2026:HHC:32457 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 382 of 2012 Reserved on: 31.07.2026 Date of Decision: 05.08.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Yashpal Singh & Ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr Sumit Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 28.04.2012, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Rohru, Shimla, H.P (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:32457 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 147 and 149 of IPC. It was asserted that the informant Badri Nath (PW1) and Kripal Singh (PW7) were sitting in the shop cum hotel of Yashpal (accused) on 07.05.2009 at about 08.00 p.m. The accused came and asked as to why the informant was creating a ruckus. He threatened the informant and went away. The informant was going to his home at about 09.00 p.m. Yashpal, Pyare Lal and Sushila stopped him. They were armed with sticks. Chaman Lal, Harvinder Singh and Shiva Singh were also accompanying them. All of them gave beatings to the informant. Bhajan Dei (PW2) had witnessed the incident. The matter was reported to the police, and an FIR (Ext.PW1/A) was registered in the police station. Dr Sanjay Vishwas (PW9) examined the informant and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. He issued the report (Ext.PW9/A). HC Balbir Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW11/A). He took the photographs (Ext.PW11/B1 to Ext.PW11/B3), whose negatives are Ext.PW11/B4 to Ext.PW11/B6. The informant produced his shirt 3 2026:HHC:32457 (Ext.P3), pyjamas (Ext.P4), cap (Ext.P1 and basket (Ext.P2), which were put in a cloth parcel and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘Y’. Seal impression (Ext.PW11/D) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the parcel was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). Accused Yashpal, Sushila and Pyare Lal produced one stick each (Ext. P5 to Ext.P7), which were seized vide memos (Ext. PW1/B to Ext.PW1/D). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 147 and 323 read with Section 149 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Informant Badri Nath (PW1) narrated the incident. Bhajan Dei (PW2) is an eyewitness. Yashpal (PW3) and C. Kirpa Ram (PW4) are the witnesses to the recovery. Hitender Singh (PW5) and Kripal Singh (PW7) deposed about the incident that took place in the hotel. The informant narrated the incident to 4 2026:HHC:32457 Bhisham Singh (PW6) and Jai Puri (PW8). Dr Sanjay Vishwas (PW9) medically examined the injured. SI Ramphal Yadav (PW10) prepared the challan. HC. Balbir Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. 5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They claimed that a false case was made against them. They examined Sudesh Kumar (DW1) in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other. Bhajan Dei (PW2) was interested, as the informant had appeared as a witness in her case. The statement of the defence witness proved that the accused was with him. An incident could not have taken place in a manner suggested by the prosecution. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The testimonies of the informant and Bhajan 5 2026:HHC:32457 Dei (PW2) corroborated each other on material particulars. Dr Sanjay Vishwas (PW9) proved that the informant had sustained injuries, which corroborated the prosecution's version. Learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the testimony of the defence witness and discarding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Sumit Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion to record the acquittal. The testimony of the defence witness did not discard the prosecution version. The medical evidence corroborated the statements of prosecution witnesses. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6 2026:HHC:32457 10. Mr Sumit Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. The informant had deposed in a case filed by Bhajan Dei (PW2), and she cannot be called to be an independent witness. The genesis of the occurrence was doubtful because no person would cause injury to another simply because he was creating a ruckus in the shop. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding the appeal. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the 7 2026:HHC:32457 evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: 8 2026:HHC:32457 “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 9 2026:HHC:32457 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. As per the prosecution, the incident had taken place on 07.05.2009 at about 09.00 p.m. The distance between the police station and the place of incident is shown to be 15 kilometres in the FIR (Ext.PW1/A). The informant reported the matter to the police on 08.05.2009 at 10.30 a.m. The FIR has a column about the reason for the delay in reporting the matter to the police. However, the column was left blank. The informant stated in his cross-examination that his village had 5-6 vehicles. He has not provided any explanation as to why he had not reported the matter to the police. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay 10 2026:HHC:32457 in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-dated to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 17. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - 11 2026:HHC:32457 “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1].” 18. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed on page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that 12 2026:HHC:32457 cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 19. Therefore, the prosecution case is required to be seen with due care and caution because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 20. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that he had a civil litigation with Yashpal and Surat Ram, which shows that the relationship between the parties was strained. Therefore, it is essential to examine the prosecution case with due care and caution, considering the delay in the matter. 21. Hitender Singh (PW5) stated that he and the informant were sitting in the hotel of the accused when the accused came and enquired as to why they were creating a ruckus. The accused and the informant quarrelled. He stated in his cross-examination that no quarrel had taken place in his presence. The informant had left towards his village in his presence. The statement of this witness is highly contradictory. He stated in his examination-in-chief that the accused and the informant had a quarrel but stated in the cross-examination that 13 2026:HHC:32457 no quarrel had taken place in his presence. Thus, his testimony cannot be used to prove the genesis of the prosecution’s case. 22. Kripal Singh (PW7) stated that he was sitting in the hotel of the accused. The accused came and slapped Reenu and enquired as to why he was creating a ruckus. Badri Nath (PW1) told him on the next day that he was beaten by the accused and other persons. He stated in his cross-examination that the persons sitting in the hotel were consuming liquor. He stated that all the persons left after the accused had asked them to go to their homes. It is nobody's case that the accused had slapped the informant. Hence, his testimony does not prove the genesis of the incident. 23. Bhajan Dei (PW2) stated that she heard some noise and came out. She saw that the accused were quarrelling with the informant. Pyare Lal, Yashpal and Susheela were inflicting blows by means of sticks and the other persons were beating the informant with kicks and fist blows. The informant sustained bleeding injuries on his head. She enquired as to why the accused were beating the informant. The accused left thereafter. 14 2026:HHC:32457 24. This site plan (Ext.PW11/A) does not show any blood stains. Dr Sanjay Vishwas (PW9) medically examined the informant and found two lacerated wounds and a superficial abrasion. He has nowhere stated that the injuries were bleeding. Therefore, there is no corroboration to the testimony of Bhajan Dei (PW2) that bleeding injuries were caused to the informant. 25. As per the prosecution case, the injuries were caused by means of a stick; however, no patterned wound was found which is likely to be caused by means of a stick.2 26. Thus, the medical evidence does not provide unequivocal corroboration to the prosecution's case that the injuries were caused by means of sticks. 27. The police had seized the informant's clothes, but these were not sent to the forensic expert to determine whether human blood was found on them or not. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the recovery of the clothes 28. Bhajan Dei (PW2) admitted in her cross-examination that the informant had deposed in her favour in a case filed by 2 Modi A textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology 24th Edition 2012 at page 521 15 2026:HHC:32457 her. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that Bhajan Dei could not be called to be an independent witness. 29. All these circumstances made the prosecution case highly doubtful. The learned Trial Court has taken a reasonable view, while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 30. No other point was urged. 31. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the 16 2026:HHC:32457 respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 33. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 5th August, 2026 (Chander)