IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.WP No.11 of 2026 Reserved on : 14.07.2026 Decided on : 30.07.2026 Uploaded on : 30.07.2026 Shaleen Kacker ...petitioner. Versus The State of HP and Others. …Respondents. Coram Hon’ble Mr. Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner : Mr. Vihaan Kumar and Mr. Mukesh Sharma, Advocates. For the respondent(s): Mr. Gobind Korla, Addl. Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3. Mr. Rajnish Maniktala, Senior Advocate with Mr. Dinkar Bhaskar, Advocate, for respondent No.4. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge By way of the present petition, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been invoked by the petitioner, seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, directing the official respondents No.1 to 3 to produce the female minor child, 'Shanaya', who is alleged to have been illegally detained by respondent No.4. 2. Marriage inter-se the petitioner and respondent No.4 took place at Delhi on 18.01.2008. Post-marriage, both 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes -2- the parties shifted to the United States of America. From the wedlock, a daughter named 'Shanaya' was born on 27.04.2016. The child, in the case at hand, suffers from autism. On account of marital discord, divorce proceedings were initiated before the US Family Court on 04.12.2018 by the petitioner. The divorce proceedings culminated in a judgment of divorce dated 27.01.2023 (Annexure P-1), passed by the US Family Court. 3. In the petition, it is alleged that respondent No.4 flouted the unambiguous directions contained in the judgment dated 27.01.2023, passed by the US Family Court and relocated to India on 30.09.2023. Respondent No.4 is alleged to be currently residing in Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. According to the petitioner, prior to the removal of the minor female child, 'Shanaya', from the USA, respondent No.4 was to take necessary steps to obtain a judgment/order/decree from a Court in India, wherein the terms of the judgment passed by the US Family Court were to be duly incorporated (mirror judgement). As per the petitioner, it is only thereafter that the minor female child could have been brought to India. -3- 4. Further according to the petitioner, rather than obtaining a "mirror judgment" on the basis of the judgment dated 27.01.2023, passed by the US Family Court, respondent No.4 filed a suit before the Court of the Additional District Judge, Palampur, District Kangra, i.e., Civil Suit 5/24, seeking only a part declaration of the judgment dated 27.01.2023, passed by the US Family Court. The suit was instituted on 17.09.2024. 5. In the said suit, the petitioner had filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC on 28.07.2025 (Annexure P-3). The same was dismissed vide an order dated 28.07.2025 (Annexure P-4). Other than the aforesaid in the suit filed by respondent No.4, written statement was filed by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was proceeded against ex-parte. The suit was dismissed vide judgment dated 08.12.2025 (Annexure P-5). 6. Prior to that the petitioner had also initiated contempt proceedings against respondent No.4 before the US Family Court. In the same, vide order dated 18.04.2025, the Court directed production of the child from 16.07.2025 to 15.08.2025 in the US, in order to enable the petitioner to have parenting time with the minor child. Thereafter, an order was -4- also passed by the US Family Court subsequently in the contempt proceedings on 29.07.2025, directing production of the female child in question from 26.12.2025 to 10.01.2026 in the United States. Vide order dated 31.10.2025 in the contempt proceedings, the US Court besides holding respondent No.4 as guilty of contempt further ordered that the petitioner shall have the sole legal and physical custody of the minor child, and gave liberty to the petitioner to register the said judgment in an Indian Court, with the further right to travel to India to take custody of the minor child. 7. In the petition, it is further averred that in response to the aforesaid orders passed by the US Court, three emergency motions were preferred before the Court by respondent No.4 seeking stay of enforcement of order dated 31.10.2025, passing of a temporary order to maintain status quo, and clarification of order dated 31.10.2025. Vide order dated 21.11.2025, it is alleged that the US Family Court denied to pass any orders on the emergency motions so preferred by respondent No.4. Besides the aforesaid, the petitioner is stated to be paying child support equivalent to 1070 US Dollars per month for the welfare of the child. -5- 8. In the aforesaid backdrop, it is alleged that since the minor has been removed illegally in violation of the judgment passed by the US Family Court, therefore, the present Habeas Corpus petition is maintainable. Besides in the facts and attending circumstances of the case at hand, it is contended that it is the US Family Court which alone has jurisdiction over the dispute inter se the petitioner and respondent No.4. Moreover, it is contended that the female minor child, "Shanaya", is a US citizen by birth (DOB: 27.04.2016) and till September 2023, she was residing in US. Therefore, courts in USA alone have jurisdiction. 