2026:HHC:31659 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.69 of 2026 Date of Decision: 21.07.2026 _____________________________________________________________________________ Shri Hasmukh K Chudgar ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. ..…....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? ______________________________________________________________________________ For the Petitioner: Mr. Virender Singh Chauhan, Mr. Anshuman Sharma, Senior Advocates with Mr. Arsh Chauhan and Mr. Arthav Gharaik For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar and Additional Advocates General, with Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General ______________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure/528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 , prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner herein for quashing of Criminal Complaint bearing registration no. 841/2018 titled State v. Care Group India, filed on 15.05.2018 under Section 18(a)(i) read with Section 27 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1945 pending before the Court of Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequential orders, including summoning order dated 06.06.2018 passed by Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. 2026:HHC:31659 2 2. Precisely facts of the case are that complainant, Drugs Inspector, upon receiving a telephonic complaint regarding vision loss of few patients, visited DrRPGMC&H, Tanda and its nearby chemist shop and drew a sample on Form-17 and Form 17-A of drug ‘INTAVISC PPF Injection’, Batch No. 16Q26, DoM-03/2016, DoE-08/2018 manufactured by Care Group India, Block No. 310/B, Dabasha, Vill. Pudra, Taluka & Dist. Vadodra, 391440, GJ on 22.12.2016 from the premises of M/s HP State Supply Medicine Shop, DrRPGMC&H, Tanda and sealed the sample in presence of Mr. Sandeep Joshi, registered Pharmacist of M/s HP State Supply Medicine Shop. The drugs inspector also handed one portion of a sealed sample to Mr. Sandeep Joshi. 3. Thereafter, the Drugs Inspector, on 23.12.2016, sent sample of the drug in question alongwith one copy of Form-18 to the Government Analyst, Central Drugs Laboratory, Kolkata, after completing the codal formalities. Complainant received test and analysis report on 17.04.2017 from the Government Analyst on Form-13 whereby the said sample of the drug was declared as “Not of Standard Quality”. After receipt of the said sample analysis report, a letter dated 24.04.2017 was issued to M/s HP State Supply Medicine Shop thereby asking it to disclose the name and address from where said drug was purchased. In addition, it was also asked to produce the purchase invoice and its distribution record as required under Section 22(1)cca of the Act. Pursuant to afore communication, M/s HP State Supply Medicine Shop supplied its purchase and sale/distribution records. 4. After scrutiny of sale and purchase record documents, it was revealed that said drug is consumed by patients, as mentioned in the complaint annexed with the petition, which may have caused eye infection leading to loss of vision. It was further disclosed by M/s HP State Supply Medicine Shop that drug in question was purchased from M/s Ravi Ratna Medicose, Kangra. The Drugs Inspector then served a letter dated 24.04.2017 to M/s Ravi Ratna Medicose inquiring about the sale invoices of the said drug, who in turn vide letter dated 11.05.2017 disclosed that the drug was 2026:HHC:31659 3 purchased from M/s Intas Pharmaceuticals, Industrial Area, Phase-II, Chandigarh 160002. Consequently, a letter dated 13.05.2017 was issued to afore M/s Intas Pharmaceuticals, who informed that the said drug was supplied by M/s Intas Pharmaceuticals, Chinubhai Center, Ashram Road, Ahmadabad. Further scrutiny of documents submitted by afore firm disclosed that Mr. Rajesh Arora is proprietor of the said firm and Mr. Bharat Singh is the competent person. A letter dated 20.08.2017 was issued to both abovementioned persons, however, as per the complaint no reply has been received till date. Thereafter, a letter dated 15.06.2017 was issued to M/s Intas Pharmaceuticals, Ahmadabad and then a subsequent reminder was also sent. Reply dated 06.09.2017 alongwith a brochure, Memorandum and Articles of Association of Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. was received back, perusal of which disclosed that the drug in question was supplied and manufactured by M/s Care Group India, Dabhasa, Vill. Padra, Tal & District Vadodra. Thereafter, both proprietor of M/s Intas Pharmaceutical Ltd.- Mr. Deshmukh K Chudgar and competent person of M/s Intas Pharmaceutical Ltd - Mr. Pravin Naik were asked to explain their position, but no reply was received back. A letter dated 01.05.2017 alongwith one sealed sample and adverse analysis report was sent to M/s Care Group India- accused no. 1. Reply to afore letter was recieved in the office of Drugs Inspector vide letter dated 17.05.2017. 5. The entire case was referred to the State Drugs Controller Office vide letter dated 20.10.2017 for prosecution sanction and the State Drugs Controller accorded sanction to institute prosecution in the Court of Law under Section 18 (a) (i) of The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 punishable under Section 27 (d) of the said act for selling, distributing and manufacturing for sale of the said drug which is ‘not of standard quality’, vide communication dated 14.11.2017. Taking cognizance of averments contained in the complaint and documents annexed therewith learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra vide order dated 06.06.2018 took cognizance of the offence and summoned the petitioner to face trial, however, fact remains that the 2026:HHC:31659 4 complaint is still pending adjudication. The learned Trial Court observed that due to a typographical error, Mr. Deshmukhi K Chudgar had been impleaded as an accused instead of the present petitioner. Consequently, vide aforesaid order, the learned Trial Court directed that the present petitioner be impleaded in place of Mr. Deshmukhi as accused no. 3 in the complaint. 