2026:HHC:31473 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA RSA No. 40/2026 a/w RSA No.39/2026 Reserved on: 07.07.2026 Decided on: 27.07.2026 RSA No. 40/2026 Devi Singh & ors. …..Appellants Versus Bhim Singh (deceased) through his LRs & ors. ….Respondents RSA No. 39/2026 Devi Singh & ors. …..Appellants Versus Bhim Singh (deceased) through his LRs & ors. ….Respondents ______________________________________________________________ Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellants: Mr. Jia Lal, Advocate, vice Mr. G. R. Palsra, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Kulwant Chauhan, Advocate, for respondents No. 1(a),4, 5 and 6. Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Kiran Kumar, Advocate, for respondents No. 2 and 3. 1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 Romesh Verma, Judge The present appeals arise out of the judgments and decrees, dated 24.12.2025, as passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., whereby the appeals filed by the present appellants/plaintiffs/non-counter claimants have been dismissed and the judgment and decree, dated 30.05.2015, as passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division),Chachiot at Gohar, District Mandi, dismissing the suit of the appellants/plaintiffs and decreeing the counter claim of the defendants/respondents, has been affirmed. 2 Brief facts of the case are that originally the appellant/plaintiff No.1, Devi Singh filed Civil Suit No. 53/2011 for declaration and injunction as a consequential relief under Sections 34 to 38 of the Specific Relief Act before the learned trial court on 4.5.2011 on the ground that the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 39/39, bearing Khasra Nos. 107,113, 118,121, 123,132 and 142, Kitta 7 measuring 8-1-18 Bighas, situated in Mohal Batand/84, Tehsil Chachiot, Distt. Mandi H.P. and the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 21/21, bearing Khasra Nos. 31,153,154,166,168,169,177,181,182,188 and 208 Kitta 11 measuring 13-13-8 Bighas, situated in Mohal Tikkar/83, Tehsil Chachiot, Distt. Mandi H.P. is the joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property, as recorded in the 3 name of his father Bhim Singh i.e. defendant No. 1, who is the Karta of the family. The proforma defendants are his brother, sisters, and step mother. 3 It is pertinent to mention here that during the pendency of the suit, proforma defendants No.5 and 6 Hira and Mala respectively were transposed as plaintiffs No. 2 and 3. Mother of the plaintiff namely Manghari was the first wife of the defendant No. 1, but got divorced. It was averred that for the purpose of cultivation, defendant No.1 permitted the plaintiff to remain in the landed property at Mohal Batand in the month of September 1984 and since then he is in peaceful possession of the same. The land situated at Mohal Tikkar/83 was given for cultivation to brothers of the plaintiff i. e. defendant No. 4 namely Diwan and Khem Singh (now deceased), who is survived by his LRs i.e. wife and two sons, i.e. proforma defendants No. 8, 9 and 10. Defendant No. 1 lives intermittently in Mohal Batand with the plaintiff and usually lives in Mohal Tikkar in the ancestral house. 4 As per the plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 is an old man being maintained by his all family members as per their legal obligations including the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 has got no legal necessity to dispose of any part of the suit land. But the plaintiff came to know from his son on 1.5.2011 that the 4 part of the suit land had been sold by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3, namely, Dharmender Singh and Nand Lal respectively. Plaintiff No.1 made inquiry and search of the revenue record and came to know that without the consent of the plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 had illegally sold Khasra No. 107 measuring 5-2-8 Bighas of the suit land, situated in Mohal Batand, vide registered sale deed No. 105 dated 16.4.2011 and mutation to this effect had been attested by the revenue authority concerned on 23.4.2011, vide mutation No.83 behind the back of the plaintiffs. The aforesaid sale deed has been procured by the defendants No. 2 and 3 on account of retaliation to the long civil litigation in the Civil Courts with respect to the adjoining land of this Khasra number on the boundary of Mohal Suraha with their father. 5 It is the case of the plaintiffs that the alleged sale deed has been procured by defendants No. 2 and 3, without delivery of possession, in connivance with the interested witnesses and defendant No. 1, whereas there was no legal necessity for the same. Though, the plaintiffs made requests to defendants No. 1 to 3 to cancel the alleged sale deed as the suit land is ancestral joint Hindu family property and even to receive the alleged sale consideration amount, but they declined to admit the legal claim of the plaintiffs over the suit land and 5 further threatened to alienate the suit land and dispossess the plaintiff No.1 from his peaceful joint possession. Therefore, the suit was instituted by the plaintiffs seeking declaration on the ground that the suit land be declared as joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property and defendant No. 1 be restrained to alienate the same to third person or make unlawful interference over the same. Further sale deed No. 105 dated 16.4.2011 qua the part of the suit land i.e. Khasra No. 107 having been executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 and mutation on the basis of same in the revenue record be declared as illegal, wrong, null and void and having no binding effect upon the rights of the plaintiff. 6 The defendants 1 to 3 contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein preliminary objections, qua maintainability, enforceability, estoppel, valuation, etc. were raised. On merits, it was denied that the suit land is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property of the plaintiff and the others. It was averred that the suit land is self acquired property of defendant No.1. Plaintiff No.1 never resided with defendant No.1 nor they constituted joint Hindu family. In fact the plaintiff No.1 has been residing with one, Hira s/o Karmu and rendering all the help to him, as such in lieu of services rendered by plaintiff No.1 to Hira Singh, he gifted his entire 6 property to the extent of 21-0-0 bighas in favour of plaintiff. Neither plaintiff No.1 resided with his father i.e. defendant No.1 nor he rendered any services to him. 7 It was specifically denied that defendant No.1 had directed and permitted the plaintiff to remain in possession of the suit land, situated at Mohal Batand since 1984. As a matter of fact, the plainitff had been given some of the landed property in Mohal Tikkar, which he got sold through defendant No.1 to Roop Chand and Gulab Chand for a sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- and the entire money of sale consideration was usurped by the plaintiff himself exclusively. As per defendants No. 1 to 3, the plaintiff No.1 never assisted and helped defendant No.1 in his needs, whereas defendant No.1 is having no source of income and he has to maintain even family of his predeceased son late Sh. Khem Singh. Defendant No.1 being an old man remained ill for a long period and remained admitted in IGMC Shimla for months together where he was operated and for that purpose, huge money was required and accordingly spent on his treatment, however plaintiff No.1 did not render any help in spite of the repeated requests made by defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 had to obtain loan for his treatment as such, he had no alternate but to dispose of the suit land. 7 8 It was averred by defendants No.1 to 3 that the sale deed which was executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 was on account of legal necessity. The plaintiff has got no locus standi to challenge the sale deed and defendant No.1 is at liberty to dispose of the property as he likes. 