Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Civil Revision No.71 of 2026
Date of decision:21.07.2026
Tarsem Chand
...Petitioner
Versus
Naresh Kumari & another
...Respondents.
Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner : Mr. Subhash Mohan Snehi, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. M.A.Safee, Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge (oral):
The instant petition arises out of the judgment as passed by the learned District Judge, Una, dated 30.03.2026, whereby the appeal filed by the present respondents/defendants came to be allowed and the order as passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No. 1, Una, was set aside, whereby the application filed by the plaintiff/petitioner for injunction was partly allowed.
2.
The facts as emerge in the present case are that the plaintiff/petitioner filed a suit for declaration under Sections 34 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act to the effect that the sale deed dated 29.06.2022, purported to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
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of the defendants, is illegal, null and void, void ab initio, and for cancellation of the same. Further, it was prayed that the mutation registered on the basis of the illegal sale deed be set aside and the defendants may be restrained from changing the nature and character or raising any sort of construction, or ousting the plaintiff from joint possession over the suit land.
3.
It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit land is owned and possessed by him and the defendants have forcibly tried to get possession over the share comprised in different Khasra numbers on the basis of a fraudulent registered deed, whereas the plaintiff specifically had mentioned that the defendants had demanded a land share from Khasra Nos. 885, 886, and 889, total land measuring 00.70.06 Kitta 3, which is situated in Mohal Shyampura, Mouza Kungrt, Sub Tehsil Dulehar, District Una, H.P., in which the plaintiff and others are the tenants. The defendants, being headstrong, clever, and cunning persons, in league with the deed writer, had got the registry of the suit land in their favour illegally.
4.
It is the case of the plaintiff that the land mentioned in the plaint is joint Hindu ancestral coparcenary property which is exclusively and jointly owned and possessed by the plaintiff and other co-sharers, and that the defendants, being strangers to the suit land, have got no right, title, or interest in the same.
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5.
Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration that the alleged sale deed, purported to have been executed in favour of the defendants, is illegal, null and void, and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff, with a further prayer that the defendants be injuncted from interfering in the possession of the suit land during the pendency of the suit.
6.
Along with the plaint, the plaintiff filed an application under
Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC praying that the defendants may be restrained from changing the nature and character, raising any sort of construction, ousting the plaintiff from joint possession, further alienating, cutting, and removing trees, or encroaching upon or demolishing the superstructure constructed, if any, in any manner by the defendants behind the back of the petitioner during the pendency of the suit. 7. The said suit came to be resisted by the defendants by raising preliminary objections with respect to limitation, valuation, maintainability, estoppel, etc. On merits, it has been averred by the defendants that the plaintiff himself executed the sale deed dated 29.06.2022 out of his own free will in the presence of his son, Shri Vyas Dev Sharma, who witnessed the execution of the said deed. 8. It has been contended that the plaintiff voluntarily sold his entire share in the suit land and handed over possession on the date
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of execution of the sale deed. The allegations of dispossession and fraud were specifically refuted and denied. 9. It is the case of the defendants that the plaintiff sold the entire share of Khasra No. 919/2 through sale deed dated 29.06.2022 and also sold land measuring 0.06.26 out of Khasra No. 963 through a sale deed dated 25.06.2024 and exchanged his remaining share of land measuring 0.06.26 of Khasra No.963 through exchange deed dated 02.07.2024. 10. The defendants filed a reply to the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and prayed for the dismissal of the same. 11. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No. 1, Una, District Una, vide its order dated 01.11.2025, allowed the application filed by the plaintiff, whereby both parties were directed to maintain status quo with respect to the possession, nature, and character of the suit property/land till the disposal of the main suit. 12. Feeling dissatisfied, the defendants preferred an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge, Una, on 29.10.2025. The learned first appellate court, vide its impugned judgment dated 30.03.2026, accepted the appeal as filed by the defendants, and the application as filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC came to be dismissed. -5-
13. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has approached this Court by invoking the provisions of Section 115 of the CPC. 14.
It is contended by Mr.Subhash Mohan Snehi, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned judgment as passed by the learned first appellate Court is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the learned first appellate Court has erred and has wrongly appreciated the point in controversy by dismissing the application filed by the plaintiff. He further submits that after accepting the present petition, the application which was filed by the plaintiff before the learned trial court deserves to be allowed and an injunction order may be passed in his favour. 15. On the other hand, Mr. M.A. Safee, learned counsel for the respondents, has defended the impugned judgment, submitting that the learned first appellate Court rightly passed the impugned
judgment and that there is no infirmity or perversity in the same. He submits that this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction while entertaining the petition under Section 115 of the CPC. 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the case file carefully. 17. In the present case, the plaintiff, Tarsem Chand, has instituted the suit seeking declaration that the sale deed executed on 29.06.2022 in favour of defendant No.1 is the result of fraud and
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deserves to be quashed, set aside, and cancelled and that the same confers no right, title, or interest over the rights of the plaintiff. 18. It is the case of the plaintiff that though he agreed to sell a few Khasra numbers to the defendants, however, on account of fraud, the defendants executed the sale deed qua the entire suit land, which he never agreed to do. 19. The plaintiff has approached the learned trial court on the premise that, on the basis of the fraudulent sale deed, the defendants are interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendants should be injuncted from interfering in any manner over the same. 20. On the other hand, the defendants have categorically taken a defence that the sale deed was executed by the plaintiff out of his own free will and it is not the result or outcome of fraud as alleged by the plaintiff. 21. It is the case of the defendants that the plaintiff voluntarily sold his entire share in the suit land and handed over possession on the date of execution of the sale deed. It is the case of the defendants that the plaintiff sold the entire share of Khasra No. 919/2 through sale deed dated 29.06.2022 and also sold land measuring 0.06.26 out of Khasra No. 963 through a sale deed dated 25.06.2024 and exchanged his remaining share of land measuring 0.06.26 of Khasra No.963 through exchange deed dated 02.07.2024. -7-
22. The learned counsel for the respondents has drawn the attention of this Court to the copy of the agreement to sell which was entered into between the parties on 12.04.2022. 23. A perusal of the suit land, including the Khasra numbers, when tallied with the sale deed, clearly shows that whatever was agreed upon by the plaintiff to sell has been sold to defendant No.1. 24.
The learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently laid stress on the fact that the agreement to sell was entered into between the parties in the presence of the grandson, namely, Shri Aniket, son of Shri Vijay Kumar. Then he drew the attention of this Court to the copy of the sale deed, which is under challenge in the main suit, which was witnessed by the son of the plaintiff, namely, Shri Vyas Dev Sharma, son of Shri Tarsem Chand. 25. The copy of the agreement and the copy of the sale deed clearly establish that the plaintiff appended his signatures over the agreement to sell and the sale deed with open eyes. The relief of injunction is discretionary. A party to get the said relief must approach the Court with clean hands. In the present case, the plaintiff has suppressed the material facts, which disentitles him to get the relief of injunction. 26. The case does not end here. The learned counsel for the respondents has drawn the attention of this Court to the exchange deed
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which was executed inter se the parties, and the same was duly witnessed by Shri Vyas Dev Sharma, son of plaintiff, on 02.07.2024. 27. The plaintiff, in order to get an order of injunction, has to pass the triplicate test of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. 28. Admittedly, in the present case, the parties entered into an agreement to sell and thereafter, a registered sale deed was executed, and pursuant to that, the exchange also took place inter se the parties. 29. On the strength of the registered sale deed, the defendants have been able to establish a prima facie case in their favour. The balance of convenience also lies in favour of the defendants. In case the defendants are restrained from utilizing the suit land, in that event, they shall suffer a huge and irreparable loss. 30.
The learned first appellate court rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff, being an alienor himself, is estopped from challenging the alienation which he himself made in favour of defendant No. 1. 31. The plaintiff has raised the plea that the suit land is joint Hindu family ancestral coparcenary property; therefore, the suit land could not have been sold to defendant No. 1 in the absence of consent by the other coparceners. 32. In the case of Budhia alias Budhi Ram versus Ramesh Chand and Others, 2008(2) Latest HLJ 1493, the submission of the
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learned counsel for the petitioner has been answered, whereby it was held that the alienor cannot challenge the alienation that was made by himself.
33.
The record reveals that the present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 01.08.2025 and admittedly, the sale deed was executed in favour of defendant No.1 on 29.06.2022.
34.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that, on the face of the record, the suit as instituted by the plaintiff is time-barred. He further submits that in order to get the discretionary relief of an injunction, the plaintiff is required to show that the suit was filed within the period of limitation.
35.
This Court is in agreement with the submission of the
learned counsel for the respondents that the suit was filed after elapse of more than three years from when the sale deed was executed on
29.06.2022. The findings of the learned first appellate Court on this point is legal, valid and sustainable. Prima facie, the suit as instituted by the plaintiff after the lapse of three years from the date of execution of sale deed is barred by limitation. 36. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the suit instituted by the plaintiff is undervalued, as the sale consideration amount by which the sale deed was executed is Rs.13,18,500/- and in the suit, the plaintiff affixed a court fee of Rs.130/-. This Court is in agreement with the contention of the learned
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counsel for the respondent that at least a court fee amounting to Rs.1,31,240/- ought to have been affixed by the plaintiff over the plaint in hand. 37. The first appellate court has thrashed out the entire material placed on record and rightly came to the conclusion that it is not the plaintiff, but rather the defendants who have a prima facie case in their favour. 38. The learned court below decided the case in hand strictly in accordance with the law, and in the considered view of this Court, there is no infirmity or illegality in the same. 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that while invoking the provisions of Section 115 of CPC, High Court will not interfere, and the powers of the High Court are very narrow and limited. 40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807, has considered the provisions of Section 115 of CPC as follows:
“5. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case.
It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional
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District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this Clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this Clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power u/s 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision u/s 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal. 41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5622 of 2025, titled as P. Kumarakurubaran vs, P. Narayanan & others, held as under: -
“14.
It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related
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activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant’s consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.”
42. In Ajit Singh & others vs. Krishan Kumar, decided on 18th October, 2023, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, held as under:
“11. The same view is reiterated in a later decision of this Court in the case of Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway [(1972) 3 SCC 195] wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High Court under Section 115 CPC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court based on facts or even involving any error of law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made.
The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear, that it had jurisdiction to make that
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order. It was not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code."
43. Consequently, in view of observations made hereinabove, the present petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed along with pending application(s), if any.
44. Any observation made hereinabove is meant only for adjudication of the present petition, the same shall not be treated to have been made on the merits of the main suit.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge 21stJuly, 2026 (vt)