2026:HHC:30602 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 666 of 2025 Reserved on: 17.7.2026 Date of Decision: 24.7.2026 Amit Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Mohar Singh, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the order dated 16.09.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which an application filed by the petitioner (accused before the learned Trial Court) under Section 358 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) corresponding to Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) was dismissed. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:30602 in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police filed a charge sheet against the petitioner/accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 108 and 85 of Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act). It was asserted that the petitioner/accused had married the victim (since deceased). He used to harass her, suspect her character, and beat her. She narrated these facts to her father (the informant). She committed suicide on 27.01.2025. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR. The police found that the victim was born on 05.08.2002. The petitioner had married her on 07.10.2019. She had given birth to a child on 03.08.2020. She was a minor on the date of her marriage and birth of the child. Hence, a charge sheet was filed before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under 3 2026:HHC:30602 Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, Sections 85 and 108 of the BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 4. The prosecution examined Dr. Ajay Kumar Negi (PW1), Bhim Singh (PW2), Kamlesh (PW3), Prakash Chand (PW4), Madan Lal (PW5), Constable Ajay Mehta (PW6), Inder Kumar (PW7), Narinder Singh (PW8), Lady Constable Ashima (PW9), Constable Gurudev (PW10), Constable Asha (PW11), Ram Krishan (PW12) and constable Rajneesh Kishore (PW13). 5. The accused filed an application under Section 358 of the BNS asserting that Prakash Chand (PW4) deposed that the marriage between the victim and the accused was an arranged marriage, which was solemnised by the parents, uncle, sister and maternal uncle of the victim. Many people had participated in the ceremonies. The statement of the witness Prakash Chand and the photographs showed that the parents and maternal uncle of the victim had intentionally encouraged and aided the commission of the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act. They suppressed the victim’s minority from the accused, his parents and relatives. The entry of marriage was recorded at the instance 4 2026:HHC:30602 of Gokal Ram. Hence, it was prayed that the persons mentioned in the application be arrayed as the accused. 6. The application was opposed by the State by asserting that no fruitful purpose would be served by summoning the additional accused. It was a matter of investigation for which a separate charge sheet would be filed. Hence, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed. 7. Learned Trial Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 358 of BNS was extraordinary and could only be exercised when the material on record established that the person sought to be summoned had committed an offence. The police had recorded the statements of the witnesses, in which it was asserted that the marriage was solemnised by the victim and the petitioner against the wishes of their parents. The statement of Prakash Chand (PW4) was not sufficient to summon the family members of the child victim. The photographs were yet to be proved. The persons sought to be summoned as accused were the material witnesses, and the application was filed to prevent them from deposing in the Court. The Court could not infer without their examination that they were instrumental in the 5 2026:HHC:30602 solemnisation of the marriage between the victim and the accused. Hence, the application was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition asserting that the statement of Prakash Chand and the photograph show that the parents and maternal uncle had encouraged and aided the commission of offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Restraint Act. They suppressed the victim’s minority from the accused and his parents. There was sufficient material to summon the victim’s relatives as additional accused, and the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the application. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Mohar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No.1/State. 10. Mr Mohar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the material on record shows that the victim's relatives had participated in the marriage. They had actively abetted the commission of the crime. There was 6 2026:HHC:30602 sufficient material on record to summon them as additional accused and the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the application. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State submitted that the petitioner and the victim had solemnised the marriage contrary to the wishes of their parents as per the investigation conducted by the police. The statement of Prakash Chand was not sufficient to conclude that the victim’s relatives had participated in the marriage. The statements of other witnesses are yet to be recorded, and the persons sought to be summoned are the material witnesses of the prosecution. The application has been filed to prevent them from deposing against the petitioner. The learned Trial Court had not dismissed the application, but held that the material on record was insufficient to summon the accused at this stage. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:30602 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Neeraj Kumar v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639 that the Court can summon a person as an additional accused if the person appears to have committed the offence. This jurisdiction is extraordinary to be exercised sparingly with due circumspection. The satisfaction required to summon a person as an additional accused is higher than a prima facie case. It was observed: - 6. The law governing the summoning of an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC is now well settled. The provision is an enabling one, empowering the Court, during the course of an inquiry or trial, to proceed against any person not already arraigned as an accused, if, from the evidence adduced before it, such person appears to have committed an offence. Its object is to ensure that no guilty person escapes the process of law, thereby giving effect to the maxim judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted). It casts a duty upon the Court to ensure that the real offender does not go unpunished, for only then can the concept of fair and complete trial be realised. 7. It is no longer res integra that the power conferred under this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection. While invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The degree 8 2026:HHC:30602 of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based on conjectures or speculations. In this regard, reference to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court would be apposite. 