA Act. - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 11.33. It is therefore contended that unless and until the petitioner establishes the precise date on which possession was actually taken by the respondents, the claim for statutory interest under Section 24 of the KSA Act cannot be sustained. 11.34. Learned AGA submits that the burden lies upon the petitioner to establish dispossession so as to attract Section 24 and that in the absence of such proof, the respondents cannot be directed to pay interest merely because compensation came to be disbursed at a later point of time. 11.35. He therefore reiterates that the compensation amount determined under Section 20 having already been paid to the petitioner, the statutory obligation of the respondents stands fully discharged and no further liability survives under the provisions of the KSA Act. 11.36. It is in the aforesaid background that this Court directed the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, to file an affidavit clarifying the factual aspects relating to acquisition, possession and payment of compensation. Pursuant thereto, an affidavit came to be filed on 25.02.2026. - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 11.37. In the said affidavit, the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, states that upon verification of the available records, it was found that the preliminary notification dated 12.09.1979 had been published in the Official Gazette on 05.10.1979 and that the final notification under the KSA Act came to be issued on 29.05.1992. 11.38. The Deputy Commissioner has further referred to the award passed on 14.01.2008 determining compensation in favour of the petitioner and the subsequent payment made in the year 2012. It is stated therein that the date of passing of the award, namely 14.01.2008, is required to be treated as the date of taking possession of the land for the purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act. 11.39. Proceeding on the said premise, the Deputy Commissioner has stated that since the compensation amount determined under the award was paid in the year 2012, the payment made cannot be said to be delayed so as to attract any further liability towards interest under Section 24 of the KSA Act. - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 11.40. The affidavit therefore seeks to justify the action of the respondents by contending that possession ought not to be treated as having been taken either on the date of issuance of the notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act or from the earlier period during which the slum admittedly existed on the subject land, but only from the date of passing of the award itself. 11.41. The Deputy Commissioner accordingly reiterates that the respondents have complied with the statutory requirements under the KSA Act by determining compensation under the award dated 14.01.2008 and disbursing the same in the year 2012 and, therefore, according to the deponent, no further amount by way of interest is payable to the petitioner. 12. Heard Sri Shankarlingappa, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Suresh Babu B.N., learned counsel for respondent No.2 and perused papers. 13. The points that would arise for determination are: (i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the land in question can be said to have vested in and possession thereof deemed to have been taken by the - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 State Government pursuant to the notification issued under Sections 11 and 17 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973? (ii) Whether the existence and continued occupation of the subject land by slum dwellers prior to issuance of the notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act would constitute divestment of possession from the petitioner for the purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act? (iii) Whether, under Section 24 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, the petitioner is entitled to payment of interest on the compensation amount determined under Section 20 of the Act? (iv) If Point No.3 is answered in the affirmative, from which date is such interest liable to be calculated and paid? (v) What order? 14. This Court answers the above points as under: 15. Answer to Point No. (i): Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the land in question can be said to have vested in and possession thereof deemed to have been taken by the State Government pursuant to the - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 notification issued under Sections 11 and 17 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973? 15.1. Sri. Shankarlingappa, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Government issued a preliminary notification dated 06/08.08.1979 under Section 3 of the KSA Act, followed by a final notification dated 29.05.1992 under Sections 11 and 17 of the KSA Act. He submitted that upon publication of the notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act in the Official Gazette on 29.05.1992, the subject land stood acquired and vested in the State Government. 15.2. Learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to the plain language of Section 17 of the KSA Act, which provides that the Government may acquire the land "by publishing in the Official Gazette, a notice to the effect that it had been decided to acquire the land." He submitted that this language makes clear that the very act of publication constitutes both the acquisition and the vesting, and no separate - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 physical act of delivery of possession is necessary to complete the vesting in the State. 15.3. Learned counsel further submitted that once the land vested in the State Government by operation of Section 17, the petitioner ceased to have any legal title or proprietary rights over the property from that date onwards. He contended that the petitioner, being the lawful owner of the property, cannot be expected to retain possession of land that has already been acquired and vested in the State by operation of law, particularly when the State had already exercised regulatory and statutory control over the land through the Section 3 notification issued in 1979. 15.4. He further submitted that possession had in substance already been effectively taken by the State long before the formal notification under Section 17, inasmuch as slum dwellers had been occupying the subject land since at least the year 1979, with the full knowledge, permission, and implicit approval of the State authorities, who regulated the said occupation through the Section 3 notification. The - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 petitioner was therefore, in substance, divested of possession well before 1992. 