2026:HHC:31625 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 474 of 2007 Reserved on: 14.07.2026 Date of Decision: __.07.2026 State of H.P. & another ...Appellants Versus Inder Raj & others ...Respondents _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the appellants : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for the appellants/State. For the respondents : Mr Mohinder Verma, Advocate, for respondents No.1(a) to 1(c). None for respondents No.1(d) and 1(e). Name of respondent No.1(f) stands deleted vide order dated 20.09.2022. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 13.04.2007, passed by the learned District Judge, Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:31625 Division) Kandaghat, Camp at Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking a declaration that the defendants had no right to dismantle the plaintiff’s building comprised in Khasra No. 922 at RD No. 100/320 valley side. A consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering with the building was also sought. It was asserted that the plaintiff had constructed a building at RD No.100/320 on the valley side in compliance with the laws prevailing at the time of its construction. The building was old and four-storeyed. The defendants initiated proceedings under the HP Roadside Control Act before the Collector, who held that the plaintiff had violated Section 5 of the HP Roadside Control Act and ordered the demolition of the building to the extent of 4 metres in width and 11 metres in length. The Learned Collector relied upon the demarcation report, which was wrong and illegal. The schedule map was never placed on record to prove 3 2026:HHC:31625 the exact width of the road in question. The defendants are bent upon executing the order passed by the Learned Collector; therefore, the suit was filed for seeking the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by defendants 1 and 2 by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability, jurisdiction and locus standi, the order passed by the Collector being as per the provisions of law, and the plaintiff being estopped from filing the suit by his act, conduct, deeds and acquiescence. The contents of the plaint were admitted to the extent that the plaintiff had constructed a building at RD No. 100/320 on the valley side in Khasra No. 922, and the proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff for violation of the provisions of the Roadside Control Act. It was asserted that the learned Collector had provided ample opportunity to the plaintiff to present his case. The learned Collector passed the order after considering the entire material on record. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Collector. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. No replication was filed. 4 2026:HHC:31625 5. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 20.04.1999: 1. Whether the notice issued by the Collector is wrong, illegal and without jurisdiction and not binding upon the plaintiff? OPP 2. Whether the order passed by the Collector in case No. 68/96 dated 29.10.1997 is illegal, wrong and without jurisdiction, null and void? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit? OPD. 6. Whether no valid notice under Section 80 CPC is issued? OPD 7. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction? OPD 8. Relief. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the Civil Court does not have the jurisdiction to go into the validity of the order passed by the Collector under the provisions of H.P.Roadside Land Control Act; however, the jurisdiction is not taken away if the Collector acts without jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s evidence was not sufficient to show that the Collector had acted without 5 2026:HHC:31625 jurisdiction. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered all the issues in the negative and dismissed the suit. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned District Judge, Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the plaintiff’s house falls within the municipal limit of Solan; therefore, by virtue of Section 2 of the National Highway Act, 1968, the part of the road passing through the Municipal Committee cannot be treated as a National Highway. The Collector had no jurisdiction to proceed in the present matter because the road was not a national highway. The plaintiff had not pleaded that the Collector did not have jurisdiction because the land was not a national highway; however, the order of the Collector was patently illegal, and the Court was not precluded from looking into its validity. The learned trial Court erred in not considering this plea. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was not sustainable. Hence, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 6 2026:HHC:31625 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court, the defendant/State has filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 12.09.2013 1. Whether the findings given by Ld. Ist appellate Court below is both against the oral as well as documentary evidence on record? 2. Whether the findings of the Ist appellate Court below are vitiated and are illegal and want of proper pleadings and proof and the notices issued under Section 80 of C.P.C. as alleged by the Plaintiff in this case will extend the period of limitation for filing suit for declaration? 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellants/State and Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for respondent No.1(a) to 1(c). 