2026:JHHC:19145 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (C) No. 5253 of 2006 1. Bhanjan Layak, Son of Late Makhan Layak (Substituted vide order dated 15.01.2018) 1.a Tapsi Layak 1.b Radheshyam Layak Both resident of Village: Petsar, P.S. Jarmundi, Sub-Division & District-Dumka 2. Jageshwar Layak @ Jageshar Layak, Son of Makhan Layak. 3. Ghuteshwar Layak @ Ghatesar Layak, Son of Late Huro Layak 4. Newaji Layak, Son of Late Bhuneshwar Layak 5. Chhaku Layak, Son of Bhattu Layak All residents of Village: Petsar, P.O. + P.S. Jarmundi, Sub Division and District: Dumka. … … Petitioners/Appellants Versus 1. Ghutari Manjhian, Wife of Late Mila Manjhi. 2. Pulthi Manjhi 3. Baddu Manjhi (Deleted Vide Order dated 31.10.2007) 4. Gultan Manjhi (Substituted vide order dated 15.01.2018) 4.a Janki Devi, Wife of Gultan Manjhi, R/o: Petsar No. 41, P.S. Jarmundi, Sub Division and District-Dumka 4.b Ashok Manjhi, Son of Gultan Manjhi, R/o: Petsar No. 41, P.S. Jarmundi, Sub Division and District-Dumka 4.c Ribu Devi, Wife of Ajit Kurwan, Village- Dumarjor, P.O. & P.S. Ramgarh, District- Dumka. 4.d Rekha Devi, Wife of Tilak Layak, Village Kapati, P.O. & P.S. Ramgarh, District-Dumka. 5. Shambhu Manjhi (Minor) 6. Satan Manjhi (Minor) All son of Late Milan Manjhi, Minors are represented through their mother and nature guardian Ghutari Manjhian. 7. Sabitri Manjhian @ Devi, Wife of Manjhi 8. Dudheshwar Manjhi (Deleted Vide Order dated 31.10.2007) 9. Manohar Manjhi 10. Nani Manjhi All son of Late Dhuna Manjhi and All residents of Village: Petsar No. 41, P.S. Jarmundi, Sub Division and District: Dumka ... ... Respondent 1st Set/Respondents 11. Mataru Kumar, Son of Late Jugal Kumar 12. Bechani Kumarain, Wife of Late Bounsi Kumar Both are Residents of Village: Patsar No. 41, P.S.: Jarmundi, Sub Division and District: Dumka ... ... Respondent 2nd Set/Respondents 13. Gauri Laikain, Wife of Late Ranjan Layak 2026:JHHC:19145 2 14. Kamdeo Layak, Son of Late Ranjan Layak 15. Budhani Laikein, Wife of Bhuneshwar Layak 16. Netal Layak, Son of Late Dhodho Layak 17. Kachu Layak, Son of Bhattu Layak 18. Bhutani Laikain, Wife of Late Guro Layak 19. Desiya Laikain, Wife of Late Guli Layak 20. Anda Layak (Minor), Son of Late Guli Layak 21. Kalia Layak (Minor), Son of Late Guli Layak Both No. 20 and 21 Minors represented through their mother and natural Guardian Deshiya Laikain. 22. Larho Layak, Son of Late Masudi Layak All are Resident of Village: Petsar, P.S. Jarmundi, Sub Division and District: Dumka. … … Performa Respondents/Respondents --- CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Petitioners : Mr. Kumar Nischay, Advocate For the Resp. 1st Set : Mr. Karamdeo, Advocate : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate : Mr. Mayank Deep, Advocate --- C.A.V. on 12.03.2026 Pronounced on 30/06/2026 1. This writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs: - “That the instant Writ application has been preferred against the order dated 28.03.2006 passed by Hon’ble Commissioner, Santhal Pragana Division, Dumka in Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 77/1985-86, whereby the Hon’ble Commissioner has been pleased to confirm the Order passed by the Settlement Officer, Dumka dated 19.06.1985 in M.A. No. 114 of 1985 preferred by the Appellants/Petitioners against the Order dated 12.12.1984 passed by Assistant Settlement Officer, Tasdik Camp, Naunihat, Dumka in Raiyati Eviction Case No. 59 of 1984 filed by the petitioners and the respondents 2nd set, whereby the respondent 1st set has been evicted from the Plot No. 1861 A of Jamabandi No. 71, Mauza: Patsar, Thana No. 41, P.S.: Jarmundi, District: Dumka. And/or For grant of any other relief(s), for which the petitioners are legally entitled to.” 2026:JHHC:19145 3 Arguments of the petitioners 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the core question involved in this case is whether the compromise decree dated 28.08.1940 passed in Title Suit No. 08 of 1940 (Makhan Layak and others vs. Mangru Manjhi and Dhuna Manjhi) instituted before the court of Deputy Collector-II, Dumka and was decided in favour of the ancestors of the petitioners could be set-aside and held to be collusive in subsequent proceeding of the year 1984. The present proceeding arises out of the proceeding of the year 1984. 3. The learned counsel has placed paragraph 9 and 10 of the judgment reported in (2014) 15 SCC 471 (R. Rajanna versus S.R. Venkataswamy and others) and has submitted that the compromise itself is an agreement and once the compromise decree is passed, any other court or the party cannot question the compromise that too after a long lapse of time. The learned counsel has submitted that in the present case Title Suit No. 8 of 1940 was decided by the competent authority which ended in a compromise and the same could not have been set-aside without following the procedure of law and in another proceeding impugned in the present case, the compromise in the title suit could not have been declared collusive. Arguments of the Respondent 1st set 4. The learned counsel for the private respondents has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the present proceeding are guided by the special act of Santhal Parganas Tenancy which was earlier guided by the regulation of 1972 and also guided by the provisions of Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1949. He submits that the defendant 1st set were the raiyats of the property and the entire property under Santhal Parganas is non-alienable as per the statute. 