6. Respondent State has filed status report, wherein facts as have been noticed herein above, have not been disputed, rather stand admitted. 7. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the present petitioner had earlier approached this Court by way of Cr.MMO No. 70 of 2025 seeking quashing of the complaint and the consequential proceedings. The said petition came to be dismissed by Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 05.03.2025 on the ground that the petitioner had not yet been summoned as an accused and that only a notice on the application seeking his impleadment had been issued by the learned Trial Court as such the appropriate remedy available to the petitioner was to appear before the learned Trial Court and oppose his impleadment as an accused. 8. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the present petition and further canvassed by Mr. Virender Singh Chauhan, Mr. Anshuman Sharma, learned senior advocates, duly assisted by Mr. Arsh Chauhan and Mr. Arthav Gharaik, advocates appearing for the petitioner, is that court concerned, while issuing process against the petitioner, failed to take note of the fact that the complaint filed by Drugs Inspector concerned under relevant provisions of Act/Rules is not maintainable against petitioner for the reason that petitioner, who is chairman emeritus of marketer and wholesaler firm- M/s Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd., was neither in-charge nor responsible to the manufacturing firm- M/s Care Group India for conduct of the business, rather the manufacturing firm had appointed Mr. Surendra Prasad, Mr. Aliasgar Dholkawala and Mrs. Aayushi Shrivastava, as the in- charge and they were responsible for the manufacturing and testing of the 2026:HHC:31659 5 drugs in question. While making this court peruse the complaint, Mr. Chauhan, learned senior counsel attempted to carve out a case that there is not a single word suggestive of the fact that petitioner, being chairman emeritus of marketer and wholesaler firm-M/s Insta Pharmaceuticals Ltd., was responsible for day-to-day activities of the manufacturing firm. 9. Mr. Chauhan, learned senior counsel further submitted that since firm, which is M/s Intas Pharmaceutical Ltd. being marketer and wholesaler has not been arrayed as accused, complaint having been filed by Drugs Inspector concerned otherwise is bound to fail, in terms of specific provisions contained under Section 34, which mandate for impleadment of company as an accused, if there is violation of any provisions contained under the Act. In support of aforesaid submissions Mr. Chauhan, learned senior counsel invited attention of this court to various judgments which shall be referred to in the latter part of order. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that Trial Court has impleaded petitioner through a purely mechanical order at a belated stage i.e. 7 years after the cognizance order dated 06.06.2018. that Mr. Chauhan further submitted that principles of natural justice were not adhered to by the Court concerned before issuing process because no opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioner, rather simply on the basis of application for impleadment, Court concerned without verifying the correctness of the averments proceeded to issue summons, which being totally contrary to law deserves to be interfered with. 11. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, while supporting the registration of complaint by Drugs Inspector against the petitioner, vehemently argued that petitioner being Chairman of the marketer and wholesaler firm-M/s Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd., is responsible for conduct of business of the firm. He further submitted that plea that Mr. Surendra Prasad, Mr. Aliasgar Dholkawala and Mrs. Aayushi Shrivastava, are 2026:HHC:31659 6 the responsible persons, is not acceptable. He further submitted that petitioner alongwith other accused was involved in manufacture, sale and distribution of the said drug, therefore he was rightly arrayed as one of the accused so having contravened Section 18(a)(i) of the Act. 12. I have heard Mr. Virender Singh Chauhan, Mr. Anshuman Sharma, learned senior advocates duly assisted by Mr. Arsh Chauhan and Mr. Arthav Gharaik, learned counsels for the petitioner and Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General. 13. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. 