15.5. Sri. Suresh Babu B.N., learned counsel for Respondent No. 2, while not disputing that notifications under Sections 3, 11, and 17 of the KSA Act had been issued and that compensation had been paid, contended that possession of the subject land was never formally taken over from the petitioner. He submitted that whenever steps were initiated pursuant to the notifications, the petitioner had objected to the taking over of possession. He therefore argued that actual physical possession continued with the petitioner. 15.6. He further submitted that mere issuance of a notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act would not automatically amount to taking over of possession of the land. According to him, in the absence of a mahazar, possession certificate, or any other contemporaneous document establishing formal delivery of possession, it cannot be held that possession was taken by the respondents. - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 15.7. On a specific query put to him by this Court as to when possession was actually taken, learned counsel fairly and candidly conceded that there is no material on record indicating the exact date on which physical possession was taken by the respondents. 15.8. Learned AGA submitted that notifications under Sections 3, 11, and 17 of the KSA Act had been validly issued and that the petitioner was fully aware of the acquisition proceedings from their very inception. He pointed out that the petitioner had challenged the 1979 notification by filing W.P.No.24109/1990 before this Hon'ble Court, which came to be dismissed, with liberty reserved to the petitioner to challenge the notification dated 29.05.1992. He submitted that the petitioner did not avail of that liberty, thereby allowing the acquisition proceedings to attain finality. 15.9. The learned AGA referred to the affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, on 25.02.2026 pursuant to the direction of this Court, wherein it was stated that the date of - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 passing of the award, namely 14.01.2008, is required to be treated as the date of taking possession for the purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act. According to the learned AGA, since the compensation amount was paid in the year 2012, i.e., within a short period after the award of 2008, no further liability for interest could arise. 15.10. He also submitted that the subject land was occupied by a number of persons calling themselves slum dwellers who could not be evicted and who were seeking rehabilitation. The petitioner was not in physical possession of any portion of the subject land. The acquisition was necessitated because of the inability to evict the slum dwellers. He submitted that in these circumstances, the question of formal taking of possession does not arise in the conventional manner, and the claim for interest must therefore fail. 15.11. The core question under Point No. 1 is whether, upon publication of the notification under - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 Sections 11 and 17 of the KSA Act on 29.05.1992, the subject land can be said to have vested in the State Government and possession thereof deemed to have been taken. 15.12. For a proper determination of this question, it is necessary to carefully read and analyse the text of Section 17 of the KSA Act. Section 17 reads as follows: "Section 17 - Power to acquire land Where the Government is satisfied that, for the purpose of executing any work of improvements relation to any slum area or any building in such area or for the purpose of re-developing any slum clearance area, or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land within, adjoining or surrounded, by any such area, it may acquire the land by publishing in the Official Gazette, a notice to the effect that it had been decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section: Provided that before publishing such notice, the Government shall call upon the owner or any other person who, in the opinion of the Government, may be interested in such land, to show cause why it should not be acquired; and after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or any other person interested in the land, the Government may pass such orders as it deems fit." 15.13. A plain and careful reading of Section 17 shows that the Government "may acquire the land by publishing in the Official Gazette, a notice to - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 the effect that it had been decided to acquire the land." The language of Section 17 is clear, unambiguous, and self-operative. The acquisition is brought about by the very act of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette. The section does not prescribe any further step, such as delivery of physical possession or passing of an award, as a precondition to the completion of the acquisition and vesting. 15.14. This reading is consistent with the overall scheme of the KSA Act. Section 20 speaks of the "amount payable in respect of any land acquired under this Act," which makes clear that determination of compensation follows acquisition and is not a precondition to it. Similarly, Section 24 uses the expression "taking possession of the land," clearly indicating that possession is a step that may follow acquisition, it presupposes that the acquisition and vesting have already occurred. The award, therefore, is not the event that creates either the vesting or the possession; it is the event that determines the compensation for an acquisition that has already been completed. - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 15.15. Section 11 of the KSA Act empowers the State Government to declare a notified slum area as a "slum clearance area", a designated zone identified for clearance and redevelopment. Such a declaration under Section 11 is a prerequisite that sets the stage for the exercise of the acquisition power under Section 17, which enables the Government to acquire land within, adjoining, or surrounding the declared slum clearance area. In the present case, the notifications under Sections 11 and 17 were issued as part of the same proceeding on 29.05.1992. The combined effect of these two notifications, duly published in the Official Gazette, is that the subject land was first declared part of a slum clearance area (under Section 11) and simultaneously acquired (under Section 17). The vesting of the land in the State Government followed as an immediate legal consequence of the Section 17 publication. 15.16. The contention advanced by the learned AGA, based on the affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, that the date of the award (14.01.2008) ought to be treated as - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 the date of taking possession, is, legally untenable and is rejected. An award is the formal determination of the quantum of compensation. It has no nexus whatsoever with the physical or legal act of taking possession. Acceptance of this argument would lead to an absurd and unjust result: the State could delay the determination of compensation for decades after the acquisition and thereby indefinitely postpone its liability to pay interest under Section 24. Such an interpretation would render Section 24 otiose and entirely ineffective as a protection for dispossessed landowners. Courts must avoid interpretations that lead to absurd results or that defeat the evident purpose of a statutory provision. 