1 2026:CGHC:14022 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR REVP No. 20 of 2026 1 - Shivkumar Markam S/o Latkhor Markam Aged About 66 Years R/o- Village- Paragaon, Tehsil- Gobra Nawapara, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Dushyant Nagarchi S/o Late Dharmu Nagarchi Aged About 26 Years R/o- Village- Paragaon, Tehsil- Gobra Nawapara, District- Raipur (C.G.) --- Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Revenue And Disaster Management Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Commissioner Raipur Division, Raipur (C.G.) 3 - The Collector District- Raipur (C.G.) 4 - The Sub-Divisional Officer (R) Sub Division Abhanpur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 5 - The Tehsildar Teshil- Gobra, Nawapara, District- Raipur (C.G.) 6 - Pankaj Prasad Dubey S/o Late Vishnu Prasad Dubey Aged About 86 Years Village- Paragaon, Tehsil- Gobra Nawapara, District- Raipur (C.G.) 7 - Smt. Nilbai Dhruw W/o Ramji Dhruw Aged About 71 Years R/o- Village- Paragaon, Tehsil- Gobra Nawapara, District- Raipur (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from CIS System) Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 For Petitioners : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate For State / Resp. Nos. 1 to 5 : Mr. D. R. Minj, Dy. Advocate General For Resp. No. 6 : Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 24/03/2026 1. The present Review Petition under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been preferred by the Petitioners being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated 06.05.2025 passed by this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2266 of 2025, whereby the Petitioners, though directly affected and necessary parties to the lis, were neither impleaded in the proceedings nor afforded any opportunity of hearing. It is respectfully submitted that the said order has resulted in grave prejudice to the Petitioners, as it has led to initiation of coercive proceedings for demolition of their residential house constructed over the disputed land, pursuant to action proposed under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code at the instance of Respondent No. 6. The Petitioners, being lawful owners and possessors of the subject property, are thus constrained to invoke the review jurisdiction of this Court to prevent miscarriage of justice and to secure an opportunity of being heard. 3 2. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the Petitioners, who have been in continuous, uninterrupted, and peaceful possession of a portion of land bearing Khasra No. 277, admeasuring 286 square feet, situated at Village Paragaon, P.H. No. 45, RIC Nawapara, Tehsil Abhanpur (now Gobra Nawapara), District Raipur (Chhattisgarh), for the last 30–40 years. The said land was lawfully allotted to Petitioner No. 1 by way of a lease/Patta dated 09.09.1998 for a period of 30 years, which remains valid up to 09.09.2028. In further recognition of such lawful possession, financial assistance was granted under the Indira Awas Yojana during the year 1999–2000 to the father of Petitioner No. 2, Late Dharmu Nagarchi, for construction of a residential house over the said land. Pursuant thereto, a dwelling house was constructed and the Petitioners have since been residing therein. The Petitioners have also been regularly paying property tax, thereby reinforcing their lawful and settled possession. After an inordinate delay, Respondent No. 6, in the year 2011, initiated proceedings under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code before the learned Naib Tehsildar, seeking dispossession of the Petitioners on the basis of a purported demarcation report dated 04.05.2011. It is submitted that the alleged demarcation was conducted on 22.04.2011 without issuance of any notice to the Petitioners and behind their back, in clear violation of principles of natural justice. Upon due consideration, the learned Naib Tehsildar, vide order dated 12.06.2019, was pleased to dismiss 4 the application filed by Respondent No. 6 and declared the said demarcation report to be invalid. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Respondent No. 6 preferred an appeal before the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Abhanpur. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, vide order dated 12.02.2020 passed in R.P.C. No. 121/A-70/2018-19, allowed the appeal and directed eviction of the Petitioners and restoration of possession in favour of Respondent No. 6, without proper appreciation of the material on record, including the Petitioners’ long-standing possession and the illegality of the demarcation proceedings. The Petitioners thereafter preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Raipur Division, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.12.2021 on the ground of multiplicity of proceedings. Thereafter, a Second Appeal preferred before the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, Circuit Court Raipur, was also dismissed vide order dated 29.09.2023, affirming the orders passed by the subordinate revenue authorities. It is submitted that due to the advanced age of Petitioner No. 1 and persistent ill health in the family of Petitioner No. 2, the Petitioners could not avail further legal remedies within the prescribed time. Subsequently, Respondent No. 6 initiated execution proceedings, and the learned Naib Tehsildar, vide order dated 10.06.2024, directed eviction of the Petitioners from the disputed land. In the meantime, Respondent No. 6 approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2266 of 2025 seeking directions for delivery of vacant possession of the disputed land. 5 This Court, vide order dated 06.05.2025, disposed of the said writ petition by directing the competent authority to take appropriate action in accordance with law. However, the said order was passed without impleading the Petitioners or affording them an opportunity of hearing, despite the fact that they are in settled possession of the property and are directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the learned Naib Tehsildar issued a notice of dispossession dated 01.01.2026 directing the Petitioners to vacate the subject property by 14.01.2026. It is pertinent to mention that the copy of the said notice served upon the Petitioners was illegible and unreadable, thereby depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to respond. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioners filed Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 228/2026 and 229/2026 before this Court challenging the orders passed by the revenue authorities as well as the consequential notice of dispossession. This Court, vide order dated 16.01.2026, disposed of the said writ petitions granting liberty to the Petitioners to file an appropriate review petition against the order dated 06.