5. The learned counsel has referred to the judgment reported 1972 SCC Online Patna 116 [Bhauri Lal Jain and Another vs. Sub-Divisional Officer of Jamtara and Others] and has submitted that the fact that the 2026:JHHC:19145 4 property is not alienable is apparent from the summary of the judgment as has been mentioned in paragraph 56 of the judgment. Learned counsel also submits that once the property is not transferrable and not alienable, it cannot be transferred even through compromise. The said compromise relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is against the statue and therefore, such transfers through compromise cannot be recognized under law. 6. The learned counsel has then relied upon the judgment reported in 1975 SCC Online Patna 14 [Ram Narain Sah vs. The State of Bihar and Others] and has referred to paragraph 6 of the judgment to submit that the fraudulent method has been included by way of amendment vide Bihar Regulation 1 of 1972 so as to include decree obtained in suits by fraud or collusion. Learned counsel has referred to paragraph 8 of the said judgment to submit that the compromise decree itself was collusive and against statute and therefore, the transfer through compromise being in contravention of the Act, was a fraud on court and also the fraud on the statute and therefore, such compromise is null and void. 7. Learned counsel has also submitted that the revenue authorities have the jurisdiction to look into the nature of transaction. He has relied upon the judgment reported in 1986 SCC OnLine Patna 125 [Raja Mian and Others vs. Puran Mian and Others] and has referred to paragraph 27 to submit that section 27 (1) prohibits transfer of a holding by a raiyat either by sale gift, mortgage or lease or by any other contract or agreement and the compromise decree is nothing but a contract between the parties. 8. Learned counsel has also submitted that the principle that the property was inalienable has already been considered and held by the court way back in the judgment of Bhauri Lal Jain (Supra). Learned counsel has also referred to paragraph 8 of the judgment passed in the case of Ram Narain Sah (Supra) to submit that the expression ‘any fraudulent method’ is wide enough to include a collusive compromise decree. 2026:JHHC:19145 5 Case of the petitioners 9. It is the case of the petitioners that they are the legal heirs and successors of Makhan Layak, Bhatu Layak and Huro Layak, descendant of Gajadhar Layak and the respondent 2nd set are the legal heirs and successors of one Jugal Kumar. 10. It is their case that plot no. 1861 appertaining to Jamabandi No. 71 stood recorded in the name of Manajer Kumar S/o Late Kailu Kumar and Jugal Kumar S/o Late Nasib Kumar in the last survey settlement, namely, Gantzer’s Settlement; the said Jamabandi No. 71 of Gantzer’s Settlement corresponds to Jamabandi No. 46 of Mc. Pherson’s Settlement belonging to the common ancestors of petitioners and the respondents 2nd party. 11. It is their case that Jugal Kumar, one of the recorded tenant of Jamabandi no. 71 of Gantzer’s Settlement, was evicted from part of Plot no. 1861A comprising sub-plot nos. 2411, 2418, 2419, 2420 and 2421 on account of illegal alienation by one Soukhi Pandit and the rest part being plot No. 1861B comprising of sub-plot nos. 2410, 2424, 2425, 2426 and 2427, was in the possession of Gajadhar Layak, ancestors of the petitioners. The eviction order was passed in E.A Case No. 681/1938-39 of the court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka with regard to plot no. 1861A. 12. It is their further case that one Mangru Manjhi [ancestor of the respondent 1st party] was settled with plot no. 1861A by order dated 05.12.1939 passed in E.A. No. 681/1938-39 and subsequently possession was also given by the court Amin with respect to the aforesaid land on 25.08.1940 and was confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka on 05.02.1941. The land of Plot No. 1861B continued to be in possession of Gajadhar layak since before 1935-36 and after his death his heirs Bhatu Layak, Makhan Layak and Huro Layak, who are also the ancestors of the present petitioners, continued in possession in their own right and title in open knowledge and assertion to all and after death of the ancestors, the petitioners continued in physical cultivating possession of the land. 2026:JHHC:19145 6 13. It is their case that the said part of plot no. 1861B corresponds to Hal Khesra Nos. 1410, 2224, 2425 and 2426 of Mouza Petsar. 14. It is the further case of the petitioners that there was a Title Suit No. 08/1940 [Makhan Layak and others vs. Mangru Manjhi] and others, in which ancestors of the petitioners were party and decree was passed in their favor and consequently they continued in possession of plot no. 1861B since before 1935-36 and obtained delivery of possession by the Court of Amin to avoid any further complications in view of order of eviction passed earlier. The aforesaid Title Suit was filed in view of the order of eviction passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner in R.M.A. No. 42/1939-40. 15. Thus, respondent 1st party continued to possess plot no 1861A on the basis of Amin’s report dated 05.11.1938 and the delivery of possession given by the Court Amin on 25.08.1940. Further, plot No. 1861B continued to be possessed by Gajadhar Layak, ancestors of the petitioners and after his death with the petitioners and they have been paying rent separately and are in possession of the rent receipts up to date. 16. It is also their case that in E.A. Case No. 681/1938-39, the heirs of Manajar Kumar were not made parties. 17. The cause of action arose when the settlement authorities during the present settlement operation found the possession of the petitioners over plot no. 1861B and accordingly recorded the names of the petitioners in the settlement record, whereas respondent 1st party was directed to be evicted from plot No. 1861A and the same was directed to be restored to respondent 2nd party vide order dated 12.12.1984 passed in R.E. Case No. 59/1984 of the court of Assistant Settlement Officer. Consequently, the respondent 1st party preferred appeal and the Settlement Officer, Dumka vide order dated 19.06.1985 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 114/1985 allowed the appeal and set-aside the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer and passed order of eviction of the petitioners as well as the respondent 2nd party. 2026:JHHC:19145 7 Consequently, the petitioners preferred appeal vide Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 77/1985-86 before the Court of learned Commissioner, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka, who after hearing the parties dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment dated 19.06.1985 passed by the Settlement Officer, Dumka in Misc. Appeal No. 114/1985, which is the impugned order in the present case. 18. The specific case of the petitioners is that the petitioners have been wrongfully evicted from plot no. 1861B which they have continued to be in possession through their ancestors since before 1935-36 and they have been regularly paying rent up to date. It is their further case that permanent occupancy right over the suit lands in question has been acquired by continuing in physical possession over the same since before 1935-36 and this would appear from the documents of E.A. Case No. 681/1938-39 as well as Title Suit No. 08/1940. 