15.17. The contention of Sri. Suresh Babu B.N., learned counsel is that possession was never formally taken, and that no mahazar or possession certificate is available, does not merit acceptance. In cases of statutory acquisition, the vesting of title and the deemed taking of possession both operate by force of the statute itself, and not by any subsequent physical act of the acquiring authority. The fact - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 that no mahazar or possession certificate exists does not mean that possession was not taken. It only means that the records of the Government are deficient. It would be wholly inequitable to allow the State to benefit from its own failure to maintain proper records. As this Court has consistently held in the context of acquisition proceedings, the absence of a formal possession document does not negative the statutory vesting that has already occurred by operation of law. Once the State itself admits (as both the learned AGA and Sri. Suresh Babu B.N. have admitted) that slum dwellers were in occupation of the land and the petitioner was not in physical possession, it cannot simultaneously contend that the State itself had not taken possession. 15.18. One further contention of the learned AGA. He submitted that the petitioner had filed W.P.No.24109/1990 challenging the Section 3 notification of 1979, which came to be dismissed with liberty reserved to challenge the Section 17 notification. The petitioner did not exercise that liberty. According to the learned AGA, the acquisition proceedings therefore - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 attained finality. This Court accepts that the acquisition itself has attained finality and is not under challenge in the present writ petition. The petitioner does not seek to question or reopen the acquisition. The petitioner accepts the acquisition as valid and only seeks the statutory entitlement to interest that flows from that very acquisition under Section 24 of the KSA Act. The finality of the acquisition, far from being a bar to the claim, is a precondition to it, it is only because the acquisition is final and the land is definitively vested in the State from 29.05.1992 that the interest liability under Section 24 is clearly and conclusively established. The earlier writ petition, which dealt with the validity of the acquisition notification, has no bearing on the present writ petition, which deals with the statutory consequence of a payment obligation arising from an acquisition whose validity is not in dispute. 15.19. For all the foregoing reasons, this Court answers Point No. (i) by holding that upon publication of the notification under Sections 11 and 17 of the KSA Act in the Official Gazette on - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 29.05.1992, the subject land vested in the State Government and possession thereof was deemed to have been taken by the State from that date. The date of the award (14.01.2008) is not, and cannot be treated as, the date of taking possession. 16. Answer to Point No. (ii): Whether the existence and continued occupation of the subject land by slum dwellers prior to issuance of the notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act would constitute divestment of possession from the petitioner for the purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act? 16.1. Sri. Shankarlingappa, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the subject land had been under the occupation of slum dwellers since at least the year 1979, when the Government issued the preliminary notification under Section 3 of the KSA Act. He submitted that Section 3 empowers the Government to declare an area as a "slum area" only upon its satisfaction that the area is already characterised by conditions of being low-lying, insanitary, squalid, overcrowded or otherwise hazardous to public health and safety, or that the buildings therein are already unfit for human habitation. He contended that Section 3 - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 does not contemplate a merely proposed or anticipated future use, its exercise necessarily presupposes the existence of an already developed slum area occupied by persons living in unhealthy and overcrowded conditions. 16.2. Learned counsel relies on Section 3 of the KSA Act and submits that: "Section 3 - Declaration of slum areas: (1) Where the Government is satisfied that- (a) any area is or is likely to be a source of danger to health, safety or, convenience of the public of that area or of its neighbourhood, by reason of the area being low-lying insanitary, squalid, overcrowded or otherwise; or (b) the buildings in any area, used or intended to be used for human habitation are- (i) in any respect, unfit for human habitation; or (ii) by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental to safety, health or morals, it may, by notification, declare such area to be a slum area." 16.3. By issuing the notification under Section 3 in 1979, learned counsel contended, the State Government itself acknowledged that the subject land was already under occupation by slum dwellers. Once the State formally recognised the existence of the slum, the - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 petitioner was effectively deprived of the beneficial enjoyment and control of the property. He submitted that the petitioner could neither develop, alienate, nor exercise ordinary incidents of ownership over the land, owing to the statutory restrictions under the KSA Act and the actual existence of slum occupants on the ground. 16.4. He further submitted that this continued deprivation of the petitioner's rights over the land without payment of compensation for nearly two decades before the formal acquisition in 1992, and without payment of interest for a further two decades thereafter, amounts to a violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his property except by authority of law. The State cannot, on the one hand, prevent the owner from enjoying the land and, on the other hand, refuse to compensate him for that deprivation. 16.5. Sri. Suresh Babu B.N. did not specifically address Point No. 2 in isolation. He continued to maintain his overall position that formal - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 physical possession was never taken by the respondents. He did not dispute the existence of the slum on the subject land or the issuance of the Section 3 notification in 1979. He contended that the absence of a mahazar or possession certificate is fatal to the petitioner's claim for interest. 