9 The proforma defendants filed separate written statement to the plaint as instituted by the plaintiff. The proforma defendants denied the claim as made by the plainitffs and filed written statement on the same lines as was filed by defendants No. 1 to 3. The proforma defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit as filed by the plaintiffs. 10 The defendants No. 2 and 3 apart from filing the written statement also instituted counter claim seeking decree of injunction by restraining the plaintiffs to cause any interference over the land comprised in Khasra No.107, measuring 5-2-8 Bighas, situated in Mohal Batand, Tehsil Chachiot, District Mandi, H.P. 11 The plaintiffs/non-counter claimants filed written statement to the counter claim, as filed by defendants No. 2 and 3 and refuted all the averments as made in the written statement and prayed for dismissal of the counter claim. 8 12 Defendants No. 2 and 3 also filed replication to the written statement, as filed by the plaintiffs/non-counter claimants, reiterating therein the averments as made in the counter claim. 13 The learned trial court on 06.10.2012/30.10.2012 framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the suit land is the joint Hindu family coparcenary property. If so, its effect? OPP 2. Whether the defendant No. 1 is liable to be restrained from alienating the suit land through a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the sale deed No. 105 dated 16.4.2011 executed in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3 qua Khasra No. 107 and mutation attested on its basis are liable to be declared null and void, as prayed for? OPP 4. Whether the present suit is not maintainable?, as alleged? OPD 5. Whether no enforceable cause of action has accrued in favour of plaintiff, as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit by his own act and conduct, as alleged? OPD 7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, as alleged? OPD 8. Whether the plaintiff is liable to be restrained from causing any interference over the part of the suit land i.e. Khasra No. 107 as the same had been purchased by counter claimants, as alleged? OPD 8A. Whether the defendant No. 1 had sold part of suit land i.e. Khasra No. 107 to defendants No. 2 & 3 for legal necessity, as alleged? OPD 9 9. Relief.” 14 The learned trial court directed the parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions to corroborate their respective case and ultimately, the learned trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 30.05.2015 dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants and decreed the counter claim, as filed by defendants No. 2 and 3. 15 The plaintiffs/appellants, feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and decree, dated 30.05.2015, as passed by the learned trial court, preferred two appeals before the learned first Appellate Court on 09.06.2015 and 02.06.2022, which too came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 24.12.2025. 16 Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments and decrees, the plaintiffs/appellants have preferred the present regular second appeals before this Court. 17 With consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the present appeals are finally heard on the following substantial question of law:- Whether the judgments and decrees of both the learned Courts below are perverse in which the pleadings and evidence led by the appellants have been totally ignored? 10 18 It is contended by Mr. Jia Lal, learned vice counsel for the appellants that the impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned Courts below, are erroneous, wrong and, thus, liable to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted that the learned Courts below have erred in law by mis- appreciation and mis-construction of the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, as a result of which great prejudice has been caused to the plaintiffs. He has further submitted that after accepting the present appeals, the suit as instituted by the plaintiffs deserves to be decreed and the counter claim as instituted by defendants No. 2 and 3 deserves to be rejected. 19 On the other hand, Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Kulwant Chauhan, Advocate, appearing for the respective respondents/defendants has defended the impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned Courts below. He has submitted that there are concurrent findings of fact returned by the Courts below, therefore, this Court, while exercising the power under Section 100 of CPC, has very narrow and limited power to interfere in the well reasoned judgments and decrees as passed by the learned Courts below. The learned courts below, after thrashing 11 entire evidence, as placed on record, have rightly dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs and have decreed the counter claim as filed by defendants No. 2 and 3 by invoking legal provisions of law. 20 I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record carefully. 21 As observed above, the appellants/plaintiffs had instituted a civil suit before the learned trial court seeking declaration and injunction as a consequential relief on the ground that suit land situated at Mohal Batand and Tikkar is joint Hindu Family ancestral and coparcenary property of the plaintiffs having been recorded in the name of their father, defendant No. 1, who is the Karta of the family. It is the case of the plaintiffs that defendant No.1 had permitted plaintiff No.1 to cultivate the landed property at Mohal Batand in the month of September 1984 and since then he is in possession of the said land. It is further case of the plaintiffs that defendant No.1 had given the suit land situated at Mohal Tikkar to his brother defendant No. 4 namely Diwan and brother namely Khem Singh (now deceased), who is survived by his LRs i.e. wife and two sons, i.e. defendant No. 8, 9 and 10. Defendant No. 1 is an old man being maintained by his all family members as per their legal obligations including the plaintiff and thus, defendant 12 No.1 has got no legal necessity to dispose of any part of the suit land. Defendant No. 1 Bhim Singh has illegally sold Khasra No. 107 measuring 5-2-8 Bighas of the suit land situated in Mohal Batand, vide registered sale deed No. 105 dated 16.4.2011 and mutation to this effect was attested by the revenue authority concerned vide mutation No.83, dated 23.4.2011, behind the back of the plaintiffs. Defendants No. 2 and 3, with a mala fide intention, got the sale deed executed in their favour in an illegal manner and the same has been procured by them without delivery of possession that too in connivance with the interested witnesses and defendant No. 1, who had no legal necessity for the same. The suit land is joint Hindu family ancestral coparcenary property, therefore, the same could not have been sold by defendant No.1 without express consent of the plaintiffs. 