2026:HHC:34712 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 701 of 2026 Reserved on: 11.8.2026 Date of Decision: 18.8.2026. Bhuvan Kumar @ Bhuwan Kumar Singh …. Petitioner Versus State of HP & anr. …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Abhinav Mohan Goel, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Mr Gunjan Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 35 of 2022 dated 25.02.2022, registered at Police Station Manpura, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34712 consequential proceedings arising out of it based on a compromise between the parties. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a consultant and he had introduced Akash Kumar to the complainant to enable him to get a No Objection Certificate from the Fire Department and Pollution Control Board for availing subsidy. Akash Kumar had charged ₹2,00,000/-, which was paid to the petitioner’s account. The parties have amicably settled the matter, and compromise has been effected between them. The informant does not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise. Hence the petition. 3. I have heard Mr Abhinav Mohan Goel, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No. 1-State, and Mr Gunjan Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2-informant. 4. Mr Abhinav Mohan Goel, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that this Court has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR based on a compromise effected between the parties. The parties have settled the dispute amongst themselves and no fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the 3 2026:HHC:34712 proceedings. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission: - (i) Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2017) 9 SCC 641; (ii) Anita Maria Dias and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2018) 3 SCC 290; and (iii) Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another (2022) 19 SCC 451 5. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No.1/State, submitted that the offences involving the forgery of the document are against society. They cannot be quashed based on a compromise between the parties. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. Mr Gunjan Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2-informant/informant has stated that he has no objection to allowing the petition. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully 8. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641 that a 4 2026:HHC:34712 settlement between the offender and the victim in offences against society will not justify the quashing of the FIR. The offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC involve the forgery of the document and such offences cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the Cr PC. It was observed:- “18. The present case, as the allegations in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties. The case involves allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of documents, utilisation of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities and the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are construed as they stand, it is evident that they implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land. Such offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but implicate the societal interest in prosecuting serious crimes. In these circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in declining to quash the FIR, which had been registered under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code.” 9. It was held in CBI v. Hari Singh Ranka (2019) 16 SCC 687: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 413: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1837 that the offences of forgery do not come to an end because of the compromise between the parties. It was observed at page 697: “17. In the Rumi Dhar case [Rumi Dhar v. State of W.B., (2009) 6 SCC 364: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074], this Court has 5 2026:HHC:34712 observed that when a settlement is arrived at between the creditors and the debtor, the offence, if committed, as such does not come to an end. Even a judgment rendered in the civil proceedings, when it is rendered on the basis of a settlement entered into between the parties, would not be of large relevance as per the criminal offence required by Section 43 of the Evidence Act. The judgment of the civil court is admissible only for limited purposes. 18. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563], this Court has considered the decision in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], Dimpey Gujral v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2013) 11 SCC 497 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 35 and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988 and has laid down the principles for interfering in such matters thus : (State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563], SCC pp. 38-39 & 41-42, paras 18, 24 & 26) “18. Recently, in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], a two-Judge Bench placed reliance on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] and Dimpey Gujral v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2013) 11 SCC 497 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 35 and distinguished the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 781, and came to hold that in the facts of the said case the proceedings under Section 307 deserved to be quashed. The two-judge Bench laid down certain guidelines by which the High Courts would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising their power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement. Some of the guidelines which are relevant for the present purpose are reproduced below: 6 2026:HHC:34712 (Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54, SCC p. 483, para 29) ‘29.2. When the parties have reached a settlement and, on that basis, a petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure the following: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power, the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, offences alleged to have been committed under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes, should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak, and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice, and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.’ 