14. In Amish Devgan vs Union of India and Ors, (2021) 1 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “(vii) Conclusion and relief 116. At this stage and before recording our final conclusion, we would like to refer to decision of this Court in Pirthi Chand [State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 37 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 210] wherein it has been held : (SCC pp. 44- 45, paras 12-13) “12. It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is conducted (sic concluded) and the charge-sheet is laid, the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the 2026:HHC:31659 7 court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance with the provisions which are considered mandatory and effect of its non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statements of witnesses on the record in support thereof whether court could take cognizance of the offence on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out, no further act could be done except to quash the charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases i.e. in rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengeance issue of process under Criminal Procedure Code is availed of. A reading of a [Vide Corrigendum dated 20-3-1996 issued from Residential Office of Hon'ble Mr Justice K. Ramaswamy.] complaint or FIR itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence — the court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power.” 15. In the case of Kaptan Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2021) 9 SCC 35, the Supreme Court held as under : “9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC quashed the criminal proceedings, by the time the investigating officer after recording the statement of the witnesses, statement of the complainant and collecting the evidence from the incident place and after taking statement of the independent witnesses and even statement of the accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court, it does not appear that the High Court took into consideration the material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482 CrPC was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations in the FIR/complaint only are required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be considered. However, thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and the Court is required to consider the material/evidence collected during the investigation. Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this Court 2026:HHC:31659 8 in a catena of decisions, the High Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel [Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] in order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. It is further observed and held that that question is required to be examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further observed it is more so, when the material relied on is disputed. It is further observed that in such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine questions once the charge- sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the merits of the allegations as if the High Court was exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC.” 16. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Abhishek Singh vs Ajay Kumar and Ors., (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1313, reiterated that: “9. The scope of the Court's power to quash and set aside proceedings is well-settled to warrant any restatement. While the arguments advanced have the potential to raise many issues for consideration, we must first satisfy ourselves as to the propriety of the exercise of such power by the High Court. The task of the High Court, when called upon to adjudicate an application seeking to quash the proceedings, is to see whether, prima facie, an offence is made out or not. It is not to examine whether the charges may hold up in the Court. In doing so, the area of action is circumscribed. In Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, it was held: “8. It is no more res integra that exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge-sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It 2026:HHC:31659 9 is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding.” 15. In that view of the matter, we hold that the High Court had improperly quashed the proceedings initiated by the appellant. It stands clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the matter, and the guilt or innocence of the respondents has to be established in the trial, in accordance with the law. The proceedings out of the subject FIR, mentioned in paragraph 2 are revived and restored to the file of the concerned Court.” 17. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. 18. Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Apex Court while elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC laid down certain principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings 2026:HHC:31659 10 ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. 19. Reliance is placed upon judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, relying upon its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330. 20. Reliance in this regard is also placed upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in B.N. John Vs. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, which reads as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not 2026:HHC:31659 11 disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. 2026:HHC:31659 12 As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 21. Reliance is further placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, which reads as under: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 22. It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him/her due to private and personal grudge, 2026:HHC:31659 13 High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC/ Section 528 BNSS can proceed to quash the proceedings, 23. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case. 24. Primarily, question which needs to be decided in the case at hand is that whether petitioner herein, being Chairman of the manufacturing firm, could also be prosecuted under aforesaid provision of law, especially when there is no specific averment with regard to his day-to-day functioning and control in the said firm, especially with regard to manufacturing. 