16.6. The learned AGA submitted that the subject land was occupied by slum dwellers who could not be evicted and who were seeking rehabilitation on the same land. He candidly admitted that the petitioner was not in physical possession of any part of the subject land even before the Section 17 notification. He submitted that it was precisely because of the inability to evict the slum dwellers that the acquisition was necessitated. He contended that the compensation having been paid on 09.05.2012, the liability of the State stands discharged. 16.7. The question under Point No. (ii) is whether the factual occupation of the land by slum dwellers, recognised and regulated by the State through the Section 3 notification of 1979, amounts to a - 47 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 divestment of possession from the petitioner for the purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act. 16.8. Section 3 of the KSA Act has been extracted in the submissions of Sri. Shankarlingappa above. The text of Section 3, as reproduced therein, makes clear that the power thereunder is triggered only upon the Government's satisfaction that the area is already characterised by conditions of being low-lying, insanitary, squalid, or overcrowded, or that the buildings therein are already unfit for human habitation. Section 3 does not contemplate a future or anticipated occupation; it presupposes a factual situation already existing on the ground. A Section 3 notification is therefore a formal and official acknowledgement by the State that the area is already under occupation by persons living in slum conditions. When the State issued the Section 3 notification in 1979 in respect of the subject land, it necessarily acknowledged that the land was already occupied by slum dwellers living in insanitary conditions. - 48 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 16.9. The admission of the learned AGA himself that the petitioner was not in physical possession of any portion of the subject land, and that the slum dwellers were occupying the same and could not be evicted, is highly significant. This admission establishes beyond any doubt that the petitioner had, as a matter of fact, lost actual physical possession of the subject property long before the formal acquisition in 1992. The State was fully aware of this factual position. 16.10. However, this Court must carefully examine whether this factual deprivation of possession constitutes "taking of possession" by the State for the specific purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act. Section 24 provides for interest "from the time of so taking possession," where "so taking possession" refers to the taking of possession by the "prescribed authority" as part of the acquisition proceedings under the KSA Act. 16.11. Slum dwellers are not agents of the State. Their occupation of the land, even if tolerated, regulated, or indirectly enabled by the State - 49 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 through the Section 3 notification, cannot be equated with the State itself formally taking possession of the property pursuant to the acquisition proceedings. The expression "taking possession" in Section 24 refers to the official assumption of possession by the acquiring authority in its capacity as such, as part of the acquisition process. It does not refer to the mere factual situation where third parties happen to be in occupation of the land. 16.12. Therefore, while the existence of slum occupation since 1979 establishes very clearly that the petitioner was substantially and effectively deprived of the beneficial enjoyment and use of the property well before the formal acquisition in 1992, this deprivation does not, by itself and independently, constitute "taking of possession" by the State for the purposes of triggering the liability under Section 24 of the KSA Act. 16.13. The formal legal event that triggers the liability under Section 24 is the vesting of the land in the State Government under Section 17 of the KSA Act, which, as held under Point No. (i), - 50 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 occurred on 29.05.1992. It is on that date that the State must be deemed to have taken possession for the purposes of Section 24. The pre-1992 occupation by slum dwellers is relevant as background context and as evidence that the petitioner had already suffered significant deprivation, but the precise date for commencing the statutory interest under Section 24 remains the date of formal vesting. 16.14. What the factual occupation of the land by slum dwellers since 1979 does establish is the justness and equity of the petitioner's claim. The State cannot declare a property as a slum area in 1979, effectively prevent the owner from using or developing it for over a decade, formally acquire it in 1992, determine compensation sixteen years later in 2008, and then pay the compensation four years after that in 2012, a total of over thirty years from the initial declaration, without paying any interest whatsoever. Such conduct is arbitrary and is inconsistent with the guarantee under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Section 24 - 51 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 was enacted by the Legislature specifically to address and prevent such situations. 16.15. The argument of Sri. Shankarlingappa based on Article 300A of the Constitution of India deserves to be expressly addressed and resolved. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The Supreme Court has consistently held that "authority of law" for the purposes of Article 300A requires not merely the existence of a law authorising acquisition, but full compliance with the procedure and obligations prescribed by that law, including the obligation to pay compensation and, where prescribed, interest thereon. Where the law authorising acquisition also mandates payment of interest for delayed disbursement of compensation (as Section 24 of the KSA Act expressly does), the failure to pay such interest constitutes non-compliance with the full "authority of law," thereby engaging Article 300A. In the present case, the State declared the land a slum area in 1979, prevented the owner from freely using or developing it through statutory restrictions, formally acquired - 52 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 it in 1992, determined compensation only in 2008, and paid it only in 2012, a span of over two decades, without paying any interest. This prolonged deprivation of the petitioner's property rights, without full compliance with the statutory obligation to pay interest under Section 24, is inconsistent with the guarantee under Article 300A. The present order, which directs payment of interest under Section 24 itself, fully and effectively addresses this constitutional concern. 