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2266 of 2025. In these circumstances, the Petitioners have preferred the present Review Petition seeking reconsideration of the order dated 06.05.2025, as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, without hearing the affected parties, and has resulted in serious civil consequences including imminent dispossession and demolition of the Petitioners’ residential house. 6 3. Learned counsel for the Review Petitioners submits that the impugned order dated 06.05.2025 has been passed in complete violation of the settled principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the Petitioners, despite being in actual, physical and settled possession of the disputed land and having constructed a residential house thereon pursuant to a valid Patta and Governmental recognition under the Indira Awas Yojana, were neither impleaded as parties nor afforded any opportunity of hearing. It is contended that any order passed to the detriment of a person without affording such person an opportunity of hearing is nullity in the eyes of law and liable to be recalled in exercise of review jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the Petitioners are bona fide owners/possessors of the subject property and their residential house, which has been constructed lawfully and has existed for several decades, is now under imminent threat of demolition pursuant to the impugned order. Such drastic civil consequences have been set into motion without adjudication of the Petitioners’ rights, thereby rendering the impugned order manifestly unjust and unsustainable in law. Learned counsel contends that the proposed action under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, which has been triggered pursuant to the impugned order, entails serious and irreversible civil consequences, including dispossession and demolition of a residential house. It is submitted that such action cannot be sustained in law without strict adherence to due process and 7 without affording an effective opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. The impugned order, having been passed in absence of the Petitioners, has thus vitiated the entire consequential proceedings. It is also urged that grave prejudice has been caused to the Petitioners, as they have been effectively deprived of their right to avail appropriate legal remedies against the illegal orders passed by the revenue authorities. It is submitted that the authorities have proceeded on an erroneous premise by invoking Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, which, as per settled legal position, is not applicable in cases where a residential house has already been constructed on the land. Thus, the entire proceedings culminating in the threat of eviction are without jurisdiction. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned actions of the Respondent authorities are arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The arbitrary exercise of power in ignoring statutory safeguards, long-standing possession of the Petitioners, and binding legal principles has resulted in hostile discrimination and unequal treatment, thereby offending the guarantee of equality before law. It is next contended that the orders passed by the revenue authorities, including the orders dated 12.02.2020 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, 13.12.2021 passed by the Commissioner, and 29.09.2023 passed by the Board of Revenue, are vitiated on account of gross violation of principles of natural justice. The entire proceedings under Section 250 were founded 8 upon a demarcation report which was prepared behind the back of the Petitioners, without issuance of notice and without affording any opportunity of participation. Such a demarcation, being contrary to settled procedure, is void ab initio, and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel submits that the Respondent authorities have acted wholly beyond the scope and jurisdiction conferred under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, which is a summary provision intended only for restoration of possession in cases of recent and proven illegal dispossession. In the present case, Respondent No. 6 has failed to establish either prior possession or the date and manner of alleged dispossession. In absence of such foundational facts, invocation of Section 250 is itself legally untenable. It is further argued that possession cannot be restored on the basis of an invalid demarcation. The settled revenue jurisprudence mandates that demarcation must be conducted in the presence of all concerned parties and adjoining landholders. In the present case, the alleged demarcation dated 22.04.2011 was conducted without notice to the Petitioners and without compliance of mandatory procedural safeguards. Therefore, no reliance could have been placed on such a defective demarcation report for directing eviction. The learned Naib Tehsildar had rightly rejected the application of Respondent No. 6 on this ground, however, the said well-reasoned finding has been illegally reversed by the appellate authorities. 9 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Respondent authorities have failed to consider material evidence on record and the settled possession of the Petitioners, who have been residing on the land for more than 30–40 years. The Petitioners’ possession stands duly recognized by the State itself through grant of Patta, disbursement of financial assistance under Indira Awas Yojana, and acceptance of property taxes. Such long- standing and settled possession could not have been disturbed in a summary proceeding under Section 250, particularly when the burden of proof was not discharged by Respondent No. 6. It is further contended that even as per the demarcation report relied upon by the Respondents, it stands admitted that a residential house exists on the land in question. Once a house has been constructed, the provisions of Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code cease to apply, and the only remedy available to the aggrieved party is to approach a competent civil court for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Thus, the eviction proceedings undertaken by the revenue authorities are wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to law. Learned counsel submits that the application filed by Respondent No. 6 under Section 250 was ex facie barred by jurisdiction, and therefore, the revenue authorities were