25. It is not in dispute that as per mandate of Section 18 of the Act, requisite information was made available by manufacturing firm, thereby informing Drugs Inspector concerned that the manufacturing firm has appointed Mr. Surendra Prasad, Mr. Aliasgar Dholkawala and Mrs. Aayushi Shrivastava, enabling them to perform the day-to-day business of the firm. 26. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 18(a)(i) of the Act, which reads as under: “18. Prohibition of manufacture and sale of certain drugs and cosmetics.—From such date as may be fixed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf, no person shall himself or by any other person on his behalf— (a) [manufacture for sale or for distribution, or sell, or stock or exhibit or offer for sale,] or distribute— [(i) any drug which is not of a standard quality, or is misbranded, adulterated or spurious; [(ii) any cosmetic which is not of a standard quality or is misbranded, adulterated or spurious;]] [(iii) any patent or proprietary medicine, unless there is displayed in the prescribed manner on the label or container thereof [the 2026:HHC:31659 14 true formula or list of active ingredients contained in it together with the quantities thereof];] (iv) any drug which by means of any statement design or device accompanying it or by any other means, purports or claims [to prevent, cure or mitigate] any such disease or ailment, or to have any such other effect as may be prescribed; [(v) any cosmetic containing any ingredient which may render it unsafe or harmful for use under the directions indicated or recommended; (vi) any drug or cosmetic in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder;] (b) [sell or stock or exhibit or offer for sale,] or distribute any drug 9 [or cosmetic] which has been been imported or manufacutred in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder; (c) [manufacture for sale or for distribution, or sell, or stock or exhibit or offer for sale,] or distribute any drug [or cosmetic], except under, and in accordance with the conditions of, a licence issued for such purpose under this Chapter: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the manufacture, subject to prescribed conditions, of small quantities of any drug for the purpose of examination, test or analysis: Provided further that the [Central Government] may, after consultation with the Board, by notification in the Official Gazette, permit, subject to any conditions specified in the notifica tion, the [manufacture for sale or for distribution, sale, stocking or exhibiting or offering for sale] or distribution of any drug or class of drugs not being of standard quality.” 27. Perusal of afore provision of law makes it clear that no person can manufacture for sale or for distribution, or sell, or stock or exhibit or offer for sale or distribute any drug or cosmetic, which is not of standard quality or is misbranded, adulterous or spurious. Violation, if any, of aforesaid provision of law, would render person concerned, liable for punishment under Section 27 of the Act, which provides for penalty. 2026:HHC:31659 15 28. Admittedly, in the case at hand, drug in question were found to be of sub-standard quality, as per Adverse Analysis Report given by the Drugs Testing Laboratory and as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by Drugs Inspector, while instituting complaint, for commission of offence punishable under Sections 18(a)(i) punishable under Section 27(d) of the Act, against the accused named in the complaint, but the question which needs determination at this stage is, whether case made out against the petitioner herein, being Chairman of marketer and wholesaler firm, is sustainable on account of certain immunities granted under Section 19(3) of the Act or not? Section19(3) reads as under: “Section 19: Pleas.— (1)x x x x (2) x x x x (3) A person, not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall not be liable for a contravention of section 18 if he proves— (a) that he acquired the drug or cosmetic from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer thereof; (b) that he did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained that the drug or cosmetic in any way contravened the provisions of that section; and (c) that the drug or cosmetic, while in his possession, was properly stored and remained in the same state as when he acquired it.” 29. Aforesaid provisions contained under Section 19(3) categorically provide that a person, not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall not be liable for a contravention of Section 18 if he proves (a) that he acquired the drug or cosmetic from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer thereof; (b) that he did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained that the drug or cosmetic in any way contravened the provisions of that section; and (c) that the drug or cosmetic, while in his possession, was properly stored and remained in the 2026:HHC:31659 16 same state as when he acquired it. In the present case, the petitioner was the Chairman of the marketer and wholesaler firm and was neither the manufacturer of the drug nor the agent of the manufacturer for its distribution. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be held vicariously liable for acts of manufacturing firm. Any defect relating to the manufacture of the drug is the responsibility of the manufacturer and as such no criminal liability can be fastened upon the petitioner merely by virtue of his position as the Competent Person of the marketer and wholesaler firm. 30. Apart from above, this court finds that Drugs Inspector concerned, while initiating proceedings against various accused named in the complaint, failed to implead M/s Intas Pharmaceutical Ltd., being marketer and wholesaler as accused. If it is so, prosecution, if any, against petitioner being Chairman of marketer and wholesaler firm is bound to fail. 31. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 34 of the unamended Act, 1940, which reads as under: “34. Offences by companies.— (1)Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.” 32. Aforesaid provision of law deals with offence, if any, committed by company. Aforesaid provision provides that where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be 2026:HHC:31659 17 deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Proviso to the aforesaid section provides that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Since, in the case at hand also Mr. Surendra Prasad, Mr. Aliasgar Dholkawala and Mrs. Aayushi Shrivastava were in-charge of and were responsible to, the manufacturing firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, liability cannot be fixed on petitioner being Chairman of marketer and wholesaler firm. 33. Till the time, company is arrayed as an accused, offence, if any, committed by company, cannot be ascertained. For the offence, if any, committed by a company, person responsible for conduct of business of the company is to be dealt in accordance with law, but admittedly, for doing so, such company is essentially required to be impleaded as accused. However, in the instant case, marketer and wholesaler firm has not been arrayed as party till date. Since aforesaid firm has not been arrayed as accused, it is not understood how prosecution would prove case against its Chairman of the said firm i.e. petitioner herein. 34. Reliance in this regard is placed upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, wherein, a similar provision enacted in the Negotiable Instruments Act was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was held that prosecution of the company is sine qua non for prosecuting the officials of the company. It is not permissible to prosecute the officials without prosecuting the company. It was observed:- “58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that the commission of an offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the section make it 2026:HHC:31659 18 absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted. 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3 SCC 491: 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is a three-judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352: 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1 SCC 1: 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery [(1987) 3 SCC 684: 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.” 35. A similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Dayle De'souza v. Govt. of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1012, wherein it was observed:- “24. There is yet another difficulty for the prosecution in the present case as the Company has not been made an accused or even summoned to be tried for the offence. The position of law as propounded in State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh (1970) 3 SCC 491, reads: “3. Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, sought conviction of the two respondents on the basis of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act under which, if the person contravening an order made under Section 3 (which covers an order under the Iron and Steel Control Order, 1956), is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It was urged that the two respondents were in charge of, and were responsible to, the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company and, consequently, they 2026:HHC:31659 19 must be held responsible for the sale and for thus contravening the provisions of clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order. This argument cannot be accepted, because it ignores the first condition for the applicability of Section 10 to the effect that the person contravening the order must be a company itself. In the present case, there is no finding either by the Magistrate or by the High Court that the sale in contravention of clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order was made by the Company. In fact, the Company was not charged with the offence at all. The liability of the persons in charge of the Company only arises when the contravention is by the Company itself. Since, in this case, there is no evidence and no finding that the Company contravened clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order, the two respondents could not be held responsible. The actual contravention was by Kamdar and Vallabhdas Thacker and any contravention by them would not fasten responsibility on the respondents. The acquittal of the respondents is, therefore, fully justified. The appeal fails and is dismissed.” 25. However, this proposition was later deviated from in Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1984) 4 SCC 352. This case pertained to the pari materia provision under Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The court held that anyone among the company itself; every person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business; or any director, manager, secretary or other officers of the company with whose consent or connivance or because of whose neglect offence had been committed, could be prosecuted alone. However, the person in charge or an officer of the company could be held guilty in that capacity only after it has been established that there has been a contravention by the company as well. However, this will not mean that the person in charge or an officer of the company must be arraigned simultaneously along with the company if he is to be found guilty and punished. 