7.1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 927 extensively discussed the power conferred under Section 319 CrPC. Relevant part is extracted hereunder: “90. … all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial may also have been involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to to take cognisance of the offence. Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words “such person could be tried” instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in- chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a 9 2026:HHC:30602 person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly in itself, is evidence. xxx 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross- examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if it goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. … xxx 110. In Lal Suraj [Lal Suraj v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 2 SCC 696 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 844], a two-Judge Bench held that there is no dispute with the legal proposition that even if a person had not been chargesheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in Section 319 CrPC. A similar view had been taken in Lok Ram [Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh, (2006) 10 SCC 192 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 532: AIR 2006 SC 1892], wherein it was held that a person, though initially named in the FIR as an accused but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. xxx 117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been chargesheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial…” (emphasis supplied) 10 2026:HHC:30602 7.2. In S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak (2017) 16 SCC 226, it reiterated that under this Section the Court possesses the power to summon the persons not named in the chargesheet to face trial, if the evidence on record so warrants. It further clarified that a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC, though not an independent piece of evidence, sufficient in itself to invoke the power under this Section, may, nevertheless, be relied upon for corroborative purposes when supported by evidence emerging during trial. It was observed as under: “34. … No doubt, at one place the Constitution Bench observed in Hardeep Singh case [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] that the word “evidence” has to be understood in its wider sense, both at the stage of trial and even at the stage of inquiry. In para 105 of the judgment, however, it is observed that “only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner”. This sentence gives an impression that only that evidence which has been led before the Court is to be seen and not the evidence which was collected at the stage of inquiry. However, there is no contradiction between the two observations as the Court also clarified that the “evidence”, based on which an accused is to be summoned to face the trial in an ongoing case, has to be the material that is brought before the Court during trial. The material/evidence collected by the investigating officer at the stage of inquiry can only be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC. 35. It needs to be highlighted that when a person is named in the FIR by the complainant, but police, after investigation, finds no role of that particular person and files the chargesheet without implicating him, the Court is not powerless, and at the stage of summoning, if the trial court finds that a particular person should be summoned as accused, even though not named in the chargesheet, it can 11 2026:HHC:30602 do so. At that stage, a chance is given to the complainant also to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in the FIR but not implicated in the chargesheet. Once that stage has gone, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC. However, this section gets triggered when during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.” (emphasis supplied) 7.3. In Omi v. State of M.P. (2025) 2 SCC 621, a coordinate bench of this Court laid the following principles of law with regard to Section 319 CrPC: “19. The principles of law as regards Section 319 CrPC may be summarised as under: 19.1. On a careful reading of Section 319 CrPC as well as the aforesaid two decisions, it becomes clear that the trial court has undoubted jurisdiction to add any person not being the accused before it to face the trial along with other accused persons, if the Court is satisfied at any stage of the proceedings on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial. It is further evident that such a person, even though he had initially been named in the FIR as an accused but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. 19.2. The trial court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the chargesheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the chargesheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence. 19.3. The power of the court under Section 319 CrPC is not controlled or governed by naming or not naming of the person concerned in the FIR. Nor is the same dependent upon submission of the chargesheet by the police 12 2026:HHC:30602 against the person concerned. As regards the contention that the phrase “any person not being the accused” occurred in Section 319 excludes from its operation an accused who has been released by the police under Section 169 of the Code and has been shown in Column 2 of the chargesheet, the contention has merely to be stated to be rejected. The said expression clearly covers any person who is not being tried already by the Court, and the very purpose of enacting such a provision like Section 319(1) clearly shows that even persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the criminal court are included in the said expression. 19.4. It would not be proper for the trial court to reject the application for addition of new accused by considering records of the investigating officer. When the evidence of the complainant is found to be worthy of acceptance, then the satisfaction of the investigating officer hardly matters. If satisfaction of the investigating officer is to be treated as determinative, then the purpose of Section 319 would be frustrated.” (emphasis supplied) 7.4. Recently, this Court, through one of us (Sanjay Karol, J.), in Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1457 summarised the principles that the Court ought to keep in mind while considering an application under this Section. It was observed: “15. The principles that the Trial Court ought to follow while exercising power under this Section are: (a) This provision is a facet of that area of law which gives protection to victims and society at large, ensuring that the perpetrators of crime should not escape the force of law; 13 2026:HHC:30602 (b) It is the duty cast upon the Court not to let the guilty get away unpunished; (c) The Trial Court has broad but not unbridled power as this power can be exercised only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not