divested of the authority to entertain or adjudicate the same. The eviction of the Petitioners could not have been ordered in a summary manner without a proper trial before a civil court. The impugned proceedings, therefore, suffer 10 from inherent lack of jurisdiction and are liable to be set aside. The orders have been passed mechanically, without appreciation of facts and without any reasoned analysis, solely on the basis of a disputed and invalid demarcation report. Finally, learned counsel submits that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, the Petitioners shall suffer irreparable loss and injury, as they would be rendered homeless without any fault on their part and without adjudication of their lawful rights. The balance of convenience lies in favour of the Petitioners and grave injustice would be caused if the order is not reviewed and recalled. He placed reliance upon the judgment of High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam passed in WP(C) No. 3302 of 2023 vide order dated 12.02.2024 in the matter of Terest Mary George vs. State of Kerala and Others, judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and Others, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 and State of U.P. and Others vs. Harish Chandra and Others, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 309. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to allow the present review petition. 5. Per contra, learned State counsel as well as learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 6 have vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the Review Petitioners and supported the impugned order dated 06.05.2025. It is submitted that the present review petition is devoid of merits and does not satisfy the limited scope of review jurisdiction under Section 114 11 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is contended that the Petitioners are, in effect, seeking re- hearing of the matter on merits under the guise of review, which is impermissible in law. It is further submitted that the order dated 06.05.2025 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2266 of 2025 is a well-reasoned order, whereby this Court has merely directed the competent revenue authority to act in accordance with law. It is argued that no adjudication of rights of the present Petitioners was undertaken in the said writ proceedings, and therefore, the contention regarding violation of principles of natural justice is misconceived and untenable. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that the Petitioners were fully aware of the proceedings initiated under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code and had actively participated in the same at various stages. The matter has been adjudicated by the competent authorities, including the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Commissioner, and the Board of Revenue, and all such authorities have concurrently held in favour of Respondent No. 6. The Petitioners, having failed to secure relief before the competent forums, cannot now be permitted to reopen the entire dispute by filing the present review petition. It is contended that the demarcation proceedings were conducted by the competent revenue authorities in accordance with prescribed procedure, and the findings recorded therein cannot be assailed in collateral proceedings. The validity of the demarcation report, as well as the 12 legality of the orders passed by the revenue authorities, has already attained finality up to the level of the Board of Revenue. Therefore, the Petitioners are precluded from challenging the same in the present proceedings. Learned counsel further submits that the Petitioners have no lawful title over the disputed land and are unauthorized occupants. Mere long possession or construction of a house does not confer any legal right or ownership in favour of the Petitioners. It is also submitted that Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code has been rightly invoked in the present case, as Respondent No. 6 was dispossessed from the land in question, and the competent authority, upon due consideration of material on record, has directed restoration of possession. The contention of the Petitioners that Section 250 is not applicable where a house has been constructed is misconceived and not supported by any binding legal precedent. Learned State counsel submits that all procedural safeguards have been duly complied with during the course of proceedings before the revenue authorities, and adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded to the parties at each stage. The Petitioners have failed to point out any procedural irregularity or jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the record, which alone could justify exercise of review jurisdiction by this Court. It is further contended that the allegation regarding non-service or illegibility of the notice of dispossession is an afterthought and has been raised only to delay the execution 13 of lawful orders passed by the competent authorities. The Petitioners have adopted dilatory tactics to frustrate the implementation of the orders, despite having exhausted all available remedies under the law. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 6 submits that the Petitioners have suppressed material facts and have not approached this Court with clean hands. The present review petition is an abuse of the process of law and is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. It is lastly submitted that no case of “error apparent on the face of the record” or discovery of new and important evidence has been made out by the Petitioners so as to warrant interference in review jurisdiction. The Petitioners are merely attempting to reagitate issues which have already been conclusively decided by the competent authorities. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the present review petition being devoid of merit and not maintainable in law, deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 7. The scope of interference in a review petition under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is extremely limited. It is well settled that a review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise and cannot be invoked for re- hearing or re-arguing the matter on merits. The jurisdiction is confined only to cases where there exists an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important matter or 14 evidence which, despite due diligence, could not be produced earlier, or any other sufficient reason akin thereto. The law in this regard has been succinctly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 wherein it has been held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. It has further been held that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. It was held as under : “12. This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] held as under: (SCC p. 675, para 1) “1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in 15 the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on 16 points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” (emphasis in original) 13. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 222] , this Court, in paras 8 and 9 held as under: (SCC pp. 171-72) “8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1965 SC 845] . For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3 17 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279] . The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi [(1971) 3 SCC 5] . Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except ‘where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility’: Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] . 9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned 18 Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.” 14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India [1980 Supp SCC 562 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 381] held as under: (SCC p. 566, para 12) “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib 19 [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] this Court observed: (SCC p. 675, para 1) ‘1. … A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. … The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.’” 15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held as under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9) “7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372] this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11) ‘11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did 20 not involve any substantial question of law is an “error apparent on the face of the record”. The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an “error apparent on the face of the record”, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.’ 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of 21 the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.” (emphasis in original) 16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54, 56 & 58) “54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of 22 the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: ‘1.Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.’ Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 23 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter. * * * 56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment. * * * 24 58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment 25 interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words ‘any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule’ as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] . Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [AIR 1954 SC 440] , this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [AIR 1955 SC 233] , it was held: (AIR p. 244, para 23) ‘23. … [I]t is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error 26 apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in—Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality [ILR 1953 Bom 191 : AIR 1953 Bom 133] , that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.’ Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for 27 reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.” 17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 651] held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10) “10. … In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the 28 face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.” 18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501] , held as under: (SCC pp. 504- 505, paras 11-12) “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not 29 rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. 12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of ‘second innings’ which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.” 19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the principles 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 30 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275] 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous 31 decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 8. Similarly, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the power of review cannot be exercised merely because the decision is erroneous on merits and it was held as under : 52. The dictionary meaning of the word “review” is “the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement”. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3 SCC 844 : AIR 1970 SC 1273] held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to 32 bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka [1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 320 : (1994) 26 ATC 448] held : (SCC pp. 619-20, para 19) “19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai [AIR 1941 FC 1] the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and 33 narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh [(1836) 1 Moo PC 117 : 2 MIA 181] that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: ‘… nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in…. The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.’ Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: ‘It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to 34 prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.’ Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution- makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to 35 be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.” The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength. * * * 56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation 36 of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.” 9. In the present case, the primary contention of the Petitioners is that the order dated 06.05.2025 was passed without affording them an opportunity of hearing, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. However, upon careful perusal of the said order, it is evident that this Court, while disposing of W.P.(C) No. 2266 of 2025, had not adjudicated the inter se rights of the parties, but merely directed the competent authority to proceed in accordance with law. The said order is thus in the nature of a direction simpliciter and does not determine any substantive rights of the Petitioners. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that non-impleadment of the Petitioners in the earlier writ proceedings does not, by itself, constitute an error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of review jurisdiction. The Petitioners, if aggrieved by any consequential action taken by the authorities, always had and continue to have appropriate remedies available to them in accordance with law. 10. Very recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Malleeswari Vs. K. Suguna and Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1927 has held as under : 15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be assumed unless expressly conferred by the statute or the rules having the force of a statute. 37 The review jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is conferred by law on the authority or the Court. Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review of the courts. The power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial decisions: 15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. 15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court. 15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. 15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power. 15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. 38 Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.” 11. Further, High Court of Allahabad in the matter of Sonu Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and Others, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine All 999 has held as under : “5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner (review) and gone through the grounds taken in the Review Application, we find that virtually there is an attempt to re-argue the matter which is not permissible in a Review Application. An application for review cannot be treated to be an opportunity to argue the case on merits afresh. In the garb of a review application reargument on merits of the case cannot be allowed. We are even fortified in our view by the following authoritative pronouncements. The suspension was dated 30.8.2005. The deceased was dismissed from service. This fact would be relevant which has been minutely considered by the Division Bench of the this Court and, therefore, we find no reason to interfere in the judgment of the earlier Bench dated 2.7.2019. 6. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372 the Court said: “A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.” 39 7. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 the Court said: “… there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.” 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 : AIR 1995 SC 455 while quoting with 40 approval the above passage from Abhiram Taleshwar Sharma v. Abhiram Pishak Shartn (supra), the Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 it was held that an error, which is not self evident and has to be detected by process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise powers of review in exercise of review jurisdiction. 10. In Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai, (2007) 15 SCC 513 : AIR 2003 SC 2095, the Apex Court has observed about limited scope of judicial intervention at the time of review of the judgment and said: “The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgement/order cannot be disturbed.” 11. Thus, Review is not an appeal in disguise. Rehearing of the matter is impermissible in the garb of review. It is an exception to the general rule that 41 once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 : AIR 2000 SC 1650, the Court said that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a new. Such powers can be exercised within limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The aforesaid view is reiterated in Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663.” 12. In the present case, the grounds raised by the Petitioners, including alleged illegality of demarcation, applicability of Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, and validity of orders passed by the revenue authorities, are all issues which require detailed examination on merits and cannot be adjudicated in review jurisdiction. It is also to be noted that the Petitioners have already availed remedies before the competent revenue authorities up to the level of the Board of Revenue, and the orders passed therein have attained finality. The attempt of the Petitioners in the present review petition is clearly to reopen the entire controversy and to indirectly assail the orders passed by the revenue authorities, which is impermissible in law. 13. The case law relied upon by the petitioner pertains to the merits of the case and is distinguishable, as the present matter involves the exercise of review jurisdiction. 42 14. The contention of the Petitioners regarding violation of principles of natural justice in the proceedings before the revenue authorities, as well as the legality of invoking Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, pertains to the merits of the dispute and cannot be gone into in a review petition against an order which merely directs the authorities to act in accordance with law. 15. Applying the aforesaid settled principles of Hon’ble Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that no error apparent on the face of the record has been demonstrated by the Petitioners. The grounds urged in the review petition are essentially a repetition of arguments on merits and an attempt to seek a fresh adjudication of issues already considered or capable of being considered in appropriate proceedings. So far as the apprehension of dispossession and demolition of the residential house is concerned, it is always open to the Petitioners to avail such remedies as may be available to them in accordance with law against any specific action taken by the authorities. However, the same cannot be a ground to invoke review jurisdiction in absence of any patent error in the order under review. 16. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present review petition does not fall within the limited parameters of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. No case for 43 interference is made out. 17. Accordingly, the Review Petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Shayna Judge 44 Head Note Review jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is limited and cannot be invoked to reargue the case on merits. An order merely directing authorities to act in accordance with law does not adjudicate rights and cannot be termed erroneous for non-issuance of notice to respondent. In absence of any error apparent on the face of record, review is not maintainable.