Page No.# 1/16 GAHC010010262026 undefined THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/642/2026 AMIR UDDIN LASKAR S/O- LATE HANIF ALI LASKAR, VILL.- SERISPORE TE, P.O. CHANDPUR WEST, P.S. AND DIST. HAILAKANDI, ASSAM VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA AND 8 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI 2:THE STATE OF ASSAM TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-6. 3:THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA NIRVACHAN BHAWAN NEW DELHI. 4:THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-6. 5:THE STATE COORDINATOR NATIONAL REGISTRAR OF CITIZENS (NRC) ASSAM GUWAHATI. 6:THE FOREIGNERS REGIONAL REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (FRRA) HAILAKANDI ASSAM Page No.# 2/16 7:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER CUM RETURNING OFFICER DIST. HAILAKANDI ASSAM 8:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE HAILAKANDI ASSAM 9:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B) HAILAKANDI DIST. HAILAKANDI ASSA Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A M BARBHUIYA, MS A BEGUM,MS S R MAZARBHUIYA Advocate for the Respondent : DY.S.G.I., SC, ECI,GA, ASSAM,SC, NRC,SC, F.T BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND ORDER Date : 19-02-2026 (K.R. Surana, J) Heard Mr. A.M. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. A. Gayan, learned CGC for respondent no.1; Ms. S. Katakey, learned standing counsel for respondent no.3; Mr. G. Sarma, learned standing counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9; Mr. P. Sarmah, learned Additional Senior Govt. Advocate for respondent no.7; and Mr. R. Dubey, learned standing counsel for the State Election Commissioner, respondent no.4. 2. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Amir Uddin, the petitioner has assailed the impugned ex parte opinion dated 26.02.2016, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal, Hailakandi, in F.T. Case No. 144/2012, arising out of S.P.’s Police Enquiry No. Page No.# 3/16 40/2011, by which he was declared to be a foreigner who had entered into India illegally from Bangladesh after 25.03.1971. The petitioner has also assailed the order dated 12.12.2016, passed by the said learned Tribunal in Misc. Case No. 13/2016, (arising out of F.T. Case No. 144/2012), by which the application under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC, read with Section 151 CPC and a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay was dismissed. 3. As this writ petition has been filed only on 21.01.2026 to assail the opinion dated 26.02.2016 i.e. after there has been an extraordinary delay of 9 years, 10 months, 26 days (or 3617 days) and if delay is calculated from 12.12.2016, it would be 9 years, 1 month, 9 days (or 3327 days), the learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to address the Court on delay and laches before issuing notice. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in order to explain the delay in assailing the impugned opinion had submitted as follows:- a. It has been submitted that after the ex parte opinion, the petitioner had been taken into custody on 18.07.2016, and after taking bail, he was released on 26.08.2016. b. Thereafter, the petitioner had submitted an application for vacating the ex parte opinion, wherein he had taken support of a medical certificate as he was suffering from a serious ailment. However, the learned Tribunal had whimsically and mechanically rejected the said petition. c. It was submitted that on 12.12.2016, when the order was passed in Misc. Case No. 13/2016, he was at Imphal for earning his livelihood. Page No.# 4/16 He was not informed by his learned counsel of the said order dated 12.12.2016 and he also did not advise him to challenge the ex parte opinion or the order dated 12.12.2016. Therefore, the petitioner was not aware of the legal procedure or about his right to assail the same. Therefore, he could not avail his legal remedy on time. d. It has been submitted that recently, the police came to his residence and after examining his documents were satisfied that he was an Indian citizen, did not arrest him and allowed him to come to this Court and get a favourable order. e. It was submitted that the petitioner is an illiterate person and does not know how to read and write. f. It was submitted that during Covid-19 pandemic period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, he could not contact his engaged counsel. g. It has been submitted that as valuable citizenship right of the petitioner may be curtailed, he should be given a chance to contest the proceeding. h. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following cases, viz., (i) Babasaheb Raosaheb Kobarne & Anr. v. Pyrotek India Private Limited & Ors., decided by order dated 09.05.2022, passed by the Supreme Court of India in a Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 2522/2022, for granting the petitioner the benefit of exemption of limitation during Covid-19 period; and (ii) K. Thimappa & Ors. v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India & Anr., (2001) 2 SCC 259 (para 8 and 9), on the point that the High Court should not throw away the writ petition on the ground of Page No.