any other material collected during investigation; (d) The Trial Court is not powerless to summon a person who is not named in the FIR or Chargesheet; they can be impleaded if the evidence adduced inculpates him; (e) This power is not to be exercised in a regular or cavalier manner, but only when strong or cogent evidence is available rather than the mere probability of complicity; (f) The degree of satisfaction required is much stricter than the prima facie case, which is needed at the time of framing of charge(s); (g) The Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage as the expression used is ‘such person could be tried’ and not ‘should be tried’. (emphasis supplied) 8. Keeping in view the principles delineated above, let us now examine whether the Courts below have applied the correct standard while declining the prosecution's prayer to summon the respondents as additional accused. As is evident from the record, the prosecution has relied primarily on three facets of evidence: (i) the testimony of PW-1, the informant and brother of the deceased; (ii) the testimony of PW-2, the minor daughter of the deceased, along with her statement recorded during investigation; and (iii) the statements of the deceased herself recorded under Section 161 CrPC. We may consider each in turn. 14. The terms ‘prima facie case’ and ‘higher than prima facie case’ were explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 14 2026:HHC:30602 Mohd. Kaleem v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 397, wherein it was observed:- 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case record. The central question is the propriety of the exercise of power by the Trial Court under Section 319 Cr.PC and the justifiability of the imprimatur granted thereto by the Court below. Before proceeding to the merits of the matter, it is important to understand the scales on which the question of propriety will be adjudged. Courts generally assess evidence at three distinct levels, depending on the stage of proceedings and the nature of the relief prayed for. The lowest threshold, or prima facie standard, requires only a connection to proceed with formal charges. The middle threshold, which is often described as strong and cogent, applies when Courts consider summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC; the evidence must be reliable and reasonably persuasive, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. The highest threshold demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, the standard necessary for conviction, where the Court must be fully satisfied of the guilt of the accused. It is best illustrated through a hypothetical situation- At night, a high-end jewellery store is robbed. Police investigation seizes CCTV footage showing a masked person fleeing on a motorcycle, statements from two eyewitnesses, and phone records linking certain suspects to the vicinity of the store at the time of the incident. At the first stage, the investigating officer submits a charge-sheet against Person ‘A’. The Magistrate reviews the evidence, including the CCTV footage, witness statements, and other investigative material. Based on this, the Magistrate finds that there is sufficient ground to believe that ‘A’ may have committed the offence and frames charges. This stage requires evidence indicating involvement beyond mere suspicion, but it does not demand foolproof or trial-level examination thereof. 15 2026:HHC:30602 During the trial of ‘A’, evidence emerges suggesting that Persons ‘B’ and ‘C’ may also have been involved in planning or executing the robbery. A witness reports seeing ‘B’ near the scene discussing the plan with ‘A’, while phone records and CCTV footage show interactions between ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’. The Court would examine whether this evidence is strong and cogent enough to summon ‘B’ and ‘C’ as additional accused under Section 319. Minor contradictions in witness accounts or timing are noted, but they do not automatically negate the overall reliability of the evidence. At this stage, the court is not determining guilt, only assessing whether a reasonable inference of involvement exists. As the trial continues, forensic evidence reveals fingerprints of ‘B’ on the display case and DNA of ‘C’ on a glove left at the scene. Eyewitnesses place ‘B’ and ‘C’ at the time of the robbery, and phone messages show coordination among all three. Cross-examination fails to provide credible alibis. Cumulative assessment of the evidence leaves no reasonable doubt regarding the participation of ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’, and the Court can convict all three. This represents the highest threshold, where minor inconsistencies are immaterial because the totality of the evidence conclusively establishes guilt. 8. The Trial Court's reasoning in rejecting the Section 319 application, prima facie, appears to be largely aligned with the principles laid down by this Court, such as the requirement that evidence must be strong and cogent rather than mere suspicion. Both Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86 and Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639 emphasise that the power under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. The Court must assess whether the evidence on record, if unrebutted, reasonably indicates the involvement of the proposed accused. 15. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 16 2026:HHC:30602 16. The copy of the charge sheet shows that the prosecution witnesses have consistently stated that the marriage between the petitioner and the victim was solemnised contrary to the wishes of their relatives. The petitioner/accused relied upon the statement of Prakash Chand (PW4) who stated in his cross- examination that parents and family members of the deceased were present in the marriage and had performed the ceremonies. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the statement of one witness was not sufficient to summon the victim's relatives as accused, especially when Prakash Chand admitted that he knew the family of the accused, which shows that he has an interest to support the accused. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the learned Trial Court had not rejected the prayer to summon the victim's relatives as accused, but had held that the material on record was insufficient at this stage to summon them as the accused. Therefore, it would be open for the accused to ask the learned Trial Court to summon the victim’s relatives as accused at an appropriate stage. Moreover, the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court appears to be correct that the application was filed to prevent the victim's relatives from 17 2026:HHC:30602 deposing against the accused and the application was not bona fide. 17. The material on record is not sufficient at this stage to satisfy that the victim's relatives had committed the offence. Thus, the dismissal of the application by the learned Trial Court cannot be held to be bad. 18. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 19. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th July, 2026 (Chander)