9. Other than the aforesaid, it is contended that in terms of order dated 31.10.2025, sole custody of the minor has been granted to the petitioner, and respondent No.4 has been held to be guilty of contempt. It is further alleged in the petition that on account of forceful removal of the minor child from America, the minor would not become an ordinary resident of the new place of residence, i.e., Palampur and hence, jurisdiction of the Family Court (Guardians and Wards Act) at Palampur would not be invocable. 10. Per contra, in the reply filed by respondent No.4, solemnization of marriage, birth of the minor child and passing -6- of the judgment dated 27.01.2023 by the US Family Court is admitted. However, any infraction of the judgment dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Family Court, specifically para 8 thereof, on account of relocating the minor to Palampur on 30.09.2023, is categorically denied. In this respect, attention of the Court has been invited to Annexure R-16 (page 256 of the paper book), i.e., email dated 25.09.2023, whereby respondent No.4, before leaving for India, had informed the petitioner. 11. Other than the aforesaid, attention has also been invited to an application filed in the US Family Court by the petitioner seeking modification of the judgment dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Family Court (Annexure R-14, page 248 of the paper book). In terms of order dated 04.03.2023 passed thereupon, modification being sought in paragraph 8 of the judgment had been denied. The modification being sought in paragraph 8 was to the effect that the child would not be removed to India till the time a mirror judgement of the judgment dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Family Court is obtained from an Indian court and a certified copy thereof is provided to the petitioner-father. -7- 12. After the relocation of respondent No.4 along with the minor child on 30.09.2023, as per respondent No.4, a civil suit was filed on 28.02.2024 under Section 13 of the CPC, seeking requisite declaration qua the judgment dated 27.01.2023, passed by the US Court. The said suit had been filed for obtaining a mirror judgment. Copy of the plaint in this respect is appended along with the reply as Annexure R- 17. The same was withdrawn as the Civil Judge, Palampur did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Thereafter, a suit was filed in the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Palampur (Annexure R-18) to obtain a mirror judgment on 17.09.2024. The same had been filed in September, 2024. In the reply, it is further contended that since United States is a non-reciprocating Country, therefore, obtaining a mirror judgment in India is neither automatic nor straight-forward. 13. In the subsequent suit so filed, the petitioner did not cooperate, rather adopted an obstructionist approach as the petitioner initially filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which was filed on 28.07.2025 and, vide an order of the same date, was dismissed. Thereafter, in the suit, the petitioner filed a written statement, despite a request for filing a joint petition, which was refused. -8- 14. Other than the aforesaid, it is contended in the reply that respondent No.4 had applied for a US visa in the year 2024, which was granted only in September 2025. In view of the fact that the respondent No.4 had no valid visa, directions passed by the US Family Court with respect to parenting time granted to the petitioner could not be complied with. Despite being aware of the same, it is alleged in the reply that the petitioner pursued an aggressive and coercive process in the US Family Court by filing contempt proceedings and getting orders passed thereupon. 15. It has further been averred in the reply that the respondent No.4 through video conferencing is participating in the court proceedings being conducted in the USA. Moreover, in the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, it is pointed out that respondent No.4 has been continuously and bona-fidely engaging herself in the process of obtaining a mirror judgment in India, in terms of the US Family Court judgment. 16. The petitioner is stated to have not paid the child support from February 2024 to February 2025 (for a period of 12 months). Other than the aforesaid, the petitioner is stated to have obtained a temporary order in April 2026 qua -9- stoppage of payment of child support. The custody of the child is stated to be legal and valid, and hence the petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is contended to be not maintainable. 17. The child is stated to be residing in India since September 2023, and hence, according to respondent No.4, the child should be treated to be an ordinary resident, conferring jurisdiction upon Courts in India to deal with rights of guardianship qua the child. The child is stated to be enrolled in a school in India since 2023. It is contended that the welfare of the child is of prime importance. 18. Proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, are stated to have been initiated before the Additional Principal Judge, Palampur, wherein the petitioner is also stated to be a party. On account of availing the aforesaid alternate efficacious remedy, the present petition is stated to be not maintainable. 19. Other than the aforesaid, the statement of the child recorded before the Court of Additional Principal Judge family Court, Palampur, has been placed on record to point out that the wish and desire of the child is to remain with the mother. Instances of maltreatment of the child by the petitioner have also been placed on record. Details of past misdemeanours of -10- the petitioner have also been narrated in the response filed by respondent No.4. 