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2026 DAILYLAW 18218 (CHH)

SMT. PRAMILA SAHU v. DHARMENDRA SAHU

FA(MAT)/331/2025 · 2026-03-22

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:13684-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA(MAT) No. 331 of 2025 Smt. Pramila Sahu W/o Shri Dharmendra Sahu Aged About 42 Years R/o Bhatapara, Nahar Paar Mopka, Post Office Mopka, Police Station- Sarkanda, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. ... appellant(s) versus Dharmendra Sahu S/o Kartik Ram Sahu Aged About 46 Years R/o Mopka, Post Office - Mopka, Police Station- Sarkanda, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For appellant (s) : Mr. Pranjal Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Laxmeen Sahu, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 23 /03/2026 1 Heard Mr. Pranjal Agrawal, Advocate appearing for the appellant as well as Ms. Laxmeen Sahu, learned counsel for respondent in the SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.03.27 13:21:38 +0530 2 present appeal. 2 Present is an appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, against the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.07.2025 passed by learned 2nd Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 376 A/2019, whereby a decree has been passed in favour of the respondent/husband, granting divorce and the marriage between the parties has been dissolved by the decree of divorce. 3 The status of the parties, as shown in the civil suit before the learned Family Court, is being taken and referred in the present appeal for the sake of convenience. 4 Brief facts of the case are that the marriage between the parties was solemnized in the year 1997, as per their rituals and customs. They are blessed with two daughters who are presently residing with the wife/Non-applicant. After some time of marriage, the quarrel started between the parties initially on some domestic issues, which became aggravated by the lapse of time, culminated into their separation. Ultimately, the husband/ applicant has filed an application on 24.06.2019 under Section 13(1) A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for the grant of divorce. In the application, he pleaded that the non- applicant/ wife treated him with cruelty by raising a quarrel without any reason and by saying that she is not ready to reside with his parents, and he is required to live separately from them. The non-applicant wife deserted without any sufficient cause and has been residing separately for more than 10 years, and therefore, a decree of divorce may be granted in his favour. 3 5 The Non-applicant/wife, in her written statement, denied the allegation made by the applicant husband and pleaded that the applicant/ husband was in the habit to raise quarrel after getting him intoxicated. He has not taken care of her children and thrown them out of his house by raising a quarrel and committed marpeet with her. Every time he confessed his guilt and asked to be forgiven. She has never treated her husband with cruelty and never raised any quarrel. It is the applicant’s husband who raised a quarrel with her and threw them out. She also denied that he deserted the applicant/ husband for 10 years, and there is no ground available to him for the grant of a decree of divorce in his favour. And therefore, the application filed by the husband is dismissed. 6 Based on the pleadings of the parties, the learned Family Court has framed the following issues:- 7 In support of his application, the applicant/ husband examined himself as (AW/1), and the non-applicant/ wife also examined herself as (NAW/1), Laxmi Prasad Sahu (NAW/2) and Sharad Kumar Sahu (NAW/3). 8 After hearing the parties, the learned Family Court passed its judgment and decree on 10.07.2025, allowed the application of the applicant/ husband and granted a decree of divorce in his favour, which is under challenge in the present appeal. 9 Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the impugned judgment and decree suffer from perversity and illegality. The applicant’s husband has failed to prove the desertion and cruelty 4 against the non-applicant/ wife. There is lack of sufficient pleading and evidence with makes him entitled for grant of a decree of divorce. The learned Family Court has erred in holding that the wife has deserted the husband for more than 10 years without any sufficient cause. They should have considered the evidence in its proper perspective and inquired about the reasons for their separate residing. He would further submit that it is applicant/husband who committed cruelty with her and after committing marpeet, thrown them out from his house and is not taking care of his children which itself shows that the applicant/ husband is at fault and he cannot be benefited for his own fault, therefore, the appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment and decree may be set aside. 10 Learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposed the submission made by learned Counsel for the wife and supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Court. she would submit that after adverting the entire facts and evidence available on record, the learned Family Court allowed the application and granted divorce in his favour. There is no illegality in passing the decree of divorce in favour of the applicant/ husband, and the appeal filed by the Non-applicant/wife is liable to be dismissed. 11 We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Family Court. 12 From perusal of the impugned judgment, it transpires that the learned Family Court has considered their long separation and the reasons for their separation. They also considered that though the Non- 5 applicant/wife raised an allegation that the applicant committed marpeet with her and used to quarrel with her, and even after being thrown out of his house, she has not lodged any report to the Police and has not made any complaint to any authorities. She has not pursued her complaint, which was allegedly made to the Police Station. She also did not lodge any report with respect to any dowry demand or cruelty against the husband/ applicant. She admitted in her evidence that earlier, the non-applicant wife was residing for about 6-7 years at Jora Talab, Sarkanda Bilaspur and thereafter, started residing at Bhatapara, Mopka in a rented house. She admitted in her evidence that the applicant/ husband had filed an application before the learned Family Court Bilaspur under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for restitution of conjugal rights but she refused to go with him and thereby hold that it is the non-applicant/ wife who deserted her husband and they are residing separately since 12-13 years and has passed the decree of divorce in favour of applicant/ husband. 