19. It is their further case that the respondent 1st party got settlement of only plot no. 1861A and delivery of possession was given by the court of Amin on 25.08.1940, therefore, the order of the Settlement Officer, Dumka with a direction to record the names of the respondent 1st party in respect of whole area of plot no. 1861 [1861A and 1861B] is wrong, illegal and against the materials on record. It is also their case that the respondent 1st party never possessed the land of plot No. 1861B at any point of time and that the respondent 1st party is paying proportionate rent only for the area of plot No. 1861A. Case of the respondent 1st party 20. Although the respondents have not filed any counter-affidavit in this case, but during the course of arguments, a list of dates have been furnished and it has been submitted by the private respondent 1st party that the SDO Court in Eviction (Alienation) Case No. 681/1938-39 ordered eviction of both alienor and alienee vide order dated 07.03.1939 and the petitioners are claiming through the alienee. It has been submitted that the entire plot no. 1861 was settled in favor of the respondents raiyats 2026:JHHC:19145 8 (respondent 1st party) vide order dated 05.02.1940 and the ancestors of the respondent 1st party were recognized as raiyats as back as on 05.02.1941. However, prior to that, Title Suit No. 08/1940 was filed which ended in a collusive compromise decree with respect to 3 Bigha 7 Katha and 7 Dhur of land which is comprising of Plot No. 1861B. It has been submitted that the copy of the compromise decree has not been filed in the writ petition and the contents of the said decree is not available on record and what is available is only what is recorded in the subsequent proceedings of the revenue authorities in eviction proceedings. 21. It has been further submitted by the private respondent 1st party that much thereafter on 12.12.1984, the Assistant Settlement Officer passed an order in favor of the petitioners and ordered the eviction of the respondents and change in revenue records vide R.E. Case No. 59/1984. Against the order dated 12.12.1984 passed in R.E. Case No. 59/1984, against which an appeal was filed being M.A. Case No. 114/1985, which was allowed vide order dated 19.06.1985 as contained in Annexure-2. Against the appellate order, Revision being R.M.A. Case No. 77/1985-86 was filed before the learned Commissioner, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka, but the revision application was dismissed vide order dated 28.03.2006 (Annexure-3). Findings of this court. 22. The petitioners have filed only the three orders, which have been passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Settlement Officer and the Commissioner along with the writ petition and no other documents, including the compromise decree referred to in the writ petition, have been filed for perusal and consideration of this Court. 23. However, during the course of argument, no dispute has been raised with regarding to the findings of facts recorded by the learned Commissioner in the impugned order. 24. Further, the only argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the compromise arrived at in the Title Suit way back in 2026:JHHC:19145 9 the year 1940 cannot be set aside by the revenue authorities in subsequent proceedings. 25. In the aforesaid background, the facts as reflects from the impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner in the R.M.A. case no. 77 of 1985-86 upholding the order passed by the settlement officer in Misc. Appeal No. 114/1985 [reversing the order dated 12.12.84 passed by the A.S.O. in R.E. Case No. 59/1984 and evicted the appellants (petitioners) from part of plot No. 1861/B], are as under: - A. The case of the petitioners before the authority was that plot no. 1861 of Jamabandi no. 71 [corresponding to M.C Pherson’s Jamabandi no. 46] was jointly recorded in the names of Manager Kumar S/O Kailu Kumar and Jugal Kumar S/O Nasib Kumar during Gantzer’s Settlement. The said jamabandi belonged to the common ancestors of the petitioners and the respondent 2nd party and Jugal Kumar was evicted from part of plot no. 1861A with area of 1 bigha 19 Katha, 4 dhur in E.A Case No. 681/1938-39 and it was settled with one Mangru Manjhi, the ancestor of respondent 1st party. The rest area 4 bigha, 15 katha, 12 dhur being plot-1861B continued to be possessed by the ancestors of the petitioners which were converted with new plots 1416, 2424, 2425, 2426 and 2427 and continued till Title Suit No.-8/1940 [Makhan Layak and others Vs. Mangru Manjhi and Others] which ended in a compromise and the title and possession of the ancestors of the petitioners was acknowledged by Mangru Manjhi, the respondent 1st set, and the petitioners continued in possession. B. The settlement authorities during the present settlement operation found the possession of the petitioners over aforesaid rest area 4 bigha, 15 katha and 12 dhur and 2026:JHHC:19145 10 accordingly recorded their names in the khata and evicted the respondent 1st party therefrom and directed the same to be restored to respondent 2nd party vide order dated 12.12.1984 in R.E. case No.-59/1984. The respondent 1st party preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No.-114/85 and vide order dated 19.6.85 the appeal was allowed and the order dated 12.12.1984 passed in R.E. Case No.-59/1984 was set-aside and petitioners as well as the respondent 2nd party were directed to be evicted. The grounds of appeal before the Commissioner was that the petitioners have been in continued possession over the area of 4 bigha, 15 katha, 12 dhur and were paying the rent up to date and thereby acquired permanent occupancy right and that the respondent 1st party got settlement of only 1 bigha, 19 katha, 4 dhur and paid rent accordingly and never ever claimed the whole area. C. The case of the respondent 1st party was that said Jugal, the recorded tenant, had alienated ½ of his share to one Saukhi Pandit and rest half to Gajadhar Layak and in Eviction case no.