22 On the other hand, the suit has been resisted by the defendants primarily on the ground that in case suit land is found to be ancestral one, then the sale as executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 is for legal necessity. Though in para 2 of the written statement, it was denied that the suit land is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property and it was claimed that the suit land is self acquired property of defendant No.1. Plaintiff No.1 never 13 resided with defendant No.1 nor he constituted Joint Hindu family. In fact plaintiff No.1 had been residing with one Hira s/o Karmu and said Hira Singh gifted his entire property to the extent of 21-0-0 Bighas in favour of plaintiff. 23 As per case of the defendants, the plaintiff No.1 had been given some land in Mohal Tikkar which he got sold through defendant No.1 to Roop Chand and Gulab Chand for a sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- and the entire money of sale consideration was taken away by plaintiff No.1 himself exclusively. Plaintiff No.1 never assisted and helped defendant No.1 in his needs. Defendant No.1 being an old man had no source of income and he had to maintain family of his predeceased son late Sh. Khem Singh, consisting of his widow and two sons, for their education and maintenance. Being an old person, he fell ill for a considerable period and remained admitted in IGMC Shimla for various months, and there, he was operated and he had to spend hefty amount on his treatment, however no help was rendered by plaintiff No.1 in spite of repeated requests made by defendant No.1. As a result of which, defendant No.1 had to raise loan for the said necessity as he had got no other alternate but to dispose of the suit land and the sale which was executed by him in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 was for legal necessity. 14 24 In counter claim, filed by defendants No. 2 and 3, it was claimed that on the basis of sale deed, which was executed by defendant No.1 in their favour, they have become owners in possession of the suit land bearing Khasra No.107, measuring 5-2-8 Bighas, situated in Mohal Batand, Tehsil Chachiot, District Mandi, H.P., therefore, the plaintiff may be restrained from causing any interference over the suit land in any manner. 25 In order to substantiate their case, plaintiff No.1 Devi Singh entered into the witness box as PW1 and tendered in evidence his affidavit, Ext. PW1/A, wherein he stated that the suit land is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property and his father i.e. defendant No.1 is entered as owner of the suit land. His father is ‘Karta’ of the joint family. In order to maintain the joint land in a proper manner, defendant No.1 in the month of September, 1984 had given the suit land situated at Mohal Batand to plaintiff No.1 and since then, he is in peaceful possession of the same. The suit land situated at Mohal Tikkar was given to his brother namely Diwan, defendant No.4 and defendants No.8 to 10, legal heirs of late Sh. Khem Singh, his brother. He stated that his father is an old person and the entire family maintains and looked after him from the usufructs of the suit land. In order to alienate the suit land, defendant No.1 had got no legal necessity, as plaintiff 15 No.1 along with his sisters had contributed financially for the treatment of their father in 2010 at Mandi and Shimla. On 1.5.2011, his son, Topender told him that defendant No.1 had executed a sale deed in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 by selling part of the suit land at Mohal Batand. When PW1 inquired about the same after obtaining necessary revenue papers, it came to his knowledge that his father had sold Khasra No. 107 measuring more than 5 Bighas, situated at Mohal Batand in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 at his back and necessary mutation had also been attested. 26 As per PW1, defendants No. 2 and 3 had intentionally got executed sale deed in their favour on account of enmity and long standing litigation between them. He stated that till date, he is in possession of suit land bearing Khasra No. 107 and the possession of the same has not been delivered to defendants No. 2 and 3, therefore, after decreeing the suit, sale deed as executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 may be cancelled. 27 In his cross-examination, he stated that defendant No.1 Bhim Singh is his father and he is more than 80 years old. He is an agriculturist. They are three brothers and reside along with family at Mohal Batand. He stated that his Khata is separate from his father. Name of his second brother is Diwan. 16 He is residing separately at Mohal Tikkar. He stated that his father is also residing separately and he resides in a separate home at Mohal Tikkar. PW1 further stated that he occasionally used to come to Mohal Batand. He stated that his third brother namely Khem Singh had expired and in his family, he is survived by his wife and two sons and they are also residing separately. He stated that for the last 35-40 years, they are residing separately. He stated that his income is very limited and even income of his brothers is also very limited. He stated that he is having land to the extent 20-22 bighas. Hira Singh had executed a gift deed by giving 20-22 Bighas land in his favour. He earns Rs.10,000/- to 15,000/- per annum from the agriculture. His father obtained some land through grant of nautor, which is about more than 4 Bighas. His father had purchased some land measuring 5-6 Bighas and had got some land from his maternal side. He stated that he cannot say what is the extent of the land, which his father got from his mother. Self stated that it must be about 5 Bighas. He denied that at Mohal Tikkar, some land was given to him by his father. He stated that he does not know that his father had sold land at Mohal Tikkar to Roop Chand and Gulab Chand. Self stated that his father must have sold. He stated that he did not institute any suit against them. He denied that the said land was given 17 to him and that the same was sold by him for a sum of Rs.80,000. He denied that he kept the entire sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- and did not give anything to his father. He stated that he had told his counsel about the execution of the sale deed in favour of Roop Chand and Gulab Chand, but he did not file any suit against them. 28 As per PW1, his sister-in-law is having two sons, who are studying in Mandi. He admitted that their education expenses are being borne by defendant No.1. Both the sons of deceased brother are studying in Mandi College. They are residing in a rented accommodation at Mandi. He stated that his father is not feeling well for the last 5-6 years. Eye of his father was operated about 5 years ago and the said operation was conducted at Mandi and the same was got done by him. He stated that he cannot place any material on record to show that the said operation was got conducted by him and at the relevant time, he spent about Rs.10,000/- for the said operation. In 2010, defendant No.1 was suffering from kidney problem and he was taken for check up initially at Bagshad and thereafter at Mandi. At Mandi, defendant No.1 remained admitted in Hospital for about 8-10 days. He does not know how much amount was spent on treatment. Self stated that Rs.5000/- to Rs.7,000/- must have been spent on the same. 18 Defendant No.1 was accompanied by his son Diwan, defendant No.4. He does not know name of the doctor, who treated his father. Thereafter, defendant No.1 was