# 5/16 delay and laches. 5. Per contra, the learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC had submitted that the explanation given is vague, and not supported by any documents and even the application for setting aside the ex parte opinion and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have not been annexed. It is also submitted that even the copy of the order dated 12.12.2016 is incomplete. It is also submitted that as the cause of action to approach this Court did not arise within the Covid-19 pandemic period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, the petitioner cannot get any benefit for such period of time. 6. The learned counsel for the other appearing respondents have adopted the submissions made by the learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC. 7. As the application for setting aside the ex parte opinion and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1962 have not been annexed to the writ petition, the Court had given an opportunity to the learned counsel for the petitioner to produce the same, if available with him. Only thereafter, the learned counsel for the petitioner had produced the same. On a perusal of the same, it is seen that in those two petitions, the petitioner has not made any statement to the effect that “he was taken into custody on 18.07.2016, and after taking bail, he was released on 26.08.2016”, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner and thus, a totally false and incorrect submission regarding arrest has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which is strongly deprecated. Moreover, no medical document is found to have been annexed by the petitioner with the said two petitions. Page No.# 6/16 8. As per the contents of the impugned ex parte opinion dated 26.02.2016, the petitioner had appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed his written statement on 04.06.2013 and he had filed his evidence-on-affidavit on 17.06.2013 and the next date was fixed for his cross-examination. It is noted that the petitioner had remained absent for about 2 years, 7 months, 29 days (i.e. 973 days), but his learned counsel went on taking adjournments and thus, by order dated 02.02.2016, the petition for adjournment was allowed for a last time, fixing 15.02.2016, but the petitioner remained absent on 15.02.2016, and then the ex parte opinion was passed on 26.02.2016. 9. In this writ petition, except for an absolute vague statement that the petitioner was in Imphal, no other good, cogent and acceptable reason has been assigned by the petitioner for his negligence in not appearing for cross-examination for 2 years, 7 months, 29 days (i.e. 973 days) from 17.06.2013 (date of filing of written statement) till 15.02.2016 (last date fixed for the petitioner to face cross-examination). 10. Thus, in this case, relevant documents like (i) daily orders passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal in F.T. Case No. 144/2012; (ii) petition for condonation of delay; (iii) petition for setting aside ex parte opinion; (iv) medical documents, if any; (v) complete copy of order dated 12.12.2016, passed by the learned Tribunal in Misc. Case No. 13/2016, have been withheld for reasons best known to the petitioner. Though when specifically put questions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has produced a copy of the petition for condonation of delay and petition for setting aside ex parte opinion, but no reason has been disclosed in this writ petition as to why those were not annexed. 11. In this case, the delay and laches of the petitioner is in three Page No.# 7/16 phase:- a. During the proceeding of F.T. Case No. 144/2012 from 17.06.2013 (date of filing of written statement) till 15.02.2016 (last date fixed for the petitioner to face cross-examination) i.e. 2 years, 7 months, 29 days (i.e. 973 days). b. From 26.02.2016, the date of opinion till 16.09.2016, date of filing application for setting aside ex parte opinion. Be it stated that under Order 3-C(1) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, the limitation for filing application for setting aside ex parte application is 30 days. Thus, delay is 234 days. c. Delay of 9 years, 10 months, 26 days (or 3617 days) and if delay is calculated from 12.12.2016, i.e. date of opinion. Delay would be 9 years, 1 month, 9 days (or 3327 days), if delay is calculated from 12.12.2016, date of passing of order in Misc. Case No. 13/2016. 12. The two cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not found to help the petitioner in any manner, as stated hereinafter:- a. In the case of Babasaheb Raosaheb Kobarne & Anr. (supra), the learned trial court had not accepted the written statement as 120 days for filing the written statement had lapsed. The writ petition filed to assail the said decision was unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court. The Supreme Court of India held that 120 days period had lapsed on 09.05.2020, which was during the Covid period. Accordingly, it was held that the High Court had refused to condone the delay. Therefore, referring to the decision rendered in the order dated 10.01.2022, passed in Miscellaneous Application No. 21/2022, and Page No.