-681/38-39 said Jugal was evicted from the entire plot and an order was to settle the same with poor raiyats. It was their further case that in course of settlement one Tajib Layak took settlement by supressing the aforesaid fact to which an objection was filed by Mangru Manjhi who was settled on the entire land. However, Gajadhar Layak had filed a Collusive Title suit only to create a document in which decree was passed for ½ of the area but Gajadhar Layak never came in the possession. 2026:JHHC:19145 11 The learned Commissioner upon going through the materials on record came to the following conclusions: - i. The whole claim of the petitioners is based on his contention that in Eviction Case No. 681/1938-39, one Jugal had been evicted from only part of plot no.-1861. But on perusal of the copy of the concerned case record his contention is proved false. ii. The reality is on a report dated 01.08.1938 of S.N. Roy, Dy. Collector that there was alienation by Jugal and upon an recommendation dated 07.03.1939 of the S.D.O. that both alienor Jugal Kumar and alienee Saukhi Pandit, Gajadhar Laik and others be evicted from the entire land of 1861, the Deputy Commissioner ordered eviction accordingly. iii. In course of settlement of the land after eviction, the record proves that order dated 21.08.39, the S.D.O. had decided to deny settlement with Makhan and Bhikhu Layak son of Gajadhar Layak because that would have practically inspired the illegal alienation on which basis the eviction had been ordered and executed. iv. Vide another order of the same date, that is 21.08.39, one Tajum Layak was found to be a Jamabandi raiyat for 4 annas only and so the land was settled with him but vide order dated 05.12.1939, on a petition against their settlement, the S.D.O found that Tajum Layak had fraudulently taken the settlement so the settlement with Tajum Layak was cancelled and the entire land was settled with Mangru Manjhi and Dhuna Manjhi. v. The learned Commissioner recorded that there appears to be no appeal against this settlement of the entire land with Mangru Manjhi and Dhuna Manjhi, hence the learned 2026:JHHC:19145 12 Commissioner held that the story put forth by the petitioners was not substantiated. vi. So far as the Title Suit No. 08/1940 is concerned, the Settlement Officer in his order, impugned before the learned Commissioner, has examined this case in detail and by a reasoned examination has concluded that this was a collusive document produced by forcing the poor settlees to make a compromise. After having recorded as aforesaid, the learned Commissioner dismissed the appeal filed by the present petitioners. 26. Since, the learned Commissioner has concurred with the view taken by the settlement officer in appeal particularly with regards to the compromise in Title Suit No.-8/1940, which is the bone of contention between the parties before this court also, it would be useful to quote the findings of the Settlement Officer, which is quoted as under: - “In the eviction (alienation) case 681 of 1938-39 vide Order dated 07.03.39 the S.D.O. had recommended for eviction of both alienor and alienee. The D.C. vide order dated 10.4.39 ordered eviction. Subsequently on 21.08.39 the lands were settled with one Tajim Laik. However, on 05.12.39 the S.D.O. records that Tajim Laik is not deserving as he has a big Jaima and therefore the previous settlement is cancelled and the lands (i.e. plot 1861 area 6 Bighas 14 Kathas 16 Dhurs) are settled with very poor raiyats namely Mangur Majhi and his brother Dhuna Manjhi on 05.02.40 the S.D.D. records in his order sheet that there is no need to revise the settlement with Mangur Manjhi and Dhuna. On 05.02.41, it is recorded that Banagarhi is given. It is admitted that Mangru manjhi and Dhuna Manjhi are the ancestors of the appellants. In Title Suit No. 08 of 1940 in the court-II of the Deputy Collector at Dumka, the alienee Makhan Laik and others were plaintiffs and Mangur and Dhuna were the defendants, his suit was decreed vide order dated 28.08.40 in terms of a compromise petition filed by the parties on 17.08.40. In the 2026:JHHC:19145 13 compromise petition, the Manjhi brothers who had taken settlement had mentioned that they were very poor and could not persuade their case and because initially these alienees had possession over certain portions of this plot 1861, hence they fortified right to 3 bighas 7 kathas 7 dhurs to the plaintiffs. There is title execution case no. 2 of 1941 in the same court-II at Dumka vide order dated 30.07.41 it appears that possession was delivered. Thus, we see that the S.D.O. had proposed eviction of both alienor and alienee from plot 1861 and settled it with the ancestors of the appellants saying that there were the poor raiyats who deserved the settlement. Even in that case the laiks had wanted to take settlement and the S.D.O. had recorded that the land could not be settled with them as it would amount to respiring illegal alienation as these were the alienees. What the laik's could not achieve in the S.D.O’s court, they tried to achieve in the Title Suit. It is clear that the poor settles Mangur and Dhuna Manjhi were found to make a compromise as they did not have money to fight the case and somehow they were frauded into making the compromise. Thus in my considered opinion such fraudulent compromised decree cannot be valid as this amounted to alienation of land which was validly settled with Mangru and Dhuna Manjhi. The Manjhis under law could not alienate these lands thus this compromise decree is bad in law. The laiks cannot claim adverse possession as possession in the title Execution Casa No. 02 of 1941 was delivered to them on 30.07.41 and hence these persons and their successor had not perfected their title by 01.11.49 when the act of 1949 came into force. Regarding the claims of the respondents first party, it is clear that they were validly evicted from plot no. 1861 and therefore can claim no title to it. In view of the above-mentioned discussion, it is clear that both the respondents first and second party have no title over the said plot 1861. The whole of old plot 1861 of J.B. 71 measuring 6 Bighas 19 Kathas 16 Dhurs rightfully belongs to the appellants, whose predecessors got these lands by valid settlement and were according to the S.D.O. the most deserving raiyats of the mouja. Under the circumstances, I find that the learned A.S.O. has erred in his judgement dated 12.12.84 in which has completely 2026:JHHC:19145 14 ever looked the said Eviction (Alienation) Case No. 681 of 1938-39. This appeal is therefore allowed and the order dated 12.12.84 passed by