HITESH MATHUR S/O LATE SH. KISHAN CHAND MATHUR v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
SAW/626/2019 · 2026-01-12
Inderjeet Singh, Ravi Chirania
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 17566 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 17566 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
[2026:RJ-JP:1143-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 626/2019
1. Hitesh Mathur S/o Late Sh. Kishan Chand Mathur, Aged About 58 Years, R/o Mohalla Cheepan, Opp. Madan Kuiyan, Old Tonk, District Tonk (Since Deceased) Through Legal Heirs -
2. Sh. Vishwas Mathur S/o Late Shri Hitesh Mathur, Aged About 24 Years, R/o Cheepon Ka Mohalla , Opp. Madan Kuiyan, Old Tonk, District Tonk -304001
3. Smt. Surbhi Mathur W/o Deepender Mathur, Aged About 21 Years, R/o Near Rai Ji Kuiyan, Palwas Road, District Sikar - 332001
4. Ruchika Mathur W/o Manish Mathur, Near Vidhya Bharti B.ed. College, Todinagar, District Sikar-332001 ----Appellants Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary To The Government, Finance (Tax) Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Director General, Stamps And Registration, Ajmer. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Laxmi Kant Malpura, Advocate. Mr. Keshav Parashar, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sankalp Vijay, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Vigyan Shah, Additional Advocate General.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA
Order 12/01/2026
1. This appeal has been filed on behalf of the appellant (hereinafter to be referred as ‘original petitioner’) against the
[2026:RJ-JP:1143-DB] (2 of 5) [SAW-626/2019]
judgment and order dated 04.02.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge.
2.
Brief facts of the case are that the original petitioner was served with a charge-sheet by the respondents vide order dated
09.03.2006. Upon conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority, by order dated 30.03.2011, inflicted the penalty of dismissal from service on the charge of embezzlement of government money i.e. Rs.5,82,069/-. Aggrieved thereby, the original petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, which remanded the matter to the enquiry officer for fresh consideration. Thereafter, after conducting the enquiry, enquiry officer sent its report to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority vide its order dated 03.02.2016 imposed the punishment of dismissal from service to the original petitioner. Being aggrieved of the order dated 03.02.2016 passed by the disciplinary authority, the original petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority vide its order dated 31.05.2017 dismissed the appeal filed on behalf of the original petitioner. Being aggrieved of the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, the original petitioner preferred an SBCW No.12637/2017 before this Court. The learned Single Judge vide its order dated 04.02.2019 dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the original petitioner filed this appeal before this Court. During pendency of the appeal before this Court, the original petitioner died and his legal representatives were taken on record by this Court. [2026:RJ-JP:1143-DB] (3 of 5) [SAW-626/2019]
3. Counsel for the original petitioner submits that when the matter was remanded to the enquiry officer by the appellate authority, the enquiry officer failed to consider the evidence produced by the original petitioner before him and has wrongly found the charge proved against the original petitioner. Counsel further submits that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority wrongly awarded the punishment of dismissal from service to the original petitioner without appreciating the document available on record vide their order dated 03.02.2016 and 31.05.2017 respectively. 4. Counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider this aspect of the matter that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority both had failed to appreciate the evidence placed before them by the original petitioner. Counsel further submits that the original petitioner was acquitted by the trial court on the same charges and prayed for allowing the appeal. 5.
Counsel for the respondents opposed this appeal and submitted that the original petitioner was guilty of embezzlement of government money and he also wrote a letter to the higher officers of the department and sought permission for depositing the amount of embezzlement in the treasury. Counsel further submits that mere acquittal in the criminal case is of no help to the original petitioner as the standard of proof in criminal case as well as in departmental enquiry is different. Counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Airports Authority of India versus Pradip Kumar Banarjee”, (2025) 4 Supreme Court Cases 111, decided on
[2026:RJ-JP:1143-DB] (4 of 5) [SAW-626/2019] February 4, 2025 wherein in paragraphs no.36, 37 and 41, it is held as under:
“36. All that is required on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was done by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority while dealing with the case of the respondent. 37. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-a-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. It is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. 41.
The position is, thus, settled that in an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must restrain itself and the interference into the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is permissible only if the judgment of the learned Single Judge is perverse or suffers from an error apparent in law. However, the Division Bench, in the present case, failed to record any such finding and rather, proceeded to delve into extensive re-appreciation of evidence to overturn the judgment of the learned Single Judge.”
6. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. We have gone through the order passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority as well as by the learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge has held that the disciplinary authority after appreciating the evidence submitted by the original petitioner has come to the conclusion of dismissal from service which was not interfered by the learned Single Judge. [2026:RJ-JP:1143-DB] (5 of 5) [SAW-626/2019]
8. We are of the considered view that while sitting in appeal, this Court cannot appreciate the evidence which was produced before the departmental authorities. We have also considered the fact that no irregularity in conducting the departmental enquiry has been pointed out before this Court. Therefore, we are not inclined to act as an appellate court in this matter. 9. Also, in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Airports Authority of India (supra), we are of the considered view that no case is made to interfere with this appeal by this Court. 10. Hence, this appeal is dismissed. (RAVI CHIRANIA),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J Tushar/175