Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 386 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand through its Secretary, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O.-Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi-834004 2. Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Government Construction of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O.-Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi-834004 3. Chief Engineer (Communication), Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O.-Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi-834004 4. Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division, P.O.-Chaibasa-P.S.-Sadar, District-West Singhbhum ... Appellants/Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 Versus Mandeepa Enterprises (a proprietorship firm) having its office at Unit G- 1, Tulip Garder Dashodron, Rajarhat, Main Road, Opposite State Bank of India, Kolkata-7000136 through its proprietor namely, Madan Satya Das, aged about 38 years, son of Late Satya Girish Das, resident of Tulip Garden, Dashodron, Rajarhat, Main Road, Opposite State Bank of India, P.O. & P.S.-Rajarhat, District-Kolkata-700136 (West Bengal) ... Writ Petitioner/Respondent L.P.A. No. 560 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand through its Secretary, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O.-Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi-834004 2. Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O.-Dhurwa, P.S.-Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi-834004 3. Chief Engineer (Communication), Road Construction Department, Government Of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O.-Dhurwa P.S.- Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi-834004 4. Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division, Seraikella- Kharswan, P.O. and P.S.- Saraikela, District – Kharsawan. ... Appellants/Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 Versus Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB Mandeepa Enterprises (a proprietorship firm having its office at Unit G- 1, Tulip Garden, Dashodron, Rajarhat, Main Road, Opposite State Bank of India, Kolkata-700136 through its proprietor namely, Madan Satya Das, aged about 38 years, son of Late Satya Girish Das, resident of Tulip Garden, Dashodron, Rajarhat, Main Road, Opposite State Bank of India, P.O. & P.S.-Rajarhat District-Kolkata-700136 (West Bengal) ... Writ Petitioner/Respondent --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I Mr Aditya Kumar, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-I For the Respondents: Mr Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate Mr Ritesh Kumar Gupta, Advocate Ms Shruti Shekhar, Advocate --------- 08/Dated: 29.06.2026 I.A. No. 9477 of 2025 (in L.P.A. No. 386 of 2025) with I.A. No. 9486 of 2025 (in L.P.A. No. 560 of 2025) 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Both the Interlocutory Applications seek condonation of delays of 275 days in instituting the accompanying appeals. 3. Both the accompanying appeals challenge the judgment and order dated 08.05.2024 in W.P. (C) No. 5604 of 2023 and judgment and order dated 08.05.2024 in W.P. (C) No. 5605 of 2023. 4. The State was represented by its Advocates when the impugned judgments and orders were pronounced. Therefore, rightly, there is no defence about the State not being aware of the passing of the impugned judgments and orders. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB 5. The limitation period for filing the appeals would have expired by 8th of June 2024. Even if the period for obtaining the certified copies is excluded, the limitation period would expire some time in mid-June 2024. 6. The two IAs, which give almost identical reasons, only list out the movement of files from one table to the other and from one officer to the other. The State is convinced that by merely citing such movement of files, a sufficient cause can be said to have been made out. 7. Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav proceeded to make a bold submission that the moment the State demonstrates that it has taken some steps within the prescribed period of limitation, the cause shown in respect of the delay after the expiry of the limitation period must be liberally construed. He submitted that there are decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to this effect, but did not choose to cite any such decision before us. 8. We have perused the reasons set out in the original IAs and the supplementary affidavits filed in support thereof. As noted earlier, all that is stated in the IAs and the supplementary affidavits is that the files moved from one officer to another between 14.06.2024 and 19.07.2024. On 26.07.2024, a meeting was convened under the Chairpersonship of the Additional Secretary, and it was decided Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB that an opinion should be sought from the Legal Department on the issue of filing of LPAs. 9. Although no precise date or details of the Legal Department's opinion have been provided, it is stated that on 12th of December 2024, the Additional Secretary directed the Chief Engineer to submit grounds for filing the appeals. The Chief Engineer then directed the Executive Engineer to prepare the grounds for filing the appeals. The Executive Engineer prepared the grounds and submitted them to the Chief Engineer. All this was completed by 23.12.2024. 10. There is nothing stated about what happened between 23.12.2024 and 13.02.2025 when, surprisingly, the Engineer-in-Chief directed the Executive Engineer to file the LPAs through Senior S.C.-I. All relevant documents were handed over to Senior S.C.-I on 17.02.2025. But the LPAs were filed only on 11.03.2025. The records also show that the certified copies of the impugned judgments were applied for only on 04.04.2025, i.e. after the filing of the appeals and a delay of almost 330 days from the date of the impugned judgments and orders. 11. The above explanation, which is nothing but indicating the movement of files and citing of usual bureaucratic procedures, cannot constitute any sufficient cause as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB 12. The State seems to be firmly convinced that some different period of limitation applies to it or that notwithstanding the period of limitation prescribed by the Legislature, the State, as a matter of right, is entitled to continue with its archaic bureaucratic procedures involving movement of files from table to table and from officer to officer before an appeal is actually filed in the court. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered and rejected similar reasons after pointing out that the law of limitation binds the State equally and such excuses cannot constitute any explanation of sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 14. In state of State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that lethargy, tardiness and indolence cannot be equated to sufficient cause. Beyond a point, the courts cannot help a litigant, even if the litigant is the Government, which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular point no indulgence can be shown even to the Government, merely because it functions through an impersonal machinery. 15. In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB Government Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and an inherited bureaucratic methodology for making several notes cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies that are available and in use. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 17. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have the matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause is assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB 20. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at the later stages. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18799-DB attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never- exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 23. Applying the above principles to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no case has been made out for condonation of delays. Accordingly, both these IAs are dismissed. 24. Consequently, accompanying appeals and the interim applications, if any therein, will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 29, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 01.7.2026