taken to Shimla, but he does not know how he went to Shimla. He does not know for how many days, he remained at Shimla. Self stated that he remained there for about more than 1 month. He must have been taken to Shimla in the month of July and August. When defendant No.1 was taken to Shimla, he was accompanied by his brother defendant No.4. He does not know how much amount was spent on account of his treatment at Shimla and he stated that the said fact must be known to his brother Diwan. He stated that he gave Rs.10,000/- for the treatment of defendant No.1, whereas his sisters also gave Rs.18,000/- and Rs.20,000/- respectively to defendant No.1. He does not know on account of his illness, defendant No.1 raised loan from how many persons. He stated that on account of the illness, the amount, which was spent on treatment must be known to his father and brother Diwan Singh. He does not know that entire treatment was got done by raising loan. Land comprised in Khasra Nos. 106 and 107 is Khadeter. He stated that he does not know about Khasra number of the land which was given to his father as nautor and the land which was inherited by his 19 father from his maternal side. He denied that suit land is not joint Hindu family coparcenary property. 29 PW2 Smt. Mala tendered in evidence her affidavit, Ext. PW2/A. In her deposition, she has stated that the suit land is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property and her father, defendant No.1, is registered owner in the revenue record. The land situated at Mohal Batand is about 8 bighas and the land at Mohal Tikkar is about 13 ½ Bighas. She reiterated the averments as made by PW1. She stated that land at Mohal Batand was given to the plaintiff No.1 in September 1984 and since then, he is in possession of the same, whereas the land situated at Mohal Tikkar was given to defendants No. 4, 8 and 10. She stated that her father had got no legal necessity to sell the suit land in any manner. She stated that she along her brothers and sisters got treated her father at Mandi and Shimla in 2010. 30 In her cross-examination, she stated that all the brothers and sisters were looking after defendant No.1. She submitted that for the last 25-35 years they are residing separately. She admitted that at Mohal Batand some land was in possession of his father, which was Khadeter. Her father fell ill in 2010 and before that he was perfectly alright. Prior to that, treatment was not got done by anyone. Her Father fell ill in 20 July-August. She stated that initially her father was taken to Bagshad and thereafter Mandi and finally to Shimla. She remained at Mandi for 4-5 days. Defendant No.1 was accompanied by her brother Diwan to Mandi and thereafter to IGMC. She stated that she does not know for how many days they remained in Shimla. Self stated they must have remained there for 10 days. 31 As per PW2, when they remained in Shimla, expenses of the treatment must have been borne by her brother Diwan. She does not know how much amount was spent on the treatment of her father. Self stated that initially they used to say Rs.60,000/- and thereafter they started saying that more than Rs.1,50,000/- was spent on his treatment. She does not know as to from how many persons her father had raised loan for his treatment. She stated that factum of raising loan was in the knowledge of defendants No. 1 and 4. She stated that during treatment of her father, she never remained wtih him. They never brought any medicine during his treatment. Self stated that money was given to plaintiff No.1, who gave the same to Diwan at Mandi. She stated that she had given Rs.20,000/- and her sister had given Rs.18,000/-, whereas her brother/plaintiff had given Rs.10,000/- for treatment of their father. She denied that the suit land is not joint Hindu family 21 ancestral and coparcenary property. She does not know that the land was sold to Gulab Chand about 10-12 years ago. She does not know that the land which was sold at Mohal Tikkar had been given by her father to the plaintiff. She denied that the said land was sold at the behest of the plaintiff. She stated that she does not know that the entire sale consideration was taken away by the plaintiff and no money was given to their father. She stated that they did not file any suit against Roop Chand and Gulab Chand. Self stated that the suit was to be instituted by Diwan. She stated that she does not have any objection with respect to sale of the said land in favour of Roop Chand and Gulab Chand. She admitted that plaintiff No.1 is residing separately and his Khata is separate. She denied that the plaintiff No.1, did not help his father, defendant No.1 in any manner. She denied that defendant No.1 got his treatment after raising loan. 32 In order to rebut the case of the plaintiffs, defendant No.1, Bhim Singh, entered the witness box as DW1. He stated that he is having three sons and two daughters. His elder son is Devi Singh, whereas Khem Singh was younger to him, who has died and his third son is Diwan. Names of his daughters are Hira Devi and Mala Devi. The plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.4 are residing separately. The plaintiff lives in Mohal Batand and 22 defendant No.4 Diwan lives in Mohal Tikkar. He stated that he had given more than 1 ½ Bigha of land at Mohal Tikkar and 3 Bighas of land at Mohal Batand. The plaintiff No.1 sold the land which was given to him at Mohal Tikkar for sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- to Roop Chand and Gulab Chand. Plaintiff No.1 kept the entire sale consideration with him and did not give even a single penny to him. 33 As per DW1, some land came to him from the maternal side. He obtained grant of nautor, which is about 4 Bighas. He had purchased land measuring 6 bighas from one Dalaru. He stated that his second son Khem Singh had expired about 22 years ago. He is survived by his two sons and widow. The names of sons are Gopal and Laxman Singh. When his son Khem Singh expired, at that time, age of his children was about 2 years and 1 years. He stated that he is looking after and maintaining the said children. The children of Khem Singh are residing with him. He further stated that sons of Khem are studying in college and he is bearing all the expenses of their education along with expenses of their mother. He stated that he is not feeling well and about 2-3 years ago, he had urine problem. He was treated at Bagshad, Mandi and thereafter at Shimla. He remained admitted in Shimla for about 10-15 days for the purpose of treatment. He was accompanied by his son 23 Diwan and on his treatment, a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- was spent. After operation, he used to go to Shimla for follow up in jeep. He has no independent source of income. For the purpose of his treatment, he sold the part of the suit land at Mohal Batand to Nand Lal and Dharmender. Apart from the Khadeter, the land, which is cultivable, is still with the plaintiff. He stated that for his treatment, Diwan had obtained loan from Mohan Singh and Chura Mani and in order to repay the loan amount, he sold part of the suit land at Mohal Batand. In cross- examination, nothing favourable could be extracted by the plaintiffs in order to impeach his testimony. 