16.16. This Court answers point No. (ii) by holding that the existence and continued occupation of the subject land by slum dwellers prior to the Section 17 notification does not, standing alone, constitute "taking of possession" by the State for the purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act. However, it firmly establishes that the petitioner was substantially and effectively deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the property from 1979 onwards. The formal legal event that constitutes "taking of possession" under Section 24 is the vesting of the land pursuant to the notification under Section 17 of - 53 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 the KSA Act on 29.05.1992, and interest under Section 24 runs from that date. 17. Answer to point No. (iii): Whether, under Section 24 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, the petitioner is entitled to payment of interest on the compensation amount determined under Section 20 of the Act? 17.1. Sri. Shankarlingappa submitted that Section 24 of the KSA Act expressly provides for payment of interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the time of taking possession until the compensation is actually paid or deposited. He submitted that the land having vested in and possession having been deemed taken by the State Government on 29.05.1992 (as per Section 17), and the compensation having been paid only on 09.05.2012, the petitioner became entitled to interest under Section 24 from the date of vesting to the date of actual payment. 17.2. Learned counsel contended that Section 24 is a mandatory provision and imposes a non- negotiable statutory obligation on the prescribed authority to pay interest whenever the compensation is not paid or deposited before taking possession. He submitted that the - 54 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 award dated 14.01.2008, which failed to award any interest under Section 24, is defective and that the said failure cannot extinguish the statutory right of the petitioner. 17.3. He further submitted that withholding compensation for nearly twenty years after vesting, from 1992 to 2012, without payment of any interest amounts to unjust enrichment by the State at the expense of the petitioner. He contended that Article 300A of the Constitution of India mandates that a person deprived of his property by the State must receive just and fair compensation, which necessarily includes the monetary value of the use of the property for the period during which the compensation was withheld. 17.4. Sri. Suresh Babu B.N. submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to interest because formal possession was never taken by the respondents. He argued that Section 24 is a conditional provision and not an automatic one, it is triggered only upon actual physical taking of possession. Since the petitioner had objected to the taking of possession at various stages, - 55 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 and since there is no mahazar or possession certificate on record, the condition precedent for Section 24 has never been satisfied. He further submitted that the payment of compensation under the award fully satisfies the statutory obligation and no additional liability by way of interest can be imposed. 17.5. Relying on Section 20 of the KSA Act, the learned AGA submitted that the Act provides a self-contained, complete, and exclusive code for determination of compensation. Section 20 of the KSA Act reads as follows: "Section 20 - Amount payable: (1) The amount payable in respect of any land acquired under this Act shall be [three hundred] times the property tax payable in respect of such land on the date of publication of the notice referred to in section 17, under the municipal law applicable to such area and where no such property tax is payable in respect of such land, the property tax payable in respect of similar land adjacent thereto. (2) The prescribed authority shall, after holding an enquiry in the prescribed manner, determine by order the amount payable under sub-section (1) and publish the said order in the Official Gazette. A copy of the said order shall be communicated to the owner of the land and every person interested therein. - 56 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 (3) Where the owner of the land and the owner of the building on such land are different, the prescribed authority shall apportion the amount between the owner of the land and the owner of the building (in the same proportion as the value of the land bears to the value of the building on the date of the acquisition)." 17.6. He submitted that Section 20 of the KSA Act consciously adopts a fixed statutory formula, 300 times the property tax, for computation of compensation, and does not expressly provide for interest, solatium, or any other additional amount. He argued that the KSA Act is a special enactment distinct from the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and that the Court cannot import provisions relating to interest or solatium from the Land Acquisition Act into the KSA Act. 17.7. He further submitted that the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, conducted the enquiry under Section 20(2) of the KSA Act and passed the award on 14.01.2008. The petitioner accepted the compensation of Rs.32,71,500/- and did not challenge either the methodology or the quantum. He therefore submitted that the petitioner is estopped from - 57 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 now seeking interest over and above the amount already paid. 17.8. The learned AGA also placed reliance on Section 24 of the KSA Act itself and submitted that interest thereunder is payable only when the compensation is not paid or deposited "on or before taking possession." He submitted that since the date of possession is disputed and no document evidences the date of possession, the trigger for Section 24 of the KSA Act has not been established. In the alternative, referring to the affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner, he submitted that even if Section 24 of the KSA Act applies, the relevant date of possession should be taken as 14.01.2008 (date of award), and since compensation was paid in 2012, no meaningful delay justifying interest can be shown. 17.9. The learned AGA also placed reliance on Section 26A of the KSA Act, which reads as under: "Section 26A - The Board to have power to acquire land by agreement: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 17 and 20, the Board may, with the - 58 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 previous approval of the Government, enter into an agreement with any person for the acquisition from him, by purchase, lease or exchange of any land within, adjoining or surrounded by any slum area or slum clearance area, or any interest in such land which is needed for the purpose of executing any work of improvement in relation to any slum area or any building in such area or for the purpose of redeveloping any slum clearance area, or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers. (2) Where any land is acquired under sub- section (1), the Board may undertake the measures referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 27 in accordance with such plans as may be approved by the Government and subject to such directions as may from time to time, be given by the Government." 