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2026 DAILYLAW 1741 (BOM)

CEAT Limited v. Aditi Marketing

ARBP/388/2026 · 2026-08-06

Shri Arif S Doctor

body2026

Judgment text

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1/3 15-ARBP-388-2026 (OS).DOC IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 388 OF 2026 Ceat Limited ...Petitioner Versus Aditi Marketing ...Respondent _______ Mr. Zerick Dastur a/w Ms. Archana U. for the Petitioner. _______ CORAM : ARIF S. DOCTOR, J. DATE : 6 th AUGUST, 2026 P.C. 1. The present Petition is filed under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. 2. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has placed reliance upon an Affidavit of Service to establish service upon the Respondent. The Affidavit of Service shall be filed in the Registry. 3. Learned Counsel further submits that the Respondent did not appear at any stage of the arbitral proceedings. He further submits that the arbitral award has since been published. 4. It is submitted that the statutory period of one year expired on 20 th April 2026, whereas the arbitral award came to be published on 8 th June 2026. Learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera in support of the proposition that, even in Areeb MOHAMMAD AREEB MOHD AKBAR Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AREEB MOHD AKBAR Date: 2026.08.10 14:46:56 +0530 2/3 15-ARBP-388-2026 (OS).DOC such circumstances, this Court is empowered to extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal in the interests of justice. 5. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has invited my attention to paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of the aforesaid decision, which read thus: “21. In view of the above analysis, we are of the opinion that provisions of the Act, particularly Section 29A, must not be interpreted to infer a threshold bar for an application under Section 29A(5) for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator even when an award is passed, though after the expiry of the mandate. 22. While interpreting an enactment providing legal remedies for the resolution of disputes, a constitutional court has the obligation to ensure that the provision is: (a) accessible, (b) affordable, (c) expeditious and (d) cohesive. Accessibility requires the remedy to be easily available25. Affordability is an aspect that is related to the cost of availing the remedy, it must be at a reasonable price. Expeditious nature of a remedy is concerned with the quick disposal and abhors unreasonable delays. Yet another facet of effective remedy is in its cohesiveness. 23. In conclusion, we hold that an application under Section 29A(5) for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator is maintainable even after the expiry of the time under Sections 29A(1) and (3) and even after rendering of an award during that time. Such an award is ineffective and unenforceable. But the power of the court to consider extension is not impaired by such an indiscretion of the arbitrator. While considering the application, the Court will examine if there is sufficient cause for extending the mandate, and in the process, it may impose such terms and conditions as the situation demands. The Court will also take into account other factors such as reduction of the fee of the arbitrator under proviso to Section 29A(4) and also impose costs on parties if the fact situation so demands. Substitution is an option for the Court as the provision itself says, "it shall be open for the Court to substitute", and it will be exercised carefully. If the mandate is extended, the arbitral tribunal will pick up the thread from where it was left, and seamlessly continue the proceeding from the stage at which the mandate had expired, and conclude within the time granted.” 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and having noted Areeb 3/3 15-ARBP-388-2026 (OS).DOC that, despite service, the Respondent has remained absent, I am of the view that the Petition deserves to be allowed. The Petition is accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). [ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.] Areeb