26. Relying upon the reasoning in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) and limiting the interpretation of C.V. Parekh (supra), this Court in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd. (2000) 1 SCC 1 had held that: “13. If the offence was committed by a company it can be punished only if the company is prosecuted. But instead of prosecuting the company if a payee opts to prosecute only the persons falling within the second or third category, the payee can succeed in the case only if he succeeds in showing that the offence was actually committed by the company. In such a prosecution 2026:HHC:31659 20 the accused can show that the company has not committed the offence, though such a company is not made an accused, and hence the prosecuted accused is not liable to be punished. The provisions do not contain a condition that prosecution of the company is sine qua non for prosecution of the other persons who fall within the second and the third categories mentioned above. No doubt a finding that the offence was committed by the company is sine qua non for convicting those other persons. But if a company is not prosecuted due to any legal snag or otherwise, the other prosecuted persons cannot, on that score alone, escape from the penal liability created through the legal fiction envisaged in Section 141 of the Act.” 27. However, subsequent decisions of this Court have emphasised that the provision imposes vicarious liability by way of deeming fiction which presupposes and requires the commission of the offence by the company itself as it is a separate juristic entity. Therefore, unless the company as a principal accused has committed the offence, the persons mentioned in subsection (1) would not be liable and cannot be prosecuted. Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, extends vicarious criminal liability to the officers of a company by deeming fiction, which arises only when the offence is committed by the company itself and not otherwise. Overruling Sheoratan Agarwal and Anil Hada, in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited (2012)5 SCC 661, a 3-judge bench of this court expounding on the vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, has held: “51. We have already opined that the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal runs counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is by a larger Bench and hence, is a binding precedent. On the aforesaid ratiocination, the decision in Anil Hada has to be treated as not laying down the correct law as far as it states that the Director or any other officer can be prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless to emphasise, the matter would stand on a different footing where there is some legal impediment and the doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia gets attracted. ……… 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as 2026:HHC:31659 21 an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is a three-judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.” 36. From the aforesaid exposition of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, it is thus clear that, a company, being a juristic person, cannot be imprisoned, but it can be subjected to a fine, which in itself is a punishment. Every punishment has adverse consequences, and therefore, prosecution of the company is mandatory. The exception would possibly be when the company itself has ceased to exist or cannot be prosecuted due to a statutory bar. However, such exceptions are of no relevance in the present case. Thus, the present prosecution must fail for this reason as well. Therefore, it is not permissible to prosecute the petitioner without prosecuting the firm. Since the firm has not been arrayed as an accused, therefore, it is not permissible to prosecute the petitioner in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 37. Having scanned entire material adduced on record, vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Chauhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner, that this Court, while exercising power under Section 528 of BNSS may proceed to quash the complaint against the petitioner, because continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law, since, for the reasons stated herein above, case of prosecution is bound to fail against the petitioner in all probabilities. 2026:HHC:31659 22 38. Otherwise also, in case prayer made on behalf of the petitioner is not accepted he would be unnecessarily subjected to ordeal of facing protracted trial, which otherwise is bound to fail. 39. In view of detailed discussion made herein above and law taken into consideration, present petition is allowed. Criminal Complaint bearing registration no. 841/2018 titiled State v. Care Group India, filed on 15.05.2018 under Section 18(a)(i) read with Section 27 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1945 pending before the Court of Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequential orders, including summoning order dated 06.06.2018 passed by Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh are quashed and set aside. The petitioner is discharged henceforth. All pending applications, stand disposed of. July 21, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma) Judge