IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.186 of 2026 Date of decision:24.07.2026 Gopal Chand ...Petitioner Versus Nisha Verma & others ...Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the petitioner : Mr. N.K. Bhalla, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, Senior Advocate with Ms. Upasana Thakur, Advocate, for respondent Nos.2 and 3. Romesh Verma, Judge (oral): The instant petition arises out of order as passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge Court No.1, Solan, dated 06.12.2025, whereby the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner for amendment of the plaint was dismissed. 2. The facts, as emerge in the present case, are that the plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction and in the alternative, for possession and Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- injunction against the respondents/defendants, Smt. Nisha Verma and Shri Rajesh Pal, on 16.11.2005. 3. It has been stated in the plaint that the plaintiff is the owner-in-possession of the land comprised in Khata-Khatoni Nos. 6/87 min and 90/61 min, Khasra No.616/308/14/9 and Khasra No. 616/308/14, measuring 7 biswas, as per Jamabandi for the year 2001- 2002, situated at Mauja Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan. 4. As per the case of the plaintiff, the suit land was purchased by him from Shri Prem Das through a registered sale deed which was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Solan. A path leads to the land of the plaintiff and the same has been mentioned in the sale deed, which also finds mention in the map annexed with the sale deed. As per the plaintiff, the disputed path has been marked as a common path in the sanctioned map between the lands of the defendants, comprised in Khasra No. 303/14, in the map as stated above. Further, it has been submitted that the land shown as vacant land comprised in Khasra No. 616/308/14/9, measuring 2 biswas in the above-stated map, has been purchased by the plaintiff through a registered sale deed, as the same adjoins the land earlier purchased by the plaintiff comprised in Khasra No. 616/308/14, measuring 5 biswas, situated at Mauja Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan. The defendants, without any legal right, title, or interest over the suit land or over the said path, are -3- threatening to raise construction over the said path and have also started digging work at the spot. 5. It is the case of the plaintiff that there is no other path available at the spot and the encroachment made by the defendants has diminished the value and use of the property of the plaintiff. Therefore, under such circumstances, the plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit seeking decree that the defendants be restrained from raising construction on the path as shown in the map duly sanctioned by the TCP Department and shown as a common path between Khasra No. 303/14 and Khasra No. 305/14, situated at Mauja Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan. 6. The said suit came to be resisted by the defendants by filing separate written statements. 7. Defendant No.1 in her written statement raised preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action, etc. On merits, it was stated that there is no path over the suit land as alleged by the plaintiff and the plaintiff be put to strict proof to establish the contents of the same. 8. In paragraph-3 of the written statement, defendant No.1 raised objections in the following manner: “That the contents of para 3 of totally wrong and hence denied. It is denied that the defendant No.1 has no rights, title or interest over path and is threatening to raise the construction over the path and also started digging work on the spot. It is stated that the replying defendant had -4- purchased the land comprised in Khasra No.306/14 measuring 6 biswas situated in village Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan H.P. from Shri Krishan Kumar son of Nek Ram through a sale deed dated 18.3.1998 and immediately thereafter she has constructed her house at the sot in this land and now no digging or other work is being carried out by her at the post and hence the question of making any request by the plaintiff as alleged does not arise at all. No threats as alleged were ever advanced by replying defendant to the plaintiff at any point of time and there was any occasion to do so. Rather it is the defendant No.2 who is raising the construction at the spot and is stated to have encroached upon the path but in connivance with the plaintiff false allegations of digging and construction etc. are being levelled against the replying defendant. The replying defendant has no intention to encroach upon the path nor she has ever advanced any threats to do so nor she is indulging in any wrong and illegal acts. As stated above no construction activities etc. are being carried out by the replying defendant at the spot.” 9. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 filed separate written statements and also prayed for the dismissal of the suit as filed by the plaintiff. Preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action, being barred by equity, valuation, etc., were raised by them. 10. The learned trial Court framed the issues in the matter and as per the learned counsel for the parties, the evidence of the plaintiff commenced on 19.06.2014. Thereafter, both parties concluded their evidence and the matter was fixed for final hearing. At the stage of final arguments, the plaintiff-petitioner filed an application under -5- Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of the plaint on 25.10.2025. 11. It has been averred in the application that at the time of drafting the plaint, the plaintiff, due to a typographical mistake, has written the khasra number of the land of the defendant as Khasra No. 303/14 instead of 306/14 and this fact came to the knowledge of the counsel at the time of preparing the arguments. Therefore, it was prayed that the plaintiff be permitted to carry out the necessary amendment by incorporating and substituting Khasra No. 306/14 in place of Khasra No. 303/14 in paragraph-1 of the plaint. 12. Though in the application a prayer was also made that during the pendency of the suit, the defendants had encroached upon the suit land and that in order to incorporate the pleadings, the plaintiff intended to place on record the photographs. However, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he does not press the second prayer as made in the application and shall confine his submissions only with respect to the substitution of the khasra number from 303/14 to 306/14. 