2026:HHC:34125 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 163 of 2014 Reserved on: 05.08.2026 Date of Decision: 13.08.2026. Roop Lal ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate with Ms Swati Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 10.04.2014 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.04.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34125 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Asha Devi (PW1), her husband Brij Lal (PW2) and her children were going to Shimla on 13.07.2009 at about 07.30 a.m. A bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 came to the bus stand. The informant and her daughters boarded the bus. Brij Lal (PW2) climbed onto the bus roof to place the luggage. The conductor whistled the driver to start the bus. The driver started the bus, and Brij Lal (PW2) fell. The passengers asked the driver and conductor to carry Brij Lal (PW2) to the hospital, but they refused and took the bus to Shimla. The injured was carried to the hospital, and intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ext.PW9/A) was recorded in the daily diary. ASI Biri Singh (PW8) and Constable Raj Kumar were sent to the hospital for verification. ASI Biri Singh (PW8) recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/A) as per his version and sent it to the police 3 2026:HHC:34125 station where FIR (Ext.PW8/A) was registered. Dr Poonam (PW7) examined Brij Lal (PW2) and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. She advised an X-ray. Dr D. Bhangal (PW6) went through the X-ray and found a fracture of the fifth and sixth rib. A final opinion (Ext.PW7/A) was issued stating that the injuries were grievous and could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. ASI Biri Singh (PW8) went to the spot where he prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/C) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 along with documents vide memo (Ext.PW5/A). Kashmir Singh (PW3) mechanically examined the bus and did not find any defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW3/A). Rahul Chauhan (PW5), the owner of the bus, issued a certificate (Ext.PW5/D) stating that accused Joginder Singh was driving the bus and Roop Lal was a conductor of the bus. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of investigation. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, accused Joginder Singh was charged with a commission of offences 4 2026:HHC:34125 punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and accused Roop Lal was charged with a commission of offences punishable under Sections 336, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. Asha Devi (PW1) is the informant. Brij Lal (PW2) is the victim. Kashmir Singh (PW3) mechanically examined the vehicle. Rikhi Ram (PW4) took the X-rays. Rahul Chauhan (PW5) is the owner of the bus, who issued a certificate stating that the accused were employed as driver and conductor of the bus. Dr D. Bhangal (PW6), radiologist, went through the X-rays and issued his report. Dr Poonam (PW7) medically examined the injured Brij Lal. ASI Biri Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. Roshan Lal (PW9) signed the FIR and prepared the challan. 5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) admitted that Rahul (PW5) had issued a certificate stating that accused Joginder Singh was employed as a driver and Roop Lal was employed as a conductor. They denied the rest of the prosecution 5 2026:HHC:34125 case. They claimed that they were innocent. They examined Rakesh Kumar (DW1) and Dev Raj (DW2) in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that accused Joginder Singh was driving the bus and Roop Lal was the conductor in the bus. Brij Lal was keeping the luggage on the roof of the bus when the conductor blew a whistle, and the driver started the bus. Brij Lal (PW2) fell. The accused Roop Lal was negligent in signalling the driver to start the bus when a person was on the roof. The accused, Joginder Singh, also failed to take care before driving the bus. Their negligence caused injuries to Brij Lal (PW2). Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused Joginder Singh of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC and Roop Lal of commission of offences punishable under Sections 336, 337 and 338 of IPC and sentenced them as under: Accused Joginder Singh: Sections Sentences 279 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 6 2026:HHC:34125 days. 337 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹100/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days. 338 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. Accused Roop Lal: Sections Sentences 336 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹200/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days. 337 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹100/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days. 7 2026:HHC:34125 338 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that Brij Lal (PW2) was on the roof of the bus when the accused Roop Lal signalled the driver to start the bus. He was negligent because he should have taken care to see that no person was on the roof of the bus before signalling the driver to start the bus. However, accused Joginder Singh had merely acted on the signal of Roop Lal and he could not be held to be negligent. Hence, the learned Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused Joginder Singh of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 8 2026:HHC:34125 338 of IPC but maintained the conviction and sentence of Roop Lal. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court, the accused Roop Lal has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The informant Asha Devi and her husband Brij Lal (PW2) had a vested interest to see that the petitioner is convicted and sentenced to get the compensation for the injuries sustained by Brij Lal (PW2). The statements of witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. The identity of the bus was seriously disputed. No independent witness was examined. The statement of defence witnesses proved that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69- 0752 had left the bus stand Ghumarwin at 07.05 a.m. and could not have been involved in an accident at 07.30 a.m. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms Swati Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr 9 2026:HHC:34125 Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the petitioner/accused is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The prosecution witnesses had failed to establish that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 was involved in the accident. The statements of the witnesses regarding the identity of the bus were conflicting, and the learned Courts below erred in relying upon the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The defence witnesses proved that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 had left the bus stand at 07.05 a.m. and could not have been involved in an accident at 07.30 a.m. Learned Courts below failed to consider the question of the identification of the bus, which vitiated their judgment. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the bus bearing registration No. HP- 10 2026:HHC:34125 69-0752 was involved in the accident, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts while deciding the revision petition. The informant and her husband have consistently stated that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69- 0752 was involved in the accident, and there is no reason to disbelieve their testimonies. There is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate upon the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sannhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Session Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: 11 2026:HHC:34125 “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, 12 2026:HHC:34125 sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003 observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. 13 2026:HHC:34125 In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: 14 2026:HHC:34125 “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant Asha Devi (PW1) stated that she, Brij Lal, her husband, and her daughters were present at Ghumarwin 15 2026:HHC:34125 bus stand on 13.07.2009 at about 07.30 a.m. A Sunaina bus came from Sarkaghat towards Shimla. She and her daughters boarded the bus. Her husband was keeping the luggage on the roof when the conductor signalled the driver to start the bus. The driver started the bus, and Brij Lal fell. He sustained injuries. He was left at the spot, and the bus left for Shimla. She was not aware of the names of the driver and conductor. She was permitted to be cross-examined and stated that she was not aware that Joginder Singh was driving the bus and Roop Lal was the conductor of the bus. She denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 16. Her husband, Brij Lal (PW2) stated that a Sunaina bus came to the bus stand which was going from Sarkaghat to Shimla. He did not remember the registration number of the bus. The conductor asked the informant and her children to board the bus and asked him to keep the luggage on the roof. When he was keeping the luggage on the roof, the bus started, and he fell. The accident occurred because the conductor had signalled the driver to start the bus. The conductor was present in the Court, but he was not aware of the name of the driver. 16 2026:HHC:34125 17. The informant Asha Devi and victim Brij Lal have specifically mentioned that the Sunaina bus was involved in the accident. The victim has not mentioned the registration number of the bus, and the informant stated that she was not aware of the registration number of the bus. Thereafter, she stated that the registration number of the Sunaina bus was HP-69-0752. 18. The registration certificate and the route permit of the bus mention the name of the registered owner and holder of the permit as Himgiri Transport Co-operative Society. Therefore, the documents on record show that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 was Himgiri and not Sunaina as claimed by the informant and the victim. 19. The police had not taken photographs of the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 to show that Sunaina was written over it. This was important because of the statement of the informant and her husband that the Sunaina bus was involved in the accident and the record showing that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 is allotted to Himgiri bus. 17 2026:HHC:34125 20. Rakesh Kumar (DW1) stated that he used to issue the receipts of entry tax to the buses entering and leaving the bus stand. Himgiri bus bearing registration number HP-69-0752 arrived at the bus stand at about 07:00 a.m. on 13.07.2009 and left the bus stand at 07:05 a.m. Dev Raj (PW2), Adda in charge of HRTC, stated that as per the timetable brought by him, Himgiri bus arrives at Ghumarwin bus stand at 07.00 a.m. and leaves the bus stand at 07:05 a.m. He is an independent person and has deposed on the basis of the record. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of these two witnesses. The testimonies of these witnesses falsify the prosecution’s version that the Himgiri bus had caused the accident at about 7:30 am. 21. There is a force in the submission of Mr Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner/accused, that the people would not have allowed the bus to leave the spot after the accident. The fact that the bus was not stopped and was allowed to leave makes it doubtful that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 was involved in the accident. 22. Victim Brij Lal (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that 3-4 buses leave for Shimla from Ghumarwin between 07:15 18 2026:HHC:34125 and 08:00 a.m. Therefore, the prosecution was required to establish by satisfactory evidence that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 was involved in the accident. 23. The informant Asha Devi (PW1) stated in her cross- examination that she came to know about the bus, driver and conductor of the bus after 2 days of the accident. Brij Lal (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that the names of the driver and conductor were mentioned after the second day and these were traced by his relatives. He did not remember the details of the bus number and the names of the driver and conductor mentioned by him. Thus, the informant and her husband were not aware of the names of the driver and conductor and the registration number and their testimonies regarding the identity of the bus involved in the accident are not acceptable. 24. Therefore, there was a reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the bus which had caused the accident. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate this aspect and proceeded on the basis that the bus bearing registration No. HP-69-0752 was involved in the accident without noticing the discrepancy in the name of 19 2026:HHC:34125 the bus. Therefore, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below cannot be sustained. 25. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are set aside, and the accused Roop Lal is acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336, 337 and 338 of IPC. The fine amount, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner/accused after the expiry of the period of limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused, on 20 2026:HHC:34125 receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 13th August, 2026 (Nikita)