34 Diwan Singh, brother of the plaintiff and youngest son of defendant No.1 entered the witness box as DW2 and tendered in evidence his affidavit, Ext. DW2/A, wherein he has also testified on the same lines as has been done by DW1. He stated that about three years ago, his father was seriously ill and he was taken to Zonal Hospital Mandi, where he remained admitted for about 10-11 days and thereafter he was taken to Shimla for his treatment. His father was operated in Shimla and considerable amount was spent on his treatment. When his father remained at Mandi and Shimla, on his treatment, they spent more than about Rs. 1,50,000/- and the said amount was raised in the form of loan. His father used to go to Shimla 24 for check up/follow-up and he used to take his father to Shimla. He stated that the entire expenses on his treatment was borne by his father i.e. defendant No.1. He stated that his brother and sister did not contribute for treatment of his father. His father had no independent source of income. His father is an old aged person. He stated that since his father had no source of income therefore in order to repay the loan amount he sold the suit land bearing Khasra No. 107 to Nand Lal and Dharmender. He stated that the land which was sold was Khadeter and prior to sale of the land, his father had talked to everyone. When his father sold the suit land to Nand Lal and Dharmender on the very same day, possession of the same was handed over to them. 35 DW3, Gopal Singh, is son of Late Sh. Khem Singh. He entered into the witness box and filed his affidavit, Ext. DW3/A, wherein he has also reiterated the testimonies of DW1 and DW2. He stated that his father expired in 1993 and at the relevant time he was hardly 3 years old, whereas his younger brother was one year old. After the death of his father, the entire amount of maintenance is being paid by his grandfather. They do not have any independent source of income. His grandfather is an old man and has no source of income. For the purpose of treatment, his grandfather had to raise loan and in 25 order to repay the loan amount, his grandfather sold the suit land bearing Khasra No. 107 at Mohal Batand in favour of Nand Lal and Dharmender. He stated that before selling the suit land his grandfather had taken the consent of all the stakeholders. 36 DW4 Joginder Singh, who remained Tehsildar from 2009 to January 2012, stated that the sale deed Ext. DW4/A was executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 and same was got registered by him. He stated that at the time of execution of the sale deed, he had inquired from defendant No.1 Bhim Singh who had acknowledged the execution of the sale deed and at the relevant time his mental condition was perfectly alright. 37 DW5 Nand Lal in his testimony stated that defendant No.1 on 16.4.2011 executed a sale deed with respect to Khasra No. 107 at Mohal Batand with respect to area measuring 5-2-8 Bighas at Tehsil Chachiot. They purchased the suit land for total sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- and out of the total amount, his father, Laxman Singh paid Rs.50000/- to defendant No.1 and remaining 50% of the sale consideration was paid at the time of execution of the registration of the sale deed in Tehsil Office. He stated that Bhim Singh in the months of June and July 2010 was 26 seriously ill and he was got treated in Mandi and Shimla. He stated that Bhim Singh sold the suit land for his domestic needs and on account of the fact that he had to incur lot of expenses for his treatment, thus, he raised loan and in order to repay the loan amount, he sold the part of the suit land. 38 PW1/B is copy of jamabandi for the year 2005-06 and as per the same, defendant No.1 Bhim Singh is the owner of the suit land including Khasra No. 107 at Mohal Batand. The copy of the sale deed has been placed on record as Ext. DW4/A. In the sale deed, it has been incorporated by defendant No.1 Bhim Singh that he is suffering from kidney ailment and he was got operated in the year 2011. For the purpose of his treatment, he asked for money from his relatives as his sons do not maintain and look after him. His sons did not give any money for his treatment, therefore, he had to raise loan and in order to repay the said amount, he is selling the part of the suit land i.e. Khasra No. 107 to Dharmender and Nand Lal for a total sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-. 39 The case, as set up and projected by the plaintiffs before the Courts below, is that the total suit land being joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property could not have been alienated by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants 27 No. 2 and 3 without obtaining consent from the other coparceners. 40 The learned trial court framed the issues with respect to the said fact whether the suit land is joint Hindu family coparcenary property and said issue No.1 was answered partly in affirmative and the learned trial court came to the conclusion that Bhim Singh defendant No.1 inherited the suit land from his father, grandfather etc. hence, the suit land is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property. The learned trial court came to the conclusion that it is proved on record from copies of mutations, Ext. DW5/A and Ext. DW5/B that deceased Bhim Singh and his brother Ram Singh had inherited some immovable property from their mother i.e from maternal side. 41 Plaintiffs had not led any evidence on record to prove the fact that the deceased Bhim Singh had blended his self acquired property that is received by way of inheritance from maternal side, self purchased and his nautor land in the joint Hindu family property, meaning thereby, defendant No.1 had kept the property acquired by him separate and had not blended the same into common stock of joint Hindu family property. 28 42 The said issue was answered partly in affirmative in favour of the plaintiffs by the learned trial court and the said findings came to be affirmed by the learned first appellate Court. The learned first appellate court in para 75 of its judgment came to the conclusion that part of the suit land situated at Mohal Batand, as described in copy of jamabandi Ext. PW1/B which includes Khasra No.107 having been sold to defendants No. 2 and 3 by defendant No.1, is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property, whereas rest of the suit land situated at Mohal Tikkar, as described in copy of Jamabandi, Ext. PW1/C excluding nautor land as well as land purchased by defendant No.1 from Dalaru is also joint Hindu Family and coparcenary property. Therefore, contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that defendant No.1 being owner of joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property, could not have alienated and sold the part of the suit land in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 has been partly accepted by the learned Courts below and the said findings have not been challenged by the respondents either by filing independent appeal or by filing of cross objections, therefore, this Court holds that the part of the suit land situated at Mohal Batand, as described in copy of jamabandi Ext. PW1/B which includes Khasra No.107, having been sold to defendants No. 2 29 and 3 by defendant No.1 is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property. 43 Now, the prime and vital question to be determined and as has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is whether alienation which has taken place qua the part of suit land is on account of legal necessity or not. 44 The learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently argued that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 107 is joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property in that event on account of legal necessity, the said alienation is legal and valid. 