# 8/16 order dated 04.01.2022, passed in SLP(C) No. 17298/2021, the appeal was allowed. Therefore, the facts of this instant case are nowhere close to the facts of the case of Babasaheb Raosaheb Kobarne & Anr. (supra). b. The case of K. Thimappa & Ors.(supra), equally does not help the petitioner in any manner. The relevant paragraphs 8 and 9, on which reliance has been placed, are quoted below:- (8) Mr. Rao, the learned senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, on the other hand, vehemently urged that if the treatment meted out to the petitioners is found to be discriminatory and as such violates Article 14 of the Constitution, then the Court will not throw away the petitions merely on the ground of laches. In support of the contention, reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case, of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., [1974 (2) SCR 216]. In the said case, this Court had observed: "Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the Fundamental Right or equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the Fundamental Rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like." Mr. Rao also relied upon the observation of this Court in the case of B. Prabhakar Rao and Ors.etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. Etc.Etc. [1985 (Supp.)2 SCR 573], wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J, speaking for the Court observed thus: "........the burden of establishing the reasonableness of a classification and its nexus with the object of the legislation is on the State. Though no calamitous consequences were mentioned in any of the counter- Page No.# 9/16 affidavits, one of the submissions strenuously urged before us by the learned Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh and the several other Counsel who followed him was the oft-repeated and now familiar argument of administrative chaos. It was said that there would be considerable chaos in the administration if those who had already retired are now directed to be re-inducted into service." A passage from the judgment of Lord Denning in Bradbury and Ors. v. London Borough of Enfield, 1967(3) All England Law Reports Page 434, was also pressed into service by Mr. P.P.Rao, which it is worthwhile to quote hereunder: "It has been suggested by the Chief Education Officer that, if an injunction is granted, chaos will supervene. All the arrangements have been made for the next term, the teachers appointed to the new comprehensive schools, the pupils allotted their places, and so forth. It would be next to impossible, he says, to reverse all these arrangements without complete chaos and damage to teachers, pupils and the public. I must say this: if a local authority does not fulfil the requirements of the law, this Court will see that it does fulfil them. It will not listen readily to suggestions of "chaos". The department of education and the council are subject to the rule of law and must comply with it, just like everyone else. Even if chaos should result, still the law must be obeyed; but I do not think that chaos will result. The evidence convinces me that the "chaos" is much overstated." (9) On consideration of the aforesaid legal position, though, we are inclined to agree with Mr. P.P.Rao that these cases should not be thrown out on the ground of laches alone, inasmuch as the placement made on 1.10.1979 was assailed in the year 1988 at the earliest and 1998 at the latest, yet the same may not be brushed aside, particularly, when we have not been able to find out any infraction of any Fundamental Right of these petitioners, guaranteed under the Constitution.” 13. Ultimately, though the Supreme Court of India had observed that the Page No.# 10/16 said cases should not be thrown out on the ground of delay and laches, yet having noticed that the placement made on 01.01.1979 was assailed in 1988 at the earliest and 1998 at the latest, and particularly when no fundamental rights were violated, the appeals before the Supreme Court of India were dismissed. In this case in hand, there is no infringement of any fundamental rights of the petitioner. 14. The petitioner had full knowledge that he was accused of being a foreigner who had illegally entered into India (Assam) from specified territory and thus, was not an Indian. Yet, he had not (i) appeared for cross- examination; (ii) did not file the application for setting aside ex parte opinion within the period prescribed under Order 3-C(1) of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order 1964; (iii) did not assail the orders dated 26.02.2016, and (iv) order dated 12.12.2016 within a reasonable time. 15. The Supreme Court of India, in paragraph 46 of the case of Urban Improvement Trust (supra), has reiterated the law that undue delay in approaching the Court can be a ground for refusing relief and it has been expressed that that only in exceptional cases, delay can be condoned. The said paragraph 46 is quoted below:- “46. As regards the appellant’s challenge to the inordinate delay of 21 years in filing of the writ petitions by the respondents, we are of the view that the same needs to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that the courts have consistently held that undue delay in approaching the court can be a ground for refusing relief, the courts have also recognized that in exceptional cases, where the impugned action is patently illegal or affects fundamental rights, the delay must be condoned.” 