2026:HHC:31255 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 307 of 2026 Reserved on: 21.7.2026 Date of Decision: 29.7.2026. Anju Bala ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 18.04.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 01.09.2025 and order of sentence dated 03.09.2025, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, District Sirmour, HP (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:31255 the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the accused, Anju Bala, was posted as ABPM Panjahal. She had received ₹2,05,000/- under the head IPPB Deposit in Panjahal Branch Post Office between 29.04.2019 and 06.05.2019, but failed to remit it to the head office. She handed over ₹2,05,000/- to the Postmaster, Nahan, on 07.05.2019. She had temporarily embezzled the money and used it for her own purpose by crediting it in her account and in the account of her husband. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR (Ex. P1/PW5) and investigated the matter. The police seized various documents and found that the accused had deposited ₹2,05,000/- in her account and in the account of her husband between 29.04.2019 and 06.05.2019, whereas this money was to be deposited as cash in the Branch Office Khata of Head Office, Nahan. The police also found that an interest of ₹565/- was deposited by the accused. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3 2026:HHC:31255 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, she was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 409 of the IPC, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Gopal Singh (PW1) was posted as Grameen Dak Sewak in the Post Office, Panjahal. Sunny Bhardwaj (PW2) was posted as Additional Superintendent and produced the record. Hem Shankar (PW3) forwarded the letter to the police for the registration of the FIR. Indu Bharmoria (PW4) detected the misappropriation. MHC Om Pal. (PW5) registered the FIR. Abhishek Chauhan (PW6) produced the account details of the accused and her husband. Baldev Singh (PW7) was posted as Postmaster, who proved that the money was not deposited by the accused. Hem Prakash (PW8) and Manvinder Singh (PW9) investigated the matter. 5. The accused in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure denied the prosecution case. She did not produce any evidence in her defence. 4 2026:HHC:31255 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses proved that the accused had a charge of Grameen Sewak Mail Deliverer. She had received the money but failed to deposit it with the head office as per the rules. She had deposited the money in her account and the account of her husband for 08 days between 29.04.2019 and 06.05.2019. She had temporarily misappropriated the money. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC and sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months, pay a fine of ₹2,000/- and a default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nahan, District Sirmour, HP (learned Appellate Court). The Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was a public servant and she was entrusted with the money which was to be deposited with the head office, but she deposited it in her account and in the account of her husband. The learned Trial Court had rightly 5 2026:HHC:31255 appreciated the evidence and the sentence imposed upon the accused was not excessive. There was no reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses were not sufficient to prove that the accused had misappropriated the money. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was excessive. The statements of witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State. 10. Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and she was 6 2026:HHC:31255 falsely implicated. There was no loss to any person, and the money was deposited by the accused along with the interest. The prosecution witnesses admitted that the dealing hand of the Head Office was on leave and the money could not have been deposited with any person. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate this aspect. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the money was deposited with the accused. She had made an entry in the India Post App to this effect. She was supposed to deposit the cash with the head office, but she failed to do so. She deposited the money in her account and in the account of her husband. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had temporarily misappropriated the money. The learned Courts below have imposed an inadequate sentence, and no interference is required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:31255 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the time and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in a criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 8 2026:HHC:31255 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not 9 2026:HHC:31255 exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforesaid. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory 10 2026:HHC:31255 jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material; the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to 11 2026:HHC:31255 act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: 12 2026:HHC:31255 “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The ingredients of Section 405 of the IPC were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1481 as under: - 143. The terms of Section 405 are very wide. They apply to one who is in any manner entrusted with property or dominion over property. The section does not require that the trust should be in furtherance of any lawful object. It merely provides, inter alia, that if such a person dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use the property entrusted to him, he commits criminal breach of trust. This section requires: (1) Entrusting any person with property or with dominion over property. 13 2026:HHC:31255 (2) That person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property; or (b) dishonestly uses or disposes of that property or wilfully suffers any other person so to do in violation: (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or (ii) of any legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust. 144. In Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2008) 2 SCC 561: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] this Court noted that in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust, two distinct parts are involved. The first consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is a misappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created. 