2026:HHC:31516 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1066 of 2026 Reserved on: 29.7.2026 Decided on: 30.7.2026 Pankaj Kumar ….Petitioner Versus State of HP & anr. ….Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner : M/s Y.K. Thakur, Bhanu Verma and Ritik Prashar, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No.35 of 2026, dated 25.2.2026, registered at Police Station Jogindernagar, District Mandi, H.P. for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103 read with Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nahaya Sanhita, (BNS), 2023 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:31516 2. It has been asserted that as per the prosecution, the deceased went to Urmila Devi’s house on 24.2.2026, at about 11.36 p.m. and started hurling abuses, banging on the door and accusing her of having ruined the life of the son of the deceased. The petitioner and his father came out of the residence on hearing the commotion. The petitioner tried to pacify the deceased and persuade her to leave the spot. However, the deceased continued shouting, hurling abuses and creating disturbances. The deceased fell on the pathway near the vehicles. She stood up on her own. The co-accused Ajay Thakur arrived on the spot after jumping over the gate of the petitioner's premises and pushed her into a drain. She sustained injuries and subsequently succumbed to them. The petitioner was not an aggressor, but he was trying to pacify the deceased. He had called the Police Station on 24.02.2026 at about 11.37 p.m.; however, no entry was recorded by the police in the daily diary. The allegations, even if accepted to be true, do not constitute the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103 of the BNS. There is no material to show that the petitioner shared the common intention with the co-accused. As per the prosecution, the act of pushing the deceased by Ajay Thakur led to her death, 3 2026:HHC:31516 which is an independent act. The petitioner is a permanent resident of District Mandi, H.P. He has roots in the society. His wife is in an advanced stage of pregnancy, and she requires constant care. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police had gone for patrolling on 24.02.2026. They received information at about 11.57 p.m., regarding a quarrel taking place at Arthi Road. The police reached the spot at about 12.10 p.m. and found a woman lying in a drain. She was taken to the hospital, where she was declared dead. The informant made a statement that the petitioner Pankaj Kumar and co-accused Ajay were quarrelling with the deceased. Pankaj had pushed the deceased and thereafter beaten her with the branches of Neelkanta. The deceased lost balance and tried to move backwards. Ajay Thakur reached the spot and pushed her into the drain. She sustained injuries and succumbed to them. Subsequently, the petitioner also produced his mobile phone containing the recording of the incident. The result of the 4 2026:HHC:31516 analysis showed that the video recording was prepared at 11:23:57 hours. The statements of the witnesses were recorded as per their version. The offence is heinous, and the death of a woman was caused. The prosecution witnesses reside in the same building in which the petitioner is residing. Releasing the petitioner on bail would compromise the fair trial as the petitioner could easily influence the witnesses. The cause of death was found to be Spinal shock secondary to blunt trauma sustained to the neck region and asphyxia secondary to antemortem wet drowning. The quantity of alcohol in the blood was found to be 150.17 mg%. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court. Hence the report. 4. I have heard M/s Y.K. Thakur, Bhanu Varma and Ritik Parashar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Y.K. Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. As per the statements of prosecution witnesses, the petitioner had only tried to pacify the deceased. Co-accused Ajay 5 2026:HHC:31516 Thakur had pushed the deceased. The petitioner had not shared any common intention with the co-accused. He submitted that the petitioner had made telephonic call to the police regarding the incident at 11.30 PM and 11.57 PM. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission: - (i) State of Rajasthan Vs. Balchand alias Baliay (1977) 4 SCC 308; (ii) Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor (1978) 1 SCC 240; (iii) Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI 2012 (1) SCC 40; (iv) Nikesh Tarachand Shah Vs. UOI (2018) 11 SCC 1; and (v) Rahul Singh Vs. State of H.P. 2025 Supreme (Online) (SC) 7223 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. He and the co-accused Ajay Thakur had created such circumstances which led to the death of the deceased. The petitioner is residing in the same building in which key eyewitnesses are residing. The petitioner would influence witnesses on his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6 2026:HHC:31516 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. InGudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, 7 2026:HHC:31516 particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of 8 2026:HHC:31516 course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally 9 2026:HHC:31516 incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while 10 2026:HHC:31516 considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 11 2026:HHC:31516 10. Similar views were taken in Sanjay Chandra (supra) and Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra). 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. Copy of the FIR shows that the petitioner came out of the room. He picked up a branch of Neelkanta and gave beatings to the deceased. She went towards the Nallah and abused the petitioner. Ajay Thakur came to the spot in the meantime and pushed her into the Nallah. The deceased sustained injuries which led to her death. 13. These circumstances show that the petitioner had initially given beatings to the deceased, pushed her and the deceased was forced to go to a Nallah. The co-accused pushed her from the Nallah. Thus, the acts of the petitioner and the co- accused formed a single indivisible act which led to the death of the deceased. Prima facie, the act of the petitioner would be covered under Section 103 read with Section 3(8) of the BNS. It was laid down in Subbappa Channappa v. Emperor, 1912 SCC OnLine Bom 10: 1913 Cri LJ 235 that where the accused were acting in concert in the sense that their attack was a single indivisible 12 2026:HHC:31516 thing, both of them would be liable by virtue of Section 37 of the Indian Penal Code. It was observed at page 235: 4. On the evidence, it is further established that the two appellants were acting in concert in the sense that their attack was a single indivisible thing, so that both of them would be liable for the result which ensued. That is the consequence of the provisions of section 37 of the Penal Code which enacts that when an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence. On the evidence, we are satisfied, as the learned Judge was satisfied, that the first appellant, who used the stick, intentionally co-operated in the commission of the murder with the second appellant, who used the still more cruel weapon, the stone. 14. It has been stated in Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 36th Edition, 2025. LexisNexis India that where the acts of two persons bring a result, they are liable for it even though they may not have a common intention. It is observed in Volume 1 at page 129: This Section provides that, when several acts are done so as to result together in the commission of an offence, the doing of any one of them, with an intention to cooperate in the offence (which may not be the same as an intention common to all), makes the actor liable to be punished for the commission of the offence. The acts may be several, but if the accused persons in furtherance of common intention commit the acts, they are answerable for end- result or actus reus. Thus, A and B attacked another person, say C, in furtherance of common intention and concert in the sense that their attack was a single indivisible act, and 13 2026:HHC:31516 A struck C savagely on the head with a heavy stick and B smashed C in his skull by a blow dealt with a heavy stone held firmly in the hand. C died in consequence of the injuries, but there was no general fight of any description before the attack. In this situation, by operation of section 37 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, A and B both would be held guilty of murder. 15. The judgment in Rahul Singh (supra) deals with common intention and is not relevant. The making of calls to the police will not take away the effect of the act of the accused. 16. The offence of murder is heinous and is punishable with the extreme penalty of death or imprisonment for life. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed on page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of, and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the 14 2026:HHC:31516 highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 17. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail considering the severity of the punishment and the nature of the offence. 18. The police have filed a charge sheet before the Court and the matter is pending for committal proceedings. The trial has not yet commenced. There is force in the submission of learned Additional Advocate General that the petitioner can 15 2026:HHC:31516 influence the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Thus, release of the petitioner on bail will compromise the fair trial. 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 21. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th July, 2026 (Chander)