20. No replication has been filed. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings. 21. In a habeas corpus petition as is the case at hand, it needs to be examined at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful or unlawful custody of private respondent named in the writ petition. Admittedly the custody of the minor in the case at hand is with her biological mother. The custody of the minor with her biological mother, will have to be presumed to be lawful. (Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 8 SCC 454). 22. However, in the case at hand the custody of the minor with respondent No.4 is alleged to be illegal by the petitioner on account of flouting of the judgment dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Family Court specifically clause 8 thereof (Annexure P-1). Based on the same it is contended that prior to relocating to India, respondent No.4 was required to have obtained a ‘mirror judgement’ from a court in India duly incorporating the US Family Court judgment dated 27.01.2023. -11- 23. Further according to the petitioner since in the case at hand the custody of the minor with respondent No.4 is illegal, therefore, the present petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus would be maintainable. To support the said submission reliance is placed on Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) 3 SCC 67. 24. In Yashita Sahu’s case (supra) the Norfolk Court on 26.09.2018 in terms of an agreement inter-se the parties therein granted Joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the child to the parents, with each parent being given individual parenting time. Thereafter the wife along with the child left the USA and came to India on 30.09.2018 before 01.10.2018, which was the next date fixed before the Norfolk Court. 25. Subsequent thereto on an emergency motion filed before the Norfolk Court on 02.10.2019 an ex-parte order was passed in favour of the husband whereby the Norfolk Court granted sole legal and physical custody of the child to the husband and directed the wife to return to the USA along with the child. A warrant was also issued against the wife for violating the order dated 26.09.2018 of the Norfolk Court. 26. The husband also filed a petition for issuance of a -12- writ of habeas corpus before the Rajasthan High Court for production of his minor child. Thereupon the High Court directed the wife to return to the USA along with her minor daughter to enable the jurisdictional court in the USA to pass further orders in the already pending proceedings. 27. In the aforesaid facts the apex court at the threshold examined whether the minor was in lawful or unlawful custody of the mother. The apex court held custody of the child not to be strictly legal since the wife had brought the minor to India in violation of the orders of the jurisdictional court in the USA. However, the direction issued to the adult spouse to go and live with the other strained spouse in writ jurisdiction was held to be invalid. 28. In the case at hand in terms of Clause 7 of the judgment dated 27.1.2023, the mother was permitted to remove the child to India after 15.8.2023. After removal as per clause 9 of the judgment dated 27.1.2023 the child’s legal and physical custody was to be with the mother. Clause 9 reads as under; “9. After removal of the child to India, mother shall have legal and physical custody of the child, subject to father’s parenting time.” -13- 29. By virtue of clause 8 of the judgment dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Family Court respondent No.4 was required to take all necessary steps to obtain a “mirror judgement”. Clause 8 reads as follow:- “8. Prior to her removal to India, Mother shall take all necessary steps to obtain an order/decree/judgment in India, which incorporates and directly reflects the terms of this judgment. She shall seek the assistance of legal counsel in India, in order to obtain such orders from the appropriate Indian Court.” 30. The expression used in clause 8 is, “Mother shall take all necessary steps to obtain an order/decree/judgment in India”, and not “Mother shall obtain an order/decree/judgment in India”. In this respect a reference to Annexure R-14, page 248 of the paper book would be relevant for a better understanding of clause 8 and how it was understood by the parties especially the petitioner. From a perusal of the same it is apparent that an application was filed by the petitioner in the US Family Court seeking modification of the judgment dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Family Court. Amongst various modifications being sought one modification was qua paragraph 8 of the judgment. The -14- precise modification being sought with respect to paragraph 8 of the judgment reads as under (underlined portion); 8. Prior to her removal to India, Mother shall take all necessary steps to obtain an order/decree/judgment in India, which incorporates and directly reflects the terms of this judgment. She shall seek the assistance of legal counsel in India, in order to obtain such orders from the appropriate Indian Court. Mother shall not remove the child to India until such order/decree/judgment is obtained and a certified copy thereof is provided to father. 31. Hence it is evident that the modification being sought in paragraph 8 was to the effect that the minor in question would not be removed to India till the time a mirror judgement of the one passed by the US Family Court is obtained from an Indian Court and a certified copy thereof is provided to the petitioner-father, thereby making it amply clear that the un-amended clause 8 did not contemplate/provide for the same. 32. Vide order dated 04.03.2023 the aforesaid modification being sought with respect to clause 8 was denied. Other than the aforesaid, a fact which is required to be noticed is that the respondent No.4 before leaving for India with the -15- minor vide email dated 25.09.2023 Annexure R-16 (page 256 of the paper book), had informed the petitioner. The respondent No.4 left for India subsequent to the rejection of the modification in clause 8 on 04.03.2023 and after 15.08.2023 i.e date specified in clause 7 of judgement dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Family Court prior to which respondent No.4 could not have left for India. Thereafter in view of clause 9, reproduced supra, the legal and physical custody of the child lay with respondent No.4. 33. The next question to be considered in the case at hand would be whether a judgement passed by the foreign court, on a complaint for civil contempt, directing the petitioner to travel to India to take custody of the minor child would render the custody of the minor unlawful? (Annexure P-10 page 79 of the paper book) especially when emergency motions to stay operation of Annexure P-10, clarify the same and pass further temporary orders filed on behalf of the respondent No.4 have been denied (Annexures P-12 & P13) and admittedly an appeal against Annexure P-10 is pending consideration before a court of competent jurisdiction. 34. Merely because such an order is passed by the -16- foreign court, the custody of the minor would not become unlawful per se (Nithya Anand Raghavan para 48). In the case at hand no judgement of the concerned foreign court has been shown where the custody of the minor with her mother has been declared to be unlawful. At best, as per Annexure P-10, the respondent No.4 has been held to have violated the direction to transport the minor to USA to enable the petitioner to enjoy his parenting right qua the minor. Besides the aforesaid infractions have been committed by re- spondent No.4 as per Annexure P-10 as neither steps for ob- taining a mirror judgement in India have been taken nor de- tails have been provided qua the recommended autism ser- vices for the minor in question in terms of judgement dated 27.01.2023 passed by the US Court (Annexure P-1). 35. Moreover, one cannot lose sight of the fact that in terms of Annexure P-10 the petitioner had been directed to travel to India to take custody of the minor and to register the judgement Annexure P-10, temporary order of the same date i.e 31.10.2025 Annexure P-11 with a Court in India. Which till date has not been done by the petitioner. Even for filing of the present petition the petitioner has not come to India. In this backdrop it would be relevant to reproduce order dated -17- 14.05.2026 when through video conferencing we had an occasion to interact with the petitioner. The order reads as follow:- “We have interacted with the parties in this case through video conferencing and found that the attitude of the petitioner is totally non-committal. There has apparently been no attempt on the part of the petitioner even to reach out to the child for the last three years, which a father would normally do. The father is unwilling to give a definite date to come to India to interact with the child and is more bothered about the proceedings, which are being carried out in the USA. In spite of repeated efforts being made to give a date, so that the father can interact with the child, although the mother has offered to make the child available on 15.07.2026, no positive response has been offered by the petitioner. In such circumstances, we deem it proper to defer the proceedings of this case to a month later. Let the parties, especially the petitioner re-think over the issue. List on 06.07.2026.” 36. The aforesaid conduct of the petitioner cannot be over-looked/ignored. Moreover, the wish and desire of the -18- child is to remain with the mother in terms of the statement of the child recorded before the Court of Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Palampur, Annexure R-24 (page 304 of the paper book). Other than the aforesaid the child has been living in India with her mother since September 2023. Besides the aforesaid, it would be relevant to mention that while in America, the petitioner had been booked on account of assault and battery for having thrown a semi-filled suitcase at the respondent No.4 and the minor child in question on 18.12.2016. At that particular point of time, the minor child was about six months old. The said fact is evident from Annexure R- 3 i.e. police report appended along with the reply filed by respondent No.4. The petitioner had been enlarged on bail on 19.12.2016 in the aforesaid case with the specific condition that the petitioner shall not contact/abuse the respondent in the case at hand. The order in this respect is appended as Annexure R-5 with the reply filed. In sequel thereto, the respondent in the case at hand obtained a restraining order from a US Court, whereby custody of the child had been given to the respondent. The said restraining order is appended along with the reply as Annexure R-4. -19- 37. Subsequent thereto from the initiation (18.12.2018) of the divorce proceedings inter-se the parties and till its culmination (27.01.2023) the petitioner had abandoned the marital home and ceased cohabitation leaving the respondent No.4 to take care of the upbringing of the minor child. The aforesaid facts from 18.12.2016 till the passing of the judgement on 27.01.2023 by the US Family Court find mention in the reply of respondent No.4 and the same have not been controverted by filing of a replication. 