145. In Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v. State of Bombay [AIR 1960 SC 889], this Court observed: (AIR p. 891, para 4) “4. … to establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, 14 2026:HHC:31255 or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made.” 146. However, Sections 407 to 409 make special provisions for various cases in which property is entrusted to the enumerated categories of persons who commit the offence. Criminal breach of trust by a public servant is dealt with under Section 409: “409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” This section classes together public servants, bankers, merchants, factors, brokers, attorneys and agents. The duties of such persons are of a highly confidential character, involving great powers of control over the property entrusted to them, and a breach of trust by such persons may often induce serious public and private calamity. High morality is expected of these persons. They are to discharge their duties honestly. The following are the essential ingredients of the offence under this section: (1) The accused must be a public servant; (2) He must have been entrusted, in such capacity, with the property; 15 2026:HHC:31255 (3) He must have committed breach of trust in respect of such property. 147. In Raghunath Anant Govilkar v. State of Maharashtra [(2008) 11 SCC 289: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 130: (2008) 2 Scale 303] the Court noted that Section 406, which provides the punishment for criminal breach of trust simpliciter, and Section 409 IPC are cognate offences in which the common component is criminal breach of trust. When an offence punishable under Section 406 is committed by a public servant (or holding any one other of the positions listed in the section), the offence would escalate to Section 409 of the Penal Code. In Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. S.K. Roy [(1974) 4 SCC 230: 1974 SCC (Cri) 399], this Court held: (SCC p. 235, para 12) “12. To constitute an offence under Section 409 IPC, it is not required that misappropriation must necessarily take place after the creation of a legally correct entrustment or dominion over property. The entrustment may arise in ‘any manner whatsoever’. That manner may or may not involve fraudulent conduct of the accused. Section 409 IPC covers dishonest misappropriation in both types of cases; that is to say, those where the receipt of property is itself fraudulent or improper and those where the public servant misappropriates what may have been quite properly and innocently received. All that is required is what may be described as ‘entrustment’ or acquisition of dominion over property in the capacity of a public servant who, as a result of it, becomes charged with a duty to act in a particular way, or, at least honestly.” 148. In Chelloor Mankkal Narayan Ittiravi Nambudiri v. State of Travancore-Cochin [(1952) 2 SCC 392: AIR 1953 SC 478], this Court held: (AIR p. 484, para 21) “21. … to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust it is essential that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some 16 2026:HHC:31255 property or with any dominion or power over it. It has to be established further that in respect of the property so entrusted, there was dishonest misappropriation or dishonest conversion or dishonest use or disposal in violation of a direction of law or legal contract, by the accused himself or by someone else which he willingly suffered to do.” 149. In Ram Narayan Popli [(2003) 3 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri) 869] this Court stated the law, thus: (SCC p. 786, para 361) “361. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be an entrustment, there must be misappropriation or conversion to one's own use, or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract; and the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. When a person allows others to misappropriate the money entrusted to him, that amounts to a criminal breach of trust as defined by Section 405. The section is relatable to property in a positive part and a negative part. The positive part deals with criminal misappropriation or conversion of the property and the negative part consists of dishonestly using or disposing of the property in violation of any direction and of law or any contract touching the discharge of trust.” 20. Indu Bharmoria (PW4) stated that she used to keep the account of daily transactions of the branches. The branch could have kept ₹20,000/- in cash, and any amount in excess of ₹20,000/-was to be deposited with the head office. She used to match the amount deposited in the Indian Post Payment 17 2026:HHC:31255 Account and ensure that the money was deposited with the head office. Anju Bala had shown ₹25,000/- on 29.04.2019, 01.05.2019, 02.05.2019. 03.05.2019, 04.05.2019 and 05.05.2019, she deposited an amount of ₹ 30,000/- in the IPPB account each day, but she did not send any cash to the head office. The accused had shown an amount of ₹30,000/- in the IPPB account of her husband on 23.04.2019 and ₹30,000/- in the account of her husband on 06.05.2019. However, no cash was sent. The accused deposited ₹2,05,000/- on 07.05.2019. She stated in her cross-examination that Gopal was posted as Grameen Daak Sewak, but he was on leave. She admitted that any customer could deposit the money in IPPB. She was issuing remarks to the accused on the PO Slip periodically. She had waited for 2-3 days for the accused to deposit the money. However, when the accused failed to deposit the cash, a complaint was made against her. 21. Gopal Singh (PW1) stated that he was posted as Grameen Dak Sewak since 1977. The accused was also posted as Grameen Dak Sewak, Panjahal. The accused used to make entries in her mobile phone regarding the deposit and withdrawal of the amount. The cash amount was to be put in a cash bag, which was 18 2026:HHC:31255 to be sealed and sent to Nahan. He had undergone surgery during the period, and he was not aware of the facts of the case. He was permitted to be cross-examined and admitted that he came to know subsequently that the accused had not deposited ₹2,05,000/- between 29.04.2019 and 06.05.2019. He also admitted that the accused had not given any money to him for depositing it in the Head Post Office. He agreed that it was his duty to deposit the amount. He also admitted that the accused was a new employee whereas he was an old employee. 22. The statements of these two witnesses clearly prove that Gopal Singh and the accused were posted in the Post Office, Panjahal. The statement of Gopal Singh shows that the accused used to deal with the money and make an entry regarding the deposit and withdrawal in the mobile phone. The testimony of Gopal Singh corroborates the testimony of Indu Bharmoria that the accused was dealing with the cash in the Post Office. 23. It was submitted that Gopal Singh used to take the cash to the head office. He had undergone surgery, and the money could not be taken to the head office. This submission will not help the accused. The statements of Gopal Singh and 19 2026:HHC:31255 Indu Bharmoria show that only two persons were posted in the branch office, Panjahal. If Gopal Singh was on leave and the accused had received the money, it was for her to deposit it with the head office. She cannot take shelter behind the plea that she could not have deposited the money in the head office due to the illness of Gopal Singh. 