7 2026:HHC:34712 *** 24. In the case at hand, as per the charge sheet, the respondents had obtained LCs issued by the bank in favour of fictitious companies propped up by them, and the fictitious beneficiary companies had obtained letters of credit discounted by attaching their bogus bills. The names of 10 fictitious companies have been mentioned in the charge sheet. Thus, the allegation of forgery is very much there. As is manifest from the impugned order [Vikram Anantrai Doshi v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 2242], the learned Single Judge has not adverted to the same. It is not a simple case where an accused has borrowed money from the bank and diverted it somewhere else and, thereafter, paid the amount. It does not create a situation where there is a dealing between a private financial institution and an accused, and after initiation of the criminal proceedings, he pays the sum and gets the controversy settled. The exposé of facts tells a different story. As submitted by the learned counsel for CBI, the manner in which the letters of credit were issued, and the funds were siphoned off, has a foundation in criminal law. The learned counsel would submit that it does not depict a case which has overwhelmingly and predominantly a civil flavour. The intrinsic character is different. The emphasis is laid on the creation of fictitious companies. *** 26. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Be it stated that availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner as alleged by the investigating agency vividly exposes fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi, as narrated in the charge sheet, cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong, and it has an immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived 8 2026:HHC:34712 contrivance to avail of these kinds of benefits, it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard to the financial interests of society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. The cleverness which has been skilfully contrived, if the allegations are true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which travel far ahead of personal or private wrong. It has the potential to usher in an economic crisis. Its implications have its own seriousness, for it creates a concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financial transactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the amount and obtain a “no- dues certificate” and enjoy the benefit of quashing of the criminal proceeding on the hypothesis that nothing more remains to be done. The collective interest of which the Court is the guardian cannot be a silent or a mute spectator to allow the proceedings to be withdrawn, or, for that matter, yield to the ingenuous dexterity of the accused persons to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code and quash the proceedings. It is not legally permissible. The Court is expected to be on guard against these kinds of adroit moves. The High Court, we humbly remind, should have dealt with the matter keeping in mind that in this kind of litigation, the accused, when he perceives a tiny gleam of success, readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for quashing the criminal proceedings. The Court's principal duty, at that juncture, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. It is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid, and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence, as we find in the case at hand, the learned Single Judge has not taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and quashed 9 2026:HHC:34712 the criminal proceedings. The said quashment neither helps to secure the ends of justice nor does it prevent the abuse of the process of the Court, nor can it be said that, as there is a settlement, no evidence will come on record, and there will be a remote chance of conviction. Such a finding, in our view, would be difficult to record. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social interest would be in peril, and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances, cannot be treated as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have no other option but to hold that the order [Vikram Anantrai Doshi v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 2242] of the High Court is wholly indefensible.” 19. It has been observed by this Court that when the charge sheet reflects that the respondent got LCs issued by the Bank in favour of fictitious companies propped up by them, and the fictitious beneficiary companies had got letters of credit discounted by attaching their bogus bills. It is not a simple case where an accused has borrowed money from the bank and diverted it somewhere else and, thereafter, paid the amount. Civil settlement of the controversy would not suffice to wipe off the criminal liability. The case reflects fiscal impropriety and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi, as narrated in the charge sheet, cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong, and it has an immense societal impact. This Court has further observed that the accepted principle of handling of finance is that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of this kind of benefits, it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. The quashing of the case was set aside as social interest would be in peril. The order of the High Court was held to be indefensible. Facts are more or less similar in the instant case, and as such, the impugned orders cannot be 10 2026:HHC:34712 permitted to be sustained on the anvil of the aforesaid principles. 23. In the Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 321: (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 298: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 638, an offence was registered by CBI. The allegation was that they had secured the credit facility by submitting forged documents, as collected and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by obtaining letters of credit in respect of foreign suppliers of goods without actually bringing any goods, but inducing the bank to negotiate letters of credit in favour of the foreign suppliers and also by exercising the cash credit facility. 24. This Court has considered the various decisions in Sushil Suri v. CBI, (2011) 5 SCC 708: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 764 and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988. This Court also considered whether, when the dispute has been settled by the bank, the continuance of criminal proceedings would be a futility. This Court distinguished the decision of Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858, as the case projected a larger conspiracy, and this Court refused to grant the relief in the prayer for quashing of the case. 25. In Sushil Suri v. CBI, (2011) 5 SCC 708: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 764, this Court made the following observations: (SCC pp. 716-17, para 23) “23. It is manifest from a bare reading of the charge sheet, placed on record, that the gravamen of the allegations against the appellant, as also the co- accused, is that the Company, acting through its Directors in concert with the chartered accountants and some other persons: (i) conceived a criminal conspiracy and executed it by forging and fabricating a number of documents, like