$~88 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010411962026 + CRL.M.C. 6472/2026 KAVITA KIRAN AHIRE, PROPRIETOR OF M/S SHIVTARA AGRO AGENCIES .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Vivek, Mr. Manvendra Mukul, Mr. Rahul Tiwari, Advocates. versus CORTEVA AGRISCIENCE INDIA PVT LTD .....Respondent Through: Mr. Mohit Mathur, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Ashish Kothari, Ms. Sakshi Agarwal & Mr. Vignesh Ramanathan, Advocates. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV O R D E R % 02.09.2026 CRL.M.A. 27060/2026 (exemption) 1. Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions. 2. Application stands disposed of. CRL.M.C. 6472/2026 and CRL.M.A. 27059/2026 3. By this petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the petitioner seeks quashing of complaint CC NI Act No. 61302/2025, pending before the learned JMFC (‘NI Act’), Digital Court-03, Patiala House Courts, Delhi, along with the summoning order dated This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 09/09/2026 at 11:29:18 09.10.2025 and all proceedings emanating therefrom. 4. The case of the complainant is that, under a Distribution Agreement dated 01.03.2024, accused no. 1, a proprietorship concern of which the petitioner is the sole proprietor and is arrayed as accused no. 2, was appointed as a distributor of its agrochemical products in Maharashtra. Against supplies made and invoices raised from time to time, a sum of Rs.7,07,11,938.19/- became due and remained unpaid. 5. Towards the said liability, a cheque dated 21.08.2025 for Rs.7,07,11,938.19/- drawn on the account of accused no. 1 and signed by the petitioner was issued. The cheque was dishonoured on 26.08.2025. A statutory demand notice dated 02.09.2025 was thereafter issued to both accused. Upon failure to make payment, the complaint was filed on 08.10.2025, pursuant to which the learned Magistrate, by order dated 09.10.2025, took cognizance and issued summons. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the complaint and pre- summoning affidavit, both sworn on 29.09.2025, falsely state that fifteen days had elapsed without payment. He points to the complainant’s own India Post tracking reports which record delivery at Satana on 19.09.2025. Thus, only ten days had elapsed by 29.09.2025, rendering the averment demonstrably false. 7. Learned senior counsel for the respondent submits that the demand notice was served through two modes. The courier was delivered at Nashik on 11.09.2025, as reflected in the tracking record annexed to the complaint. Thus, fifteen days had expired before 29.09.2025, when the complaint and affidavit were sworn. Service by registered post was an additional mode and once service was effected through one mode, the complainant was not This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 09/09/2026 at 11:29:18 required to await service through the other. 8. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 9. The petition rests on the premise that the statutory notice should be considered to have been served only on 19.09.2025. The complaint itself states that the notice was sent by courier as well as registered post and the courier tracking record shows delivery at Nashik on 11.09.2025. The petitioner has not disputed the said delivery. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is thus contrary to the record. 10. In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan,1 the Supreme Court held that the fifteen-day period contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is reckoned from the receipt of the statutory notice. The Court observed: “19. On the part of the payee he has to make a demand by ‘giving a notice’ in writing. If that was the only requirement to complete the offence on the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of such ‘giving’, the travails of the prosecution would have been very much lessened. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days ‘of the receipt’ of the said notice. It is, therefore, clear that ‘giving notice’ in the context is not the same as receipt of notice.” **** 25. No doubt Section 138 of the Act does not require that the notice should be given only by ‘post’. Nonetheless the principle incorporated in Section 27 (quoted above) can profitably be imported in a case where the sender has despatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it. Then it can be deemed to have been served on the sender unless he proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for such non-service. Any other interpretation can lead to a very tenuous position as the drawer of the cheque who is liable to pay the amount would resort to the strategy of subterfuge by successfully avoiding the notice.” (Emphasis Supplied) 1 (1999) 7 SCC 510 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 09/09/2026 at 11:29:18 11. Upon service by courier on 11.09.2025, the fifteen days’ period under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 expired on 26.09.2025. The cause of action had, thus, accrued by 29.09.2025 when the complaint and pre-summoning affidavit were verified and the complaint filed on 08.10.2025 was within time. The proviso to Section 138 does not prescribe any particular mode of service. Once the notice is effectively served, the statutory period runs from such service and a subsequent mode of service does not extend or restart it. 12. Bearing in mind the aforesaid, the Court finds no substance in the present petition. It is, however, made clear that whether the amount claimed was in fact due and whether the ingredients of the offence are made out are matters for the trial, and nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. 13. Accordingly, the petition fails and, is, hereby, dismissed, along with the pending application. PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J SEPTEMBER 2, 2026/aks/ksr This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 09/09/2026 at 11:29:18