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for the appellants/State submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in making out a case in favour of the plaintiff, which was never pleaded by the plaintiff. A Court can only find out a case made out by the parties, and it is impermissible for the Court to make a different case. The parties are bound by the pleadings, and any evidence beyond the pleadings cannot be looked into. The Appellate Court exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court 7 2026:HHC:31625 are not sustainable; hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:  National Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. Naresh Kumar Bandari Kumar Jagad 2011(12) SCC 695;  Kalyan Singh Chauhan vs. C.P. Joshi 2011 (11) SCC 786;  Trojan and Co. vs. Nagappa Chettir AIR No.1953 (SC) 235;  Divyagnakumari Sarisinh Parmar & Ors. Union of India 2025 INSC 1145:  Surajmull Nagoremull vs. Triton Insurance Ltd. 52 Indian Appeals 126;  Badri Prasad & Ors. vs. Nagarmal & ors. AIR 1959 (SC) 559;  Ram Sarup Gupta & ors. (by LRs vs. Bishun Narain Inter College & ors. AIR 1987 (2) and  Arikala Narasa Reddy vs. Venkata Ram Reddy Giri 2014(5) SCC 312 11. Mr Mohinder Verma, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1(a) to 1(c), submitted that the Court can take judicial notice of the facts under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in noticing the notorious facts existing on record. There is no infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon Onkar Nath & Ors. v. The Delhi 8 2026:HHC:31625 Administration AIR 1977 SC 1108 and Union of India v. Nihar Kanta Sen & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1713 in support of his submission. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial question of law No.1. 13. Section 19 of the HP Roadside Land Control Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any question relating to the matters falling under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. It reads as under: - Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts. - No civil courts shall have any jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question relating to matters falling under this Act or the rules made thereunder. 14. The plaintiff had never pleaded in the plaint that the Collector had no jurisdiction because the road fell within the Municipal Committee and was not covered under the provisions of Section 5 of the HP Roadside Land Control Act. He had only pleaded that the learned Collector had placed reliance on the demarcation report, which was illegal. He stated in his proof affidavit (Ext.PA) that the plaintiff had not violated the provisions of the HP Roadside Land Control Act and the house 9 2026:HHC:31625 was beyond the controlled width. National Highway was not located adjacent to the plaintiff’s house, and the demarcation was not correct. However, the learned Appellate Court held that the Collector had no jurisdiction because the land was located within the municipal limits. This was impermissible. It was laid down in Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Nagappa Chettiar, (1953) 1 SCC 456: 1953 SCC OnLine SC 53 that a decision cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is a case pleaded that has to be found. It was observed: 38. We are unable to uphold the view taken by the High Court on this point. It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for, and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint to incorporate in it an alternative case. The allegations on which the plaintiff claimed relief in respect of these shares are clear and emphatic. There was no suggestion made in the plaint or even when its amendment was sought at one stage that the plaintiff in the alternative was entitled to this amount on the ground of failure of consideration. That being so, we see no valid grounds for entertaining the plaintiff's claim as based on failure of consideration on the case pleaded by him. In disagreement with the courts below, we hold that the plaintiff was wrongly granted a decree for the sum of Rs 6762-8-0 in respect of the Associated Cement shares in this suit. Accounts settled could only be reopened on proper allegations. 10 2026:HHC:31625 15. A similar view was taken in Seth Badri Prasad v. Seth Nagar Mal 1958 SCC OnLine SC 107 wherein it was observed at page 236: Where a plaintiff comes to court on allegations which on the face of them show that the contract of partnership on which he sues is illegal, the only course for the courts to pursue is to say that he is not entitled to any relief on the allegations made as the courts cannot adjudicate in respect of contracts which, the law declares to be illegal (Senaji Kapurchand v. Pannaji Devichand([A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 300.]). The same view, which we think is correct, was expressed in Kumaraswami v. Chinnathambi [(1950) 20 Comp. Cas. 286; I.L.R. [1951] Mad. 593.]. 16. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Venkatappa v. M. Abdul Jabbar, (2006) 9 SCC 235: 2006 SCC OnLine SC 237 that a party is bound by the pleadings filed by it and it cannot be permitted to put forth a new case contrary to the pleadings. It was observed at page 239: 13…. This is contrary to the pleadings and evidence. The appellants herein are bound by the pleadings in the written statement filed by the first defendant and cannot be permitted to put forth a new case. 17. Similar view was taken in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, (2011) 12 SCC 695 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 791: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1212 wherein it was observed at page 712: 43….In the instant case, the appellant has not taken the plea before either of the courts below. In view of the 11 2026:HHC:31625 provisions of Order 8 Rule 2 CPC, the appellant was under an obligation to take a specific plea to show that the suit was not maintainable, which it failed to do so. The vague plea to the extent that the suit was bad for non-joinder and, thus, was not maintainable, did not meet the requirement of law. The appellant ought to have taken a plea in the written statement that it was merely an “agent” of the Central Government; thus, the suit against it was not maintainable. More so, whether A is an agent of B is a question of fact and has to be properly pleaded and proved by adducing evidence. The appellant miserably failed to take the required pleadings for the purpose. 