24. Baldev Singh (PW7), stated that he was working in the head office as Postmaster. He was informed by R.D. Pathak that ₹2,05,000/- was not deposited by the accused between 29.04.2019 and 06.05.2019. The money was required to be deposited on a daily basis. The money was deposited on 07.05.2019, and he made an entry in the cash book (Ex. P1/PW6). He stated in his cross-examination that the accused was not posted as a Branch Post Master and she was only a Grameen Daak Sewak. She also admitted that the responsibility was always given to a person in writing and the responsibility of taking money was with Branch Postmaster, Gopal Singh. He also admitted that it was the duty of Gopal Singh to collect the money and maintain the account. 20 2026:HHC:31255 25. The testimony of this witness will not help the accused. It was duly proved by the statements of Gopal Singh and Indu Bharmoria that two persons were posted in Branch Office Panjahal and Gopal Singh was on leave at the relevant time. Therefore, the money was being deposited with the accused, and she had to deposit it in the Head Office. She was the person who had deposited it ultimately with the Head Office. Therefore, the statement that it was the duty of Gopal Singh to receive the money and remit it to the Head Office will not save the accused. 26. Abhishek Chauhan (PW6) stated that he was posted at Head Post Office, Nahan as Branch Manager. He proved the account details of the accused and her husband. He stated in his cross-examination that India Post Payment Bank was a branch of India Post. He had not produced any record to show this fact. He admitted that the record produced by him had overwriting and did not bear the serial number. 27. The statement of this witness proved that the money was deposited in the account of the accused and her husband. 21 2026:HHC:31255 28. Hem Shankar (PW3) stated that he was working as Superintendent of Post Office, Solan Division. Solan and Nahan were under him. He had made a complaint regarding the misappropriation of ₹2,05,000/- by Anju Bala, which was deposited by her in her account and the account of her husband. The accused had kept ₹2,05,000/- with her between 29.04.2019 and 06.05.2019. She deposited the money on 07.05.2019. 29. The testimony of this witness also corroborates the prosecution version that the accused had kept the money with her and had deposited it in her account and in the account of her husband. 30. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused had retained ₹2,05,000/- between 29.04.2019 till 06.05.2019, which was deposited by her in her account and in the account of her husband. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was entrusted with the money; she had failed to deposit it with the head office and retained it with herself. 31. It was submitted that it was a case of late deposit which did not harm any person. This submission will not help 22 2026:HHC:31255 the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Venkat Krishna (supra) that even if a bank or financial institution does not suffer ultimate loss, but the money was allowed to be used by some person, the ingredients of Section 405 of IPC would be attracted. It was observed at page 787: - 153. A bank or financial institution may not suffer ultimate loss, but if the money has been allowed to be used by another person illegally for illegal purposes, the ingredients of Section 405 of the Penal Code would get attracted. A case involving temporary embezzlement also attracts the ingredients of Section 405 of the Penal Code. 154. Furthermore, in terms of the above-referred judgments of this Court, when a person allows others to misappropriate the property entrusted to him, that also amounts to criminal breach of trust. In the present case, the amount of Rs 40 crores was entrusted to Accused 6, C. Ravikumar, to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the NHB Act. As has already been noticed hereinbefore, the 1987 Act does not permit grant of loan to an individual. Accused 6, in violation of the law, handed over the amount to UCO Bank with full knowledge that the amount would be credited to the account of Accused 4, Harshad Mehta. The call money transaction with UCO Bank was only a cover-up. Thus, the property which was entrusted to Accused 6 was misappropriated by him. 32. Similarly, it was held in Vishwa Nath v. State of J & K, (1983) 1 SCC 215: 1983 SCC (Cri) 173: 1983 SCC OnLine SC 15 that deposit of money by the public servant does not absolve him of the commission of the offence. It was observed at page 217: 23 2026:HHC:31255 6. We do not consider it necessary to refer to any decision. The facts and circumstances of this case clearly establish that there was embezzlement of the government money by the accused, inasmuch as the accused had put to personal use the government money entrusted to him, instead of depositing the same in the proper place. The fact that the accused refunded the amount when the act of his defalcation came to be discovered does not absolve him of the offence committed by him. The accused happened to be a public servant of the Police Department and was posted as Naib-Court. He was entrusted with the amount seized in two cases, FIR Nos. 16 and 17. In complete violation of the directions of law, he had failed to send the amount to Sadar Court, Udhampur and with criminal intention he had not made any entry of the money in Rahdari Register, while he made its entry in the Malkhana Register No. 1, so that his misappropriation of the amount might not be detected by anybody. He committed criminal breach of trust with respect to this money over which he had complete dominion by putting the same to his use between February 7, 1972 and August 8, 1972. The refund of the amount after detection does not absolve him of the offence. 33. In the present case, the money was deposited by the accused in her account and the account of her husband. Therefore, it was used by the accused and her husband illegally, and the offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC would be made out even though the amount along with the interest was deposited with the India Post Payment Bank subsequently. 24 2026:HHC:31255 34. Therefore, the learned Courts below have rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 409 of the IPC. 35. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The offence punishable under Section 409 of the IPC is punishable with imprisonment for life or ten years. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is lenient, and no further leniency is required in the present case. 36. No other point was urged. 37. In view of the above, the present revision fails and is dismissed. 38. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 29th July, 2026 (Chander)