17.10. Relying on Section 26A of the KSA Act, the learned AGA submitted that the Government's order dated 04.09.2000 directing the Board to explore acquisition by mutual agreement under Section 26A of the KSA Act demonstrates the bona fide intention of the State to settle the matter amicably. He submitted that this shows the State was engaged in resolving the dispute throughout and did not deliberately withhold compensation. According to him, this should be taken into account in assessing whether any delay was intentional. - 59 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 17.11. He further submitted that Section 26A of the KSA Act begins with a non-obstante clause overriding Sections 17 and 20 of the KSA Act, and thereby provides an independent statutory mechanism enabling the Board to acquire land through negotiation. According to him, the Government was entitled, under the KSA Act, to explore both compulsory acquisition and consensual settlement, and the failure to reach an agreement under Section 26A does not convert the consensual process into a compulsory one for the purposes of Section 24 of the KSA Act. 17.12. Section 24 of the KSA Act is the central provision to be examined under this Point. It is reproduced once again for ease of ready reference: "Section 24 - Payment of interest: When the amount is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the prescribed authority shall pay the amount with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited and such interest shall be paid or deposited by the prescribed authority in the same manner as provided for the amount." - 60 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 17.13. A plain and careful reading of Section 24 of the KSA Act discloses the following features: 17.13.1. The Section expressly provides for payment of interest at the rate of 5% per annum. This rate is fixed by the statute itself and admits of no variation. 17.13.2. The liability to pay interest arises "when the amount is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession." This is the trigger or condition for the operation of Section 24 of the KSA Act. 17.13.3. Interest runs "from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited." The start date is the date of taking possession; the end date is the date of payment or deposit. 17.13.4. The payment of interest is by the "prescribed authority." This is a duty cast upon the prescribed authority and not a discretionary power. The word "shall" makes this obligation mandatory. 17.14. The first and most important point to be noted is this: Section 24 of the KSA Act is itself a part - 61 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 of the KSA Act. The argument of the learned AGA that the KSA Act does not provide for interest and that interest cannot be "imported" from the Land Acquisition Act is therefore wholly misconceived. This Court is not importing any provision from any other enactment. This Court is applying Section 24 of the KSA Act itself, which is a provision of the very same statute, and which expressly and unambiguously provides for interest. The contention that the KSA Act does not provide for interest flies in the face of the text of Section 24. 17.15. The contention of the learned AGA that Section 20 is a "self-contained code" governing compensation is also without merit in the context of this case. Section 20 of the KSA Act is a code governing the method of computation of the compensation amount, it fixes the formula as 300 times the property tax. It does not and cannot govern the question of interest on delayed payment, which is separately dealt with by Section 24 of the KSA Act. Section 20 and Section 24 of the KSA Act are not in conflict; they operate in separate domains. - 62 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 Section 20 answers the question "How much compensation is payable?" Section 24 answers the different question "What happens if the compensation is not paid before possession is taken?" They complement each other; they do not override each other. 17.16. The conditions under Section 24 of the KSA Act are: 17.16.1. The prescribed authority must have taken possession of the land. 17.16.2. The compensation amount must not have been paid or deposited on or before taking possession. 17.17. Both these conditions are undeniably and clearly fulfilled in the present case: 17.17.1. As held under Point No. 1, the land vested in and possession was deemed taken by the State Government on 29.05.1992 upon publication of the notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act. - 63 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 17.17.2. It is admitted by all parties, indeed it is not even disputed, that compensation was paid only on 09.05.2012, which is nearly twenty years after possession was deemed taken on 29.05.1992. Compensation was clearly not paid on or before the taking of possession. Section 24 is therefore squarely attracted. 17.18. The argument of Sri. Suresh Babu B.N. that formal possession was never taken and that no mahazar or possession certificate exists has already been rejected under Point No. (i). This Court has held that vesting under Section 17 constitutes taking of possession in law, independent of any formal physical act. The absence of a mahazar does not extinguish the statutory right to interest. The State cannot benefit from its own failure to maintain proper records of possession. 17.19. The argument that the petitioner objected to the taking of possession is, with respect, irrelevant to the question of entitlement to interest under Section 24. The liability under Section 24 is not contingent on the owner's - 64 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 consent or acquiescence in the taking of possession. The acquisition under Section 17 operates by force of the statute. The owner's objection to the taking of possession does not prevent the acquisition from taking effect in law. If the owner has a legal objection to the acquisition itself, his remedy is to challenge the acquisition notification before a court. He cannot resist the legal consequences of a validly published notification under Section 17 by merely objecting to the taking of physical possession. 17.20. The contention that the petitioner "accepted" the compensation and is therefore estopped from claiming interest is equally without merit and is rejected. Firstly, estoppel requires, at minimum, a clear and unequivocal representation by the party to be estopped, reliance upon that representation by the other party to its detriment, and circumstances that make it inequitable to allow departure from that representation. The mere receipt of the principal compensation by the petitioner does not constitute any representation, express or implied, to the State that the petitioner was - 65 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 relinquishing his statutory right to interest under Section 24. The petitioner never made any such representation. Quite the contrary, within less than a year of receiving the compensation in May 2012, the petitioner issued a legal notice dated 30.04.2013 specifically demanding payment of statutory interest, thereby making his position abundantly clear. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the right to interest under Section 24 is a statutory right, it is conferred directly by the Legislature through the KSA Act and is not a matter of agreement, consent, or contract between the parties. A statutory right cannot be extinguished or waived by the mere acceptance of a part of what is due under the same statute. The principle that acceptance of part does not extinguish the right to the remainder is well-recognised. The award passed on 14.01.2008 did not address the question of interest under Section 24 at all. The payment of the principal compensation was therefore the only thing discharged by that payment; it did not and could not discharge a liability that the award itself had left - 66 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 unaddressed. The estoppel argument accordingly fails. 17.21. This Court now turns to the reliance of the learned AGA on Section 26A of the KSA Act and the order of the Government dated 04.09.2000 directing the Board to explore acquisition by agreement. Section 26A begins with a non- obstante clause: "Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 17 and 20." This means Section 26A provides an alternative route of acquisition (by agreement) that overrides the compulsory acquisition provisions only if and when an agreement is actually concluded under that section. In the present case, it is admitted by the learned AGA himself that no agreement was arrived at under Section 26A. The acquisition was therefore completed under Section 17 and compensation was determined under Section 20, not under Section 26A. Section 26A, which never came into operation in this case, has no bearing on the rights and obligations created under Sections 17, 20, and 24 of the KSA Act. - 67 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 17.22. The Government's direction to explore an amicable settlement under Section 26A of the KSA Act does not detract from the right of the petitioner to interest under Section 24 of the KSA Act. The existence of a parallel avenue for settlement does not extinguish a statutory right. The fact that the State made bona fide efforts to settle the matter amicably may be a factor relevant to costs, but it has no bearing on the substantive statutory right to interest under Section 24 of the KSA Act. 17.23. In conclusion, this Court answers point No. (iii) by holding that the petitioner is clearly entitled to payment of interest at 5% per annum on the compensation amount of Rs.32,71,500/- under Section 24 of the KSA Act. The compensation was not paid on or before the taking of possession. The statutory conditions of Section 24 of the KSA Act are fulfilled. The objections raised by the respondents are without merit and are rejected. 18. Answer to point no. (iv): If Point No.(iii) is answered in the affirmative, from which date is such interest liable to be calculated and paid? - 68 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 18.1. Sri. Shankarlingappa, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner has prayed for interest from 21.05.1992, being the date on which the notification under Section 17 of the KSA Act was published in the Official Gazette, resulting in vesting of the land in the State Government and deemed taking of possession. He submitted that Section 24 mandates interest "from the time of so taking possession" and therefore interest must be computed from 21.05.1992. He further submitted that the interest must run until the date of actual payment, i.e., 09.05.2012, since Section 24 expressly states that interest is payable "until it shall have been so paid or deposited." 18.2. Sri. Suresh Babu B.N., learned counsel reiterated his overall position that no interest is payable and did not specifically address the question of the start date of interest in the event that this Court were to hold interest to be payable. 18.3. The learned AGA relied upon the affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, and reiterated that the date of the award - 69 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 (14.01.2008) should be treated as the date of taking possession. On that basis, he submitted that since compensation was paid in 2012, which is only about four years after the award date, no substantial delay justifying interest liability has occurred. He contended that even if interest is to be awarded, the period of calculation should commence no earlier than 14.01.2008. 18.4. Section 24 of the KSA Act expressly and unambiguously provides that interest runs "from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited." The start date is, therefore, the date of taking possession, and the end date is the date of actual payment or deposit of the compensation amount. 18.5. As held under Point No.(i), the date of taking possession is the date of vesting under Section 17 of the KSA Act, which is the date of publication of the acquisition notification. The petitioner has prayed for interest from 21.05.1992. The body of the petition refers to a notification dated 29.05.1992 under Sections - 70 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 11 and 17 of the KSA Act. There is a discrepancy of eight days between the prayer date (21.05.1992) and the notification date as mentioned in the body of the petition (29.05.1992). The affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner refers only to "the final notification under the KSA Act coming to be issued on 29.05.1992" without specifying the date of publication in the Gazette. Under Section 17, what vests the land is the "publishing in the Official Gazette, a notice to the effect that it had been decided to acquire the land." The operative event is the publication in the Gazette, not the administrative act of "issuing" the notification. It is therefore possible that the notification was issued (signed/dispatched) on 29.05.1992 but published (gazetted) on an earlier date, including possibly 21.05.1992 as stated in the prayer. 18.6. The respondents have not filed any counter to dispute the prayer date of 21.05.1992. They have not contended that the date of publication in the Gazette was later than 21.05.1992. In the absence of any contradiction of the prayer - 71 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 date by the respondents on the basis of the actual gazette publication date, this Court accepts the date stated in the prayer, namely 21.05.1992, as the relevant date. This Court also notes that granting interest from 21.05.1992 (eight days earlier than 29.05.1992) does not cause any prejudice to the respondents that they have not already accepted by failing to dispute the prayer date. Accordingly, interest shall be computed from 21.05.1992. 