18. This position was reiterated in Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2064 wherein it was observed: 17. These assertions advanced by the Appellants find no trace in the pleadings before any of the courts below, be it the Trial Court, or in the subsequent appellate proceedings. Neither the issues framed, nor the written submissions filed, nor the oral arguments addressed at those stages make any reference to such contentions. Indeed, the claims appear to have surfaced for the very first time before this Court. Notably, the plea concerning the applicability of Decree No. 27:135 has been raised only through an application filed before this Court on 13.07.2023 seeking leave to urge additional grounds, being I.A. Nos. 132155 and 132156 of 2023. 18. In this regard, we place our reliance on the well- entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties. 19. This rule has been consistently affirmed across time and is rooted in the very purpose of pleadings—namely, 12 2026:HHC:31625 to define the scope of the dispute and enable the court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Pleadings, together with the issues framed thereon, serve to crystallise the points of conflict, ensure that each side is apprised of the case it has to meet, and afford both parties a fair opportunity to lead evidence and advance submissions. To allow a party to depart from this framework at a belated stage would not only prejudice the opposite side but also undermine the principles of predictability and consistency that the adjudicatory process seeks to avow. 20. This position also finds statutory expression in Order XLI Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances contemplated under Order XLI Rule 27, an appellate court may permit the production of additional evidence—such as where the trial court has wrongly refused to admit evidence, or where, despite the exercise of due diligence, the party concerned was genuinely unaware of the existence of such evidence and therefore could not produce it earlier 19. Thus, the learned Appellate Court erred in entertaining the plea which was never set up before the learned Trial Court. 20. It was submitted that the Court can take judicial notice of the facts under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, this submission will not assist the plaintiff because the Court was not taking judicial notice of any fact but was granting relief on a plea which was never set up by the plaintiff. Therefore, the cited judgment will not assist the plaintiff. 13 2026:HHC:31625 21. The Learned District Judge relied upon the judgment of this Court in Gulzari Lal Jaggi vs Kamlesh Kumar Latest 2003 Suppl. 0459 to hold that the National Highway passing through Municipal Committee would not be a National Highway and would not be a controlled area within the meaning of Section 3(1) of HP Roadside Land Control Act, 1968. This judgment was delivered by the Court while considering the unamended provisions of the National Highway Act, 1956. The provision considered by this Court of Section 2(1) has been quoted in para 14 as under: “Each of the highways specified in the schedule except such parts thereof as are situated within any municipal area is hereby declared to be a national highway’ 22. However, the National Highway Act has been amended by Act No. 16 of 1997 with effect from 24.01.1997 and Section 2 (1) reads as under: Each of the highways specified in the Schedule 2*** is hereby declared to be a national highway 23. It is apparent that the words ‘except such parts thereof as are situated within Municipal Area’ have been deleted. Therefore, the very basis of the judgment that a part of a National Highway, which is located within Municipal Area, will not be a National Highway, no longer survives because of the 14 2026:HHC:31625 omission of these words. In the present case, the suit was instituted on 13.01.1998, and it was governed by the amended provisions of the Act. The provisions of the amended National Highways Act were not brought to the notice of the learned Appellate Court, and the learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the road within the municipal area would not be a National Highway. Thus, the findings recorded by the Learned Appellate Court cannot be sustained even on merits. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial question of law No.2 24. The Collector had passed an order on 29.10.1997, and the plaintiff filed the civil suit on 13.01.1998. A suit to set aside the order passed by the administrative authority would be governed by Article 100, and the period of limitation would be one year from the date of the order. Therefore, the suit was within limitation, and this substantial question of law does not arise. CMP No 7683 of 2016 25. The present application has been filed for placing on record the relevant facts necessary for the adjudication of the subject matter of the dispute. It has been asserted that the 15 2026:HHC:31625 dispute was with respect to the built-up structure of late Girdhari Lal. Sub-Divisional Collector, Solan, District Solan, H.P. held that Girdhari Lal had violated the provisions of Section 5 of HP Land Roadside Control Act. A similar order was passed in the buildings constructed by Nirmala Devi. She preferred an appeal, which was allowed on 16.02.2011 and it was ordered that the matter would be considered as per the judgment of this Court passed in Revision No. 388 of 1998, titled Guljari Lal Jaggi vs. Kamlesh Kumar & others decided on 29.04.1999. The State Government issued a notification on 19.07.2005 and declared the road as a district road, whereas the Solan-Barog-Kumarhatti road was declared as National Highway No. 22. These facts are required to be brought on record. Hence the application. 