the A.S.O. in the R.E. Case No. 59 of 1984 of mouza Petsar is set aside. The respondents first and second party, who are occupying parts of old plot 1861 are evicted and the same is restored to the appellants. It is further ordered that the appellants name entered in respect to the whole area of old plot 1861 and the Khana eleven entries relating to “Dakhal” are to be struck off.” 27. It has been held by the Settlement Officer that what the present petitioners could not achieve in the S.D.O’s court, they tried to achieve in the Title Suit. It was clear that the poor settlees Mangru and Dhuna Manjhi were found to make a compromise as they did not have money to fight the case and somehow, they were frauded into making the compromise. It has been held that alienation of land through compromise which was validly settled with Mangru and Dhuna Manjhi was invalid and the Manjhis under law could not alienate these lands and thus this compromise decree is bad in law. It has also been held that the present petitioners cannot claim adverse possession as possession in the title Execution Case No. 02 of 1941 was delivered to them on 30.07.41 and hence these persons and their successor had not perfected their title by 01.11.49 when the act of 1949 came into force. 28. The aforesaid findings of the Settlement Officer approved by the learned Commissioner in the impugned order is to be examined in the light of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties. 29. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court reported in 1972 SCC OnLine Pat 116 (Bhauri Lal Jain and another vs. Sub- Divisional Officer of Jamtara and others,) the validity of Sections 20 (1) and 42 of the Santal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 were raised and further the validity of sub-section 5 of Section 20 of the aforesaid Act of 1949 as amended by Bihar Scheduled Areas 2026:JHHC:19145 15 Regulation, 1969 was also raised. The validity of said provisions were upheld and conclusions arrived has been summarized in paragraph 56 of the judgment, which is quoted as under: - “56. From the aforesaid discussions, I have arrived at the following conclusions:— (i) That there is no incidence of transferability of Raiyati holdings in Santal Parganas. (ii) That Section 20 of the Act is not ultra vires on the ground of its being violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. (iii) That Section 42 of the Act is a legislation in respect of Entry No. 21 of List II — State List, of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and is not violative of being repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act, Central Legislation, dealing with acquisition of right by adverse possession. (iv) That the Limitation Act was applied to the District of Santal Parganas under Regulation III of 1872, and adverse possession could be acquired under an in valid transfer, in contravention of Section 27(1) of the Regulation. Those, who did not acquire title by adverse possession under Regulation III of 1872, could be evicted under the old Section 20(5) or Section 42 of the Act, even after the repeal of Section 27(3) of the Regulation, as the Act was supplemental to the Regulation. (v) That Section 20 of the Act was prospective and that there could not be acquisition of title by adverse possession in case of transfer or settlement etc., in contravention of Section 20(1) and (2) of the Act. (vi) That Section 42 of the Act is a valid piece of legislation. (vii) That Section 20(5) of the Act, as amended, is a valid piece of legislation and is not ultra vires the Constitution on the grounds urged by Mr. Sinha.” 30. Further, in the aforesaid judgment at paragraph 64 dealing with the writ petition C.W.J.C. No. 56/1971, the petitioners of the said case claimed to have settlement in 1937 through Kurfa and Title Suit No. 61 of 1963 was filed by the recorded tenant with respect to the said property which ended in a compromise decree passed on 9th November 1963, in 2026:JHHC:19145 16 which the petitioner’s right, title and interest was recognized. The Sub- Divisional Officer held that the land was illegally alienated and in order to give it a legal shape, the parties entered into collusive title suit which was ultimately compromised and it was a clear case where the provisions of Section 20(1) of the aforesaid Act of 1949 has been contravened and therefore eviction was directed under the amended Section 20(5) of SPT Act, 1969 read with Section 6 of the Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969. In the aforesaid background, the Hon’ble Full Bench observed in paragraph 65 that the authority had not investigated the necessary facts and there was no clear finding as to whether the petitioners of the said case really came in possession as alleged by them by virtue of Kurfa settlement in the year 1937 during the period when Section 27 of Regulation III of 1872 was in force, or came in possession when the Act was in force. It was further observed that if the petitioner came in possession of the plot in question in 1937 under an invalid transfer and remained in possession for twelve years, he could acquire title by adverse possession, otherwise not, as no title by adverse possession could be acquired, if the petitioner came in possession after 1949, when the Act was in force. 31. Paragraph 64 and 65 of the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain (supra) are quoted as under: - “64. In this case, the petitioner claimed to have taken Kurfa settlement in 1937 of Plot No. 12 of AKJ No. 35 of village Deolbari from the recorded tenant, whose son is Respondent No. 2, in this application, and, claims to have come in possession. The petitioner's case further is that Title Suit No. 61 of 1963 was filed by the recorded tenant in respect of the aforesaid Plot No. 12, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Jamtara, and a compromise decree was passed on the 9th November, 1963, in which the petitioner's right, title and interest in respect of Plot No. 12, having an area of 1 Bigha 15 Kathas, were recognised. