IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No.1017 of 2026 in LPA No. 435 of 2026 Decided on : _24.07.2026 Santosh Kumar ... Appellant Versus State of H.P. and others …Respondents. Coram Hon’ble Mr. Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Mr. Rajiv Rai, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, Additional Advocate General. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral) CMP(M) No. 1017 of 2026 Keeping in view the averments made in the application, duly supported by the affidavit of the official, delay of 314 days in filing the appeal is condoned. The application stands disposed of. LPA No. 435 of 2026 Consideration is sought of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 6595 of 2024, titled Santosh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and others, dated 11.7.2024, and the order dated 29.12.2025 passed in CMP(M) No. 1680 of 2025, whereby the review petition, as such, was 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes -2- dismissed by the learned Single Judge. In such circumstances, we allow the application for condonation of delay, since the petitioner was pursuing his remedy before the learned Single Judge and the review order had been passed before the Winter Vacation and the appeal could only be filed thereafter, after the opening in March, 2026. 2. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment has upheld the award of the Labour Court-cum- Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, dated 21.9.2022, whereby the reference had been decided against the present appellant, while noticing that he was engaged on a daily wage basis as a Conductor on 22.2.1999 and had worked till 31.3.1999. The case, as such, of the appellant was that on account of FIR No. 161 of 1999 having been registered against him, his services had been dispensed with on 6th July, 1999, and since he had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings on 14th January, 2014 (Annexure P-3), he had not been re- engaged, whereas his junior had been re-engaged. He, therefore had claimed that there was violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, particularly Sections 25-G and 25-H thereof. The stand of the State was that it was a case of abandonment and not termination of service, that no junior had been retained in service, and that the workman had -3- produced forged documents, on the basis of which the FIR had been lodged against him. 3. The learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that the workman had worked only for 39 days and that there was no violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The claim that one Jai Pal, who had been engaged in the year 1997, was working prior to the workman as a senior was accepted on the basis of the stand put forward by the State, and the other persons were found not to have been engaged as Conductors/Cleaners but Beldars after the alleged termination of his services, except Jai Pal. Therefore, the learned Single Judge had found that there was no scope for interference in the award passed by the Labour Court. 4. Counsel for the State has submitted that there was one co-accused, namely Prem Lal, who had also been acquitted had been reinstated and is still in service. He had also been granted the benefit of regular appointment with effect from 25th October, 2008 on a notional basis and has been held entitled to arrears for the period with effect from 16th September, 2010, while referring to the communication dated 8th December, 2014. It was in these circumstances that the appellant had also filed a Review Petition before the learned Single Judge, who came to the conclusion that the award had already been the subject matter of consideration and that re- -4- consideration of the case was being sought by placing on record the documents which were not part of the record before the Labour Court. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge did not condone the delay of 418 days in instituting the review petition and also dismissed the same on the ground that the Court while exercising review jurisdiction, could not sit in appeal over the matter. 5. We have also gone through the paper book. Learned counsel has sought parity with Prem Lal, who was a co-accused in the said FIR and had also been acquitted. From the judgment, it is apparently clear that the allegation against the appellant was that he had secured the job on the basis of forged documents, whereas there was no such allegation against Prem Lal. There is nothing on record to show that Prem Lal had discontinued his service with the respondents or had left his job. Rather, he had pursued his legal remedy by filing CWP No. 7718 of 2018 before the High Court for regularization of his services, and directions were issued for consideration of his case, which eventually led to the order being passed in his favour, as noticed above. Thus, he was never similarly situated. He had continued in service as a daily wager working as a Peon and was ultimately granted the benefit of regularization. Therefore, the appellant cannot claim parity with him, as the -5- appellant only worked for a paltry 39 days, way back 26 years ago, and there is no similarity between the two cases. 6. It is also apparent that, after the criminal proceedings arising out of the FIR had been instituted before the competent Court on 28th May, 2004, the appellant alone was facing trial, but not reporting for duty whereas Prem Lal continued in service. Therefore, the appellant cannot now claim that he had no knowledge of the fact that the said person was not similarly situated. In such circumstances, the argument that Article 14 of the Constitution of India has been violated, is also not sustainable. 7. A perusal of the award, which is the subject matter of challenge, would go on to show that the Tribunal had first decided the issue of delay in favour of the workman by holding that the reference made in the year 2015, after his acquittal, was not barred by delay and laches. However, on the other issues, whether there was any violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whether the workman was entitled to any relief on that account, all the issues were decided against the workman on the ground that his services had not been illegally terminated. There is nothing on record to show that the dispensing with his services was by way of punishment on account of the FIR. Rather, as noticed above, his case is that his services had already been dispensed with -6- from 1st April, 1999 on the basis of the FIR, whereas the FIR came to be registered much later, i.e. on 6th July, 1999. In such circumstances, it is apparent that the stand of the management has rightly been accepted and there is no valid reason to interfere with the impugned award. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 24th July, 2026 Tarun Singh