photographs of old machines, purchase orders and invoices showing the purchase of machinery in 11 2026:HHC:34712 order to support their claim to avail of a hire- purchase loan from PSB; (ii) on the strength of these false documents, PSB parted with the money by issuing pay orders and demand drafts in favour of the Company and (iii) the accused opened six fictitious accounts in the banks (four accounts in Bank of Rajasthan and two in Bank of Madura) to encash the pay orders/bank drafts issued by PSB in favour of the suppliers of machines, thereby directly rotating back the loan amount to the borrower from these fictitious accounts, and in the process committed a systematic fraud on the Bank (PSB) and obtained pecuniary advantage for themselves. Precise details of all the fictitious accounts, as well as the further flow of money realised on encashment of demand drafts/pay orders, have been incorporated in the charge sheet. Additionally, by allegedly claiming depreciation on the new machinery, which was never purchased, on the basis of forged invoices, etc., the accused cheated the public exchequer as well.” This Court considered the modus operandi noted in the afore-extracted para 23. Considering the allegations that the accused had obtained pecuniary benefit by producing forged documents, the case was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to decide the case expeditiously. The facts of the instant case are more or less similar. 12. Recently, in CBI v. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389, the allegation against the accused was that bill of lading presented by the proprietors of the accused firms were found forged and cases were registered under Section 120- B IPC read with Section 420 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and further substantive offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The accused person arrived at a settlement with the Bank and thereafter moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR. The 12 2026:HHC:34712 High Court placed [Maninder Singh v. CBI, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 4246] reliance on the decision in Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and allowed the petition and directed for quashing of the criminal proceedings. This Court placed reliance on Vikram Anantrai Doshi [(2014) 15 SCC 29: (2014) 10 Scale 690] and came to hold as follows: (Maninder Singh case [(2016) 1 SCC 389], SCC p. 394, paras 16-17) “16. The allegation against the respondent is ‘forgery’ for the purpose of cheating and the use of forged documents as genuine in order to embezzle the public money. After facing such serious charges of forgery, the respondent wants the proceedings to be quashed on account of a settlement with the bank. The development in means of communication, science and technology, etc., has led to an enormous increase in economic crimes, viz. phishing, ATM frauds, etc., which are being committed by intelligent but devious individuals involving huge sums of public or government money. These are actually public wrongs or crimes committed against society, and the gravity and magnitude attached to these offences are concentrated on the public at large. 17. The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be sparingly used. Only when the Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is not exercised can the Court quash the proceedings. In economic offences, the Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded, but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or theft of a trivial amount, but the offence with which we are concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal profit, regardless of consequence to society at large. To quash the proceedings merely on the ground that the accused has 13 2026:HHC:34712 settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy.” 10. This position was reiterated in Daxaben v. State of Gujarat (2022) 16 SCC 117: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 936, wherein it was observed at page 134: “44. In State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley, (2016) 1 SCC 376: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 282, this Court held: (SCC p. 387, paras 14- 15) “14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence, and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in CrPC relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein, but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender, as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender-neutral in this case. We say no more on this score. 15. … A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence, or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is a delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled, it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system.” 11. A perusal of the FIR shows that a complaint was made against consultant Akash Kumar for forging a No Objection Certificate stated to have been issued by the Fire Department and 14 2026:HHC:34712 Pollution Control Board. Therefore, the allegations are grave and involve the forgery of the documents issued by the Fire and Pollution Control Department, which are regulatory agencies; if the offences of forging the NOC's issued by regulatory agencies are permitted to be quashed based on a compromise, it would encourage people to forge the certificate and, if caught, get away with the forgery by compromising the matter with the informant. This would compromise the whole regulatory regime, and the FIR cannot be questioned based on a compromise between the parties. 12. In Anita Maria (supra), the High Court had refused to quash the FIR because the money was not deposited and the affidavit was defective. This was rectified before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction to quash the proceedings after noticing the judgment of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra). Parbatbhai Aahir (supra) has specifically laid down that the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, and 471 of IPC cannot be quashed based on a compromise. Therefore, this judgment will not help the petitioner. In Jaswant Singh (supra), the offences involved were 406 and 420 of IPC, which are otherwise compoundable under 15 2026:HHC:34712 Section 320 of the Cr.PC. Therefore, not much advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. 13. The judgments of Bombay High Court and this Court cannot be followed in view of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed above. 14. It was submitted that the petitioner has no role to play in the commission of the offence. This cannot be prima facie accepted. He stated in the petition that the money was deposited in his account and his involvement is made out by this averment. 15. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. 16. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th August, 2026 (Chander)