13. It was stated in the application that since the khasra number had been wrongly mentioned and it was only a clerical mistake, therefore, by allowing the application, the plaintiff may be permitted to carry out the necessary corrections. -6- 14. The non-applicants/respondents opposed the said application by filing a comprehensive reply. All the averments and contentions as raised in the application were denied and the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the application as filed by the plaintiff. It has been stated in the reply that the application is not maintainable as the same has been filed at a belated stage. Further, it has been stated in the reply that in case the amendment is allowed, the same shall alter the foundation of the pleadings and would effectively convert the present suit into one of a different, inconsistent character, which is impermissible under law. Further, it has been contended in the reply that the applicant has not approached the court with clean hands. 15. The learned trial court, vide its impugned order dated 06.12.2025, dismissed the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner for the amendment of the plaint. 16. Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff has approached this Court by invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the said order. 17. It is contended by Mr. N.K. Bhalla, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned order as passed by the learned trial court is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the amendment sought by the plaintiff is for a typographical error, which ought to have been allowed by the learned trial court. He further -7- submits that no prejudice would be caused to the opposite side in case the present application is allowed. He further submits that if the application is allowed, it will help the learned trial court to determine the point in controversy effectively and properly. 18. On the other hand, Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel, duly assisted by Ms. Upasana Thakur, learned counsel for the respondents, has defended the impugned order as passed by the learned court below. He submits that the present application has been filed just to prolong the litigation, as the suit was filed by the plaintiff way back in the year 2005. He further submits that the plaintiff has failed to make out a case for invoking the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of the plaint. 19. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the case file carefully. 20. In the present case, the petitioner-plaintiff instituted the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants, Ms. Nisha Verma and Shri Rajesh Pal, alleging that a path leads to the land of the plaintiff and that the same has been mentioned in the sale deed, which stood duly sanctioned by the TCP Department. 21. It is the case of the plaintiff that a path exists between Khasra No. 303/14 and Khasra No.305/14, and that the defendants be restrained from interfering or raising any construction on the said path. -8- In the alternative, a decree for possession by way of demolition of the illegal construction, if found by the court, has been sought by the plaintiff. 22. On the other hand, defendant No. 1, in paragraph 3 of the written statement, has categorically stated that she had purchased the land comprised in Khasra No. 306/14, measuring 6 biswas, situated in Village Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan, HP. 23. The fact remains that the plaintiff-petitioner approached the learned trial court way back in November 2005, which is more than 20 years ago by instituting the present suit. The learned trial court, after completing the pleadings of the parties, framed the issues in the matter, and thereafter both parties led their evidence. 24. When the matter was fixed for final arguments after elapse of more than 20 years, an application came to be filed by the present plaintiff-petitioner for amendment of the plaint. In the application, the only ground stated is that on account of a typographical error, he intended to replace Khasra No.303/14 with Khasra No. 306/14. 25. The body of the entire application does not disclose or substantiate what was the due diligence, on account of which the plaintiff was prevented from filing the present application earlier. 26. The provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC read as follows: -9- “17. Amendment of pleadings: - The Court may at any stage at the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and no such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. "Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial." 27. As per the aforesaid provisions, the court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend their pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. However, it has been provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. 28. In the present case, admittedly, the trial has commenced in 2014. The basic parameter laid down under the provision of Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC is that the party has to establish that despite due -10- diligence the party could not raise the said plea prior to the commencement of the trial. 29. In the application, there is no averment with respect to the fact that prior to the commencement of trial, the plaintiff was prevented on account of due diligence from raising such a plea. 30. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the respondents that in paragraph 3 of the written statement filed by defendant No. 1, it was categorically stated that she purchased the land comprised in Khasra No. 306/14, measuring 6 biswas, situated in Village Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan, HP. He further submits that since a specific stand was taken by the defendant in the written statement, therefore now, after more than 20 years, it does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiff to contend that on account of a typographical error, this fact was not within the knowledge of the applicant. 31. The learned counsel for the parties further admit that in 2016, Local Commissioner was appointed by the court to demarcate the suit land and in the said report also the khasra numbers of the suit land were depicted. Similarly, in the demarcation report, which has been carried out in 2024, the commissioner has specified the khasra numbers qua which the parties are agitating. Though the demarcation report was prepared by the commissioner on 07.12.2024, but the instant application was filed after elapse of more than 10 months, i.e., on 25.10.2025 . -11- 32. The plaintiff-petitioner has failed to prove and establish that despite due diligence, before the commencement of the trial, he was prevented from taking the plea which is now intended to be raised in the present application. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, in case the application is allowed, it will amount to a de novo trial and the decision of the trial will take another 20 years. 33. From a perusal of the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17, it is evident that ordinarily, an amendment in pleadings is not to be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court is satisfied that the party concerned could not apply even after the exercise of due diligence. In other words, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to have specifically pleaded that in spite of due diligence, he could not raise the matter now sought to be raised. 