Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 2026:HHC:31652 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. : 535 of 2025 Decided on : 29.07.2026 M/s Pargat Singh through its Proprietor …Petitioner Versus Smt. Usha Rani Sood & Ors. …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the petitioner : Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate. For the respondents : Ms. Meera Devi, Advocate, for respondent No. 1. None for respondents No. 2(a) to 2(c). Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) PetitionerM/s Pargat Singh, through its Proprietor Sh. Gurjeet Singh, has filed the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the
order, 20.05.2025, passed by the Court of learned Rent Controller, Shimla, District Shimal H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rent Controller’), in CMA No. 3209 of 2024, 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:31652 in Rent Petition No. 1022 of 2016, titled as ‘Smt. Usha Rani Sood Versus M/s Pargat Singh, through its proprietor & Anr.’. 2. Vide order dated 20.05.2025, the application filed by the petitioner under Order 8 Rule 1(2) read with Section 151 of CPC, has been rejected. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the lis, are, hereinafter, referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned Rent Controller. 4. The landlady Smt. Usha Rani Sood has filed a petition for eviction, against the tenants under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rent Act’). The eviction of the tenants has been sought on the ground of personal bonafide requirement. 5. The said eviction petition has been contested by the tenant by taking preliminary objection that same is not maintainable, as it has finally been decided that M/s Pargat Singh and brothers, partnership firm, has been held to be tenant in the premises in building No. 15, Lakkar
3 2026:HHC:31652 Bazar, Shimla. This fact has been finally decided in Rent Petition No. 42/2 of 1984, on 31.03.1986. The petition is also stated to be bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties. Other preliminary objections have also been taken. 5.1 On merits, eviction petition has been contested, on the ground, that the grounds, upon which, the eviction has been sought are not sustainable in the eyes of law. The landlady has filed the another petition for bonafide requirement of premises. 6. In the said petition, when, the lis was pending for evidence of respondents/tenants, then, an application under Order 8 Rule 1(2) read with Section 151 of CPC, for allowing the tenants to produce on record certain documents, was filed. 7. The said application has been filed, on the ground, that the landlady is in habit of filing the petition on same and similar grounds of eviction, one after another, just to harass the tenants. All these facts have been pleaded to doubt the bonafide requirement of landlady to seek eviction of any of the tenants. 4 2026:HHC:31652
8.
It is further case of the applicant that the applicant has obtained the property tax relating documents and also obtained the garbage collection bills. The said documents are stated to be relevant for the adjudiciation of the case. As such, a prayer has been made to allow the application, as prayed for. 9. This application has been contested, on the ground, that application is malafide and has been moved just to delay the disposal of the case. Highly relying upon the zimni orders passed by the learned Rent Controller, it has been pleaded that the case is now listed for evidence of tenants for the last 1½ years and instead of taking any steps for leading evidence, the application has been filed just to delay the proceedings. 9.1 On merits, the contents of the application has been denied. 10. The learned Rent Controller, vide order dated 20.05.2025, has dismissed the application. 11. The said order has been assailed before this Court, on the grounds, as taken in the petition. 5 2026:HHC:31652
12. The learned Rent Controller, in the present case, has dismissed the application, after giving the details of the proceedings, which were conducted before it, on the ground that the tenant could not point out as to how these documents are relevant for the adjudication of the case. 13. In addition to this, application has also been dismissed, on the ground, that the application is not bonafide. 14. The learned Rent Controller, is not Civil Court, but persona designata, as has been held by this Court in
“Jatinder Singh Kukreja Vs Narinder Singh Sood & Anr., CMPMO No. 53 of 2025, decided on 30.05.2026”. Relevant paras 11 to 22, of the judgment, as reproduced, as under:
“11.
