1. ( 2026:HHC:31511 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA OMP(M) No.476 of 2025 Reserved on: 07.07.2026 Date of Decision: 30.07.2026 Uploaded on: 30.07.2026 The Managing Director H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. …Applicant Versus M/s Adarsh Food Products Pvt. Ltd. …..Respondent Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicant : Mr. Prashant Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Atul Jhingan, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge Applicant has filed the accompanying appeal, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), against the judgment dated 29.03.2025, passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’), 2. By virtue of the judgment, dated 29.03.2025, the objections filed by the applicant, against the award dated 02.04.2015 and supplementary award dated 27.05.2015, passed by the Arbitrator, Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate, in 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. ( 2026:HHC:31511 ) Arbitration Case 17 of 2014, titled as M/s Adarsh Food Products Private Limited versus Managing Director H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, have been dismissed. 3. Since the appeal has been filed, after the prescribed period of limitation, as such, the present application for condonation of delay has been filed. 4. As per the report of the Registry, there is delay of 195 days, in preferring the appeal. 5. The delay has been sought to be condoned, on the ground, that the judgment was passed on 29.03.2025, and thereafter, the counsel representing the applicant applied for certified copy of the judgment on 03.07.2025, which was received on 15.07.2025. Thereafter, the legal opinion was sought from the counsel, which was received by the applicant’s office on 04.07.2025 and the matter was forwarded for drafting the appeal on 21.07.2025 and appeal was prepared and sent to the applicant for approval on 25.08.2025. Thereafter, the matter was sent back to the counsel for carrying out necessary amendments on 06.09.2025 and the final draft was received from the 3. ( 2026:HHC:31511 ) counsel on 10.09.2025 and thereafter, the final approval for filing the appeal was received on 12.09.2025. 6. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made that the delay in filing the appeal, is on account of the administrative process and the same is stated to be neither intentional, nor, deliberate. 7. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to condone the delay. 7.1. The application, is duly supported, by the affidavit of Financial Advisor of the applicant. 7.2. When, put to notice, the application has been contested, by the respondents, by filing the reply, in which, it has been highlighted that as per own version of the applicant, copy of award was applied after 96 days of passing the award, whereas, there is no explanation, with regard to the above material fact. 7.3. Other contents of the application have also been denied, on the ground, that there is no reasonable excuse for delay. As such, according to the respondent, applicant is not able to make out a case that there was sufficient cause, for not preferring the appeal, within the prescribed period of limitation. 4. ( 2026:HHC:31511 ) 7.4. Reply is duly supported, by the affidavit of the authorized signatory of the respondent. 7.5. The applicant has filed the rejoinder, denying the contents, by virtue of which, the application has been contested. It has been pleaded that the applicant had received the copy of the judgment dated 29.03.2025 from the counsel representing them, before the District Court, on 24.06.2025 and thereafter, the matter was promptly referred for legal examination. Thereafter, the certified copy of judgment was applied on 03.07.2025 and was received on 15.07.2025. 7.6. Efforts have been made to explain the delay, in filing the application, for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment, by pleading that the copy was applied on 03.07.2025, after receiving the legal opinion. 7.7. In nutshell, a plea has been taken, that on account of administrative exigency, the appeal could not be filed, within the prescribed period of limitation. 8. As such, a prayer has been made to allow the application, for condonation of delay. 9. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it has simply been mentioned, that the 5. ( 2026:HHC:31511 ) appeal could not be filed, as the copy of the judgment, sought to be assailed was applied on 03.07.2025 and was received on 15.07.2025. Thereafter, the legal opinion was obtained and the appeal has been filed. 10. When, this factual position has been contested, by the respondent, by pointing out that the copy of the judgment was applied only on 03.07.2025, whereas, the judgment was passed on 29.03.2025, then, a new plea has been inserted, in rejoinder, by pleading that the copy of the judgment dated 29.03.2025 was received on 24.06.2025 and thereafter, the matter was referred for legal examination. A new story has been introduced, after the copy of the judgment was supplied on 03.07.2025, which was received on 15.07.2025, the matter was dealt with by the authorities of the applicant at various levels and thereafter, the accompanying appeal, along with the present application, has been filed. 11. However, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court, with regard to the fact, as to when, the copy of the judgment was obtained, on 24.06.2025, then, what was the occasion to apply for the same, again on 03.07.2025. 6. ( 2026:HHC:31511 ) Moreover, the copy, which has allegedly been received on 24.06.2025, has also not been annexed, with the rejoinder to demonstrate that the copy was applied and obtained on 24.06.2025. 12. No doubt, a liberal approach has to be taken while deciding the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but, under the garb of taking liberal approach, whatsoever, pleaded in the application, is not liable to be accepted, as gospel truth. 13. The term ‘sufficient cause’ has nowhere been defined in the Limitation Act, but this does not mean that whatsoever, reason put forward by the applicant would fall within the definition of ‘sufficient cause’. The ‘sufficient cause’ is a situation, which is beyond the ordinary control of the litigant. 14. Admittedly, the applicant is impersonal machinery and acts through human agency, but, whenever, a litigant is approaching the Court, especially, in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is expected from the said applicant to plead at least true facts. The stand taken by the applicant, in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as well as, rejoinder is quite 7. ( 2026:HHC:31511 ) contradictory and does not appeal to the judicial conscience of this Court. On the pretext of taking a liberal approach, every approach is not liable to be accepted. 15. In view of the above discussion, there is no occasion for this Court to accept the above explanation, as sufficient cause, for condonation of delay. Consequently, the present application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Arb.AST No.53323 of 2025 The dismissal of OMP(M) No.476 of 2025, vide order of even date, results into the rejection of this appeal, being barred by limitation, so also the pending application(s), if any. (Virender Singh) Judge July 30, 2026 (subhash)