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that he acquired adverse title on this plot. It appears that Respondent No. 2, on the 8th February, 1967, filed an application under the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, that Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 20 of the 2026:JHHC:19145 17 above Jamabandi No. AKJ 35, having an area of 12.39 acres had been forcibly and illegally occupied by the petitioner about 3 or 4 years ago. A copy of the said application has been filed as Annexure ‘1’ to the writ application. The learned Sub-divisional Officer, without deciding the question, since when the petitioner came in possession of the suit land, passed the following orders:— “From the facts placed before me, I am satisfied that this is a clear case where the lands of Dasrath Murmu has been illegally alienated and in order to give it a legal shape the parties entered into collusive title suit which was ultimately compromised and the O.P. got the land which they wanted to keep in their possession. This is a clear case where the provisions of Section 20(1) of the S.P.T. Act have been contravened 1, therefore, evict the O.P.S. from the lands …… under the amended Section 20(5) of the S.P.T. Act, 1969, read with Section 6 of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation Act, 1969.” 65. It is thus apparent that necessary facts have not been investigated and there is no clean finding as to whether the petitioner really came in possession, as alleged by them, by virtue of the Kurfa settlement in the year 1937, during the period when Section 27 of Regulation III of 1872 was in force, or came in possession when the Act was in force, as alleged by Respondent No. 2. If the petitioner came in possession of the Plot in question in 1937 under an invalid transfer and remained in possession for twelve years, he could acquire title by adverse possession, otherwise not, as no title by adverse possession could be acquired, if the petitioner came in possession after 1949, when the Act was in force. It should be made clear that if the case of the petitioner that he came in possession of the plots in question in 1937 and continued to be in possession throughout is correct, then restoration could only be ordered under the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 20 of the Act on deposit of money as envisaged under the third proviso to that sub- section. The order of the learned Sub-divisional Officer, in so far as Plot No. 12 is concerned, therefore, has got to be quashed, as that is the only plot claimed by the petitioner, and the case remanded to the learned Sub-divisional officer for decision in accordance with law. The order of the learned Sub-divisional Officer, in respect of other plots, which are not claimed by the petitioner is not disturbed. This application is, therefore, 2026:JHHC:19145 18 allowed, the impugned order dated the 9th December, 1970, of the learned Sub-divisional Officer, Jamtara, contained in Annexure ‘3’ is quashed to the extent, as indicated above, and the case is remanded to him for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. In the result, all the three applications are allowed and the orders impugned therein are quashed to the extent as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in any of these cases.” 32. Thus, it has been held that there is no incidence of transferability of Raiyati holdings in Santal Parganas and also that with respect to a particular writ petition as mentioned above it was held that the compromise was of no consequences but it was still to be examined as to whether the petitioner of the said case had perfected his title by adverse possession. It was observed that if the petitioner came in possession of the plot in question in 1937 under an invalid transfer and remained in possession for twelve years, he could acquire title by adverse possession, otherwise not, as no title by adverse possession could be acquired, if the petitioner came in possession after 1949, when the Act was in force. 33. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court reported in 1975 SCC OnLine Pat 14 (Ram Narain Sah Versus The State of Bihar & Others), the Hon’ble Court considered the amendment made by Bihar Regulation I of 1972 in paragraph 6 and 7, which are quoted as under: - “6. After the expression “fraudulent method” in the aforesaid clause, the following has been added by amendment by Bihar Regulation I of 1972: “Including decree obtained in suits by fraud or collusion” 7. This amendment has been made for the peace and good government in the area, as the preamble of Regulation I of 1972 will show. This Regulation was published in the Bihar Gazette on the 13th January, 1972.” 34. While interpreting the said provision introduced through amendment in the year 1972, the Hon’ble Court held in paragraph 8 that the expression “any fraudulent method” under sub-section 5 of Section 20 2026:JHHC:19145 19 as substituted by Bihar Regulation I of 1969 was wide enough to include a collusive compromise decree and observed that a compromise decree is after all an agreement between the parties with the seal of the Court super added thereto. It has been observed that it is well settled that a party cannot be permitted to do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly. The Hon’ble Court further held that a transfer in contravention of the provisions of the Act will not cease to be so only because the parties have agreed in a compromise before a Court to effect transfer in contravention of the Act. It will be nothing but a fraud on the Court as well as a fraud against the statute, apart from being a case of transfer in contravention of the Act, it will also be a case of transfer by fraudulent method and clearly within the ambit of Sub-section (5) of Section 20 of the Act, even without the amendment by Regulation I of 1972. 35. Paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of Ram Narain Sah (supra) is quoted as under: - “8. Sub-section (5) of Section 20 of the Act, as substituted by Bihar Regulation I of 1969, gave wide powers to the revenue authorities to annul any transfer of land belonging to a Raiyat, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribe, as mentioned above, in contravention of Subsections (1) and (2) or by any fraudulent method. The expression “any fraudulent method” is wide enough to include a collusive compromise decree. The amendment brought in by Bihar Regulation I of 1972, by adding after “any fraudulent method” the expression, “including decrees obtained in suits by fraud or collusion”, only elucidates and clarifies the position in this regard. The view I have taken, gains some support from a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of (1) Bhauri Lal Jain v. The Sub-divisional Officer, Jamtara (1972 P.L.J.R. 415), in which case, in relation to case filed even before the amendment brought by Regulation 1 of 1972, this Court did not consider a compromise decree as ousting the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities from going into the question of a compromise decree being fraudulent or otherwise. A compromise decree is after all an agreement between the parties with the seal of the Court super added thereto. It is well settled that a party cannot be permitted to do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly. A transfer in contravention of the provisions of 2026:JHHC:19145 20 the Act will not cease to be so only because the parties have agreed in a compromise before a Court to effect transfer in contravention of the Act. It will be nothing but a fraud on the Court as well as a fraud against the statute, apart from being a case of transfer in contravention of the Act, it will also be a case of transfer by fraudulent method and clearly within the ambit of Sub-section (5) of Section 20 of the Act, even without the amendment by Regulation I of 1972.” 36. Thus, it has been held that a transfer in contravention of the provisions of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act will not cease to be so only because the parties have agreed in a compromise before a Court to effect transfer in contravention of the Act. It has been held with respect to a compromise in title suit that such a compromise will be nothing but a fraud on the Court as well as a fraud against the statute, apart from being a case of transfer in contravention of the Act, it will also be a case of transfer by fraudulent method and clearly within the ambit of Sub-section (5) of Section 20 of the Act, even without the amendment by Regulation I of 1972. 37. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court reported in 1986 SCC OnLine Pat 125 (Raja Mian and others vs. Puran Mian & Others), the question for consideration was whether Section 20 of the Bihar Act 14 of 1949 authorized the Revenue Court to evict a person who had come on the land on the basis of a compromise decree of a competent civil court, if that compromise was collusive. Paragraph 28 and 29 of the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of Raja Mian & Others (supra) are quoted as under: - “28. I have already stated above that the court of appeal bellow, on a proper appraisal of the evidences on the record, has held that the original transfer (Exchange) was against the provisions of section 27 of Santhal Praganas Regulation, 1972. The jurisdiction of the Revenue Court to evict a person under Santhal Praganas Regulation. 1872 (read with Bihar Act, 1949) is dependent upon whether the transfer of holding was in contravention of the provisions of section 27 of the Santhal Praganas Regulation, 1872. It has already been held above that 2026:JHHC:19145 21 in the present case the original transfer (Exchange) was in contravention of the provisions of Santhal Praganas Regulation, 1872. It has also been held above that T.S. No. 4/64 and the compromise decree arrived at therein were collusive. In such a situation I hold that section 20 of Bihar Act 14 of 1949 authorised the Revenue Court to evict a person who had come on the land on the basis of an illegal transfer. In the present case, it has been held that the plaintiffs did not come in possession over the suit lands in 1353 Fs., as alleged by them but they had come in possession only sometime before filing of the suit (the suit having been filed in 1966) which necessarily means that the plaintiffs had come in possession only after coming into force of Santhal Pragana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act 14 of 1949). In such a situation the plaintiffs could not have acquired title as the transaction was against the provisions of the Act. In such a view, I hold that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar (Revenue Court), was duly authorised, in law, to disregard the compromise decree in the aforesaid T.S. No. 4/64. 29. Thus, I hold that the plaintiffs had failed to prove title. I further hold that the court of appeal below has correctly held that the transfer (Exchange) was in contravention of the Santhal Praganas Regulation, 1972. I further hold that the plaintiffs never came in possession in 1353 Fs. on the basis of a transfer (Exchange), as alleged by them. They came in possession only after coming into force of the Bihar Act 14 of 1949 and only sometime before the filing of the suit. And thus they could not acquire title by adverse possession also (though I have already held above that the plaintiffs never pleaded title by adverse possession). I further hold that, in the facts of the present case, i.e., the original transfer being against the provisions of Santhal Praganas Regulation, 1872 and the plaintiffs having not perfected their title by adverse possession before coming into force of the Santhal Praganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act 14 of 1949); the Revenue Court was Well within its jurisdiction to pass order of eviction against the plaintiffs under section 20 of the Bihar Act 14 of 1949 and thus, in the facts of the present case, the Revenue Court committed no illegality in disregarding the collusive compromise decree passed in T.S. No. 4/64, in which the present contesting inter-Tenor-defendants were not parties.” 2026:JHHC:19145 22 38. Thus, it has been held that the original transfer being against the provisions of Santhal Praganas Regulation, 1872 and the plaintiffs of the said case having not perfected their title by adverse possession before coming into force of the Santhal Praganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act 14 of 1949), the Revenue Court was well within its jurisdiction to pass order of eviction against the plaintiffs under section 20 of the Bihar Act 14 of 1949 and thus the Revenue Court committed no illegality in disregarding the collusive compromise decree passed in T.S. No. 4/64, in which the contesting defendants were not even parties. 39. 39. So far as the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2014) 15 SCC 471 (R. Rajanna vs. S.R. Venkataswamy & Others) is concerned, it has been observed in paragraph 9 that the precise question that fell for determination in the case was whether the High Court was right in directing the appellant to seek redress in the suit having regard to the provision of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A CPC. The said provisions have been quoted in paragraph 10 of the aforesaid judgment. 