Before proceeding further, it would be profitable to reproduce the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Rent Control Act; Rule 12 of the H.P. Rent Control Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rent Control Rules’); and Section 141 of the CPC, as under: Sections 25 and 26 of Rent Control Act
“25. Power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses – For the purposes of this Act, an appellate authority or a Controller appointed under this Act shall have the same powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). 6 2026:HHC:31652
26. Execution of orders – Save as otherwise provided in section 31, any order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act, shall be executable by the Controller as a decree of a civil court and for this purpose, the Controller shall have all the powers of a civil court.” Rule 12 of Rent Control Rules
“12. Procedure to be followed by Controller in disposing of an application (1) When an application under the Act is presented to the Controller, he shall fix the date, time and place at which the enquiry in respect of the application will be held and send a notice alongwith a copy of the application to each respondent in FormE appended to these rules. (2) The Controller shall give to the parties, a reasonable opportunity to state their case. He shall also record the evidence of the parties and witnesses examined on either side and in doing so and in fixing dates for the hearing of the parties and their witnesses, in adjourning the proceedings, and dismissing application for default or for other sufficient reasons the Controller shall be guided by the principles of the procedure as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” Section 141 of the CPC
141. Miscellaneous proceedings.
The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Explanation.— In this section, the expression
"proceedings" includes proceedings under
Order IX, but does not include any proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution.”
12. In the above factual background, the question, which requires adjudication, by this Court, is about the fact, as to whether, the Rent Controller is stricto sensu a Civil Court, the procedure of which is to be governed by the CPC. 7 2026:HHC:31652
13. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has used the term ‘in the Court of civil jurisdiction’ in Section 141 of the CPC. In view of the provisions of Section 141 of the CPC, now, the question, which requires to be determined, is about the fact, as to whether the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority fall within the definition of ‘Court of civil jurisdiction’ or not. 14. This question has been answered in negative, by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, way back in the year 1949, in a case, titled as Pitman’s Shorthand Academy versus B. Lila Ram & Sons, reported in AIR 1950 P&H 181. Relevant paras17 to 21, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“17. The fact that there are decisions on both sides only goes to show that Judges, when confronted with the question whether a certain functionary is or is not a Court, consider it necessary to enquire into the matter and are not disposed to give a clear cut answer immediately. It follows that they have universally recognised the proposition that a judicial officer, e. g., a Senior Subordinate Judge, a District Magistrate or a District Judge may be entrusted with duties of a judicial or quasijudicialnature and yet while performing these duties he does not act as a Court. Whether this is so or not will depend on the circumstances of each particular case, namely, what was the intention of the Legislature, to create a Court or appoint a persona designata: what is the nature of the duties entrusted to him: what are his powers and what procedure does he follow : does he, when discharging these special duties, act in every way as a Court of law would act : does he satisfy all the tests usually applied to Courts of law ? 18.
18. Once it is conceded that the Senior Subordinate Judge when acting as a Rent Controller or the District Judge when acting as the "Appellate authority" may or may not be acting as a civil Court an enquiry into the matter may be undertaken with complete freedom from bias and untrammelled by the prepossession that a judicial officer always
8 2026:HHC:31652 acts as a civil Court, no matter what duties he performs. 19. We may first attempt to formulate a definition of a civil Court, As far as I am aware no exhaustive definition of the term has been given in any judicial pronouncementEnglish or Indian, though various tests have been laid down whereby the true nature of a tribunal or authority may be determined. Broadly speaking, a Court is a place where justice is judicially administered. It is, however, clear that to say this much is not enough. Further analysis of the authorities shows that there are certain ingredients or essential attributes of a Court of law without any of which the tribunal or the authority ceases to enjoy the dignity or character of a Court. It is necessary, for instance, that judicial duties be entrusted to the tribunal by operation of law and not by voluntary submission by the parties to a dispute. An arbitrator, therefore, cannot be considered as a Court of law. Again, the tribunal must adjudicate upon civil disputes. To adjudicate means to give a definitive decision which is final until it is set aside or modified by an
"Appellate Authority." It is not enough that the tribunal should give an opinion or act in an advisory capacity. Therefore, a Collector acting under S. 18, Land Acquisition Act who acts merely in an advisory capacity cannot be looked upon as a Court. Civil disputes again mean disputes whose nature is justiciable i.e., where the law of the land recognises the wrong and provide a remedy. The decision of nonjudicial disputes cannot be treated as the administration of justice. Again, it is not enough that a Court of law should conduct its proceedings with fairness and impartiality. It must decide them according to the law of the land. It must not be affected by ulterior considerations or matters of executive policy. The Privy Council in Shell Co., Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commr.