38. In Nithya Anand Raghavan’s case (supra) the Apex Court has held that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be converted into an executing court for enforcement of the di- rections given by the foreign court. The relevant extract whereof reads as follow:- “46………………………………Further, the remedy of writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for mere enforcement of the directions given by the foreign court against a person within its jurisdiction and convert that jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Indubitably, the writ petitioner can take recourse to such other remedy as may be permissible in law for enforcement of the order passed by the foreign court or to resort to any other proceedings as may be permissible in -20- law before the Indian court for the custody of the child, if so advised. (above extract has also been referred to in Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) 3 SCC 67).” 39. The plea of transfer of custody of a minor child from one parent to other by way of a habeas corpus petition came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Cr.WP No.11 of 2023, titled Saurav Rattan vs. State of H.P. and Ors., decided on 09.05.2025,(judgement was authored by one of us, C.J G.S. Sandhawalia) therein, the Court was of the view that while considering such a plea by way of a habeas corpus petition, the paramount consideration would be the welfare of the child. Besides the aforesaid it was held therein that in a petition filed seeking a writ of habeas corpus for custody of a minor child, it is to be ascertained as to whether the custody of a child is unlawful or illegal. Further, it has been held that the statutory remedy available under the Guardians and Wards Act is normally to be invoked in such like cases as the welfare and well-being of a child can be considered in accordance with law in such proceedings after appreciation of evidence collected in a detailed inquiry held thereunder and not in a Habeas Corpus petition. Even otherwise, disputed claims/facts cannot be resolved in a -21- petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 40. After holding the aforesaid in the facts and circumstances of Saurav Rattan’s case, the Court was of the view that a petition for habeas corpus was not the correct methodology to take custody of the child as therein the custody could not be termed to be unlawful. 41. The aforesaid view taken in Saurav Rattan’s case was reiterated by us in Cr.W.P. No.7 of 2026, titled Himanshu Dilip Kulkarni versus State of HP. In Himanshu Dilip Kulkarni’s case a specific reliance had been placed on Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari, (2019) 7 SCC 42. The relevant extract of Tejaswini Gaud, whereupon reliance had been placed reads as follow; “Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the child is addressed to the discretion of the Court. Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be -22- issued. In child custody matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law.” 42. The custody of the minor child for the reasons detailed supra in the case at hand is not illegal. Hence the judgement in Yashita Sahu’s case relied upon by the petitioner is of no avail. The conduct of the petitioner as discussed in paragraph 35 supra is an important factor in dis-entitling the petitioner for grant of any relief in the case at hand. Besides under the ordinary law i.e Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 there exists an effective remedy. Proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, have been initiated before the Additional Principal Judge, Palampur, wherein the petitioner is a party. Therein the Court can examine the interests of the minor without being fixated with the factum of an order of the foreign court directing return of the child nor -23- influenced with the fact that the petitioner was successful in getting an order from the foreign court for production of the child. Moreover, as has already been stated supra, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be converted into an executing court for enforcement of the directions given by the foreign court. Other than the aforesaid, the extra-ordinary jurisdiction in the case at hand has not been exercised promptly and quickly. The same has been invoked almost after two and a half years after the removal of the child to India. 43. Based on the principle of comity of Courts the court while considering the case at hand on merits would have to give paramount importance to the welfare of the child and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. The principle of comity of Courts came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Nihya Anand Raghavan VS. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2017) 8 SCC Page 454. The relevant extract whereof reads as follow:- “66. The invocation of first strike principle as a decisive factor, in our opinion, would undermine and whittle down the wholesome principle of the duty of the court having jurisdiction to consider the -24- best interests and welfare of the child, which is of paramount importance. If the Court is convinced in that regard, the fact that there is already an order passed by a foreign court in existence may not be so significant as it must yield to the welfare of the child. That is only one of the factors to be taken into consideration. The interests and welfare of the child are of paramount consideration. The principle of comity of courts as observed in Dhanwanti Joshi case, in relation to non-Convention countries is that the court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. While considering that aspect, the court may reckon the fact that the child was abducted from his or her country of habitual residence but the court’s overriding consideration must be the child’s welfare. 69. We once again reiterate that the exposition in Dhanwanti Joshi is a good law and has been quoted with approval by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Ravi Chandran (2). We approve the view taken in Dhanwanti Joshi, inter alia, in para 33 that so far as non-Convention countries are -25- concerned, the law is that the court in the country to which the child is removed while considering the question must bear in mind the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. The summary jurisdiction to return the child be exercised in cases where the child had been removed from its native land and removed to another country where, may be, his native language is not spoken, or the child gets divorced from the social customs and contacts to which he has been accustomed, or if its education in his native land is interrupted and the child is being subjected to a foreign system of education, for these are all acts which could psychologically disturb the child. Again the summary jurisdiction be exercised only if the court to which the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly. The overriding consideration must be the interests and welfare of the child. 44. Mirror judgments are passed keeping in mind the principle of comity of courts and public policy. Mirror judgments are ancillary or auxiliary in character to the order passed by the court which has exercised primary jurisdiction. Purpose being to avoid conflicting judgments being passed by -26- courts in two different jurisdictions (international family law). The judgement passed by the court which has exercised primary jurisdiction has great persuasive value and is not a binding obligation. The issue of mirror judgments came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Smriti Madan Kansagra Vs. Perry Kansagra, (2021) 12 SCC 289. The relevant extract whereof qua mirror judgements reads as under:- “24.2. Given the large number of cases arising from transnational parental abduction in inter-country marriages, the English courts have issued protective measures which take the form of undertakings, mirror orders, and safe harbour orders, since there is no accepted international mechanism to achieve protective measures. Such orders are passed to safeguard the interest of the child who is in transit from one jurisdiction to another. The courts have found mirror orders to be the most effective way of achieving protective measures. 24.3. The primary jurisdiction is exercised by the court where the child has been ordinarily residing for a substantial period of time, and has conducted an elaborate enquiry on the issue of custody. The court -27- may direct the parties to obtain a “mirror order” from the court where the custody of the child is being shifted. Such an order is ancillary or auxiliary in character, and supportive of the order passed by the court which has exercised primary jurisdiction over the custody of the child. In international family law, it is necessary that jurisdiction is exercised by only one court at a time. It would avoid a situation where conflicting orders may be passed by courts in two different jurisdictions on the same issue of custody of the minor child. These orders are passed keeping in mind the principle of comity of courts and public policy. The object of a mirror order is to safeguard the interest of the minor child in transit from one jurisdiction to another, and to ensure that both parents are equally bound in each State. The mirror order is passed to ensure that the courts of the country where the child is being shifted are aware of the arrangements which were made in the country where he had ordinarily been residing. Such an order would also safeguard the interest of the parent who is losing custody, so that the rights of visitation and temporary custody are not impaired. The judgment of the court which had exercised primary jurisdiction of the custody of the minor child is however not a matter of binding -28- obligation to be followed by the court where the child is being transferred, which has passed the mirror order. The judgment of the court exercising primary jurisdiction would however have great persuasive value.” 45. For the aforesaid reasons, the present petition is dismissed being devoid of merit, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (G.S. Sandhawalia) (Bipin Chander Negi) Chief Justice Judge 30th July, 2026 (Gaurav Rawat)