2026:HHC:30731 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 135 of 2014 Reserved on: 16.07.2026 Date of Decision: 27.7.2026. Tilak Raj ...Appellant Versus Susheel Kumar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr Dixit Sahotra, Advocate, vice Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 28.02.2024, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Amb, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:30731 (NI Act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the complainant was running a business of cement at Mubarikpur Road, Tehsil Amb, District Una. The accused purchased 60 bags of Birla White Cement from the complainant and issued a cheque of ₹25,000/-to pay the money. The complainant presented the cheque at his bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant issued a legal notice to the accused asking him to repay the money within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice was duly served upon the accused but the accused failed to repay the money. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused. 3 2026:HHC:30731 3. The learned Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself (CW-1) to prove his complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he had issued a cheque, but denied that the cheque was issued towards the payment of the cement bags. He claimed that he had purchased a vehicle from the complainant. The complainant was the sole proprietor of T.R Company and had taken blank signed cheques as security at the time of purchase of the vehicle. The complainant misused those cheques. He admitted that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. He denied that he had received any notice asking him to repay the money. He examined Rajesh Kumar (DW1) in his defence. 4 2026:HHC:30731 6. Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed by the accused. Hence, a presumption would be attracted that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The plea taken by the accused that he had purchased a vehicle from the complainant and issued blank signed cheques, as security, was highly probable. The complainant admitted that he had filed other complaints against the accused regarding the dishonour of the cheque, which supports the version of the accused that the cheques were issued as security. The complainant had not proved the demand notice, postal receipt and acknowledgement in his evidence. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were not satisfied. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the cheque carried a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The pleas taken by the accused that he had purchased the vehicle from M/S T.R. Enterprises and the complainant had filed other complaints 5 2026:HHC:30731 were not relevant to the adjudication of the present dispute. No person would hand over a blank signed cheque to another without any reason. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr Dixit Sahotra, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/complainant. 9. Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The accused had admitted his signature on the cheque; therefore, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The accused had failed to rebut the presumption by any satisfactory evidence, and the learned Trial Court erred in accepting the defence version. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by leaned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Dixit Sahotra, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused, submitted that the filing of the 6 2026:HHC:30731 multiple complaints against the accused probabilised the defence taken by him that he had issued the security cheques in favour of the complainant and the complainant had misused them. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: 7 2026:HHC:30731 “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme 8 2026:HHC:30731 Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under: - “5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8 SCC 300, this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the acts, the concatenation of which would make the offence under Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of the cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker, for payment to another person from out of that account for discharge in whole/in part of any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee or the holder in due course to the bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the banker to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, demanding payment of the cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to make payment to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, of the amount covered by the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.” 16. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that he had issued a cheque, but claimed that it was issued as security towards the payment of the vehicle. Learned Courts below had rightly held that once the issuance of the cheque and the signatures are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti 9 2026:HHC:30731 International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, that when the issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was observed: - “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of 10 2026:HHC:30731 the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.” 17. This position was reiterated in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under: “6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable, meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a probable defence.” 18. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE 15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra). 11 2026:HHC:30731 16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial transactions. 17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197]. 19. Thus, the Court has to start with the presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption. 20. The complainant denied in his cross-examination that he was the authorised dealer of Bajaj Tempo and was running the shop in the name of M/S T.R. Enterprises. Rajesh Kumar (DW-I) stated that the accused had taken a vehicle from M/S T.R Enterprises, which was owned by Tilak Raj. Rajesh Kumar is a bank official with no interest in supporting any person. Therefore, his testimony was rightly accepted by the learned trial Court. His testimony establishes that the complainant was running a shop in the name of M/S T.R Enterprises, and the accused had taken a vehicle from the complainant. This statement shows that the complainant has 12 2026:HHC:30731 falsely denied the ownership of M/s T R Enterprises and the sale of the vehicle to the accused. 21. The complainant admitted in his cross-examination that he had filed another complaint against the accused at Una, which was regarding the payment of money to the accused. Learned Trial Court rightly held that the complainant had not explained the possession of multiple cheques issued by the accused, and this fact probabilised the plea taken by the accused that he had issued the cheques as security in favour of the complainant. 22. Even otherwise, it is difficult to believe that once a case of dishonour of a cheque has been filed, against the accused by the complainant, then he would have accepted the second cheque from him, because the chances of getting the second cheque dishonoured would be quite high. Thus, this admission makes the complainant’s version suspect. 23. The complainant stated that he had sold 60 bags of cement to the accused at the rate of ₹ 425/- per bag. The cost of 60 bgas at the rate of ₹ 425 per bags would be ₹ 25,500/- and not ₹25,000/- for which the cheque was issued. 13 2026:HHC:30731 24. All these circumstances made the prosecution's case highly doubtful, and the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the accused had rebutted the presumption attached to the cheque. 25. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had not considered the presumption attached to the cheque, but this is not correct. Learned Trial Court had considered the presumption and held that the evidence of the complainant and the accused read together rebutted the presumption attached to the cheque. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and disappears after the evidence is produced. It was observed: “38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: “The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.” 14 2026:HHC:30731 26. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the Learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. 28. The records of the learned Trial Court be returned forthwith along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 27th July, 2026 (ravinder)