of Taxation, 1931 A. C. 275: (100 L. J. P. C. 55), held that a Board of Revenue was not a Court because it has to take into consideration matters of executive policy. In Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappa
9 2026:HHC:31652 Reddy, 30 Mad. 326 (17 M. L. J. 313), a District Registrar was held not to be a Court because he did not administer justice judicially. Again, the rules of procedure which the Court of law must follow cannot be arbitrary. The procedure must be defined by statute or recognised by law. In the Municipal Corporation, Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur, 3 Rang. 560; (A. I. R. 1926 Rang. 25), a Full Bench of the Rengoon High Court held that the Chief Justice of the Rangoon Small Cause Court acting under S. 14, Rangoon Municipal Act could not be said to act as a Court because he was free to disregard the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code. The Judge was entitled under S. 14, Rangoon Municipal Act to make such enquiry as he deemed necessary, and this departure from the ordinary rules of procedure as laid down by the Civil Procedure Code was considered sufficient to take him out of the category of a Court of law. In Manager, Spring Mills v. Ambekar, MANU/MH/0099/1947 :
A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 188: (I.L.R (1948) Bom. 863), the authority acting under the Payment of Wages Act was held not to be a Court of law because (1) the procedure followed was not the procedure prescribed for a civil Court, and (2) the authority was treated as a special body set up to adjudicate upon civil rights and a distinction had been made between an application to the authority and a suit filed in a civil Court. Similarly, in Sudagar Choudhury v. Radha Raman, A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 333, it was held that the District Judge when exercising jurisdiction under S. 78, Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act was not a Court because (1) the District.
Judge acted as a revisional Court although ordinarily it had no such power in respect of the Panchayat, and (2) the procedure which he could follow was unfettered. For instance, he could dispense with the rules of evidence and legal practitioners were not allowed to appear before him. In many cases it has been held that where the Presiding Officer of the Court rather than the Court is entrusted with special
10 2026:HHC:31652 powers the Presiding Officer is to be looked upon as a persona, designata. 20. A Court of law may, therefore, be defined as a tribunal dealing with and adjudicating upon civil disputes by operation of law in a judicial manner untroubled by ulterior considerations or matters of executive policy and observing certain definite rules of procedure which are either defined by statute or recognised by practice. It may be that a tribunal falling under this definition may yet not be a Court of law, but from the above
discussion it will be clear that if any of these attributes are missing the tribunal certainly falls short of being a Court of law. 21. Applying this test to the Controller and the
"Appellate Authority" appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act we find that in the first place that Act does not entrust the functions of a Controller to the Senior Subordinate Judge as such, nor does it appoint the District Judge as the "Appellate Authority". The Act reserves to the Provincial Government the power of appointing Controllers and "Appellate Authorities." Non judicial officers or indeed nonofficials could easily have been appointed to function as Controllers and "Appellate Authorities" under the Act and in that case it could not have been said that the persons so appointed were civil Courts. It was by a subsequent notification that the Government appointed Senior Sub Judges as Rent Controllers and the District Judges as Appellate Authorities." In the second place, the procedure laid down is not the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code except in two or three respects e. g., power has been given to the Rent Controller and the "Appellate Authority" to summon and examine witnesses. The orders made by the Controller or the 'Appellate Authority" can be enforced by a civil Court as if they were decrees of that Court. A modification of the principle of res judicata has also been introduced by the provisions of S. 14. None of the other incidents of a Court of law, however, obtain. The "Appellate Authority" in hearing an appeal from the decision of the Controller
11 2026:HHC:31652 can make any further enquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Collector, and this contemplates even a private enquiry, should the "Appellate Authority" consider it necessary. Such a course would be wholly foreign to the duties of a Court of law. Again, it is to be noted that S. 15, subs. (4) makes a distinction between a Court of law and the Controller, for it says that the order of the Controller cannot be called in question in any Court of law. It is by itself sufficient to indicate that it was not the intention of the Legislature to create a Court of law but to appoint a persona designata who would be entrusted with certain specific functions.