26. The application is opposed by filing a reply making preliminary submission regarding lack of maintainability. It was asserted that the learned District Judge omitted to take note of the provisions of Section 2 of the Roadside Land Control Act, 1956, by which the words ‘except such parts thereof’ as are situated within any Municipal Area’ are omitted with effect from 24.01.1997. Girdharilal was found to be an encroacher upon the controlled width of the road, and he is liable to be evicted as per 16 2026:HHC:31625 the provisions of the Act. Judgment in Guljari Lal Jaggi is of no help to the plaintiff as the Act was amended in the year 1997 and the provision of exclusion of Municipal Area from National Highway was omitted. The new facts can be brought on record by amendment and not otherwise. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed. 27. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the application was filed. 28. I have heard Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the applicants/respondents and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the non-applicant. 29. The present application has been filed to bring on record the subsequent events. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, (2002) 2 SCC 256: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 96 that the rights and liabilities are crystallised on the date of filing of the suit, but the Court can take note of subsequent events if they are brought on record by following the proper procedure by way of amendment of the pleadings. It was observed at page 262: 11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord 17 2026:HHC:31625 with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770: AIR 1975 SC 1409] this Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court cannot be blinked at. The court may, in such cases, bend the rules of procedure if no specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated, for it would promote substantial justice provided that there is absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. The Court, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J., affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as the litigation pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as would stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (ii) rules of procedure may be bent if no specific provision or fair play is violated and there is no other special circumstance repelling resort to that course in law or justice, (iii) such cognizance of subsequent events and developments should be cautious, and (iv) the rules of fairness to both sides should be scrupulously obeyed. 12. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the court may take judicial notice of the event and, before acting thereon, put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring 18 2026:HHC:31625 it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond the pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment, as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. In Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC 456: AIR 1953 SC 235] this Court has held that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found; without the amendment of the pleadings the Court would not be entitled to modify or alter the relief. In Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1898) 25 IA 195 (PC)], Their Lordships observed that, as a rule, relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted. 13. Power of the court to take note of subsequent events, especially at the appellate stage, came up for the consideration of a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court presided over by Justice Sinha (as His Lordship then was) in Chhote Khan v. Mohd. Obedulla Khan [AIR 1953 Nag 361]. Hidayatullah, J. (as His Lordship then was) held, on a review of judicial opinion, that an action must be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the action. No doubt, courts “can” and sometimes “must” take notice of subsequent events, but that is done merely “inter partes” to shorten litigation, but not to give to a defendant an advantage because a third party has acquired the right and title of the plaintiff. The doctrine itself is of an exceptional character only to be used in very special circumstances. It is all the more strictly applied in those cases where there is a judgment under appeal. His Lordship quoted the statement of law made by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J. in a series of cases that merely because the plaintiff loses his title pendente lite is no reason for allowing his adversary to win if the corresponding right has not vested in the adversary but in a third party. In the case at hand, the defendant-appellant 19 2026:HHC:31625 has simply stated the factum of proceedings initiated by HUDA against the plaintiff-respondent in an affidavit very casually filed by him. He has not even made a prayer to the court to take notice of such subsequent event and mould the relief accordingly, or to deny the relief to the plaintiff-respondent as allowed to him by the judgment under appeal, much less sought for an amendment of the pleadings. The subsequent event urged by the defendant- appellant is basically a factual event and cannot be taken cognisance of unless brought to the notice of the court in accordance with the established rules of procedure, which, if done, would have afforded the plaintiff- respondent an opportunity of meeting the case now sought to be set up by the appellant. We do not think this Court would be justified in taking notice of a fact sought to be projected by the appellant in a very cavalier manner. The fact remains that the present one is a landlord-tenant dispute and we cannot upset the relief granted by the courts below and the High Court to the plaintiff- respondent by relying on the doctrine of eviction by title paramount as it cannot be said that the proceedings initiated by HUDA against the plaintiff-respondent have achieved a finality or are such proceedings wherein the plaintiff-respondent cannot possibly have any sustainable defence. 