18.7. The contention of the learned AGA that the date of the award (14.01.2008) should be treated as the starting date for interest is rejected for all the reasons already given under Point No. (i). This Court emphasises once more that such an interpretation would allow the State to unilaterally determine when its obligation to pay interest commences, simply by delaying the passing of the award. This is precisely the mischief that Section 24 was enacted to prevent. 18.8. This Court has held, under Point No. (iv), that statutory interest under Section 24 of the KSA - 72 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 Act is payable on the compensation amount of Rs.32,71,500/- from 21.05.1992 (deemed date of taking possession) to 09.05.2012 (date of actual payment of compensation). The principal compensation was discharged on 09.05.2012. However, the interest amount that had accrued under Section 24 up to 09.05.2012, being approximately Rs.32,68,000/- (and to be precisely computed by Respondent No. 3 as directed), was never paid on that date, nor at any time thereafter. The respondents have not paid this amount despite the legal notice dated 30.04.2013 and the filing and pendency of the present writ petition. The interest amount under Section 24 of the KSA Act has therefore itself remained outstanding since 09.05.2012. 18.9. The question that arises is whether this Court should, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, direct further interest on the outstanding Section 24 interest amount from 09.05.2012 till actual payment. This Court answers that question in the affirmative, for the following reasons: - 73 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 18.9.1. The interest amount under Section 24 is not a penalty or a discretionary award, it is a statutory debt due and payable to the petitioner. A debt due under a statute carries with it, in equity and in law, an obligation to pay further interest for the period during which that debt remains unpaid. Once the principal compensation was paid on 09.05.2012, the interest amount crystallised and became immediately due and payable as a liquidated sum. The respondents' continued failure to pay this liquidated sum thereafter amounts to wrongful withholding of a sum of money to which the petitioner has been legally entitled since 09.05.2012. 18.9.2. This Court is a Court of equity as well as law. Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers wide and expansive powers on this Court to issue directions, orders, or writs as it deems necessary to do complete and effectual justice. It is settled law that a High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction is not confined to - 74 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 granting only the minimum relief strictly available under the letter of the statute, but may fashion appropriate relief to ensure complete justice between the parties. Where a statutory debt has remained wrongfully withheld for an extended period despite a formal legal demand, this Court is competent to direct payment of further interest on that debt so as to prevent the debtor from benefiting from its own wrongful default. 18.9.3. The rate of further interest is fixed at 5% per annum simple interest, the same rate prescribed by Section 24 of the KSA Act. This rate reflects the legislative judgment on the appropriate rate of compensation for delayed payment in the context of this very statute and these very proceedings. There is no reason to depart from this rate. The period for which further interest runs is from 09.05.2012 (the date on which the interest debt crystallised and became due) until the date of actual payment of the interest amount by Respondent No. - 75 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 3. Respondent No. 3 shall apply this further interest at 5% per annum simple interest on the interest amount computed under Section 24 (i.e., on the amount computed under para 16.6 above, as precisely determined by Respondent No. 3 in accordance with the formula directed), from 09.05.2012 till the date of actual disbursement. 19. Answer to point No. (v): What order? 19.1. In view of the findings recorded under Points (i) to (iv) above, the petitioner has made out a clear and complete case for the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 19.2. The right to receive interest under Section 24 of the KSA Act is a statutory right created by the Legislature in favour of landowners whose land is acquired without simultaneous payment of compensation. The failure of the respondents to pay interest under Section 24 despite the plain statutory mandate constitutes a failure to perform a statutory duty. A writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a statutory - 76 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 duty that has been wrongfully withheld. The petitioner has duly demanded interest through a legal notice dated 30.04.2013, which has remained unanswered. The failure to respond to this demand further makes out a case for issuance of a writ of mandamus. Hence, this court passes the following ORDER (i) Writ Petition No.55526 of 2013 is hereby Allowed. (ii) A Writ of Mandamus is hereby issued to Respondent No. 3, the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, directing as follows: (iii) Respondent No.3 shall compute and disburse to the petitioner, Nolamba Veershaiva Sangha (R), the following two amounts: (a) COMPONENT I — Statutory interest under Section 24 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973: Simple interest at 5% per annum on the compensation amount of Rs.32,71,500/- (Rupees Thirty Two Lakhs Seventy One Thousand Five - 77 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 Hundred only) for the period from 21.05.1992 to 09.05.2012, which is approximately Rs.32,68,000/- (Rupees Thirty Two Lakhs Sixty Eight Thousand only). (b) COMPONENT II — Further interest on Component I: Simple interest at 5% per annum on the Component I amount for the period from 09.05.2012 until the date of actual disbursement to the petitioner. This further interest is awarded in exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to ensure complete justice and to prevent unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of the petitioner. (iv) Respondent No. 3 shall disburse both Component I and Component II (as computed under clause (iii) above) to the petitioner within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Component II shall be computed up to the actual date of disbursement. (v) The disbursement shall be made through the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, in the same manner in which the principal compensation amount of Rs.32,71,500/- was disbursed on 09.05.2012. (vi) If Respondent No. 3 fails to compute and disburse the interest amount within eight weeks as directed above, - 78 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:25827 WP No. 55526 of 2013 the petitioner shall be at liberty to apply to this Court for further directions. Sd/- (SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE KTY List No.: 1 Sl No.: 95