W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 $~99 Q * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010438022026 + W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026, CRL.M.A. 28606/2026 & CRL.M.A. 28607/2026 M/S PROJECT DELIVER AND MAINTENANCE OF ESMART ENERGY SOLUTION LIMITED .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Deepak Kalra, Advocate. Mr. Saurabh Arora, Authorised Representative. versus STATE GNCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Respondents Through: Mr. Sanjay Lao, Sr Advocate with Mr. Tarang Srivastava, APP, Mr. Arjan Sachdeva, Mr. Priyam Agarwal and Mr. Abhinav Kumar, Advocates. Insp. Lalit Chauhan. Mr. Sushant Mukund, Advocate for R-2 with R-2 in person. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN O R D E R % 16.09.2026 1. By way of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner – M/S Project Delivery & Maintenance of eSmart Energy Solutions Limited [“the Company”] – seeks quashing of FIR No. 349/2024, dated 26.07.2024, registered under Sections 289 and 125(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [“BNS”], at Police Station Geeta Colony, Delhi, and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, on the ground of settlement. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31 W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 2. Issue notice. Mr. Tarang Srivastava, learned counsel, accepts notice on behalf of the State. Mr. Sushant Mukund, learned counsel, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 2. 3. Mr. Saurabh Arora, the Authorised Representative [“AR”] of the Company, who is himself one of the accused, is present in Court, and is identified by his learned counsel and the Investigating Officer [“IO”]. A Board Resolution designating him as the AR of the Company has been placed on record. Respondent No. 2 is also present in Court, and has been identified by his learned counsel and the IO. 4. The subject FIR was registered at the instance of Sub Inspector Rajesh Kumar Chauhan, in respect of an incident which took place on 26.07.024. It is alleged that one Nikki Gupta, wife of respondent No.2 herein, while cleaning the outside of her house, was electrocuted by an electric pole. She was admitted to a hospital, but succumbed to her injuries. Accordingly, the subject FIR was lodged against the Company, which was responsible for maintaining the street lights in the said locality. 5. A chargesheet has subsequently been filed in the matter, in which the prosecution has arrayed four accused, all of whom are employees of the Company. Section 106(1) of BNS [corresponding to Section 304-A of IPC] has also been added. 6. Respondent No. 2 had also filed a writ petition [W.P.(C) 13269/2024] against BSES Yamuna Power Limited [“BSES”], which was the electricity distribution company in the area. In the course of hearing of the aforesaid writ petition, BSES and respondent No.2 were referred to mediation and consequently entered into a Settlement Agreement dated This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31 W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 28.11.2025, by way of which respondent No.2 was to be compensated by BSES for a sum of Rs.17,00,000/-. The Settlement Agreement refers both to the aforesaid writ petition and to settlement of the disputes in the subject FIR. 7. However, the Company and respondent No.2 have also entered into a separate Settlement Deed dated 20.11.2025, by which the disputes in the subject FIR have been settled for a sum of Rs.2,75,000/-, to be paid by the Company to respondent No.2. 8. Learned counsel for the parties confirm that the settlement has been entered into voluntarily and without any coercion or undue pressure. 9. Mr. Lao, however, submits that the three other accused, who are named in the chargesheet, namely Kailash, Krishna, and Chatur, have not been arrayed as parties to this petition. As far as this aspect is concerned, Mr. Mukund submits that all accused persons are employees/associates of the Company and respondent No.2 does not wish to proceed against any of them. The statement of respondent No.2 to this effect has been separately recorded. The statement was made in Hindi and has been translated to English by me. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid, the Company seeks quashing of the subject FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom. 11. It is well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of their inherent jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may quash criminal proceedings where the parties have amicably settled their disputes, provided that no overriding public interest is adversely affected. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31 W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 12. The Supreme Court, in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.1, held as follows: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and- fast category can be prescribed.”2 Further, in Narinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.3, the Supreme Court has also laid down guidelines for High Courts while 1 (2012) 10 SCC 303. 2 Emphasis supplied. 3 (2014) 6 SCC 466. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31 W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31 W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”4 13. The non-compoundable nature of Section 106(1) of BNS [corresponding to Section 304-A of IPC], thus, does not, ipso facto, operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings. This Court has, in a catena of decisions, delineated the circumstances in which such power may be invoked even in cases arising under the said provision. In Babu Khan and Anr. v. State and Ors.5, after adverting to the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court observed as follows: “20. In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1, the Supreme Court had explained that for a negligent act to constitute an offence, under Section 304A of the IPC, the same should be gross negligence and an element of mens rea must be shown to exist. The Court had further explained that the degree of negligence which is punishable under Section 304A of the IPC should be of a high degree. The Court had observed as under:— “48. We sum up our conclusions as under: …(5) The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may be negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher i.e. gross or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. (6) The word ‘gross’ has not been used in Section 304A of IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be ‘gross’. The expression ‘rash or negligent act’ as occurring in Section 304A of the IPC has to be read as qualified by the word ‘grossly’…” 4 Emphasis supplied. 5 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10007 [hereinafter, “Babu Khan”]. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31 W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 21. Thus, while evaluating whether a proceeding relating to an alleged offence, under Section 304A of the IPC, be quashed on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the victim, it would also be necessary to consider whether it is probable that the facts presented would constitute gross negligence and an element of mens rea, which is likely to secure a conviction.” The Court specifically rejected the submission that, an earlier judgment in Bhajan Lal Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)6 operates as a bar to the adoption of such a course7. 14. A coordinate Bench of this Court, in Sunil Malhotra v. State (NCT of Delhi)8, undertook a comprehensive examination of precedents on the said issue and concluded that proceedings arising out of an offence under Section 304A IPC are amenable to quashing, including in cases where a settlement has been entered into with the legal heirs of the deceased. The Court reiterated the well-settled principle that criminal liability for negligence under Section 304A IPC is attracted only where the negligence is of a gross nature, to be determined on an assessment of the facts and circumstances of each case. 15. The facts of the present case arise out of an unfortunate incident in which the wife of respondent No.2 lost her life. No material has been brought to the notice of this Court which would, prima facie, disclose such a degree of rashness or negligence as would satisfy the threshold of gross negligence so as to necessitate continuation of criminal proceedings despite settlement. Respondent No.2 and his children have entered into a settlement and have been compensated both by BSES and by the Company. The possibility of quashing of the FIR on the ground of a 6 2019 SCC OnLine Del 4234. 7 Babu Khan, paragraph 8. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31 W.P.(CRL) 2847/2026 settlement in such cases has been upheld by this Court in a number of cases, including on behalf of minor heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. 16. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Company shall also pay costs of Rs. 50,000/- to respondent No.2 within a period of two weeks from today. An affidavit of compliance be filed within a week thereafter. 17. In view of the aforesaid, the petition is allowed, and FIR No. 349/2024 dated 26.07.2024, registered at Police Station Geeta Colony, along with all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, is hereby quashed, subject to payment of costs. 18. The parties will remain bound by the terms of the settlement. 19. The petition accordingly stands disposed of. PRATEEK JALAN, J SEPTEMBER 16, 2026 SS/SM/ 8 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7365. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 19/09/2026 at 11:59:31