45 It has come in the written statement of defendant No.1 that plaintiff No.1 never assisted and helped defendant No.1 in his day to day needs. It is case of defendant No.1 that he had no independent source of income and he had to maintain family of his pre-deceased son for their upkeep and education. Defendant No.1 was an old aged person and he usually remained ill. For a long period, he remained admitted in IGMC Shimla, where he was operated. For the said purpose, he incurred lot of expenses and for post operation follow up he had to go to Shimla. He stated that neither the plaintiff No.1 30 nor his daughters rendered any monetary help for incurring the expenses for his treatment either at Mandi or Shimla. 46 A stand has been taken that in order to incur the expenses for his treatment he had to raise loan and as such, in order to repay the loan amount, he had to execute the sale deed in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. The said fact was corroborated when he entered the witness box, where he categorically stated that for the purpose of his treatment, he had to spend more than Rs.1,50,000/-. He had got no independent source of income and in order to bear the expenses he had to raise loan and for the purpose of repayment of loan, he had sold the part of suit land at Mohal Batand in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. He stated that on his treatment, his younger son Diwan, defendant No.4 had raised loan from Mohan Singh and Churamani. 47 The said fact has also been corroborated by DW2, Diwan, whereby he stated that his father is an old aged person and on account of his illness, he was taken to Zonal Hospital, Mandi and thereafter he was admitted in Shimla, where he was got operated. While undergoing treatment at Shimla, considerable amount was spent on his treatment. His father had no independent source of income. Neither plaintiff No.1, his brother, nor his sisters, contributed for treatment of defendant 31 No.1 in any manner. He has stated that his father has borne all the expenses of his treatment and in order to repay the loan amount, he sold the part of the suit land in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. 48 DW3 Gopal Singh has also deposed on the same lines that his father Khem Singh had died in the year 1993 and at the relevant time he was hardly 3 years old, whereas his younger brother was about 1 year old. He stated that they had no independent source of income and his grandfather was looking after them. His grandfather and mother were bearing their day to day expenses and also for their education. His grander father was an old and ailing person and he had no source of income. For the purpose of his treatment and in order to look after them, his grander father had to raise loan and in order to repay the said amount, he sold the part of the suit land to defendants No. 2 and 3. 49 It has come on record that defendant No. 1 was having three sons namely Devi Singh, plaintiff and Khem Singh, who predeceased his father and is succeeded by his two sons and widow and third son is Diwan. The case as projected by the plaintiffs that the suit land being joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property could not have been alienated without express consent of the other coparceners has been 32 contested by defendant No.1 by taking a stand that the sale deed, which was executed by him in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 was on account of the legal necessity. 50 In order to prove the same, in case pleadings and evidence as led by the defendants are seen, it is established on record that defendant No.1 was an old and ailing person and he had no independent source of income. He used to look after family of Khem Singh, who predeceased to defendant No.1. The defendants have led evidence that sons of late Khem Singh were studying in college at Mandi and PW1 has admitted in his testimony that it is only defendant No.1 Bhim Singh who was looking after, maintaining and educating them. Apart from looking after family of Khem Singh, when defendant No.1 fell ill, he was taken to Hospital at Mandi and then to Shimla. 51 It has come on record that defendant No.1 was operated and about more than Rs. 1,50,000 was spent on his treatment. Being an old man having no independent source of come, he had to obtain loan from his relatives and the said fact has been duly corroborated By DW2 Diwan Singh. It has also come on record that in order to repay the said loan amount, part of the suit land was sold by defendant No.1 for total sale of Rs.1,00,000/- in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. The factum of illness of defendant No.1 has been admitted by PW-1 and 33 PW-2. It is also admitted by plaintiff and his sister that on account of illness the defendant No.1 was treated at Bagshaad, Mandi and thereafter in Shimla. The factum of treatment and hospitalization of DW-1 has rather been admitted by plaintiff and his witness. During the pendency of suit, defendant No.1, Bhim Singh, expired, however in his written statement, which is duly signed by him and while making deposition in the witness box as DW1, he has himself stated that his relatives including his sons did not help him financially for his treatment, therefore, he raised the loan. In order to repay the said loan, he sold the suit property to defendants No.2 and 3. The said fact could not be rebutted by plaintiff in any manner. 52 As observed above, perusal of sale deed, Ext. DW4/A shows that there is stipulation in the deed that defendant No.1 was suffering from kidney ailment and he was operated in IGMC Shimla, in the year 2011. For the purpose of his treatment, he raised loan from the relatives as his sons did not look after him. It has been incorporated in the sale deed that his sons did not give any money for his treatment, therefore, in order to repay the loan amount, he sold the part of the suit land in Mohal Batand to defendants No. 2 and 3 for total sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- 34 53 The defendants have been able to establish that on account of legal necessity defendant No.1 was constrained to sell the suit land being Karta of the family, therefore, there is no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the impugned judgments and decrees as passed by the learned Courts below. The said concurrent findings of fact as returned by the learned Courts below are well reasoned, cogent, authentic and valid. 54 The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that right of Karta to sell joint family property is well settled. Karta enjoys wide discretion with regard to existence of legal necessity and in what way such necessity can be fulfilled it depends upon facts of the each case. 55 The Hon’ble Supreme Court after analyzing concept of legal necessity applied on Mulla’s Hindu Law observed that a Hindu father has special power of alienating coparcenary property, which no other coparcener has. In the exercise of this power, he may make a gift of ancestral immovable property and even of ancestral movable property. He may sell or mortgage ancestral property, whether movable or immovable including the interest of his sons, and grandsons, great grandsons for the payment of his own debt; provided the debt was an antecedent debt and was not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes. 35 56 What is legal necessity was also succinctly said by Mulla in Article 241, which reads as under: “Article 241 241. What is legal necessity.