2026:JHHC:17347-DB -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 766 of 2025 With I.A. No.15524 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary/Principal Secretary, Department of Home (Police), having office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town and District Ranchi. 2. The Secretary/Principal Secretary, Department of Planning -cum- Finance, having office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa,Town and District Ranchi. 3. The Joint Secretary to Government, Department of Planning -cum- Finance, having office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town and District Ranchi. 4. The Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police- 1 (JAP-I), having office at Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Town and District Ranchi. ... ... Appellants Versus 1. Bishnu Kumari Thakuri, wife of Late Gyan Bahadur Thakuri, residing at House No.23, C/o Tahir Ali, Line Mohalla, Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Town and District Ranchi. 2. Accountant General (A & E), having office at Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Town and District Ranchi. ... Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellant : Mr. Vineet Prakash, A.C. to SC-IV For the Respondent : Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate. Mrs. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate. --------- 02/Dated: 16.06.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. I.A. No. 15524 of 2025 seeks condonation of the delay of 707 days in filing an appeal against learned Single Judge’s order dated 18.09.2023 disposing of W.P.(S) No. 5882 of 2016. The excuses for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation and filing the same beyond 707 days after the expiry of the limitation period have been set out in paragraph 3. 3. Notwithstanding the length of paragraph 3, all that it discloses is the movement of files from one table to the other and from one officer to the other. 2026:JHHC:17347-DB -2- 4. Based upon the virtually identical reasons, we have, declined to condone the delay by following various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the subject matter. 5. The appellants, by citing routine bureaucratic procedures cannot expect delay of 707 days to be condoned. More especially indulgence can be shown to the State Government in such matters. The reference to “established Standard Operating Procedure among the Government functionaries” cannot be a valid ground to condone the inordinate delay of 707 days. 6. Assuming that there are such Standard Operating Procedures, it is high time that such procedures are changed given the fact that the law of limitation equally applies to the Government and the Government, cannot adopt any Standard Operating Procedures by rendering it almost impossible for itself to file appeals within the limitation period prescribed by a competent legislature. 7. Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay of 707 days. This is a case of utter lethargy, tardiness and indolence to borrow the phrases used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others vs Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191. 8. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the distinction between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ proffered as a ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier decisions, in which it is held that there is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant, even if the litigant is the Government, which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a 2026:JHHC:17347-DB -3- particular point, no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government, which functions through an impersonal machinery. 9. In Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court held that, in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 10. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost the right to have the matter considered on the merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. 2026:JHHC:17347-DB -4- 11. The Court also held that when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. The ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 13. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State- machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as 2026:JHHC:17347-DB -5- is famously said but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at the later stages. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 2026:JHHC:17347-DB -6- 16. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no case has been made for condonation of the delay of 707 days in instituting the instant appeal. 17. I.A. No. 15524 of 2025 is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed without any order for costs. 18. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the interim application(s) (if any) therein will not survive are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 16.06.2026 N.A.F.R. APK/VK Uploaded on 23.06.2026