40. Paragraph 9 and 10 of the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of R. Rajanna (supra) are quoted as under: - “9. The precise question that falls for determination in the above backdrop is whether the High Court was right in directing the appellant to seek redress in the suit having regard to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A CPC. 10. Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A CPC may at this stage be extracted for ready reference: “3.Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter 2026:JHHC:19145 23 of the agreement, compromise, or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule.” 41. The findings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 11 and 12 of the judgment are also quoted as under: - “11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity of the compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came 2026:JHHC:19145 24 up rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the application made by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (respondents herein) could hardly be heard to argue that the plaintiff (appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher court. 12. The upshot of the above discussion is that the High Court fell in a palpable error in directing the plaintiff to take recourse to the remedy by way of a separate suit. The High Court in the process remained oblivious of the provisions of Order 23 Rules 3 and 3-A CPC as also orders passed by the City Civil Court rejecting the plaint in which the trial court had not only placed reliance upon Order 23 Rule 3-A but also the decision of the Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 holding that a separate suit was not maintainable and that the only remedy available to the aggrieved party was to approach the Court which had passed the compromise decree. The following passage from the decision of Pushpa Devi case is, in this regard, apposite: “17. … Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal 2026:JHHC:19145 25 by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.” We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi (1993) 1 SCC 581 where also this Court had observed: “13. … As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Order 23 Rule 3, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Order 43 Rule 1-A of the Code.” 42. Thus, it has been held in the aforesaid judgment that in terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It has been further held that Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that this implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC which was precisely what had happened in the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, it has been held that if a compromise is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872, a separate suit is not maintainable to set aside the compromise decree but a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is to be raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise and it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. 43. The said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not apply to the present case where the compromise in the title suit is against the statute and it is not a case of a compromise being void or voidable under 2026:JHHC:19145 26 the Contract Act, 1872. The compromise against the statute stands on different footing from the compromise being void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. Compromise in title suit against the statute governing the parties in the present case, that is, Santhal Pargana Regulations and Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act, as fully discussed above by referring to the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court, is void and is a fraud on statute and it has also been held that such a compromise can be avoided or even set-aside by revenue court while passing an order of eviction under section 42 of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of R. Rajanna (supra) does not help the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. 44. It has been held that alienation of land through compromise which was validly settled with Mangru and Dhuna Manjhi was invalid and the Manjhis (respondent 1st party) under law could not alienate these lands and thus this compromise decree is bad in law. It has also been held that the present petitioners cannot claim adverse possession as possession in the title Execution Casa No. 02 of 1941 was delivered to them on 30.07.41 and hence these persons and their successor had not perfected their title by 01.11.49 when the act of 1949 came into force. 45. This Court has gone through the judgment passed by the Settlement Officer passed in appeal which has been affirmed by the learned Commissioner by the impugned order and is of the considered view that the authority has rightly held that the compromise in Title suit no. 8 of 1940 was fraudulent; what the present petitioners could not achieve before the Sub-Divisional Officer, they tried to achieve in the Title Suit and the compromise itself was against the provision of law. 46. The aforesaid findings are in consonance with the aforesaid judgments passed by Hon’ble Patna High Court. Further, the authority has also considered the plea of adverse possession and has rejected the same by citing cogent reasons. The law is well-settled that with respect to the 2026:JHHC:19145 27 parties and land governed by Santhal Pargana Tenancy that there is no incidence of transferability of Raiyati holdings in Santal Parganas and no title by adverse possession could be acquired, if the petitioners came in possession after 1949 when the Act was in force and in order to claim adverse possession the party has to be in at least 12 years prior to coming into force of the aforesaid Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions Act),1949. 47. This Court finds no illegality or perversity in the impugned order calling for any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 48. Accordingly, this writ petition is hereby dismissed. 49. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Dated: 30.06.2026 Uploaded On: 01.07.2026 Mukul/-AFR