—The following have been held to be family necessities within the meaning of Article 240: (a) payment of government revenue and of debts which are payable out of the family property; (b) maintenance of coparceners and of the members of their families; (c) marriage expenses of male coparceners, and of the daughters of coparceners; (d) performance of the necessary funeral or family ceremonies; (e) costs of necessary litigation in recovering or preserving the estate; (f) costs of defending the head of the joint family or any other member against a serious criminal charge; (g) payment of debts incurred for family business or other necessary purpose. In the case of a manager other than a father, it is not enough to show merely that the debt is a pre-existing debt. The above are not the only indices for concluding as to whether the alienation was indeed for legal necessity, nor can the enumeration of criterion for establishing legal necessity be copious or even predictable. It must therefore depend on the facts of each case. When, therefore, property is sold in order to fulfil tax obligations incurred by a family business, such alienation can be classified as constituting legal necessity.” 36 57 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.R. Vinoda vs. M.S. Susheelama (dead) by LRs., (2021) 20 SCC 180, has held as follows: “25. Read in this light, it can be validly argued that the relinquishment deed dated 13th March 1969, Exhibit P-2, executed by the fourth defendant would be invalid. However, in the present case, other aspects have to be noticed to decide the relinquishment deed’s validity. First, we must again refer to the superior power that the Karta enjoys and, consequently, his greater rights and duties than other members. A Karta can alienate the property when other coparceners have given consent. It is also settled that a Karta may alienate the joint family property for value, either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, to bind the interests of all the undivided members of the family, whether they are adults or minors or widows. There are no specific grounds to prove the existence of legal necessity, and it must therefore depend on the facts of each case. A Karta has wide discretion in the decision over the existence of legal necessity and as to in what way such legal necessity can be fulfilled. However, it is observed this exercise of power and rights by Karta is not beyond challenge on the limited ground of lack of existence of legal necessity or absence of benefit to the estate. 26. This Court in Kehar Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives and Others v. Nachittar Kaur and Others, analysing the concept of legal necessity had relied on Mulla’s Hindu Law to observe: 37 “20. Mulla in his classic work Hindu Law while dealing with the right of a father to alienate any ancestral property said in Article 254, which reads as under: Article 254 254. Alienation by father.— A Hindu father as such has special powers of alienating coparcenary property, which no other coparcener has. In the exercise of these powers he may: (1) make a gift of ancestral movable property to the extent mentioned in Article 223, and even of ancestral immovable property to the extent mentioned in Article 224; (2) sell or mortgage ancestral property, whether movable or immovable, including the interest of his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons therein, for the payment of his own debt, provided the debt was an antecedent debt, and was not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes (Article 294).” 21. xxx xxx xxx 26. Once the factum of existence of legal necessity stood proved, then, in our view, no co-coparcener (son) has a right to challenge the sale made by the karta of his family. The plaintiff being a son was one of the co-coparceners along with his father Pritam Singh. He had no right to challenge such sale in the light of findings of legal necessity being recorded against him. It was more so when the plaintiff failed to prove by any evidence that there was no legal necessity for sale of the suit land or that the evidence adduced by the defendants to prove the factum of existence of legal necessity was either insufficient or irrelevant or no evidence at all.” 38. In our opinion, Article 60 would not apply as this is not a case of transfer of property made by a guardian of a ward. Article 109 applies to a plaint for setting aside the father’s alienation of ancestral property governed by 38 Mitakshara law. As per Article 109, the suit must be filed within 12 years when the alienee takes possession of the property. When we apply Article 109, the suit would be barred by limitation as it was filed in 1994, nearly 24 years after the relinquishment deed (Exhibit P-2) was executed to the fourth defendant in favour Patel Mallegowda branch and nearly 21 years after the Plaintiff No.3 attained majority in 1973. For the same reason, the suit would be barred under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act as it had been filed post three years from the date the right to sue first accrued as per Article 58 and when the facts entitling the plaintiffs to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first came to the knowledge of the plaintiffs as per Article 59. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly rejected the specious and untrue plea of the plaintiffs that till two months before the filing of the suit, they were unaware and did not know about execution of the relinquishment deed by their elder brother, the fourth defendant.” 58 The perusal of the records shows that the sale deed has been executed by father of the parties for the payment of his own debt and it is also matter of record that said debt was not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes, rather the debt was on account of his treatment which was conducted at Shimla and for that purpose, he incurred more than Rs.1,50,000 and when his sons refused to pay the said amount, then he was constrained to raise the loan from his relatives and 39 in order to repay said amount he had to execute the sale deed in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. 59 Similarly the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. A. No. 5340/2017, titled as Dastagirsab vs. Sharnappa, decided 16.09.2025 has held in para 11 as under:- “11 Right of a Karta to sell joint family property is well settled. Karta enjoys wide discretion with regard to existence of legal necessity and in what way such necessity can be fulfilled. Whether legal necessity existed justifying the sale would depend on facts of each case. In Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy vs. V. Manjunath & Anr., this Court succinctly elucidated: “6. Right of the Karta to execute agreement to sell or sale deed of a joint Hindu family property is settled and is beyond cavil vide several judgments of this Court including Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar (1996) 8 SCC 54] , wherein it has been held that a joint Hindu family is capable of acting through its Karta or adult member of the family in management of the joint Hindu family property. A coparcener who has right to claim a share in the joint Hindu family estate cannot seek injunction against the Karta restraining him from dealing with or entering into a transaction from sale of the joint Hindu family property, albeit post alienation has a right to challenge the alienation if the same is not for legal necessity