Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 626 of 2026 In / And L.P.A. No. 193 of 2026 1) The State of Jharkhand. 2) The Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 3) The Chief Engineer, Minor Irrigation Department, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal House, P.O.+ P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 4) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Department, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal House, P.O.+ P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 5) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Khunti, Government of Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.- Khunti, District-Khunti, Jharkhand. 6) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.-Deoghar, District- Deoghar, Jharkhand. 7) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.-Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh, Jharkhand. 8) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.- Gumla, District- Gumla, Jharkhand. 9) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Dumka, Dist. Dumka, Jharkhand. 10) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.-Madhupur, District Madhupur, Jharkhand. 11) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Godda, District – Godda, Jharkhand. ... Writ Respondents/Appellants Versus 1. Sudarshan Mahto, S/o- Bansropan Mahto, aged about- 63 years, R/o- Kachari Chowk, Minor Irrigation Division, Abhiyantran Bhawan, Ranchi, P.O. + P.S. Kutchery, District- Ranchi. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB 2. Bimal Kumar, S/o- Baiju Pandit, aged about- 65 years, R/o- Nadaul, Masuri, Kharauna, P.O. + P.S. Masuri, District-Patna, Bihar. 3. Satya Narayan Pandey, S/o- Late Tarni Pandey, aged about-63 years, R/o- Saff Bank Colony, Vikas Nagar, Psca More, Ratu Road, P.O.+ P.S.-Hehal, District- Ranchi-Jharkhand. 4. Bigan Uraon, S/o- Late Kapil Uraon, aged about-63 years, R/o- Village Boreya, P.O. + P.S.-Kanke, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 5. Govind Sahu, S/o- Mahendra Sahu, aged about- 64 years, R/o- Kumhar Toli, Bargain, P.O. Lame Bargain, P.S.- Sadar, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 6. Brajnandan Mahto, S/o- Mohan Mahto, aged about-67 years, R/o- Qr No-B 748, H.E.C., Sector-II, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.-Jaggarnathpur, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand. 7. Kaushal Kumar Keshri, S/o- Ramlakhan Prasad Singh, aged about- 63 years, R/o- benipur, P.Ο. + P.S. Raisa, District Nalanda, Bihar. 8. Mahesh Lohra, S/o- Sohan Lohra, aged about-68 years, R/o- Garahdih, Sonahatu, P.O. + P.S-Sonahatu, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 9. Uma Vishwakarma, S/o- Birju Prasad, aged about-70 years, R/o- Old Post Office Building, Church Road, Lower Bazar, GPO, P.S. Lower Bazar, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 10. Jitendra Nath, S/o- Chatu Sahu, aged about-72 years, R/o- Harijan Muhullah, P.O.- Torpa, P.S. Torpa, District Khunti, Jharkhand. 11. Janki Nandan Lal Das, S/o- Chiranjib Lal Das, aged about-70 years, R/o- R/o- Torpa, P.Ο.-Torpa, P.S.- Torpa, District- Khunti, Jharkhand. 12. Abraham Guria, S/o- Paika Guriya, aged about-62 years, R/o-Ubka, Torpa, P.O. Torpa, P.S.-Torpa, District Khunti, Jharkhand. 13. Karmpal Mahto, S/o-Bhusu Mahto, aged about-66 years, R/o- Murhu, P.O. + P.S.- Korakel, District Khunti, Jharkhand. 14. Manoj Kumar Lal Das, S/o- Indu Shekhar Lal, aged about-62 years, R/o-Abhiyantran Bhawan, Minor Irrigation Division, Ranchi, Kutchery Road, G.P.O., P.S. Sadar, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB 15. Ramnandan Prasad Singh, S/o-Late Bishshwar R/o-Damakundi, Charakmara Prasad Singh, Kundahit, P.O. + P.S. Kundahit, District- Dumka, Jharkhand. 16. Ram Kumar Singh, S/o-Kapil Dev Singh, aged about-79 years, R/o- Narhat, Masouri, Kharauna, P.O.- Masaouri, P.S.- Kharauna, District-Patna, Bihar. 17. Krishna Mandal, S/o- Ramchandra Mandal, aged about-68 years, R/o-P.N.B. Argora, Doranda, P.O. + P.S.- Doranda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 18. Sushil Kumar Mishra, S/o- Upendra Mishra, aged about 62 years, R/o- Rasyari, P.O.+ P.S.-Rasyari, District- Darbhanga, Bihar. 19. Anil Kumar Mandal, R/o-Late Tiru Mandal, aged about-61 years, R/o- Village- Jhakhia, P.Ο.-Dhamnilata, P.S. Jarmundi, District- Dumka, Jharkhand. 20. Narayan Prasad Sinha, S/o- Late Badri Prasad Sinha, aged about-61 years, R/o- Kunoni, P.O.-Kunoni, P.S.-Banka, District Banka, Bihar. 21. Shankar Prasad Rana, S/o-Thakur Rana, aged about-65 years, R/o- Beaja, Chilra, P.O. P.S. Chilra, District Dumka, Jharkhand. 22. Surya Mohan Jha, S/o- Thakkan Jha, aged P.O.-District-about-68 years, R/o-Rasiyari, Ghanshyampur, P.S.-Ghanshyampur, Darbhanga, Bihar. 23. Shashi Bhushan Prasad Sandhwar, S/o-Ramchandra Prasad, aged about 69 years, R/o-Near Theka Baba, New Kumar Para, P.O. + P.S.-Dumka, District-Dumka, Jharkhand. 24. Kali Oraon, S/o- Mangra Oraon, aged about- 72 years, R/o- Village- Khora Jamtoli, P.O.-Khora, P.S. Gumla, District Gumla, Jharhand. 