We thus find that many of the attributes of a Court of law are not to be found in the Controller or the "Appellate Authority". (self emphasis supplied)
15. The proceedings before the learned Rent Controller are specialized quasi judicial processes, governed by Rent Control Act, aiming to regulate the relationship between the landlord and tenant, including the rent fixation and eviction. 16. As per the Rent Control Act, ‘Controller’ has been defined under Section 2 (c), in the following terms:
“2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) … … … (b) … … … (c) “Controller” means any person who is appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of the Controller under this Act.”
17. Meaning thereby, the Rent Controller is not a Court, but, persona designata. Similarly, the Appellate Authority, as per Section 24 of the Rent Control Act is also persona designata, as has been held in Pitman’s Shorthand Academy’s case (supra). 18. The question, with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the CPC, again arose before a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Ram Dass versus Sukhdev Kaur and another, reported in AIR
12 2026:HHC:31652 1981 P&H 301, wherein, it has been held that the Rent Controllers are not Courts stricto sensu and, as such, Section 141 of the CPC cannot be invoked. Relevant paras3 to 5 and 8 of the said
judgment, are reproduced, as under:
3. Now to appreciate the aforesaid legal question what calls for pointed attention at the outset is the very nature of the tribunal exercising jurisdiction under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949(hereinafter called 'the Act'). Section 2(b) of the Act defining the word 'Controller' is in the following terms:
“Controller" means any person who is appointed by the State Government to perform the function of a Controller under this Act." It would be manifest from the above that a wideranging power is given to the State government to appoint any person as a 'Controller' under the Act. Again reference to Section 15(1)(a) empowering the State Government to appoint the Appellate Authority is instructive:
"The State Government may, by general or special order, by notification confer on such officers and authorities as they think fit, the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as maybe specified in the order." This would again show the wide amplitude of the power vested in the State Government to name the Appellate Authorities under the Act. 4. I may point out that considerable misapprehension and confusion sometimes arises in this context from the fact that usually the powers of the Controller under the Act have been conferred on subordinate Judges and the powers of Appellate Authority now are also specifically vested by notification in the District Judges. This fortuitous circumstance, however, should not lead one to the error of assuming that there by the controllers or the Appellate authorities became Civil courts as such. They retain their
13 2026:HHC:31652 essential nature as tribunals or person designate under the special statute. It is instructive to remind oneself that under a sister statue, namely,
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973
, the powers of the controllers were at one time taken away from the subordinate Judges and vested in the subDivisional Officers and similarly the Deputy Commissioners of the districts were made the Appellate Authorities by a notification. By
Section 15
, Clause (6) of the Haryana urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, the financial commissioner was designated by the statute itself as the revisional Authority to the exclusion of the High Court.
Though there is recently a reversion to the old practice, the above circumstances rightly highlight the fact that if would be misleading to assume that the controllers or the Appellate authorities are necessarily Civil Courts. 5. I deem it unnecessary to labour the point because within this jurisdiction, it has been settled law that the Controllers and the Appellate Authority under the Act are not even courts and are indeed persons designate. Way back it was authoritatively held by the Full Bench in Pitman's Shorthand Academy v. B. Lila Ram and Sons, AIR 1950 East Punj 181, as follows (at p. 188):
".......With great respect, therefore, I must differ from the pronouncement of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court and it is clear to me that the intention of the Legislature was to appoint persona designate to perform specific duties and it was further the intention that these persons would not be governed by the ordinary rules of procedure, nor would their decisions be subject to appeal or revision in a Court of law, and I must, therefore, hold that the Rent controller and "Appellate Authority" are not Courts of law subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P. C."
14 2026:HHC:31652 Apart from the afore said authoritative enunciation, reference is also called for to the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of the Act, which are in the following terms:
"16. Power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses.For the purposes of this Act, an Appellate Authority or a Controller appointed under the act shall have the same powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
"17. Execution of Order.Every order made under Section 10, or 13, and every
order passed on appeal under Section 15 shall be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court." It would be thus manifest on principles also from the relevant statutory provisions that the Civil Procedure Code as such does not govern the proceedings under the Act except to the limited extent provided for under Ss. 16 and 17 thereof. Even by applying these provisions most liberally one cannot bring in either expressly or by necessary implication the rest of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In particular it would be evident that the specific and detailed provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code would not, therefore, be applicable proprio vigore to the rent jurisdiction. The controllers and the Appellate Authorities being persona designate are entitled to devise their own procedure within the confines prescribed by the Act itself. 6. … … …
7. … … …
8. In fairness to Mr. J. R. Mittal, it may be mentioned that he had first sought to place reliance on Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is in the following terms:
15 2026:HHC:31652
"Miscellaneous
proceedings.The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction." From the above it would be plain that the contention of the learned counsel is not well conceived. The aforesaid provision makes the procedure applicable to proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. As has been already indicated above, it is well settled that the Rent Controllers are not Court stricto sensu, but are persona designate, as held by a string of judgments in this Court. Consequently
section 141
of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked in this context.” (self emphasis supplied)
19. Had the intention of the Legislature been to make the procedure, as contained in the CPC, applicable to the proceedings, under the Rent Control Act, before the Rent Controller, then, there would have no hesitation for the Legislature to apply the same, in clear terms, whereas, by way of Rule 12 of the Rent Control Rules, it has been provided that the Controller shall be guided by the principle of procedure, as laid down in the CPC. 20.
The proforma of the petition, under Rule 3 and subRule (3) to Rule 4 of the Rent Control Rules, has been prescribed, which has been prescribed, keeping in view the legislative intent to decide the petition, in a summary manner. 21. The Rent Controller cannot proceed with the eviction petition, filed under Section 14 or Section 17 of the Rent Control Act, as per the procedure, prescribed under the CPC. The same is governed by Rule 5, which prescribes the verification, as per
Order VI Rules 14 and 15 of the CPC. Similarly, by way of Rules 14 and 15 of the Rent Control Rules, procedure for filing the appeal and revision, has been prescribed.
22. If the above Rules are seen, in the light of the provisions of the CPC, then, it can safely be held that the Legislature has provided a window, by way of Rule 12 of the Rent Control Rules, qua
16 2026:HHC:31652 the applicability of the principle of procedure, which shall guide the Rent Controller, while deciding the eviction petition.”
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner, could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court as to how the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1(2) of CPC are applicable in the petition, filed under the Rent Act, which is to be adjudicated by the persona designata i.e. Rent Controller.
16. Moreover, when the legislature has prescribed the procedure in the Act itself, then, the petitioner cannot take recourse to the provisions of CPC, which has been held to be not applicable to the proceedings before the persona designata and only the principles are to be followed.
17. Considering the above facts, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the well reasoned
order passed by the learned Rent Controller, that too, under the provisions of 227 of the Constitution of India, where the scope of interference is very limited, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case “K. Valarmathi & Ors. Versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606”. Relevant para 9 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
17 2026:HHC:31652
“9. Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.”
18. Even otherwise, in a recent decision in case
“Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Verus B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of interference has again been explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.”
18 2026:HHC:31652
19. In view of the above, there is no occasion to interfere with the findings passed by learned Rent Controller.
Consequently, the instant petition is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 20. No order as to costs. 21. Parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the learned Rent Controller, on 20.08.2026, at 10:00 am. ( Virender Singh ) Judge 29th July, 2026 (Pramod Kumar)