or for betterment of the estate. Where a Karta has alienated a joint Hindu family property for value either for legal necessity or benefit of the estate it would bind the interest of all undivided members of the family even when they are minors or widows. There are no specific grounds that 40 establish the existence of legal necessity and the existence of legal necessity depends upon facts of each case. The Karta enjoys wide discretion in his decision over existence of legal necessity and as to in what way such necessity can be fulfilled. The exercise of powers given the rights of the Karta on fulfilling the requirement of legal necessity or betterment of the estate is valid and binding on other coparceners.” xxx xxx xxx 60 From the aforesaid explosion of law, whereby the rights of ‘Karta’ to sell the joint family property have been settled as in the present case, whereby the father of the parties sold the part of suit property in order to incur the expenses for his treatment, therefore, on account of legal necessity, the ‘Karta’ i.e. defendant No.1 was not barred from alienating or selling part of the suit land in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. 61 Apart from above, the most interesting fact in the present case is that it has come in the evidence of the defendants that part of the suit land was given to plaintiff No.1 at Mohal Tikkar and he sold the said land to Roop Singh and Gulab Chand for a total sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- through defendant No.1, however, he kept the entire sale consideration with him and did not pay anything to defendant No.1, therefore, on account of his conduct, plaintiff No.1 is 41 estopped to challenge the sale deed as executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. On the one hand, he himself had sold the part of the suit land for a total sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- and on the other hand, when defendant No.1, was in dire need of money for his medical treatment, and sold part of the suit land at Mohal Batand on account of legal necessity, the suit came to be instituted by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate that on the one hand plaintiff No.1 himself has sold the joint Hindu family ancestral and coparcenary property to Gulab Chand and Roop Chand and on the other hand he has challenged the alienation of part of the suit land in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 by defendant No.1. 62 The defendants No. 2 and 3 have been able to establish and prove execution of the sale deed for sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- and on the strength of the sale deed, they have become owners in possession of the suit property and it has come in the evidence also that after execution of the sale deed on the very same day, the possession of the suit land was delivered to purchasers i.e. defendants No. 2 and 3. Therefore, on the strength of title, the learned courts below have rightly granted decree of injunction in favour of the counter claimants and there is no perversity infirmity or 42 illegality in the same. Being owners of the suit property, defendants No. 2 and 3 are well within their right to restrain the plaintiffs/non-counter claimants from interfering in their possession in any manner. There are concurrent findings of fact as returned by the learned Courts below and after appreciating oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, both the courts below have determined and adjudicated the point in controversy in legal and valid manner. 63 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under Section 100 CPC can interfere with the findings of fact on limited grounds such as - (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not case in hand. 64 The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under: 18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been 43 issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that : "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are 44 well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 20. to 22 xx xxxxxx 23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to 45 decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 65 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs. Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:- “16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be determined by a court of fact after appreciating the evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a second appellate court exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC can interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is not the case here. 17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on the back of a registered document (Exb. A-1) after considering the oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were not 46 disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in paragraph 29 of its judgment was not addressed by the High Court. In fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed that genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our view, the High Court fell in error here. While exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have interfered with the finding of fact returned by the first appellate court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the evidence available on record as also the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document (Exb.A-2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while disturbing the finding of the first appellate court, the High Court did not hold that the finding returned by the first appellate court is based on a misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no occasion for the High Court, exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to interfere with the finding of the first appellate court regarding payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above the sale consideration fixed for the transaction. 18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first appellate court is sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not ready and willing to perform its part under the contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and, over and above that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so, because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to 47 perform its part under the contract is to be formed on the entirety of proven facts and circumstances of a case including conduct of the parties. The test is that the person claiming performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he has treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to fulfil his obligation and accept performance when the time for performance arrives.” 66 As observed above, the Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that the scope of interference under Section 100 CPC is limited and the interference will be in those cases where the judgments are perverse and based on no evidence. On perusal of the impugned judgments and decrees, this court is of the opinion that the same are valid, legal and sustainable in the eyes of law and there is no infirmity and illegality in the same. and no interference of any kind is required in the same. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 67 No other point was urged by either of the parties. 68 In view of aforesaid discussions and for the reasons stated hereinabove, there is no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. (Romesh Verma) July, 2026 Judge (pankaj)