25. Sukhdeo Bhagat, S/o- Bhavran Bhagat, aged about- 66 years, R/o- Village Garhtoli, Soso More, P.O. Sakarpur Gamhariya, P.S. Gumla, District- Gumla, Jharkhand. 26. Baban Ram, S/o- Late Puni Ram, aged about-67 years, R/o- Village Dihara, Dehra Munji, P.O. +P.S. Munji, District- Rohtas, Bihar. 27. Bijay Kumar Ghosh, S/o-Late Bhawesh Chandra Ghosh, aged about- 66 years, R/o- Dalia, Bausi, P.O. + P.S. + District Banka, Bihar. ... Petitioners/Respondents Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr Manish Kumar, Sr. S.C.-II Mr Ashwini Bhushan, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II --------- Reserved on: 22.06.2026 Pronounced on: 25/06/2026 Per M. S. Sonak, C.J. 1. Heard Mr Manish Kumar, learned Sr. S.C.-II, appearing for the appellants-State. 2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 475 days in filing the appeal against the judgment dated 05.08.2024 made by the learned Single Judge disposing of W.P. (S) No. 4299 of 2024. 3. From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., it is axiomatic that no sufficient cause has been made out to explain the inordinate delay of 475 days. The application, in essence, does little more than trace the routine movement of files, the obtaining of legal opinion, the collection of records, and internal departmental processing, culminating in the bald assertion that the grounds of appeal were thereafter prepared and the appeal filed. Also and importantly, no attempt has been made to explain why each of these steps consumed the time that it did. 4. To be precise, it is evident from paragraph 4 of the I.A. that the impugned order was passed on 05.08.2024. Yet, the first concrete step adverted to in the application is dated 04.11.2024, when the file is stated to have been placed before the Secretary of the Department, a gap of nearly three (3) months, for which the I.A. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB offers no explanation whatsoever. The application is wholly silent as to what transpired during this initial period, and no material has been placed on record to suggest that any effective step was taken in the interregnum. 5. Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the I.A. discloses that the file was forwarded to the Law Department for a legal opinion on 11.11.2024, and that the opinion was ultimately received on 04.09.2025. Inexplicably, the application neither explains the reasons for this prolonged pendency nor indicates whether any steps were taken during this considerable interval to pursue or expedite the matter. This silence is compelling and cannot be ignored. 6. Lastly, the averments contained in paragraphs 5 to 8 of the I.A. are confined to the decision to file the appeal taken on 10.09.2025, the preparation of grounds, the collection of service records, the obtaining of further opinion, the approval from the Law Department, and the entrustment of the matter to the conducting lawyer. These subsequent steps, however diligently narrated, do nothing to cure the foundational infirmity, namely, the complete absence of any explanation for the two most conspicuous periods of inaction, the three months immediately following the impugned order, and the ten months during which the legal opinion lay pending. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB 7. Accordingly, what emerges from the above is that the delay is unsupported by any coherent or continuous explanatory chronology. The application merely catalogues routine departmental steps without addressing, even cursorily, why the matter remained dormant for such extended periods at the most material stages. An applicant seeking the extraordinary relief of condonation of delay must do more than narrate what eventually happened; it must also account for what did not happen. 8. The law is well settled that casual averments and formulaic bureaucratic explanations do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay of this magnitude. The mere recitation that files moved through proper channels, that legal opinion was sought and obtained, that service records were called for, and that the appeal was eventually prepared, cannot, without more, justify the exercise of discretion in favour of the appellants. 9. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble SC in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology, Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof. 10. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble SC in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 13. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never- ending paraphernalia. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:18643-DB 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 18. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown, and consequently, we dismiss this I.A., seeking condonation of the delay of 475 days in filing the accompanying appeal. 19. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not survive and are disposed of. 20. No costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June 25, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Cp.2 Uploaded on 25.06.2026