16. In respect of the legal proposition that delay and laches are fatal to belated challenge to the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunals, it may be relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Jonali Das v. Union of India, 2018 (5) GLT 492: (2018) 0 Supreme (Gau) 1186. Paragraph 9 thereof is as follows:- Page No.# 11/16 “9. In Azmat Ali @ Amzad Ali Vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No.4971/2018, disposed of on 01.08.2018], this Court had observed as follows:- "It is more than three decades that the issue of influx of foreign nationals has been in public domain in the State of Assam and has engaged the attention of the people. Interest of the State is of paramount importance in that unabated influx has the potential to affect the integrity and sovereignty of the country. Citizenship of a person, no doubt, is a very valuable right and should be zealously guarded. There is no gainsaying the fact that a person who is alleged to be a foreigner must be given due and reasonable opportunity to establish that he is a citizen of India. However, if a person does not take steps for safeguarding his interest, he does so at his own risk and peril as grant of opportunity cannot be an endless exercise. Right to a fair hearing or principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to lead to a farcical situation and to be an engine for defeating the very object of identification and deportation of foreigners." 17. The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104: 2025 Supreme(SC) 1679, while dealing with the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has laid down certain guidelines. Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to a writ petition, but in the considered opinion of the Court, when a writ petition is filed to assail the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunals, under certiorari jurisdiction, the same principles should apply, requiring the petitioner to provide at least some cogent and acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay in assailing the opinion. 18. Moreover, this Court, in the case of Ajbahar Ali v. Union of India, (2025) 0 Supreme (Gau) 763, had held to the effect that the plea of compliance with the principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to lead to a farcical situation and to be an engine for defeating the very object of identification and deportation of foreigners. A similar opinion has also been expressed by this Court in the case of Abu Bokkor Siddique v. Union of India, 2019 (1) GLT 813. Page No.# 12/16 19. It must be taken note of the fact that the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665, in paragraph 73, has held to the effect that the procedure under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 is just, fair and reasonable and does not offend any constitutional provision. In paragraph 63, the Supreme Court of India had observed that there can be no manner of doubt that the State of Assam is facing external aggression and internal disturbance on account of large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals and that it, therefore, becomes the duty of the Union of India to take all measures for protection of the State of Assam from such external aggression and internal disturbance as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 70, it was observed that the influx of Bangladeshi nationals who have illegally migrated into Assam pose a threat to the integrity and security of the North Eastern region and that their presence has changed the demographic character of that region and the local people of Assam have been reduced to a status of minority in certain districts. 20. In this case, though the stand of the petitioner that he was taken into custody and then released on bail in 2016 is not found substantiated by any document, but assuming that the same is correct, then the petitioner is aware that he was arrested on account of being a foreigner from specified territory. Yet, the present writ petition has been leisurely filed on 21.01.2026 to assail the ex parte opinion dated 26.02.2016. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not show as to which fundamental right of the petitioner would be violated. Rather, it is the interest of the Country that would suffer if persons who are declared illegal migrants are allowed to defeat the process of expulsion of detected illegal foreigners/migrants, by allowing such illegal migrants an Page No.# 13/16 endless time to assail the opinion passed by the learned Tribunals. 21. By showering sympathy in this particular case, this Court would be encouraging unscrupulous practice of withholding accurate facts and documents from Courts, as already referred to hereinbefore. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned Foreigners Tribunal is found to be taking steps for the petitioner on all dates though the petitioner was in default in appearing. Therefore, it is unbelievable that the said counsel would withheld the passing of the opinion dated 26.02.2016. The petitioner, by withholding applications for setting aside ex parte opinion and application for the condonation of delay, has deliberately prevented the Court from appreciating the statements made therein. Had the petitioner’s learned counsel been in default, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in this writ petition, would have highlighted it by producing those two applications to substantiate such allegations. Therefore, in this case, the petitioner has made a deliberate attempt to distort facts, withheld relevant documents, and presented incomplete order dated 12.12.2016. 23. Thus, the petitioner and his learned counsel in this writ petition, have both equally contributed to prevent this Court as well as the learned CGC, Govt. and Departmental counsel from perusing all the relevant materials. As stated hereinbefore, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding arrest of the petitioner on 18.07.2016 and release on bail on 26.08.2016 were not found supported by any documents. Thus, in this case, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not shown his fairness towards (i) the Court; (ii) towards the respondents; and (iii) towards the learned counsel, who was hitherto representing the petitioner before the learned Foreigners Tribunal, which the Court strongly deprecates. Page No.# 14/16 24. The Court is of the considered opinion that if such belated petitions are entertained after nearly 10 (ten) years, there would be no meaning attached to the Limitation Act, 1963 as if it has become otiose. If such an order is passed, it would become a law that by a mere unsubstantiated statement that one is poor, the delay in approaching the Court would have to be condoned. In other words, delay, irrespective of the number of days, would have to be condoned at the drop of a hat. It would also render the provisions of Order 3(8) and Order 3(14) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 otiose. 25. Before parting with the records, it would be appropriate to mention that as the petitioner has not come with clean hands, no case is made out for appreciating any documents annexed to the writ petition, as this Court is exercising certiorari jurisdiction and thus, cannot act as a Court of original jurisdiction so as to convert itself into a Foreigners Tribunals. This Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction. The petitioner has failed to show that the impugned opinion is vitiated by any error apparent on the face of the records. The Court is of the considered opinion that in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court ought not to substitute its view over the opinion of the learned Foreigners Tribunal, which is not found to be vitiated by any error whatsoever. If one needs any authority on the point, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, 2023 INSC 733: (2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 763, may be referred to. Paragraph 77 thereof is quoted below:- “77. The purpose of certiorari, as we understand, is only to confine the inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction, so as to avoid the irregular exercise, or the non- exercise or the illegal assumption of it and not to correct errors of finding of fact or interpretation of law committed by them in the exercise of powers vested in them under the statute. The accepted rule is that where a Court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which crops up in the case and whether its decision is correct or otherwise, it is bound to stand until reversed by a competent Court. This Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore Page No.# 15/16 District and Others, (1952) 1 SCC 334 observed: 26. Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.” 26. Thus, the challenge to:- a. the impugned ex parte opinion dated 26.02.2016, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal, Hailakandi, in F.T. Case No. 144/2012, arising out of S.P.’s Police Enquiry No. 40/2011, by which the petitioner, namely, Amir Uddin Laskar, was declared to be a foreigner who had entered into India illegally from Bangladesh after 25.03.1971; and b. the order dated 12.12.2016, passed by the said learned Tribunal in Misc. Case No. 13/2016, (arising out of F.T. Case No. 144/2012), by which the application under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC, read with Section 151 CPC and a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay were dismissed – fail and this writ petition is hereby dismissed at the motion stage without issuance of notice on the respondents. 27. There shall be no order as to cost. 28. The learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC shall communicate a downloaded copy of this order to the Home and Page No.# 16/16 Political (B) Department, so as to send a copy of this order to be made a part of the record of the learned Foreigners Tribunal for future reference. JUDGE JUDGE. Comparing Assistant