30. This position was reiterated in Hukum Chandra v. Nemi Chand Jain, (2019) 13 SCC 363 = 2018 SCC OnLine SC 2812, wherein it was observed: - “15. The rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of institution of the suit. However, in appropriate cases, the court can take note of all the subsequent events. Observing that the court may permit subsequent events being introduced into the pleadings by way of the amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the performance of determining the rule in controversy for the parties, provided certain conditions are satisfied……. 20 2026:HHC:31625 16. The normal rule is that in any litigation, the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtained at the commencement of the litigation. Whenever there are subsequent events of fact or law, which have a material bearing on the rights of the parties to relief or the aspects of moulding appropriate relief to the parties, the court is not precluded from taking cognisance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief (vide Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, 1992 Supp2 SCC 623)” 31. In the present case, no amendment is being sought, and it is impermissible to place the subsequent events on record by means of an application under Section 151 of the CPC. 32. Even otherwise, the appeal was never preferred by Girdhari Lal, but was filed by Nirmala Devi; therefore, the judgment delivered by the Financial Commissioner would be irrelevant for determining the dispute pending between Girdhari Lal and the State. Thus, the order cannot be taken into consideration. 33. The subsequent notification issued by the State Government will not help the plaintiff as Solan-Barog- Kumarhatti as a major district road under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. The notification issued under Section 3 of the HP Land Roadside Control Act was noticed by this Court in Inder Singh vs Asstt Engineer ILR 1995 HP 927 as under: 21 2026:HHC:31625 12. Annexure DF is the copy of the notification, referred to above, dated 19th July, 1971, issued under Section 3 of the Act. In this notification, the controlled area, for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, has been defined as under: (1) (2) National Highways State Highways Up to a horizontal distance of 5 metres from the edge of the road land on either side, (3) Other Roads Up to a horizontal distance of four metres from the edge of the road land on either side. (4) Road junctions Up to a horizontal distance of five metres from the edge of the road land on either side and up to a length of 50 metres on all roads meeting at the junctions. 34. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Collector (ExP5) shows that the violation was to the extent of 4 meters; hence the notification will not alter the violation in the present case. 35. Consequently, the present application cannot be allowed and is dismissed. 22 2026:HHC:31625 CMP No. 8946 of 2024 36. The present application has been filed for dismissing the RSA No. 474 of 2007. It has been asserted that the proceedings were initiated in a large number of cases and identical eviction orders were passed by the Sub-Divisional Collector; however, the Financial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, has set aside those eviction orders on the ground that Village Deongahat had been included in the Municipal Area of Solan, H.P. and the provisions of HP Roadside Land Control Act do not apply. The plaintiff had not filed any appeal, but filed a civil suit. The State is discriminating against the plaintiff. Therefore, it was prayed that the copies of the decisions of the authority be placed on record. 37. The application was opposed by filing a reply taking preliminary objection regarding lack of maintainability. It was asserted that the plaintiff had filed a civil suit, which was dismissed by the learned trial Court, and this decree was set aside by the Appellate Court. The plaintiff is an unauthorised occupant of the land. Therefore, it was prayed that the application be dismissed. 23 2026:HHC:31625 38. I have heard Mr Mohidner Verma, learned counsel for the applicants/respondents and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the non-applicant/appellant/State, and have gone through the records carefully. 39. It is undisputed that the applicant had not challenged the order passed by the learned Sub Divisional Collector against him. Therefore, the order has attained finality. Such an order will not cease to exist merely because similar orders were challenged and were set aside by the competent authority. The remedy of the plaintiff was to challenge the order, and in case he had not challenged it, he cannot take the benefit of the orders passed in other cases. Further, it is difficult to see how an order passed by the Financial Commissioner will bind this Court or the Civil Court to adjudicate the dispute pending before them. It has been found above that the inclusion of the land within the municipal area will not make any difference. Hence, the RSA cannot be dismissed because of inclusion of the land in the municipal area. Therefore, the application cannot be allowed and is dismissed. 24 2026:HHC:31625 Final Order 40. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court are ordered to be set aside while those passed by the learned trial Court are ordered to be restored. 41 The present appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending application(s), if any. also stands disposed of. 42. The record of the learned Courts below be returned along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th July, 2026 (ravinder)