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2026 DAILYLAW 17632 (HP)

TUSAR DOGRA v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

CRMMO/646/2026 · 2026-07-27

Sandeep Sharma

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:HHC:30932 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.646 of 2026 Date of Decision: 27.07.2026 _______________________________________________________ Tusar Dogra …….Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others … Respondents _______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioner: Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol, Additional Advocate General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the respondent-State. Ms. Manjeet Kaur, Advocate, for respondents No.2 to 5. _______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,2023, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.47 of 2026, dated 04.05.2026, under Sections 281, 125(a) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings pending adjudication in the competent Court of law, on the basis of the compromise arrived inter se parties, 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:30932 whereby both the parties have resolved to settle their dispute amicably interse them. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, are that the FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, came to be lodged at the behest of respondent No.2, Smt. Mamta Devi (hereinafter referred to as the complainant), who alleged that on 03.05.2026, while she, alongwith her brother Tej Singh, and his son Arman, was going towards Dharamshala and had reached near Chamunda Temple, one motorcycle came in high speed from Dharamshala side and hit her nephew Arman from behind, as a result of which, he fell on the ground and suffered serious injuries. Since complainant alleged that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-53-C-6075, FIR came to be lodged against him. Though, after completion of the investigation, police has presented the challan in the competent Court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical end, parties have entered into compromise, whereby they resolved to settle the dispute amicably interse them. In the aforesaid background, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of the FIR as well as consequent proceedings. 3 2026:HHC:30932 3. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, respondent-State has filed status report under the signatures of SHO, Police Station, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, wherein factum of compromise arrived interse parties has been duly acknowledged. 4. Respondent No.2/complainant has come present in Court and is being represented by Ms. Manjeet Kaur, Advocate. She states on oath before this Court that she of her own volition and without there being any external pressure has entered into the compromise, whereby both the parties have resolved to settle their dispute amicably interse them. She states that FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, is result of misunderstanding because accident did not occur on account of rash and negligent driving of the petitioner, rather on account of error of judgment. She states that since after the accident, her nephew was taken due care by the petitioner-accused, named in the FIR, and he has already recovered from the injuries suffered by him in the accident, she does not wish to prosecute the case further and shall have no objection in case prayer made on behalf of petitioner for quashing of the FIR as well as consequent proceedings, if any, pending adjudication in the competent Court of law, is accepted and petitioner-accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him. While admitting the contents of the compromise placed on record to be correct, she also 4 2026:HHC:30932 admits her signature upon the same. Her statement is taken on record. 5. Mr. Ravi Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, after having heard the aforesaid statement made by respondent No.2/complainant, fairly states that no fruitful purpose would be served in case FIR as well as consequent proceedings, sought to be quashed, are allowed to sustain. He further states that otherwise also, chances of conviction of petitioner-accused are very remote and bleak in view of the statement made by respondent No. 2/complainant and as such, respondent-State shall have no objection in case the prayer made in the petition is allowed. 6. The question which now needs consideration is whether FIR’s in question can be ordered to be quashed when Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014)6 SCC 466 has specifically held that power under S. 482 CrPC is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., since such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 7. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh (supra), whereby the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to 5 2026:HHC:30932 accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings. Perusal of judgment referred to above clearly depicts that in para 29.1, Hon’ble Apex Court has returned the findings that power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable and where the parties have settled the matter between themselves, however, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution. In para Nos. 29 to 29.7 of the judgment Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down certain parameters to be followed, while compounding offences. 8. Careful perusal of para 29.3 of the judgment suggests that such a power is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Apart from this, offences committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly 6 2026:HHC:30932 arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes may be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. Aforesaid view taken by Hon'ble Apex Court has been further reiterated in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh supra has held that power of the High Court in quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court to compound the offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Even in the judgment passed in Narinder Singh’s case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that while exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482 Cr.P.C the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to exercise the power for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors. (2013( 11 SCC 497 has further reiterated that continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. Hon'ble Apex Court further 7 2026:HHC:30932 observed that when offences of a personal nature, burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. 10. Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 4th October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh’s case supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. 11. In the case at hand also, offences alleged to have been committed by petitioner do not involve offences of moral turpitude or any grave/heinous crime, rather same are petty offences, as such, this Court deems it appropriate to quash the FIR as well as consequential proceedings thereto, especially keeping in view the fact that the petitioner and respondent No.2/ complainant, have compromised the matter interse them, in which case, possibility of conviction is remote and no fruitful purpose would be served in continuing with the criminal proceedings. 12. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No. No.47 of 2026, dated 04.05.2026, under Sections 281, 125(a) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as 8 2026:HHC:30932 well as consequent proceedings pending adjudication in the competent Court of law, are quashed and set aside. Accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him. 13. Since petitioner-accused has been charged under Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court deems it fit to impose fine of Rs. 5000/- upon the petitioner-accused, which shall be deposited in the District Treasury, Kangra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh within a period of four weeks, failing which, he shall render himself liable for penal consequences as well as contempt of the Court. 14. List for compliance on 02.09.2026. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, alongwith all pending applications. 15. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge July 27,2026 (shankar)