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court has interpreted the proviso to be a mandatory requirement to prevent frivolous applications for amendment intended only to delay the trial. 35. In Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353, it was held as under:- “27. Order VI Rule 17 of the Code deals with amendment of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999, this provision was deleted. It has again been restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 but with an added proviso to prevent application for amendment being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The proviso, to some extent, -12- curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Now, if application is filed after commencement of trial, it has to be shown that in spite of due diligence, such amendment could not have been sought earlier. The object is to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to delay the trial. There is no illegality in the provision.” 36. What is 'due diligence' has not been defined in the Code, but it has been explained by the Apex Court in Chander Kanta Bansal vs. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117, in the following terms: “16. The words "due diligence" have not been defined in the Code. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edn.2006), the word "diligence" means careful and persistent application or effort. "Diligent" means careful and steady in application to one's work and duties, showing care and effort. As per Black's Law Dictionary (18th Edn.), "diligence" means a continual effort to accomplish something, care; caution; the attention and care required from a person in a given situation. "Due diligence" means the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. According to Words and Phrases by Drain- Dyspnea (Permanent Edn.13-A) "due diligence", in law, means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. "Due diligence" means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs.” 37. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in M. Revanna vs. Anjanamma, (2019) 4 SCC 332, held that the burden lies upon the person, who seeks an amendment after the commencement of the trial -13- to show that he could not have sought the amendment before the commencement of trial, and it was observed as follows: “7. .. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC virtually prevents an application for amendment of pleadings from being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. The proviso, to an extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Therefore, the burden is on the person who seeks an amendment after the commencement of the trial to show that in spite of due diligence, such an amendment could not have been sought earlier. There cannot be any dispute that an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and under all circumstances. Though normally amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court needs to take into consideration whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide and whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money.” 38. The said position was reiterated in Vijay Hathising Shah vs. Gita Devi, (2019) 5 SCC 360, wherein it was observed as follows: “9. In our view, the trial court was right in rejecting the application. This we say for more than one reason. First, it was wholly belated; second, Respondent 1-plaintiff filed the application for amendment of the plaint when the trial in the suit was almost over and the case was fixed for final arguments; and third, the suit could still be decided even without there being any necessity to seek any amendment in the plaint. In our view, an amendment in the plaint was not really required for the determination of the issues in the suit.” -14- 39. In view of the exposition of law and the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC, the petitioner-plaintiff has failed to make out a case for the amendment of the plaint. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that after elapse of 20 years, no relief can be granted to the petitioner, and in case the application is allowed, the parties shall be relegated to the same stage at which the suit was initially filed by the plaintiff, which shall cause huge and irreparable loss to the parties. 40. This Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has passed a well-reasoned order, and it does not suffer from any illegality, irregularity, or jurisdictional error. 41. The power under Article 227 is limited to see that the Courts below function within the limits of their authority or jurisdiction. The High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court or Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, over the last 50 years, it has consistently been observed that the limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with findings of fact or by setting aside the judgments of the courts below on merits. 42. Hon’ ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2226 of 2010, titled State of Haryana & others vs. Manoj Kumar, decided on 09.03.2010 has held as follow:- -15- “23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or jurisdiction. 24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895. The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. 25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566. The court observed as under:- "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision." 26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing -16- Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576. The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it. 28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits. 29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit.” 43. To the similar extent, the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3072 of 2022, titled as Ibrat Faizan vs. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited, decided on 13.05.2022 has held as follows: - “14. In view of the above, in the present case, the High Court has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against -17- the order passed by the National Commission which has been passed in an appeal under Section 58 (1) (a) (iii) of the 2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes without saying that while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be exercised. 14.1 The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC Online SC 29). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigor of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.” 44. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of any merit, deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. -18- 45. Before parting, it is made clear that any observation made here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main case and the same shall be adjudicated upon uninfluenced by any observation made here- in-above, which are only for the purpose of the instant petition. (Romesh Verma) Judge 24th July, 2026. (vt)