Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 3451 of 2026 In / And L.P.A. No. 162 of 2026 The Deputy Development Commissioner Deoghar-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parisad, Deoghar, P.O. & P.S. – Deoghar, Dist. – Deoghar. ... Respondent/Appellant Versus 1. Sukhdeo Rao aged about son of- Late Shibu Rao, resident of Village + P.O. + P.S. Malaypur, District Jamui (Bihar), presently residing at Mohalla Chattisi, Ward No. 4 (new Ward No. 27), P.O. Bilasi Town, P.S. and District Deoghar. … Writ Petitioner/Respondent 2. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Rural Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi. 3. Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Directorate, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S- Dhurwa, Dist. – Ranchi, Jharkhand. 4. Director Panchayati Raj Directorate, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. & P.S. – Dhurwa, Dist. – Ranchi. ... Respondents/Performa Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellant: Mr Ashutosh Anand, Addl. A.G.-III Mr Sahbaj Akhtar, A.C. to A.A.G.-III For the State: Mr Ashwini Bhushan, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II --------- Reserved on: 22.06.2026 Pronounced on: 25 /06/2026 Per M. S. Sonak, C.J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 762 days in filing the appeal against the Learned single judge’s judgment dated 25.07.2023 disposing of W.P.(S) No. 1753 of 2017. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB 3. From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., it is evident that no case has been made out by the Appellants to explain this delay of 762 days. The I.A. simply lists routine steps, the movement of files, the obtaining of a legal opinion, internal processing, and then states that the appeal was drafted, grounds were prepared, documents were collected, and the appeal was filed. There is no attempt to explain why any of these steps took as long as they did, particularly when the limitation period was well known by all concerned in the process. 4. Paragraphs 3-8 of the I.A. show that the impugned judgment was passed on 25.07.2023. The first step mentioned in the application is dated 08.05.2024, and even this step was not taken on the appellants' own initiative but only after contempt proceedings had been initiated against them by the writ petitioner (the respondent no. 01 in the instant case). Nevertheless, what happened in those nine months between the date of the judgment and this first step is left entirely unexplained in the I.A. by the Appellants. 5. Moving forward, the I.A. states that the Government Advocate's response was received on 10.07.2024. After that, nothing of substance appears to have been done until the file was sent to the Principal Secretary on 28.05.2025, a hiatus of nearly ten months. The I.A. has nothing to say about this period, and no material has been placed on record to show that any effort was made to advance the matter during this time. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB 6. Taken together, these two unexplained periods of inaction, spanning approximately nine and ten months respectively, constitute a major part of the delay sought to be condoned. The I.A. furnishes no explanation for these prolonged periods of inactivity; rather, it merely recounts the steps that were eventually taken thereafter. 7. It is a well-settled principle of law that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must account for each period of delay with specific, cogent, and satisfactory reasons. However, in the matrix of the present facts, it would not be incorrect to observe that the appellants have meticulously explained everything regarding the bureaucratic movement of files across various governmental departments, save for the essential "sufficient cause" mandated by Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a belatedly filed application. 8. In cases of this nature, it is to be stated that it is well settled that applications filed with casual averments and routine bureaucratic explanations cannot be accepted as showing sufficient cause. In the present case, nothing has been demonstrated to show any real or substantive reason for the delay. Merely stating that the matter was under consideration, that notes were moved, and that the grounds of appeal were ultimately prepared, cannot by itself justify condonation of delay of this unusual magnitude. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB 9. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble SC in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology, particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants tries to point out that the State has a good case on the merits. There is nothing to prima facie support this argument, which, we note, is advanced in practically every matter where appeals are filed after considerable and unexplained delay. Be that as it may, in any event, merely having a good case on merits cannot be a sole consideration for condoning the delay of 762 days, when no sufficient cause is shown. 11. The Hon’ble SC in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity. The status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot override the bar of limitation. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 14. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. In Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never- ending paraphernalia. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18642-DB 19. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown, and consequently, we dismiss this I.A., seeking condonation of the delay of 762 days in filing the accompanying appeal. 20. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 25th, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Cp.2 Uploaded on 25.06.2026