13 In her evidence, the NAW/1 has admitted that in the year 2016, she filed an application for the grant of maintenance amount before the learned Family Court, Bilaspur, in which she deposed that she has been residing separately from her husband since 2012. She further admitted that the applicant/ husband does not have any permanent job and she asked him to search of permanent job and quarrel arose for that reason. In para 15 of her evidence, she also admitted that the applicant/ husband had filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court Bilaspur and during counseling he 6 proposed to take her back, but she refused. And thereafter, the said case was closed. She further admitted that in the year 2008, she was appointed as Anganbadi Sahayika, and after 3-4 years of her appointment, she started residing separately. She further admitted that despite the act of the applicant/husband, she has not lodged any report to the Police authority. She also has not produced any sufficient evidence about the community meeting. There is also admission of the non-applicant/ wife that, with respect to the demand of dowry by the applicant/ husband, she has not lodged any report to the Police. 14 The applicant/ husband has stated in his evidence that the non- applicant/ wife, after being employed as Anganbadi Sahayika, does not want to live with him, saying that the applicant does not have a job and she is employed in Govt. Job and further that she can take care of her children, and left him without any reason. She regularly makes sarcastic comments about him, and despite trying to convince her, she could not be convinced. 15 The ground of desertion has been provided in section 13 (1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which states as under:- "13. Divorce. (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition. presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other part- (i) xxx xxx xxx (ia) xxx xxx xxx (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately 7 preceding the presentation of the petition; or (ii) to (vii) xxx xxx xxx Explanation. In this sub-section, the expression "desertion" means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly." 16 The word "desertion" in the context of Sections 13(1)(ib) and 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has been considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi1 and to establish "desertion", their Lordships have laid down two essential ingredients in order that it may furnish a ground for relief, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships observed in paragraph 6 of the report as under:- "6. 'Desertion' in the context of matrimonial law represents a legal conception. It is difficult to give a comprehensive definition of the term. The essential ingredients of this offence in order that it may furnish a ground for relief are: 1. The factum of separation 2. The intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end- animus deserendi; 3. The element of permanence which is a prime condition. requires that both these essential 1 AIR 2002 SC 88 8 ingredients should continue during the entire statutory period; The clause lays down the rule that desertion to amount to a matrimonial offence must be for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. This clause has to be read with the Explanation. The Explanation has widened the definition of desertion to include 'wilful neglect of the petitioning spouse by the respondent. It states that to amount to a matrimonial offence desertion must be without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of the petitioner. From the Explanation it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended to give to the expression a wide import which includes wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage. Therefore, for the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively and their continuance throughout the statutory period.” 17 Similarly, in the matter of Roi (Bari) Stree v. Rassinga Naik and anothe2, relying upon the observations of GORELL BARNES, J. in the 2 AIR 1935 Mad 541 9 matter of Sickert v. Sicker3, it has been held by the Madras High Court that in order to constitute desertion there must be a cessation of cohabitation and an intention on the part of the accused party to desert the other, and it has been observed as under:- "In order to constitute desertion there must be a cessation of cohabitation and an intention on the part of the accused party to desert the other. In most cases of desertion the guilty party actually leaves the other, but it is not always or necessarily the guilty party who leaves the matrimonial home. In my opinion, the party who intends bringing the cohabitation to an end, and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the case of a husband who intends to put an end to a state of cohabitation, and does so by leaving his wife, and that of a husband who with the like intent obliges his wife to separate from him." 18 However, in this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Malathi Ravi, M.D. v. B.V. Ravi, M.D.4 may be noticed herein in which the essential elements of desertion have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - "20. In the said Savitri Pandey case", reference was also made to Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani case wherein it has been held that desertion in its essence means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. For the offence of desertion so far as the deserting spouse is 3 (1899) P. 278, 282 4 (2014) 7 SCC 640 10 concerned, two essential conditions must be there (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. For holding desertion as proved the inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation." 19 In the facts and evidence of the present case, it is quite vivid that the applicant and non-applicant have been living separately for 12-13 years. In the application filed by the applicant for restitution of conjugal rights, the non-applicant refused to live with him. The non-applicant is employed as the Anganbadi Sahayika, and after 3-4 years of her employment, she started residing separately from the applicant. As such, the applicant/ husband has established that there has been no cohabitation between the parties for a continuous period of 12-13 years immediately preceding the presentation of the application for the grant of divorce. The non-applicant/ wife predicted her separation on the allegation of cruelty; however, no complaint or report has been lodged by her. 11 20 In view of the above, the explanation of the wife for leaving the matrimonial house stands eroded, and it is established that she is living separately without sufficient and reasonable cause. The allegation of cruelty by the husband and his family members remained unsubstantiated, rendering the wife’s withdrawal from the matrimonial house without any sufficient cause. The prolonged period of 12-13 years, coupled with a lack of any effort towards reconciliation, clearly demonstrates an intentional and permanent abandonment of the matrimonial obligation. It is evident that the abandonment was both intentional and without the consent of the husband, and thereby, the non-applicant wife repudiated the matrimonial bond with the intention of bringing cohabitation to a permanent end. 21 Accordingly, we found that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Court are based on a proper appreciation of evidence and the law applicable to it. It is rightly held by the learned Family Court that the applicant/ husband is entitled for decree of divorce which has been granted in his favour. This Court does not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Court. 22 Accordingly, the first appeal filed by the non-applicant wife fails and is hereby dismissed. 23 An appellate decree be drawn accordingly. Sd Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika